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Foreword

The

historic International

the Naval

War

Law

Studies ("Blue Book") series was initiated by

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that

contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the eighty-

volume of the "Blue Book" series, is a compilation of scholarly papers and
remarks derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War
College on June 21-23, 2011 entitled "Non-International Armed Conflict in the
eighth

21st Century."

The purpose of the June 2011

International

Law Conference was

the legal issues surrounding non-international

modern

era.

To

both military and

and academic

renowned

this end,
civilian,

institutions

armed

conflict

international academics

to

examine

(NIAC)

and

in the

legal advisers,

representing military, diplomatic, non-governmental

from the global community, were invited

to the

War

NIAC. Specifically, the panelists undertook an examination of the types of NIACs and the law applicable to
each; the legal statuses of actors in NIAC; means and methods of warfare in
NIAC; recent and ongoing NIACs; detention in NIAC; and enforcement of international law in NIAC. In addition, the Honorable Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser
of the U.S. Department of State, presented a luncheon address at the Naval Station Newport Officers' Club on the second day of the conference.
The distinguished panelists were invited to contribute articles to this volume to
further develop their thoughts offered at the conference, and this "Blue Book" is
largely comprised of these articles. Readers and researchers will find within this
volume a detailed study of the law pertaining to non-international armed conflicts
as it is interpreted and applied in the post-September 1 1 world, and its effect on
College to analyze a variety of legal topics related to

State actions, particularly military operations.

The conference and
port from the Naval

the "Blue

War

Book" were made possible with generous sup-

College Foundation, the Israel Yearbook on

Human

Rights^the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, and the Lieber Society

on the Law of Armed

On
the
all

Conflict,

American Society of International Law.

behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and

Commandant

of the Marine Corps,

the participants, contributing authors

I

extend our thanks and gratitude to

and

editors for their invaluable contri-

butions to this project and to the future understanding of the law applicable in
non-international

armed

conflicts, the

predominant form of warfare during the

last several

likely to

decades and the type of conflicts in which military forces are most

be engaged in the twenty-first century.

JOHN N. CHRISTENSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

xn

War College

Introduction

During the past half century,
outnumbered those

non-international armed conflicts have far

that are international in character. Indeed, as the con-

ference that provided the basis for this

was engaged with
istan

its

States

NATO allies in a non-international armed conflict in Afghan-

and was winding down

also "at

volume was underway, the United

its

long participation in one in Iraq. The nation was

war" with various transnational terrorist groups in what many characterize

as non-international

armed

conflict.

Yet, the lex scripta governing international

ing non-international

armed

armed

conflict dwarfs that address-

Moreover, although international tribunals

conflict.

many cases involving the latter, their decisions often prove controespecially when applying the law of international armed conflict to non-

have handled
versial,

international conflicts. Unfortunately, even the academic
attention to the law of non-international

complexity and the frequency and
it

armed

human

community pays

conflict than merited

by

its

less

legal

consequences of the conflicts to which

applies.

This reality

is

unsurprising. International

armed

conflict self- evidently affects

As history has demonstrated time and again, the risks of
escalation and of spread are high whenever such conflicts occur. These and other
factors motivate the members of the international community to agree upon
norms limiting the effects of State-on-State conflict lest they find themselves ininternational stability.

volved therein. In doing

so, States

not only accept limitations on their battlefield

actions, but also secure protection for, inter alia> their civilians, civilian property

and

soldiers hors de combat.

treaty

The key to

and customary law regimes

that

the system

is

the reciprocity inherent in the

encompass opposing belligerents. Since the

law of international armed conflict is more robust than
terpart, so too

is

the attention paid

ity

States are facing organized

is

by agreeing

of a fundamentally different nature. In

groups of lawbreakers from whom reciproc-

cannot be expected. Therefore, there

their scope of action

is

to legal

often

little

incentive for States to limit

norms with which only they

Moreover, as the conflict

is

"internal," the risk of spread

volvement of other States

is

a matter of their discretion.

However, the context

in

non-international coun-

it.

Non-international armed conflict

most cases,

its

is

which non-international armed

will abide.

limited, while the in-

conflict occurs

is

un-

dergoing transformation. Transnational terrorism has become a globally pervasive

Introduction

phenomenon, one

that the international

community seems

classify as non-international, at least to the extent

conflict" as a matter of law. Further, as illustrated

it

increasingly willing to

rises to the level

by the

of "armed

conflicts in the Balkans,

Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region of Africa, the likelihood of spillover into

neighboring countries
giously based or
nal

when

is

very

real, especially

adjacent territory

is

when

a conflict

poorly governed.

is

ethnically or reli-

And

the rise of crimi-

groups with capabilities equaling those of government forces, as

and Mexico,

armed

raises the

in

Colombia

question of whether the hostilities they engage in qualify as

conflict.

The

International

exploring
a closer

new

Law Department of the Naval War

legal challenges in its

College, long noted for

annual conferences, accordingly decided that

examination of the law governing non-international armed conflict was

opportune. Held in June 201
the key legal practitioners

law and where

expand on

it

1,

the resulting conference brought together

and scholars

in the field to consider

both the

many of

state

of the

might be headed. Certain of the participants were invited to

their presentations in this

College's International

Law Studies

volume, the eighty-eighth

("Blue Books")

in the

series. It delves into

Naval

War

such com-

armed conflict, the legal status of
on methods and means of warfare, detention and en-

plicated topics as the scope of non-international
actors, specific limitations

forcement. The volume also offers several firsthand descriptions of particular
non-international

armed

conflicts. Hopefully, the various contributions will assist

armed
scholarship on the

those tasked with providing legal advice during future non-international
conflicts, as well as

make

a

measurable contribution to the

subject.

Appreciation

is

owed

to

many who made the conference and this volume of the

"Blue Books" possible. Rear Admiral John Christenson, President of the Naval

War College, and Ambassador Mary Ann

Peters,

its

Provost, provide the leadership

Law Department to undertake these cutting-edge
studies. Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, consistently affords the International Law Department the material supthat enables the International

port necessary to engage in meaningful research, as well as the vision that undergirds

all

of

its activities.

International
topic

Professor Dennis Mandsager, former

Law Department, was

at the

helm

as the

Chairman of

Department developed the

and executed the conference. Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader ably

served as Conference Director, an oft-thankless duty, but one that
cess. Finally,

is

the key to suc-

Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin, Canadian Forces (Ret.), the

College's 201 1-12 Stockton Professor of International Law,

Norris, U.S. Coast Guard, edited this important

and

the

editorial finesse.

They

and Captain Andrew

volume with substantive aplomb

are to be congratulated.

xiv

War

Introduction

The Naval War College has engaged in

international law study

and writing since

volume of the "Blue Book" series was
authored in 1901 by Professor John Bassett Moore, who would go on to serve as the
first U.S. judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice. It is our commitment to continue this proud tradition in the years to come.
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the

first

PROFESSOR MICHAEL N. SCHMITT
Chairman, International Law Department
United States Naval

xv

War College

Preface

From June 21

to 23, 201

1,

the U.S. Naval War College hosted distinguished in-

and

ternational scholars

practitioners,

both military and

civilian, repre-

senting government and academic institutions, to participate in a conference

examining the evolving law in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the
twenty- first century. Panelists discussed their views on

how the law will develop as

the world continues to struggle with the changing nature of the threats to national

and international

security posed

transnational criminal
ing,

and

by

failed

and

failing States, insurgencies,

The conference featured open-

terrorist organizations.

luncheon and closing addresses,

The conference summary

and

as well as six panel discussions.

that follows

was prepared by Commander Christian

member of the Navy Reserve unit that supports the
Naval War College's International Law Department. The summary recapitulates
the highlights of each conference speaker's presentation. As co-editors, we are
deeply indebted to Commander Fleming for his attention to detail and assistance
in facilitating the publication of this "Blue Book." We would also be remiss if we
P.

Fleming, JAGC, U.S. Navy, a

did not thank Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, U.S.

Navy (Ret.),

for his outstanding

support and dedication in editing the submissions for this volume of the International

Law Studies

series.

We also extend our sincere appreciation to Susan Meyer

of the Naval War College's Desktop Publishing Division for expertly preparing the

page proofs. Additionally,

we would like to thank Albert Fassbender and Shannon

Cole for their excellent work in proofreading the conference papers. The quality of
this

volume

is

a reflection of their professionalism

This "Blue Book" would not have

mously

successful conference

made

and outstanding

expertise.

come to fruition had it not been
possible in large

for the enor-

measure by the conference

committee under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader, U.S.

Marine Corps* working with Mrs. Jayne Van Petten of the International Law Department, and the support provided by the Naval War College Foundation, the In-

Law of Armed
Yearbook on Hu-

ternational Institute of Humanitarian Law, the Lieber Society on the

Conflict (American Society of International Law)

man Rights.

and the

Israel

We thank these individuals and organizations for their enduring sup-

port and generosity.

We hope that the thought-provoking articles published in this "Blue Book" will

—and help shape—

on the multiple complex emerging
sues presented by the changing character of war. The insights offered
add

to

the debate

legal is-

to legal

Preface

practitioners

may

that

and scholars should

them

assist

as they address these

and other

issues

evolve in future conflicts.

Opening Address
Professor

Ken W'atkin delivered the opening address. After introductory remarks,

Professor

Caldwell,

\\

atkin began his discussion of law in

who

in

1906 defined a form of

"campaigns undertaken
the world

NIAC by

NIAC known

to suppress rebellion

and

quoting Colonel

as "small wars" as being

guerilla warfare in

all

where organized armies are struggling against opponents who

meet them

in the

will

not

The 1940 Small Wars Manual of the U.S. Marine
"small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of

open

Corps indicated that

parts of

field."

the Marine Corps."

Because States have been hostile to clarifying the law, there has been limited suc-

NIAC. The concern is that non-State actors will be
given legitimacy. Given the lack of consensus on what law applies to small war, a dialogue has been left open as to how and to what degree human rights law governs
the use of force, the treatment of detainees and the accountability process in
NIACs. Gaps remain and the law governing NIAC needs to be clarified for a numcess in articulating the law of

ber of reasons.
First,

NIACs have been and

will

remain the dominant form of warfare. NIACs

not disappear and pure international wars are becoming rare. International

will

armed conflicts (IACs) can change to NIACs overnight. This occurred in Afghanistan. Did troops on the ground notice the change? Did the legal advice change? As a
result, for

most practitioners the key question

to be asked

is

whether there

is

an

IAC or NIAC. Ironically, the Lieber Code,
written during the American Civil War, a NIAC, was a starting point for codifying
rules in an armed conflict. Unfortunately, the law applied in NIACs has become
armed

conflict rather than

whether

it is

muddier since then.
Second, the lack of clarity regarding the law of NIAC can have a profound and

sometimes negative

effect

not only on the victims of conflict, but also on States in

terms of whether their actions are viewed as being legitimate. For example, in post9/1

1

detainee operations, the dialogue would have been

been greater clarity in the law.

much different if there had

An application of the policy of treating captured per-

sonnel under prisoner of war standards, without providing that status, or as security

detainees under

Geneva Convention IV could have been

a practical, defensible

and ultimately helpful approach. However, even today, an internationally agreed-

upon framework governing detainees

in

NIAC

xvi n

is

lacking.

Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris

Third, there
conflicts

is

between

gal issues,

a belief that the law applicable to
States.

However, there can be

impacted their

ability to influence
filled

organizations instead of by States.
the

Red

which deals with an

ing or unable to address.
States should

how that law is being shaped.

Gaps, both

by restatements and manuals of international

One example is the International Committee of

issue that States appear to have

The Guidance

is

been either unwill-

representative of a trend suggesting that

be held to a higher standard than their non-State opponents. Adding

inequity to the existing law

is

not likely to aid in reaching consensus

such significant stakeholders in international law as

At the same time,
fully

NIAC has nega-

Cross's 2009 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in

Hostilities,

new

significant cross-pollination of le-

of States to clarify what law applies to

and perceived, are being

real

has no real relevance to

such as when dealing with an insurgency during belligerent occupation.

Finally, the unwillingness
tively

NIAC

States

States.

cannot complain about new manuals

engaged in the processes being used to

among

if

they do not get

clarify the law. Civilians

must be pro-

and the question is the degree to which States want to influence that process.

tected

Panel I: Types ofNIACs and Applicable Law
Panel

War

moderated by Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy, of the Naval

I,

College's International

Law Department,

consisted of Mr. David

Graham

of

the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Professor

Geoffrey Corn of South Texas College of Law, Professor Charles Garraway of the

Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Mr. Karl Chang of
the U.S. Department of Defense Office of General Counsel.

Mr. Graham established the framework for the discussion by posing these questions:

How do we recognize a NIAC? Are there different types of NIAC? How does

the United States decide whether a
that the law of

armed

conflict

NIAC

exists or not?

(LOAC) provides no

definition of

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
violence

NIAC.

must

States

exist

and how protracted

Mr. Graham commented

It is

NIAC, nor does

not clear what

fear of legitimizing belligerent groups. Additional Protocol

I

own borders for

to the 1949

Conventions does not aid in defining NIAC; Additional Protocol

II

rows the number ofNIACs to which

it

pear to be that of making no

determination as to whether a

but, instead, to state that

LOAC,

regardless of

self-serving, this

is

all

how

would

apply.

The

such a conflict might be characterized.

Geneva
II)

nar-

would ap-

NIAC

exists,

comply with
While perhaps

approach with a proven track record.

xix

(AP

U.S. practice

U.S. personnel involved in a conflict will

a practical

of

that violence needs to be for there to be a

have been reluctant to recognize NIACs within their

official

level

Preface

Professor
tion

Corn focused on the

and why

LOAC

this

— namely,

a

is

to

kill

issue of willful blindness in conflict determina-

dangerous approach.

and detain

ing to provide protections under

— then

State enters an

Turning

armed conflict,

it

it

label

powers under

from neglect-

Article 3. Said differently,

must be bound by the

cannot

to the U.S. conflict against al

States invoke

States should be estopped

Common

going to use the tools of war, then

When

it

as a

if

rules of war.

The United

justify the use

When

a

Qaeda, Professor Corn believes the Bush ad-

Common

States attempted to use the inherent right of self-defense to

of force, but pretended to not need to address jus

There was

ations.

is

NIAC or IAC to game the system.

ministration attempted to use a gap in the law to justify an exception to
Article 3.

a State

willful blindness to suggest that

in hello consider-

when invoking self-defense,

the

question of the legal framework governing the conflict did not have to be
addressed.

Professor Garraway spoke from the European standpoint, and addressed the

border between law enforcement and NIAC. Prior to 1949, there was either war or
peace. In 1949, everything changed,
to sixty years has

ors merge.

The main

the underlying

Human

NIAC.

been

like a

is

many years was the line between NIAC and IAC, but

determining the line between law enforcement and

law and

rights

last fifty

rainbow, with difficulty in determining where the col-

issue for

problem

and the spectrum of violence over the

LOAC are reasonably compatible insofar as "prohi-

The problem comes with the "permissions" inherent in
"Hague law" on the conduct of hostilities. The challenge is that if human rights law
and LOAC are not to collide, there need to be compromises where they differ, such

bitions" are concerned.

as in targeting.

There

The answer might
to IAC,

lie

is

a

need to know what law applies in which circumstances.

in the intensity of the violence.

Where the

intensity

is

similar

LOAC has priority; where the level is less, human rights law has priority.

Mr. Chang observed that people are troubled by a dearth of law pertaining to

NIAC. He argued that attempts to fill this perceived void by drawing from human
rights law or from law relating to IAC were unpersuasive and often an exercise in
applying law to situations for which it was not intended. Instead, Mr. Chang proposed that the law of neutrality, which governs the relations between belligerents

and

on transnational NIACs. In IAC, we know
and where we want to fight. But in transnational NIAC, the

neutrals, gave principled limits

whom we are fighting

fighting often takes place in neutral or non-belligerent States against citizens of

such States. The framework of neutrality law

is

needed to determine when persons

have forfeited their neutral immunity and acquired enemy
trality

law

is

needed to determine where the State

States are unable or unwilling to address threats

xx

may

status. Similarly,

use force,

emanating from

i.e.,

when

neuother

their territories.

Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris

Panel II: Legal Status of Actors in

NIAC

The International Law Department's Commander Andrew Norris, U.S. Coast
Guard, moderated this panel, which consisted of Durham University professor
Michael Schmitt, Creighton University School of Law professor Sean Watts and
Mr. Stephen Pomper of the U.S. Department of State. The panel delved into the legal
status of actors in NIAC, focusing on the categorization of those fighting for and
against the State. Mr. Pomper commented on various U.S. legal policy positions regarding NIAC.
Professor Schmitt discussed the law pertaining to opposition forces in

noting that treaty law directly on point

is

sparse.

NIAC,

A threshold issue is determining

whether the persons are actually members of the opposition or merely individual

members of criminal gangs taking advantage of the instability that exists during conflict. The latter cannot be parties to the conflict unless they are acting in support of rebel forces, and operations conducted against them are governed
criminals or

by domestic and human
there

is

rights law. Professor Schmitt cautioned, however, that

a possible change in the

competing with the

wind

State for control

for well- organized

est case is that

level

organized armed group

who

activities.

such time as they participate in the

engage in recurring acts of

conflict

act against the State

may qualify as

on the nature of their

times.

State before attaining the status of

an "organized armed group," that is, a party to the
targeting as such. Individuals

all

of structure and coordination and engage in

"armed" actions (or support thereof) against the

period of the

territory

of dissident armed forces, which are clearly targetable at

Other groups must display some

ing

when the State
forces in a NIAC, the easi-

and authority over

must resort to the military in response. As to opposition

armed criminal gangs

and therefore subject to

without membership in an

"direct participants in hostilities"

depend-

When they qualify, they become targetable for
conflict. Professor

Schmitt argued that

hostility, their targetability

if

they

extends throughout the

acts.

Professor Watts addressed the status of government forces in
fied that "status"

was being discussed

in the classic sense as

NIAC, and

combatant

clari-

status,

i.e.,

one's exposure to hostilities and one's authority to engage in hostilities. Initially,

Professor Watts observed that States have not turned to international law to define
the status of government forces in
in this area

NIAC. There

and very little by way of treatment

is

no customary international law

in scholarly journals. States have not

seen a need for international law to speak to the issue of government forces in

NIAC, because they are committed to domestic law in this area and have generally
been reluctant to commit NIAC issues to international law. Additionally, there is a
lack of consensus among States as to the law applicable to NIAC. However, NIAC
xxi
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law

changing.

is

tribunals

It is

possible to imagine a future

— recognize
NIAC

Although

rules are often

distinction. Professor

developed by analogy from rules

some

government

Watts suggested, however, that such

forces' participation in

NIAC

NIAC.
of IAC, the more

is

their

a rule

The

NIAC rule of

would be

concern with

real

conduct rather than

their legal

gateway to protections and obligations and conceiving of status

political terms.

This forces a

more

ineffec-

choice between conceiving of combatant

status. Ultimately, this exercise requires a

status as a

—and perhaps

derivation of the existing

addressing the traditional concerns of distinction.

tive in

States

rules regulating participation of government forces in

source for such a rule would be

likely

where some

in purely

theoretical consideration of jus in hello than

usual.

Mr. Pomper noted that the
than in IAC. Often

rules governing actors in

NIAC

are less developed

NIAC rules are drawn from their analogs in IAC and translated

NIAC context, but this exercise can be difficult. There are identity and status issues at the center of this exercise. Parallels exist between NIAC and IAC, but it
is difficult to categorize the actors in NIAC the same way we do in IAC. How this is
into the

defined has important implications for

and

life

liberty,

and has

great operational

significance for warfighters. There appears to be growing consensus

among

the

United States and like-minded countries that there are two primary ways an individual

becomes

nized

armed group; the second

hostilities,

who

a

is

liable to attack in a

whether or not a

member

contrast, a civilian

NIAC. The
he

is if

member

is

first is if he is

a civilian

who

a

member of an

directly participates in

of an organized armed group.

of an organized armed group can be attacked

who

orga-

An

at

individual

any time. By

directly participates in hostilities loses protection only for

the duration of the participation. There also appears to be growing support for the

concept that to determine whether there

is

direct participation in hostilities, the

nature of the harm, causation and a nexus to the hostilities must be considered.

Panel

III:

Means and Methods

Lieutenant Colonel George Cadwalader
tional

ods

in

Jr.,

U.S.

in

NIAC

Marine Corps, of the Interna-

Law Department, moderated this panel, which discussed means and methNIAC. The panel consisted of Air Commodore Bill Boothby of the Royal Air
Professor Dr.

Force,

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of Europa-Universitat

Viadrina and Mr. Dick Jackson, the Special Assistant to the U.S.
cate General for

Air
there

Law of War

Matters.

Commodore Boothby opened

is

a

Army Judge Advo-

the panel by posing the question whether

meaningful distinction between the weapons laws that apply during IAC

and NIAC.

First

examining the

similarities,

xxn
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principles of superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering

weapons

AP

that are indiscriminate

by nature apply equally

and the prohibition of
in

both types of conflict.

do the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention. However, there is an issue raised by expanding bullets. While treaty law
applies to both, as

II

bans the use of expanding bullets in I AC,
ary international law.

questionable whether this

it is

The Kampala Review Conference for the Rome

is

custom-

Statute of the

International Criminal Court (ICC) added the offense of employing expanding
bullets to those that could

be committed in NIAC, but only if they are employed to

"uselessly aggravate suffering." Thus,

expanding bullets seem to represent a point

of distinction between the laws applicable to
fense

is

I

AC and NIAC. In the former, the of-

not tied to superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering; in the

While the general trend has been convergence
classes

in the

latter

it is.

weapons laws of these two

of conflict, achieving complete convergence would require State action and

adjustment of some

legal interpretations.

von Heinegg focused on naval means of warfare in
NIAC. Until the 1990s there were not many rules in NIAC related to means and
methods. The emerging trend is to expand treaty law applicable to NIAC through
the terms of the treaty itself, i.e., the treaty provisions state that it applies in NIACs.
Professor Dr. Heintschel

However, those

treaties that

do not distinguish between IACs and NIACs have not

become customary international law. If there is a merger between the law in IAC
and that in NIAC, then it cannot be a one-way street. The law cannot just speak
about protections, but must also address privileges, such as targeting. There have
been some historical examples of naval components to NIACs, such as during the
Spanish Civil War, and the Sri Lanka, Algerian and, more recently, Libyan conflicts. There are no substantive rules of international law prohibiting naval means
and methods in NIAC. Within the State's territory, government forces can interfere

with international navigation. However, government forces cannot expand

this principle to international waters.

gation, the State

must provide notice

And,

if

non-State actors interfere with navi-

to international shipping.

Mr. Jackson remarked that the trend has been a collapsing of IAC

rules into

NIAC, driven largely by the warfighter on the ground who does not know when the
situation shifts from an IAC to a NIAC. He then discussed perfidy in NIAC. Perfidy
violates the principle of distinction. The most important part of perfidy under
NIAC is feigning of civilian status. The Military Commissions Act requires a showing of a violation of LOAC; perfidy

may be

xxin
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Panel IV: Recent and Ongoing NIACs

War College professor Pete Pedrozo, was comprised
Raymundo Ferrer of the Philippine Armed Forces, Colonel

This panel, moderated by Naval
of lieutenant General

fuan Carlos

Gomez of the Colombian Air Force and Captain Rob McLaughlin of the

Royal Australian Navy.

Its

focus was on recent and ongoing NIACs.

General Ferrer focused on the two major insurgent groups in the Philippines:
the Maoist

group and the Moro group. The Maoist group, consisting of the

Com-

munist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, operates nationwide and
the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the world.

is

The Moro group operates

primarily in the southern Philippines, and consists of three major groups: the

Moro

National Liberation Front, the

Moro

Islamic Liberation Front and the

Sayyaf Group. General Ferrer opined that the

human

in the Philippines

is

a cry for

security.

Colonel

He

NIAC

Abu

Gomez

discussed the forty-five years of internal conflict in Colombia.

stated there are three groups of illegal

armed

actors: the Revolutionary

Armed

Army (ELN) and paramilitary forces that have become criminal gangs. Colonel Gomez described the difficulty in the new operational environment that consists of human rights law on one
Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Liberation

side

and international humanitarian law on the other, with the government's effort

combat terrorism and organized crime operating, depending on the circumstances, under one or the other of these two norms. Essentially, human rights law
to

provides the framework in territory controlled by the government and international

humanitarian law applies where the organized armed groups control. The

dichotomy is

that

the use of force
self-defense.

under human

is

rights law,

where there

is

typical criminal violence,

governed by restrained law enforcement standards, including

Under

international humanitarian law, where there

is

a high level of

violence, the concepts of military necessity, military objective, distinction,
ity

human-

and proportionality apply. The nature and location of the operation determine

whether government forces are operating under law enforcement-type rules of en-

gagement (ROE) or the more robust

ROE

applicable to traditional military

operations.

Captain McLaughlin analyzed Australia's experience in East Timor, which he
described as a high-end law enforcement operation, and contrasted

it

with the

NIAC. He stated that whether a
NIAC or an IAC is important because

Australian experience in Afghanistan, which was a

law enforcement, a

conflict

is

under

law enforcement scenario,

a

NIAC and

classified as

IAC, the

LOAC

lethal force

can be used for self-defense, but in

principles govern the use of force.

ghanistan has clearly been a

NIAC

since 2005

xxiv

and

that there

He opined

was

that Af-

little political

or
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strategic risk in classifying

it

as such, especially since the Taliban are seen to

few redeeming features. However, East Timor was, for
sons as

much

as legal reasons, classified as a

political

and

have

strategic rea-

law enforcement action, in large part

because the intervening force was invited in by Indonesia and shared responsibility
for security with Indonesia.

The decision on how to

ROE, determining whether there

are attack or only self-defense

respect to lethal force.

While self-defense

sion accomplishment

ROE

practical difference

between

are

characterize a conflict impacts

ROE in place with

ROE are the same under both labels, mis-

where they

differ.

He

indicated that there

is little

NIAC and law enforcement insofar as detention rules

are concerned.

Luncheon Address

The Honorable Harold Koh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, presented a
luncheon address entitled "International Law and Armed Conflict in the Obama
Administration." Mr. Koh opined that there was an emerging Obama/Clinton
doctrine that espoused four principles: (1) principled engagement, (2) diplomacy
as

an element of smart power,

(3) strategic multilateralism

and

(4)

compliance

with the rules of domestic and international law.

Mr. Koh stated that the United

LOAC,

States

is

deeply committed to applying

all

ap-

armed conflict with al
Qaeda with respect to both targeting and detention. Under domestic law, the authority to detain stems from the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
as informed by the laws of war. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, all
contemplate that parties may lawfully detain belligerents to prevent them from
returning to the battlefield. Once detained, all persons in U.S. custody must be
treated humanely, and the administration has taken a number of steps to ensure
that detainees in JJ.S. custody are treated humanely in accordance with our domestic and international legal obligations. The United States has unequivocally affirmed that it will not engage in torture and has affirmed that current U.S. military
practices are consistent with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
and with Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, including
the rules within these instruments that parallel the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
plicable law, including

He

in

its

non-international

further stated that the United States complies with

all

applicable law in

its

The United States is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the
Taliban and associated forces, and may also use force consistent with the inherent
targeting practices.

right of self-defense.

Congress has authorized force through the

xxv
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bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, clearly had an ongoing operational role and his
activities

posed an imminent threat against the United

question that he was the leader of an

enemy

force

and

States.

There can be no

a legitimate target in

our

armed conflict with al Qaeda. Moreover, the operation against him was conducted
in a manner consistent with LOAC, including with the principles of distinction
and proportionality, and in accordance with U.S. domestic law.
Turning to Libya, Mr. Koh stated that there was a call to international action by
the Arab League and NATO, and the use of force to protect civilians was authorized
by the

UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the situ-

ation within Libya threatened international peace
consistent with the

War Powers Resolution

cifically as follows:

scope

—with the

NATO-led
forces
ties

risk

was

(1) the U.S.

shift to

and

security. U.S. actions

were

in these particular circumstances, spe-

mission was limited in nature, duration and

an explicit support role by the U.S. forces as part of a

multilateral civilian protection operation; (2) the exposure of U.S.
limited, involving

and no sustained

no U.S.

casualties or threat of significant U.S. casual-

fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces; (3) the

of escalation was limited, with no U.S. military forces on the ground; and (4)

the military

means used were

that used in Kosovo.

limited, the

ordnance dropped being

Mr. Koh posed the question: Did Congress

a fraction of

in 1973,

when

it

enacted the

War Powers Resolution as an attempt to prevent future Vietnam Wars,

intend that

it

also interrupt a mission

—limited

launched to stop the slaughter of innocent

in nature, duration

civilians, as

was the mission

Mr. Koh concluded by remarking that the administration has
emerging national security

and

coalition partners

mines

who

policies with the

are parties to the

and scope
in Libya?

tried to square

need for interoperability with

ICC and

cluster

its

allies

munitions and land-

treaties.

Panel V: Detention in

NIAC

This panel was moderated by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Young, JA, U.S. Army, of
the International

Law Department, and

consisted of Brigadier General

Thomas

Army; Lieutenant Commander Kovit Talasophon of the Royal Thai
Navy; Dr. Knut Dormann, of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and

Ayres, JA, U.S.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; Rule of Law and Detainee

Policy,

William

Lietzau.

General Ayres addressed the role of detainee operations in NIAC.
legal authority existed to detain insurgents in a

until the cessation of hostilities.

He

He noted that

NIAC to keep them out of the fight

noted, however, that based

upon

his experi-

ences in Iraq, there are four types of insurgents: (1) those acting for a criminal

xxvi
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purpose,

e.g.,

to steal; (2) those

who oppose

the presence of coalition forces

attempt to demonstrate to the civilian populace that the occupying force

is

and

incapa-

who oppose the government and seek to disforeign fighters who may be training to engage in terrorist activities

ble of keeping civilians safe; (3) those
credit

it;

and pose

and

(4)

a threat to the national security interest of the United States or other coali-

tion nations.

The
all

first

type of insurgent, those with a criminal purpose, would, in almost

phases of the conflict, be turned over to the government of Iraq to be tried in

With regard to the remaining categories of insurgents, the coalition forces' objective was to detain only the worst of the worst, because, for operational reasons and due to "insurgent math," it was impossible to
detain all potential "bad actors." The operational realities drove the coalition to
the domestic criminal courts.

evidence-based detention. Moreover, once the

UN

Security Council resolution

providing authority for the presence of coalition forces in Iraq neared expiration,
the coalition began transferring detainees to the Iraqi government. In preparation
for that transfer, the coalition sought to assist in the maturation of the Iraqi gov-

ernment

institutions in their

complying with

Iraqi

implementation of the rule of law by increasingly

law and respecting Iraq's criminal law as the basis for de-

taining insurgents. General Ayres asserted that the coalition's efforts in modeling

adherence to a criminal law paradigm to detain insurgents should not be seen as
undercutting the international humanitarian law basis for detaining insurgents in
a

MAC.
Lieutenant

Commander Talasophon

reviewed Thailand's experience with de-

tention in what he characterized as "almost a

during the Cold War and in border wars with

civil

its

war" with communist groups

neighbors.

He indicated that there

are ongoing hostilities in the southern portions of Thailand

ment and those with

political grievances.

clared that these hostilities are not a

between the govern-

However, the Thai government has de-

NIAC;

therefore, they are dealt with through

law enforcement operations. Domestic law has been used instead of international

humanitarian law, although the government has complied with the

mon Article
and

3 in conducting the operations. Detention

is

spirit

of Com-

used to secure evidence

to ensure that the actor does not engage in further violence.

Dr.

Dormann spoke on

the legal framework of detention in

NIAC. He began

with a general observation that the sources of international law pertaining to de-

NIAC consisted of Common Article 3, Articles 4 through 6 of AP II and
customary international law. Next, he opined that it is now generally accepted that
human rights law applies alongside international humanitarian law in situations of

tention in

armed

conflict, including, despite the

United

States, extraterritorially. Dr.

view of some important dissenters

Dormann
xxvn

discussed the rules

like the

on treatment

in
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detention, conditions of detention and

internment

(i.e.,

fair trial rights,

non-criminal detention).

He indicated that internment cannot be

used solely for interrogation purposes; nor can
acts.

do

Internment

so, a

may be

resorted to

if

but focused his remarks on

it

be used as punishment for past

there are imperative reasons for security to

standard which includes direct participation in

He

hostilities.

stated that

the status of those detained should be periodically reviewed to determine whether

they are

gaps in the law of detention in

framework

Dormann concluded by stating that there were
NIAC and States should meet to discuss the legal

a security threat. Dr.

still

to

fill

those gaps.

Mr. Lietzau observed that the United States used to not think about what law
applied in
tact,

NIAC,

particularly with regard to those detained during the conflict. In

the United States' last experience with long-term detention was of prisoners of

war captured during World War
war could be held
have changed.

until the

II.

The law then was

end of the

conflict.

clear

—enemy prisoners of

But twenty-first-century conflicts

Now the war is not with another State, but with a non-State actor, al

Qaeda. In the early period of this new type of war, the United States was accused of
holding detainees indefinitely without providing a means of review to determine

whether there was

sufficient basis for the detention.

viduals are submitted to a Detainee Review Board.

Today, newly captured indi-

The Board, comprised of three

field-grade military officers, reviews each individual's detention for both legality

and necessity of continued detention. The detainee

who

a U.S. officer

is

authorized access to

taining to that detainee. This review
ing,

which must take place within

is

all

receives expert assistance

from

reasonably available information per-

repeated periodically after the

sixty days of arrival at the

initial

internment

hear-

facility.

Now some argue that the pendulum has swung too far, and that the United States is
releasing detainees (some of whom have returned to the fight) too quickly. What is
unarguable

new wars

that an indefinite detention without

is

will

Panel VI, on enforcement in
British

Institute of

in these

not be stomached.

Panel VI: Enforcement

OBE,

some form of process

in

NIAC

NIAC, was moderated by Colonel Darren

Stewart,

Army, the Director of the Military Department of the International

Humanitarian Law

at

San Remo,

Italy.

The

panelists

were Professor

John Cerone, professor of law and Director, Center for International Law

New England Law

|

Boston; University of Essex professor Francoise

& Policy,

Hampson; and

Johns Hopkins University professor Ruth Wedgwood.
Introducing the topic, Colonel Stewart remarked that there
black letter law applicable to

NIAC when compared
xxvi n

to

is little

the

substantive

international
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NIAC has gaps, it is

humanitarian law applicable to IAC. However, while the law in
applied day to day by practitioners

on

the ground.

The question of enforcement

brings the gaps in the law into sharp focus.
Professor Cerone discussed enforcement issues in the context of the then-current
situation in Libya. After reviewing the phases of the conflict, he discussed the legal

regimes that applied to each phase, as well as
stated that

it is

now widely accepted that

how

they related to each other.

international

human

He

law applies

rights

simultaneously with humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts. Even those
States that object to simultaneous application in international or transnational

do not object to the application of international human rights
law in internal armed conflicts. He then focused on international criminal law and
the Security Council referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC. As Libya is not a
party to the ICC Statute, the Court will need to address issues of immunity and

armed

conflicts

nullum crimen sine

lege.

The Court

have to ensure, in particular, that any

will

crimes prosecuted are well established in customary international law. Professor

Cerone indicated that twenty years ago

NIAC law gave

rise to individual

it

was debatable whether any violations of

criminal responsibility in international law.

The

landscape has changed dramatically since that time. Nonetheless, he con-

legal

cluded that

it is

diction of the

Professor

clear that

not

all

ICC have entered

Hampson opined

of the war crimes within the subject matter juristhe corpus of customary law.

that in the past fifteen years the focus has

criminal responsibility, with not enough focus on

civil responsibility.

been on

The advan-

tages of a civil action are that the claim can be brought against a State without the

need to identify the actual perpetrators, there
criminal cases and the victims have

more

is

a lower standard of proof than in

control over the claims. Claims can be

brought in the domestic courts of the State where the violation occurred and possibly in the domestic courts of third-party States. Professor
there

is

no international means of bringing

the only

way

to proceed

is

basis.

she stated, the most important feature of the

of an individual to
Professor

file

human

human

rights bodies. In

rights bodies

is

the right

a petition with them.

Wedgwood offered several suggestions for improving the work of the

ad hoc war crimes tribunals.
speedy

At the international

to bring a claim against a State. Claims could be

brought before the International Court of Justice or other
fact,

indicated that

a claim against a non-State actor, al-

though possiblyarbitration could be used on an ad hoc
level,

Hampson

First,

indictments should be structured to allow a

The charges against Milosevic might have been tried in separate parts
Croatia and Kosovo, instead of the four-year trial in the International

trial.

in Bosnia,

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during which both the presiding judge

and the defendant passed away. Second, international

xxix

justice

should
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not be segregated by tribunal; she observed that
to share

unfortunate the

it is

ICTY declined

evidence from Serb military archives with the International Court of Jus-

tice in the latter's

adjudication of the Srebrenica genocide case. Third,

tant that cases be tried against defendants
conflict, SO that there

is

from

all

it is

impor-

ethnic communities in a

civil

no misplaced imputation of bias. The failure of the Rwanda

members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the
Tutsi armed forces, instead remitting them to local justice authorities controlled by
the Kagame government, was an unfortunate event. Fourth, political organs are
tribunal to try any cases against

not well suited as the locus for war crimes investigations. In particular, the con-

ducting of investigations of war crime allegations by the
office or the

Human

Rights Council

may

UN

Secretary-General's

be problematic because of limited

fact-

finding capacity and their daily immersion in politics.

Closing Address

Professor Emeritus

Yoram

Dinstein of Tel Aviv University and the U.S. Naval

College's Stockton Professor of International

Law during academic

War

years 1999-

2000 and 2002-3 delivered the closing address. Professor Dinstein addressed

five

main areas: the definition of NIAC, thresholds in armed conflicts,jws in
vention and interaction.

hello, inter-

NIAC as a conflict taking place within

the borders

Professor Dinstein defined a

of a single

State, carried

out between the central government of that State and orga-

armed groups, or, there being no effective government, between organized
armed groups fighting each other. A NIAC can spill over across the borders and
start another NIAC in a second country, as happened in the Great Lakes region of
Africa. Still, the idea (endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United States) that a
nized

NIAC

can be global

is

oxymoronic.

Next, Professor Dinstein pointed out that there were three thresholds in armed
conflicts:

violence
nature.

two

for

NIACs and one

(e.g., riots)

that

is

for IAC, plus a sublevel of sporadic

below the

first

and

isolated

threshold, and thus law enforcement in

The first threshold of NIACs is established by Common Article 3 of the four

Geneva Conventions of 1949. This famous provision (which
ternational law) does not spell out

what conditions have

reflects

to

customary in-

be met for the

first

The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in the 1995 Tadic case
added the element that the violence must be "protracted."
The second threshold of NIACs is set up by AP II of 1977, which requires the
exercise of control by an organized armed group over a part of the territory, enthreshold to be crossed.

abling

it

to carry out sustained

and concerted military operations. Professor

Dinstein indicated that this requirement makes the distinction between a

xxx
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and forms of conflict not amounting to a NIAC much clearer: sustained and concerted military operations are the antonym of sporadic and isolated violence. The
acid test of control of some territory explains the difference, for instance, between
the then-current internal situations in Libya
foreign intervention by

inasmuch

fiat

and

Syria. In

as the insurgents exercised control over vast tracts of land.

and the

fact that

it

NIAC

of the Security Council), there was no doubt a

the violence in Syria remained below the threshold
intensity

Libya (not counting the

was protracted

By

— notwithstanding

—because no

contrast,
its

great

part of the territory was

under the control of any insurgent organized armed group.

means that the armed conflict amounts to an IAC, and this
denotes that two or more States are pitted against each other.
Professor Dinstein then focused on the jus in hello in NIAC, noting that while

The

there

third threshold

a very

is

remarkable trend in treaty law of growing convergence between the

jus in hello applicable in

IACs and that in NIAC, there cannot be

law in the two types of armed

conflict.

merger of the

a full

He indicated that there are at least three in-

surmountable obstacles to such merger:

(a) the

domestic law

will always consider

insurgents to be traitors and therefore they cannot be accorded the status of prisoners

of war by the government of the State (absent recognition of belligerency); (b)

neutrality is not an issue, as there

whole body of law

is

only one State embroiled in a NIAC; and

relating to belligerent occupation

is

irrelevant to

(c)

NIACs

the

since

neither the government nor the insurgents can be in belligerent occupation of their

own land. There are additional, less compelling problems relating to the legality of
certain

means and methods of warfare,

e.g.,

the legality of particular

weapons and

blockades.

The

issue of intervention relates to military assistance requested from, or of-

fered by, a foreign country when a

NIAC is going on. International law permits for-

eign countries to extend military assistance to the State combating insurgents. If

and when the foreign country does

so, the

armed

conflict

the participation"of foreign troops in the hostilities,
are not battling another State.

the government, the

armed

However,

if

remains a NIAC, despite

inasmuch

as the foreign troops

the foreign troops are deployed against

conflict automatically crosses the third threshold

becomes an IAC. Moreover, even when the foreign troops

arrive at the request of

the government, consent to their presence can be withdrawn at any time.

consent

do so

is

withdrawn by the government, the foreign forces must

will result in the situation

and

Once

leave. Failure to

becoming an IAC.

The last issue Professor Dinstein addressed is interaction. He first indicated that
it must be appreciated that an armed conflict can coexist with the law enforcement
paradigm. Criminal activities do not cease when an armed conflict (either a NIAC
or an IAC) breaks out. Indeed, usually crime rises in wartime,

xxxi

if only

because there

1

Preface

are

numerous new crimes (such

as black

market

or trading with the en-

activities

emy). Ordinary crimes, even in the course of an armed conflict, are governed not

by the

jus in hello

tional

human

but by domestic criminal law, subject to the precepts of interna-

rights.

NIAC

Second, a

on behalf of insurgents

is

a

can segue into an IAC; foreign intervention

prime example. But an IAC can

the implosion of a State torn apart by a

a

concerned,

it

be the outcome of

NIAC and the continuation of the hostilities

between several new sovereign States created on
ers in the field are

also

its

ruins. Obviously, as far as fight-

may not always be easy to detect at what exact point

NIAC has morphed into an IAC (the situation in Bosnia in

of clarity in a graphic manner).

It is

1992 showed that lack

therefore easier to analyze the situation

there has been an intervening period of time; for instance, Eritrea
cessfully against Ethiopia in a

against the

NIAC, and

same country. Third, the

first

when

rebelled suc-

then, several years later, started an

reverse

is

also true:

IAC

IACs can turn into NIACs.

Thus, the IAC between the American-led coalition and the Baathist regime in Iraq

came

to a successful end,

than a NIAC. Fourth, a
country.

The

and the

fighting that continues in Iraq

NIAC and an IAC can

best illustration

is

IAC between

Fifth, as indicated

Afghanistan in 2001, where there was a

different organized

since

the United States (supported by

in

NIAC be-

October of that year)

its allies)

and the Taliban.

by General Ferrer with respect to the Philippines, there may even

be several unrelated

diverse

today no more

be waged concurrently in the same

tween the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and (starting
a separate

is

NIACs going on

armed groups

in the

fight the

—and perhaps clashing—aims.

same country simultaneously, where

same

central

government while having

All this can cause confusion, especially

governments are often "in denial," reversing the thresholds. That

is

to say,

when governments are engaged in an IAC, they tend to claim that the armed conflict is no more than a NIAC. When they are caught in a NIAC, they are inclined to
maintain that the violence

is

sporadic and below the

NIAC threshold.

Professor Dinstein concluded by recognizing that times are changing and that

NIAC

law must change with them.

KENNETH WATKIN
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R

ear Admiral Christenson, Ladies

Let me begin by saying what a pleasure

and Gentlemen.

it is

to finally be here at the

Naval War College

delivering opening remarks at the annual international law conference.

because as

many of you know I took a detour,

June to look for accommodations,
eign Observer

on the

time incident of
delaying
I

Israeli

May

received a

literally.

phone

call

say "finally"

While driving here

asking

if I

would be

last

a For-

independent commission investigating the Gaza mari-

31, 2010.

I

accepted and the College was very gracious in

my start and, I must say, patient in waiting for my return.

am not going to comment on the commission, in part because its work is still

ongoing; however, Part

One

of its report dealing with the blockade

the commission website for those
operations.

1

1

ago would be

will say,

who have an

however, that

if I

interest in the

is

available

Perhaps

of the inquiry, but

it

it

on

law governing such

thought traveling to the Middle East a year

my last connection with the Naval War College for a while

pletely mistaken.
ter

I

quite

I

I

was com-

should have come as no surprise given the subject mat-

seemed everywhere

I

turned

I

found myself in touch with

someone or a learned publication connected to this College.
The list of former Stockton Professors was itself impressive. They included,
most obviously, Mike Schmitt and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, who directly assisted the

*

commission, but also inevitably reference had to be made to the

Stockton Professor, U.S. Naval

War College.
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influential

fellow

works of other Stockton Professors, such

Canadian

Leslie

Maritime Operations
found

3

Green. Craig Allen's
in

Support of

in the eighty-first edition

article

WMD

as

Yoram

Dinstein 2 and

my

"Limits on the Use of Force in

Counter-Proliferation Initiatives,"

Law Studies

of the International

series 4 (the

"Blue

Book"), was particularly informative regarding the law on stopping ships on the
high seas. Articles such as Professor Allen's highlight the impact that the product of

conferences like this can have on real-world international issues. 5

The connection to the College did not stop there. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg's
contribution on blockade to the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International

Law

world leading. 6 The International Institute of Humanitarian Law's Rules of

is

Engagement Handbook, 7 brought
Mandsager, provided guidance

in

to

life

under the steady hand of Dennis

an area often ignored by international lawyers:

the right to individual personal self-defense, as opposed to State self-defense, un-

der international law. In addition, the book Naval Blockades and Seapower* edited

by two professors from the Naval War College, Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine,
provided an excellent historical perspective on blockades and maritime interdiction. Finally,
ations,

9

NWP 1-14M, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Oper-

product of the International

a

essential source

Law Department,

on the law governing blockades, but

also,

served not only as an

importantly, as an indi-

cation of the views of a specially affected State, like the United States, which then

could be compared with the more international flavor of the 1994 San
ual.

U)

Remo Man-

Quite impressive influence by the International Law Department,

and the much broader Naval Warfare College community on an
world away.

I

its

alumni

issue arising a

can admit to feeling a considerable amount of humility given the

work of my predecessors as I start my sojourn as the Stockton Professor.
However, we are not here to talk about blockade, but rather "non-international
armed conflict," although the relative inattention paid to such conflicts by international lawyers until recently reminds me of the reference in the San Remo Manual
regarding the participants having

with the question of whether
pressing the view

it

firm that blockades
in

looking

flict
I

at

had

it

commenced

their discussion of blockade law

was "entirely archaic," with some participants ex-

fallen into

"complete desuetude." 11

I

personally can con-

— and blockade law— have not disappeared and

it is

clear that

both history and the present situation non-international armed con-

has definitely not fallen into disuse.

want

to start with this

quote by Colonel Callwell

Majesty's Forces, defining in 1906 a form of warfare

of, at that

known

time, His Britannic

as "small wars":

paigns undertaken to suppress rebellion and guerrilla warfare in

world where organized armies are struggling against opponents

them

in the

open

field."

12

all

"cam-

parts of the

who will

not meet

Kenneth Watkin

Of

by another

conflicts"

Now in case anyone is wondering why a "Naval" War College is concerning

name.
itself

armed

course, these often are "non-international

with "small wars," one need not look farther than the United States Marine

Corps, whose 1940 Small Wars
ject in its day,

Manual was not only

but also identified such wars as representing the

quent operations of the Marine Corps." 13
that the

Vietnam War and the ongoing

Little

has changed,

when one

considers

conflict in Afghanistan qualify in various

aspects as "small wars," although they are anything but small.
to consider

on the sub"normal and fre-

the leading text

whether the Navy and Marine Corps involvement

up

to

you

in the air

and

leave

I

it

missile strikes at the opening of the Libya operation constituted participation in
yet another "small war."

"Small wars" are not new. Unfortunately, neither
tional

community to provide

extensive
flict.

and

the inability of the interna-

the parties fighting such conflicts the comparatively

framework

clear legal

is

that

is

in existence for State-versus-State con-

Indeed, both operators and their legal advisors should get uncomfortable

when

reference has to be

Rome

Statute, 14 for the clearest

made

to an international criminal law treaty, the 1998

convention-based

cable to such conflict. 15 Indeed, in
Callwell's definition of "small wars"

more
—or
individual—when considering how
"failure"

what

is

listing

now

over a century after Colonel

was presented,

it is

hard not to use the term

positively "limited success," if you are a "glass half full"

at least

well, in

ticulation of the law of non-international

terms of consensus and

armed

clarity,

the ar-

conflict has fared.

As most of you are aware a big part of the reason
States themselves

of the legal norms appli-

for this "limited success"

have been very reluctant, indeed often

hostile, to the

is

that

notion of

clarifying this area of the law. Certainly, the unsuccessful efforts of the Interna-

tional

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

to have the rules of international

conflict apply equally to non-international

ones during the negotiations of the

1949 Geneva Conventions stand out as one of a
tance.

mon

What was
Article

character."

16

3

left

armed

number of examples of that

reluc-

was the important, but exceptionally watered-down, Com-

protections applicable to "conflicts not of an international

States, including the

brand-new

States of the post-colonial period,

continued to be very concerned that their non-State opponents, existing and potential,

would be "legitimized" by their being provided the same rights as States in

treaty regime governing

armed

conflict.

17

While

I

understand the jws ad helium

branch of international law governing the recourse to war concerns
State-versus-State conflict,

and considerable

erning the conduct of hostilities, jws in

and non-State alike,

it is

also clear to

bello,

effort

a

is

made

itself

with

to ensure the law gov-

applies equally to

all

participants, State

me one aspect of just war theory, fighting for a

State as the "right authority" in order to have legitimacy,

hangs

like a

dark cloud

'Small Wars": The Legal Challenges

over the attempts to reach consensus on the

armed

conflict In particular,

legal regulation

impacts on issues such as status of participants,

it

(DPH)

detention, targeting and direct participation in hostilities
topics of contemporary

of non-international

— the common

media headlines. In addition, given the evident lack of con-

sensus as to what law applies to these "small wars,"

and more vigorous dialogue regarding how and

it

to

has

much broader
human rights law

open

left

what degree

a

governs the use of force, the treatment of detainees and the accountability process
in internal conflicts.

Despite claims that international humanitarian law can be applied in

and the

to non-international conflicts,
that,

it

appears to

me that gaps

its

entirety

policies of various States that seek to

remain.

I

also sense, at times,

do just

an element of fatigue

community regarding these issues. As someone
mentioned to me recently as we were talking about an upcoming event, there is a
feeling of "not yet another conference on the interface between human rights and

setting

in

within the legal

humanitarian law." However,

it

cannot be a fatigue that

is

forged with a sense of re-

sounding success. One decade into the twenty-first century many countries are still
engaged in "small wars," both long- and short-term, and the requirement to

re-

more important than ever.
believe there are a number of reasons why this area of the law must be clarified.
First, non-international armed conflict has been and remains the predominant

solve these issues remains
I

form of warfare. Notwithstanding

armed

a

growing concern over potential international

conflicts with certain States flexing

newfound economic and

powers, they remain just that, potential conflicts, which, should they
largely be

conducted within

tional law

—although,

a comparatively well-developed

as will

military

arise,

would

framework of interna-

be discussed shortly, not one without some disagree-

ment. The same cannot be said for the existing and future "small wars" that

will

continue to occupy the attention of States, either because they are occurring within
their territory or as a result of

having deployed expeditionary forces to deal with

them. Non-international armed conflict

will

not disappear in the same way that

blockades were believed by some to have fallen into disuse.

The prevalence of non-international armed

conflict has also

an approach that views only State-on-State conflict
ter.

However, such "pure" international armed

ingly rare.

character

many

The
is

effect

places lacks the clarity of

historical note,

armed

conflict

conflicts are

its

immersed

was over.

18

is

in a legal

by definition increasnon-international in

environment that

in

international counterpart. In an interesting

such determinations can be

stan, as early as June 2002, there
tional

as "international" in charac-

of a determination that a conflict

that participants are then

been ensured by

made

virtually overnight. In Afghani-

were declarations that the then-existing interna-

The

conflict

from

that point

was to be considered

Kenneth Watkin

Of

a non-international one.

Supreme Court

note, the U.S.

Hamdan

in

subse19

quently adopted this categorization for the Afghanistan conflict in 2006.

could wonder

if

on the ground

the troops

you there was no change

in the operational

plexity of the operations they

to

them changed

occur without

on

participants.

wonder that

do from time
for

were conducting.

The debate over

I

doubt the

legal advice

if I

legal uncertainty

provided

they are imposing

me to think at
think it may fairly be said

categorizing conflict does cause

can paraphrase him,

I

which

to time appear to construct paper worlds

correspond to the world in which everyone

at crucial points to

tell

environment, the threat or the com-

thought of the resulting

times of Michael Walzer and,
that lawyers

can

I

However, such debates regarding "form" often seem to

either.

much

actually noticed the difference.

One

else lives.

20

fail

It is

no

many practitioners the key focus is on whether there is an "armed

conflict" rather than

on

a struggle over assessing

its

degree of "international" or

"non-international" character.

common to

It is

look

at the Instructions for the

Government of Armies of the

United States in the Field of 1863, the famous Lieber Code,
the effort to codify the rules governing

commenced with
termed

armed

a conflict that itself in

a "conflict not of

it

is

quite ironic this effort

contemporary terminology would be

an international character." Of course, we

better as a civil war. After nearly

such armed conflict

conflict. It

as a starting point in

one hundred

fifty

all

know

it

years of working to regulate

seems the situation has become

Perhaps the rea-

less clear.

son the Lieber Code managed to even get off the ground was that

it

was the prod-

uct of one government rather than an international effort. In this respect the

suggestion by John Bellinger, a former Department of State Legal Advisor, in an
article

on the law about detainee operations

American Journal of International Law

contemporary conflict found

in
21

in the

appears to have considerable merit.

201

1

He

suggests that specially affected States, those engaged in detention operations,

should get together and work out a recommended

common

set

of

legal rules

governing such operations given the inability of the international community to

do

so.

22

Unfortunately things actually seem to be getting increasingly muddier.
suggested at a conference

I

recently attended that because there were

It

was

no "combat-

armed conflict there could be no "combatant privilege"
Further, the authority for a State to use deadly force would

ants" in non-international
for State

armed

forces.

have to be found in domestic legislation of the
fighting

on the other

side of the world.

While

I

State,

am

even

if

those soldiers were

at a loss to

think of any State

own security forces on the basis there was no empowering
domestic legislation, it would be interesting to know how many of the States represented in this room with troops serving in Afghanistan have such specific domestic

practice of prosecuting

its

'Small Wars": The Legal Challenges

legislation focused

away

land.

on

targeting during a non-international

would suggest there

I

armed conflict

in a far-

strong argument supporting the existence of a

is

customary norm of providing State security forces a form of "privilege" in respect
to the use of force in internal armed conflicts. Perhaps this will be an issue that can
be discussed and clarified during

this conference.

Second, the lack of clarity regarding the law of non-international armed conflict

can have a profound and sometimes negative

effect,

not only on the victims

of conflict, but also on States in terms of whether their actions are viewed as being
legitimate.

What

if

there had been a greater international consensus

stantive law that applied to the detention, treatment, transfer

unprivileged belligerents

(if

one can use that term

conflict) detained in the post-9/1

1

law.

An

much

status review of

armed
abuse and alle-

in a non-international

Would the potential for
same? One cannot help but

period?

gations of mistreatment have been the

dialogue would have been

and

different

if

think that the

had been greater

there

on the sub-

clarity in the

application of the policy of treating captured personnel under prisoner-

of-war standards, without providing that status, or as security detainees under

Geneva Convention IV could have been a practical, defensible and ultimately
helpful approach. However, even now, some ten years after the issue first arose,
an internationally agreed framework governing detainees in non-international

armed

conflict

is

lacking.

That

it

remains a topic of academic debate

ference demonstrates the distance that must

be traveled on

still

at this

con-

this issue before

"success" can be declared.

Third,

I

also sense

from time to time

to non-international conflict have

Perhaps

this

that there

no

is

a belief that the issues applicable

real relevance to conflicts

between

States.

simply a reflection of the lack of interest demonstrated by States

is

themselves in the regulation of non-international armed conflict. However, there

can be significant "cross-pollination" of
issues that arise in the

legal issues.

For example, a number of

conduct of internal "small wars" are also inherent

in

an

in-

surgency being carried out during belligerent occupation, which, of course, occurs

during international armed

conflict.

Both occupation and internal

conflicts

ultimately involve what General Sir Rupert Smith has called a "war amongst the
people." 23 In addition,

it is

highly likely that any future war between States

would

involve not only clashes between regular military forces but also "irregular
forces," "organized
State's behalf.

armed groups" or even individual

This includes in the cyber realm.

in non-international

would have

armed

Any

civilians acting

suggestion that legal issues

conflict are not relevant to international conflict

to address the controversial aspects of Additional Protocol

pear for nearly thirty- five years to have stood in the

and application

on the

to international

armed

conflicts.

8

25

way of its

24
I

that ap-

universal acceptance

Kenneth Watkin

Fourth, and

finally,

the unwillingness of States to engage in clarifying

applies to non-international

armed conflict has

pacted on their ability to influence

in

what law

many respects negatively im-

how that law will be, and

is

presently being,

Yoram Dinstein has noted in the most recent edition of his book The
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, " [interna-

shaped. As

must march in lockstep with the compelling demands of reality." 26 Gaps,
and perceived, are being filled through means such as unofficial restate-

tional law

both

real

ments of the law and manuals of rules crafted by various groups of legal "experts."
States

bered,

do send

officials in their

personal capacity, although they are often

and ultimately lack the voice

that they

would have

outnum-

in official treaty negotia-

One example is reflected in the
ICRC's DPH study. Now, I am critical of a number of aspects of the study; 28
however, at the same time it must be noted that the ICRC courageously took on
tions.

The

results

can be problematic for

States.

27

one of the most perplexing and
conflict

—one

difficult issues

that States appear to have

of the contemporary law of armed

been "unwilling or unable," to use a con-

temporary phrase, to address.

My goal today is not to dwell on specific details of the DPH study but rather to
refer to

it

as

being representative of a trend of suggesting that States should be held

and ultimately more onerous standard than

to a different

their non-State

oppo-

The study sets out significantly broader parameters for "membership" in
regular armed forces, and therefore for the forces' ultimate targetability, than it
does for members in the "organized armed groups" against which they are fighting.
In effect, it seems to turn the jus ad helium principle of "right authority" on its head.
nents.

A principle that provided the basis for giving prisoner-of-war status to those fightthem over their non-State counterparts, now
seems to mean, if you accept the thesis, those same State actors, indeed many of you
in this auditorium, can be more easily killed than persons performing exactly the
same function in an opposing non-State organized armed group. Indeed the nonState counterparts would be protected from being targeted by being considered to
ing for a State, thereby privileging

be "civilians."
Ultimately, this approach seems to have a
the State that

the

is

always held

more

"human rights-like" flavor, where it is

responsible

and accountable. In

a

2010 report to

Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or

Arbitrary Executions,

may

see

study,
ians.

29

when looking

at the

DPH

study, suggested that while

some

an inequity between State forces and non-State actors identified in the

one

it is

It is

built into international

not immediately clear to

humanitarian law in order to protect

me

conflict support this approach. Indeed,

that the statistics

it is

civil-

from the Afghanistan

reported that in Afghanistan in 2010,

75 percent of civilian casualties were caused by insurgents. 30

It is

difficult to see
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how making

insurgents

more

volved civilians

who have demonstrated little

difficult to target

protection for those civilians.

human

of applying

It

than their State counterparts enhances the

one of the acknowledged challenges

also points to

norms

rights

to

reticence about killing unin-

contemporary armed

conflict. International

humanitarian law has long sought to have equal application to both sides of the

to the existing

new inequity

of prisoner-of-war status notwithstanding. Adding

conflict, the issue

law

not likely to aid in reaching consensus

is

among such significant

stakeholders in international law as States.
It

seems to

tional law

me that

—such

rely

on broadly accepted interna-

approximating what any other detainee captured under the ex-

as

regime

isting treaty

approaches which do not

in

armed

conflict

would

receive, in deciding

for the treatment of those captured in non-international conflict

evenly apply the law in respect of targeting to
likely to create obstacles rather

At the same time,

it is

if

—or which do not

parties to the conflict, are

than help resolve these fundamental

how States

difficult to see

law" and manuals of rules

all

on the standards

they do not

issues.

can complain about new "soft

become more

gaged in the processes that are being used to

more

and

fully en-

clarify the law. Ultimately,

attempts

strategically

made to fill voids with or without State participation, and with good reason.
Civilians must be protected from the ravages of war. The question is the degree to
will

be

which

States

want

to influence that process.

There are important, indeed

essential, issues that

need to be resolved. Im-

One example is the 2006 Institute of International
Humanitarian Law Manual on the Law of Non- International Armed Conflict
no
surprise, again with a link to the Naval War College, its authors being Yoram
pressive

work

being done.

is

1,1

—

Mike Schmitt and Charles Garraway. Unfortunately, it is a work that has
not received the publicity that it should and the unsettled State of the law demands.
Dinstein,

As editor of this year's "Blue Book,"
to this

I

will

be interested to see how many authors refer

manual in their scholarly assessments of non-international armed conflict.

Finally, there

that will result.

I

is

this conference,

encourage

all

and the

inevitable articles in the "Blue

Book"

of you to participate fully and ask probing questions

of the panelists, thereby shaping the discussion. Indeed, you never know. You,
yourself,

might someday unexpectedly take a detour and become immersed

complicated
the world.

and others

I

problem

legal

do know that you
like

it

will

armed

conflict

war" occurring on the other side of

be able to search the product of this conference,

here at the Naval

non-international
time.

related to a "small

in a

War

—the

College, for guidance
difficult

Thank you.
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OVERVIEW: THE LAW IN NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

II

Law in

Will-o'-the-Wisp? The Search for

Non-International Armed Conflicts

John

F.

Murphy

1

remarks
member of the Types of NIACs and Applicable Law Panel
Inthe Naval
War College's International Law Conference on Non-International
as a

his

at

Armed Conflict in the 21st Century, held from June 21
scribed the law of non-international

to 23, 201

1,

David Graham de-

armed conflict as being located at the "vanish-

ing point of the law of war."

This

not surprising, because, as

is

Graham further noted,

States resist the appli-

cation of international law to their struggles with rebels. In particular, they resist

according status to rebels by applying the law of armed conflict
Rather, they prefer to deal with rebels under their

from any constraints

that

(LOAC)

to them.

own national criminal laws,

might be imposed by the law of armed

conflict.

free

For ex-

ample, Charles Garraway, speaking on the same panel as Graham, pointed out that
the United

Kingdom never acknowledged

"the Troubles" in Northern Ireland as

an "armed conflict" to which the law of armed conflict might apply.

From
armed

a historical perspective, express treaty law governing non-international

conflict

was formerly

virtually non-existent. After the carnage of

World

War II, and the extreme brutality of the Nazi Germany forces, however, there was a
* Professor

of Law, Villanova University School of Law.

search assistance of Bernard G. Dennis and

Villanova University School of Law.

I

want

to

acknowledge the excellent

re-

Megan L. O'Rourke, both second-year students at the

.
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marked change of

attitude.

As reported by Gary D.

Solis in his

2010 magisterial

treatise:

The

trainers

of the 949 Conventions determined that there must be some minimal
1

—

in-

armed conflicts conflicts occurring within one state's borders, not involving a second nation. World War II
ternational humanitarian protections for the victims of internal

tion

on

would involve

conflicts

between

a departure

and

states

To

raise

new

from Geneva's previously uninterrupted

fixa-

revealed the stark absence of protections for civilians in wartime.

protections

a certain disregard of the long-entrenched act

of

community was unanimous, however, that it could
not stand by while depredations such as those committed by the Nazis took place in
future conflicts, internal or not. Not even in the United Nations Charter is there a similar effort to regulate intrastate armed force.
The international

state doctrine.

1

The
only

result

was

article in the

"when common
applies"

1.

Common

Article 3 of the 1949

Geneva Conventions

Geneva Conventions. 2

that covers internal

Article 3 applies, no other part of the 1949

Common Article 3

armed

the

It is

and

conflict,

Geneva Conventions

provides:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory

of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
ply, at a

minimum,

bound to ap-

the following provisions:

hostilities, including members of armed forces,
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely ....
( 1 )

Persons taking no active part in the

who

As

have

laid

down

Solis notes,

their

"There follows a brief list of prohibitions, acknowledged to be

complete: violence to

life

and person,

in particular

murder, mutilation, cruel

in-

treat-

ment, and torture; the taking of hostages; humiliating and degrading treatment;

and the passing of sentences without previous judgments from regularly constituted
courts." 4

the

The positive obligation

Geneva Conventions

is,

that

Common Article 3 imposes on States parties to

in non-international

are hors de combat (out of the fight) humanely.
cided, however, not to elaborate

The

International

armed conflicts,

to treat those

who

The drafters of Common Article 3 de-

on the meaning of "humane treatment." 5

Committee of the Red

Cross's (ICRC's) study of customary

international law does provide generalized guidance as to

what constitutes humane

treatment:

The actual meaning of "humane treatment"
is

an overarching concept.

It is

is

not spelled out

The requirement

.

.

generally understood that the detailed rules found in

16

John
international humanitarian law

of "humane treatment."

meaning of what

is

.

.

.

F.

Murphy

and human

rights

However, these

rules

meant by humane treatment,

law give expression to the meaning

do not

as this

necessarily express the full

notion develops over time un-

der the influence of changes in society. 6

By

its

terms,

flicts.

As

shall

Common Article
its

humanitarian norms are so basic

this early stage in this essay,

it is

Common Arti-

important to note that the international and

national jurisprudence that has declared
tional
its

that, today,

extends to international armed conflicts as well.

At

of

armed con-

be seen below, however, international and national court decisions

have declared that
cle 3

3 applies only to non-international

Common

Article 3 extends to interna-

armed conflict illustrates a major difficulty with Common Article 3: because
sparse wording and inherent ambiguities, Common Article 3 raises more

questions than

and whether

it

it

answers, and, in particular, these include issues of when

it

applies

can be the basis for criminal prosecutions in international or na-

tional tribunals.

we

some of these issues, we need to note the second primary
source of treaty law on non-international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol II
Before

turn to

to the 1949

Geneva Conventions. 7 Like Additional Protocol

ternational

armed

conflicts,

Additional Protocol

II is

a

I,

8

which concerns

in-

supplement to the 1949

Geneva Conventions and does not amend or replace any part of them. 9 Although
Additional Protocol
the United States

II

has 166 States parties, 10 a

and Israel,

II is

a

including

and it is unclear what pro-

for example, are not parties,

visions, if any, of the Protocol represent

Additional Protocol

number of major States,

customary international law. 11 Moreover,

good example of the unwillingness of

States to

be

governed by international law in their internal conflicts with rebel groups. This
because the "threshold" of applicability of Protocol

armed

conflict

conflicts

is

II

is

to a non-international

extremely high. Under Article 1(1), Protocol

II

only applies to

between the armed forces of a State party "and dissident armed forces or

armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Paragraph 2 of
other organized

Article

1

provides that the Protocol "shall not apply to situations of internal distur-

bances and tensions, such as
acts of a similar nature, as

riots, isolated

and sporadic

acts of violence

and other

not being armed conflicts."

The result of these explicit limitations is that Additional Protocol II is basically a
non-operational treaty. As one commentator has noted, the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda

17

Will-o'-the-Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts

have produced very

little

jurisprudence related to Additional Protocol

cused has been convicted for a violation of the Protocol.

armed

conflicts to

the extent to

which Additional Protocol

which

is

it

now

.

.

Similarly,

tions

on common

Article 3

.

.

.

II."

as to

much

with

II

[Common]

Article 3

.

enthusiasm,

.

and has escape clauses designed

likely that

ac-

12

to

.

.

II

make

deniable. In the end, the only useful result of Protocol

what more

and no

and doubts

George Aldrich, who was the head of the U.S. delegation

ited protections

.

.

limited categories of

to apply

on the Protocols, has written dismissively: "Protocol

Protocol

.

part of customary international law have deterred the

Prosecution from entering the realm of Additional Protocol
preferring instead to rely

The

.

may be said

II

II

II

.

.

.

affords very lim-

applicability easily

its

may be

may be found

to the negotia-

to

make

it

some-

applicable in lieu of

13

/.

Filling the

Gaps

in

and Expanding the Coverage of

Common Article 3
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, a former head of the ICRC's Legal Division, has contended
that the current
failure to

law of armed conflict

implement

major differences

in

it

good

faith.

is
14

not the major problem, but rather
This seems

clear,

but there are

as to interpretation of the existing rules,

even

it is

the

at the least

among the leading

experts of developed Western States, to say nothing of on a worldwide basis. Ideally,

these ambiguities
existing law.

would be resolved by international negotiations

However,

as Dr.

might open Pandora's box and
law of armed

As

conflict.

less

rather than

more

is

that

it

satisfactory

Common Article 3, is important to note that neither the Geneva
including Common Article 3, nor Additional Protocol contains a

definition of an
in

much

result in a

this route

15

to gaps in

Conventions,

II,

Lavoyer has noted, the risk of

to revise the

it

I

"armed conflict." In contrast,

paragraphs

1

and

2 of Article

1,

defines

we have seen, Additional Protocol
non-international armed conflicts in
as

such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. But
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,

16

in 1995, in the

Tadic In-

the International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stepped into the breach and addressed the preliminary
issue of the existence of an

armed conflict

dant that there had been no active

in

response to a contention by the defen-

hostilities in the area

of the alleged crimes

at the

relevant time:

[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International

18
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humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-

yond the cessation of hostilities

until a general conclusion of peace

case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement
tional

is

is

reached; or, in the

achieved. Until that

moment, interna-

humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States

or, in the case

of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party,

whether or not actual combat takes place

there.

17

This definition covers both international and non-international conflicts. There
is

a question

armed

whether under

conflict.

As

I

the U.S. conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an

it,

suggested in another forum,

[t]he only time this conflict could have qualified as an international armed conflict
would have been when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to
the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were integrated into the Taliban forces, the de facto
both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as inarmy of Afghanistan. At present
surgents in Afghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal
armed conflict. 18
.

By now

it is

well

jected the assertion

had not accepted
Conventions,

known

.

.

Hamdan

that in

Rumsfeld 19 the Supreme Court

that

it

would be governed by the

its affiliates

rules set forth in the

To be

sure, this

best illustrated perhaps

Geneva

could not invoke their protections. Rather, a plurality of

on

terror"

was a non-international armed

and therefore that at a minimum Common Article

with Al-Qaeda.

re-

by the U.S. government that since Al-Qaeda was not a State and

the Court held that the so-called "war
conflict,

v.

3 applies to the conflict

holding has been subject to considerable criticism,

by Yoram Dinstein's argument

that

"from the vantage

point of international law ... a non-international armed conflict cannot possibly

assume global proportions." 20 There are supporters of the Court's holding, however,

and there

is

no consensus on

this issue.

21

In light of current developments, the distinction between international and

armed conflict maybe becoming irrelevant, at least as long as an
"armed conflict" is present. As Kenneth Watkin has noted, there is a "trend under
humanitarian law to apply the established rules for governing international armed
non-international

conflict to

its

non-international counterpart." 22 This trend, however, has not been

based on the conclusion of new conventions, or even the revision of old conventions,

on the law of armed conflict. Rather,
sions, especially the decision of the

which claimed

oped

in 1995 that "it

it

has been based on international judicial deci-

ICTY Appeals Chamber

in Prosecutor

v.

Tadic,

cannot be denied that customary rules have devel-

to govern internal strife." 23

The Tribunal

covering

19

identified

some of

these rules as

Will-o'-the-Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts

such areas as protection or civilians from

hostilities, in particular

from indiscriminate

attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all

who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain
methods of conducting hostilities. 24

those

The ICRC has also actively promoted the idea of applying the rules governing
international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict through the customary international law process, especially in its two-volume Customary Interna25
Customary international law has long played an
tional Humanitarian Law study.
important role in the development of the law of armed conflict, as illustrated by
the Martens Clause, which was named after Frederick de Martens, a leading Russian
international lawyer who was a Russian delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences
of 1889 and 1907. The Martens Clause first appeared in the preambles of Hague
Convention (II) of 1899 and Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land. 26 A recent example of the Martens Clause may be
found

in Article 1(2)

of Protocol

I

of 1977, which reads as follows: "In cases not

covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived

from the
It

from established custom, from the principles of humanity and

dictates of public conscience."

should be noted, however, that the nature of the customary international law

process has

become

suggested that in
tional law

many

— perhaps most—instances of

norms, there

have accepted the

"much

increasingly controversial. Patrick Kelly, a leading

may be

little

critic,

customary interna-

alleged

clear evidence that the vast majority of States

norm as a legal obligation. 27 The result is that, according to

of international law

from nations ....

Much

is

announced

in

books and

articles

of CIL [customary international law]

with
is

little

its

tack

study of customary international humanitarian law has

— most

particularly, in the

III,

Legal Adviser, U.S.

sel,

U.S.

ICRC,

November

3,

2006 joint

letter

Department of State, and William

Department of Defense,

setting forth the U.S.

J.

itself

Kelly,

input

a fiction." 28

should come as no surprise therefore that the methodology employed by the
in

has

It

ICRC

come under at-

from John Bellinger

Haynes, General Coun-

to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the

government's

"initial reactions" to

the ICRC's study. 29

The letter states that "based on our review so far, we are concerned about the methodology used to ascertain rules and about whether the authors have proffered sufficient facts

and evidence

Study's large scope,

to support those rules."

we have not

yet

Although noting that "[g]iven the

been able to complete a detailed review of its

conclusions," the authors go on to state that they thought
to outline

some of our

it

would be "constructive

basic methodological concerns and,

20

by examining

a

few of

.
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the rules set forth in the Study, to illustrate

how these flaws call into question some

of the Study's conclusions." 30

A detailed discussion of the authors' concerns is beyond the scope of this essay.
For present purposes

it

suffices to

study's assessment of State practice

ment. The authors also find

commentary.

fault

note that the

and

its

letter finds fault

approach to the opinio

with both the
juris require-

with the study's formulation of the rules and

its

Significantly, the letter finds that these faults contribute to

two more general errors in the Study that are of particular concern to the United States:

First,

the assertion that a significant

tocols to the

law applicable to

all States,

in the Additional Pro-

status of customary international

including with respect to a significant

cluding the United States and a

armed

number of rules contained

Geneva Conventions have achieved the

number of

number of States

(in-

other States that have been involved in

conflict since the Protocols entered into force) that

have declined to become a

party to those Protocols; and

Second, the assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols have
in internal

armed

become binding as

a matter of customary international law

conflict notwithstanding the fact that there

is little

evidence in sup-

port of those propositions. 31

In closing the letter the authors indicated their "appreciation for the ICRC's con-

tinued efforts in this important area, and hope that the material provided in this
letter

and

ICRC and

in the attachment will initiate a constructive, in-depth dialogue with the

others

on the

subject." 32

In July 2007, Jean-Marie Henckaerts responded to the Bellinger/Haynes

letter.

33

His response focused largely on methodological issues and, following the structure
of the U.S. comments, addressed the following questions:

1

What density of practice is required for the formation of customary international

law and what types of practice are relevant?

2.

How did the Study assess the existence of opinio juris

3.

What

4.

What are the broader implications of the Study with respect to Additional Proto-

cols

I

and

is

II

the weight of the commentaries

on the

rules?

and the law on non-international armed

21
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conflicts in particular?
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Because U.S. comments also addressed four particular rules of the study,
Henckaerts's response dealt with the main aspects of those

comments as part of the

The rules included "Rule 31 (protection of
humanitarian relief personnel), Rule 45 (prohibition on causing long-term widespread and severe damage to the environment), Rule 78 (prohibition of the use of
antipersonnel exploding bullets) and Rule 157 (right to establish universal jurisdiscussion of the methodological issues.

diction over

war crimes)." 34

As with respect

to the Bellinger/Haynes letter, this

is

not the time or place to

set

forth a detailed discussion of Henckaerts's responses to the U.S. concerns. For

present purposes,
there

is little

it

suffices to note that the

ICRC

rejects the U.S.

contention that

evidence to support the assertion that certain rules in the Geneva Con-

ventions and the Additional Protocols have
ary international law in internal

become binding as a matter of custom-

armed conflict.

On the contrary, in the ICRC view:

[T]he conclusion of the Study that many rules contained in the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary international law in non-international armed conflict is the result of state practice to this
effect.

.

.

[Developments of international humanitarian law since the wars in the former
Rwanda point towards an application of many areas of humanitarian
law to non-international armed conflicts. For example, every humanitarian law
treaty adopted since 1996 has been made applicable to both international and noninternational armed conflicts.

Yugoslavia and

.

.

The criminal tribunals and courts set up, first for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and later for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly with violations committed in noninternational armed conflicts. Similarly, the investigations and prosecutions currently
under way before the International Criminal Court are related to violations committed
in situations of internal armed conflict. These developments are also sustained by
other practice such as military manuals, national legislation and case-law, official
statements and resolutions of international organizations and conferences. In this respect particular care

was taken

in

Volume

I

to identify specific practice related to

non-international armed conflict and, on that basis, to provide a separate analysis of
the customary nature of the rules in such conflicts. Finally, where practice was less extensive in non-international

armed

conflicts, the

corresponding rule

to be only "arguably" applicable in non-international

When
there

it

is

comes

armed

acknowledged

armed conflicts,
and of their out-

to "operational practice" related to non-international

probably a large mix of official practice supporting the rules

right violation.

is

conflicts.

To suggest, therefore, that there is not enough

broad conclusion

is

to

practice to sustain such a

confound the value of existing "positive" practice with the many

22
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armed conflicts. This would mean that we let
violators dictate the law or stand in the way of rules emerging. The result would be that
a whole range of heinous practices committed in non-international armed conflict
would no longer be considered unlawful and that commanders ordering such practices
would no longer be responsible for them. This is not what states have wanted. They
have wanted the law to apply to non-international armed conflicts and they have
wanted commanders to be responsible and accountable. 35
violations of the law in non-international

The Bellinger/Haynes

letter, in

tain rules contained in the

become binding as
flict,

challenging the

ICRC study's

Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols have

a matter of customary international

claims that "there

is little

law in internal armed con-

evidence in support of those propositions." 36 The

Henckaerts response attempts to provide such evidence.
that "every humanitarian law treaty
to both international
treaties

assertion that cer-

First,

it

correctly notes

adopted since 1996 has been made applicable

and non-international armed

conflict." 37

But none of these

extends any of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions or of the Addi-

tional Protocols to non-international

practice to the issue
Similarly,

it is,

is

armed

conflict, so the relevance

of this State

questionable at best.

of course, correct that the International Criminal Tribunals for

the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the globally focused International

Criminal Court and the hybrid tribunal for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly
with violations committed in non-international armed conflicts. The basic issue
faced by these various tribunals

is

whether the concept of war crimes and grave

breaches are applicable in internal as well as international armed conflict. Resolution of this issue in turn depends

upon the

statutes of the various tribunals

and the

tribunals' interpretation of their terms.

As Gary Solis has noted, the ICTY Appeals Chamber,
case, first

in

its

decision in the Tadic

answered the basic question in the negative. According to the Appeals

Chamber, " [we] must conclude that,

in the present state of development of the law,

Article 2 of the [ICTY] Statute ["Grave breaches of the

Geneva Conventions of 1949"]

only applies to offences committed within the context of international armed con-

to

38

By its decision the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's ruling
the contrary. At the same time, later in its decision, in dicta, the Appeals Chamber

flicts."

foreshadowed

later

change when

[W]e have no doubt that they

it

stated,

[violations of rules of warfare in international law] entail

individual responsibility, regardless of whether they are

national

armed

conflicts. Principles

and

committed in internal or inter-

rules of humanitarian

law

considerations of humanity" widely recognized as the mandatory

duct in armed conflicts of any kind. 39

23

reflect

"elementary

minimum

for con-

y
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As Soils notes,

shadowed

The Search for Law

Chamber took

years later the Appeals

six

in its dicta in Tadic.

gal distinction

in Non-International Armed Conflicts

40

between the two

It

the step

had

it

fore-

ruled in the Celebici case that "to maintain a

legal

le-

regimes and their criminal consequences in

respect ot similarly egregious acts because of the differences in the nature of the

would ignore the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions." 41

conflicts

Many commentators welcomed

the Celebici ruling. Guenael Mettraux, for ex-

ample, opined that "[t]he acknowledgement by the ad hoc [Yugoslav and Rwanda]

much of the law of international armed conflicts would apply in the
of internal armed conflicts may be one of their most significant jurispru-

Tribunals that
context

dential achievements, as far as

Meron emphatically

stated,

war crimes are concerned." 42 For

"There

is

no moral

justification,

his part,

and no

Theodor

truly persua-

sive legal reason, for treating perpetrators of atrocities in internal conflicts

leniently than those

engaged

in international wars."

This commentator, however,
tribunals

is

and commentators such

more

43

concerned that both the Yugoslav and Rwanda
as

Mettraux and Meron may be setting forth the

somewhat differently, they may be
failing to distinguish between the is and the ought. There would seem to be compelling reasons for applying much of the law of international armed conflict in the
context of non-international armed conflicts, but it is not clear that States, acting
de legeferenda rather than the lex

through

treaties or the

To put

it

customary international law process, have done

judges on the Yugoslav and

important roles they play

endowed with

lata.

Rwanda

tribunals nor

prominent

make

Neither

scholars, despite the

in the international legal process in general,

the capacity to

so.

have been

that extension of the law.

On the other hand, Solis may be on sounder ground when he reports that " t] he
domestic legislation of fifty-four states criminalizes serious violations of LOAC in
[

internal

armed

conflicts." 44

Such

legislation

form of State practice that may contribute

is

generally regarded as constituting a

to the formulation of a

customary inter-

national law norm. Moreover, the binding nature of such legislation in the
tic legal

system of the acting State

the practice as law, the second,
international law.

may supply evidence of opinio juris,

domes-

acceptance of

and perhaps most important, element of customary

45

United Kingdom's Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict
support of the proposition that customary international law provides for war
Solis also points to the

in

crimes and grave breaches in non-international armed conflicts. 46

Manual as

quotes the

follows:

Although the
sions,

He

treaties

governing internal armed conflict contain no grave breach provi-

customary international law recognizes that serious violations of those

24

treaties
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can amount to punishable war crimes.
of conduct that

Yoram

is

F.
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Murphy
now recognized that there is a growing area

criminal in both international and internal

armed

conflict.

47
.

.

.

Dinstein has applauded reliance on legislative codes and military manuals

as illustrations
als (i.e.,

of State practice: "Irrefutably,

legislative

codes and military

Manu-

binding instructions to the armed forces) are invaluable sources of genuine

State practice." 48

It is

U.K. Manual.

not clear, therefore, whether the position of the U.K. Manual has

It is

noteworthy, however, that Solis

and quotes only the

cites

been adopted in the manuals of other major military powers.
In any event,

it is

letter to the alleged
is

likely that the challenges

two general errors

because the two positions of the

in the

ICRC

contained in the Bellinger/Haynes

ICRC study will not be successful. This

study are so attractive as de

that they will eventually be accepted as the lex lata.

and Protocol II are

Article 3
conflicts,

clearly inadequate to

The

lege ferenda

reality is that

Common

govern non-international armed

and selective extension of the legal regime governing international armed

conflicts to

supplement the current law governing non-international armed

makes enormous good sense. Ideally, of course, this extension should be
effected by the conclusion of new
or the revision of current
global treaties. But
if this method of extension is a mission impossible, as the evidence convincingly
demonstrates, then customary international law methodology will have to be employed, even if there is continuing disagreement as to exactly what that methodolconflicts

—

ogy

—

entails.

II.

Perhaps

it is

Rethinking the Possible Benefits of Additional Protocol II
time for the United States to reevaluate the possible benefits of becom-

ing a party to Additional Protocol

Additional Protocol

II

has been that

should be noted, however, that
tional Protocol

II

As indicated above, the primary

II.

its

when

to the Senate for

its

threshold of applicability

tion of 12 August 1949

do

and

to

all

likewise." Secretary of State

Reagan of December
The

final text

13,

of Protocol

too high.

advice and consent to ratification, 49 he did so

by Article

3

it

will

common to the Geneva Conven-

such conflicts, and encourages

George

apply this Pro-

P. Shultz's Letter

all

other States to

of Submittal to President

1986 describes the reasons for the declaration:

II

did not meet

all

the desires of the United States

and other

western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal conflicts in which
dissident

It

President Ronald Reagan submitted Addi-

with a declaration that read: "The United States declares that
tocol only to those conflicts covered

is

criticism of

armed groups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a
and concerted military operations.

part of the national territory as to carry out sustained

25
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This

is

many

narrower scope than we would have desired, and has the

a

internal conflicts in

which dissident armed groups occupy no

tory but conduct sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area.

ommending

that

United States

will

US

ratification

of excluding

significant terri-

We are therefore rec-

be subject to an understanding declaring that the

apply the Protocol to

all

conflicts covered

by Article 3

1949 Conventions (and only such conflicts), which will include

armed

effect

all

common to the

non-international

conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, riots

and

sporadic acts of violence). This understanding will also have the effect of treating as

non-international these so-called "wars of national liberation" described in Article
1(4) of Protocol

which

I

fail

to

meet the

traditional test of an international conflict. 50

The approach of the Reagan administration, therefore, would resolve the primary problem of Additional Protocol II by declining to follow the provisions of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II that would severely limit its applicability, opting
instead to apply its other provisions to all non-international armed conflict covered by Common Article 3. It also would counter the most unacceptable
to the
United States

—

—

aspect of Additional Protocol

by treating as non-international the

I

"wars of national liberation" that are described and treated in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol

I

turn Additional Protocol
treaty to
teristic

armed conflicts. Such an approach might serve to
from its current status as a basically non-operational

as international
II

one that could usefully be applied to many of the internal

of today's armed conflicts, and a treaty that could enhance and strengthen

the legal regime governing non-international

The

conflicts charac-

report of the Department of State

armed

conflicts.

on Additional Protocol

II,

transmitted by

President Reagan with the Protocol to the Senate, 51 contains a detailed analysis of
the various provisions of the Protocol. In his Letter of Submittal to President Reagan,

Secretary of State George Shultz spells out the ways in which the Protocol

was designed
Article 3

to

expand and

common to the four

conflicts.

refine the basic

humanitarian provisions contained

in

1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non-international

While the Protocol does not (and should not) attempt to apply to such
the protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed

conflicts

all

conflicts,

such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants,

to guarantee that certain

it

does attempt

fundamental protections be observed, including:

(1)

humane

treatment for detained persons, such as protection from violence, torture, and collective

punishment;

(2) protection

rorism of persons

who

take

no

from intentional

attack, hostage-taking

and acts of ter-

part in hostilities; (3) special protection for children to

provide for their safety and education and to preclude their participation in
(4)

fundamental due process for persons against

whom

hostilities;

sentences are to be passed or

and appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and
medical units which assist them; and (6) protection of the civilian population from
military attack, acts of terror, deliberative starvation, and attacks against installations
penalties executed; (5) protection
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containing dangerous forces. In each case, Protocol
cific

II

expands and makes more spe-

52
the basic guarantees of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions.

Hence, application of Additional Protocol

to non-international

II

armed con-

would greatly strengthen the humanitarian protections of Common Article 3,
and, as President Reagan suggested in his Letter of Transmittal, "[i]f these fundaflicts

mental rules were observed,

armed
It is

conflicts could

many of the worst human tragedies of current internal

be avoided." 53

worth noting that on March

White House press

release in

tion of Additional Protocol

of Protocol

I

to

II

which

and

"any individual

it

it

its

2011, the

7,

indicated

Obama

its

administration issued a

strong support for the ratifica-

intention to apply the principles of Article 75

armed

detains in an international

conflict." 54 In

pertinent part, the press release reads as follows:

Support for a Strong International Legal Framework

Because of the

vital

importance of the rule of law to the effectiveness and legitimacy of

announcing our support for two
framework that covers armed conflicts: Additional Protocol II and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva

our national security

policy, the Administration

important components of the international

is

legal

Conventions.

Additional Protocol
trial

II,

which contains detailed humane treatment standards and

fair

guarantees that apply in the context of non-international armed conflicts, was

by President Reagan in 1987. The Adon this Protocol, to which
extensive interagency review concluded that United States

originally submitted to the Senate for approval

ministration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable

165 States are a party.
military practice

is

An

already consistent with the Protocol's provisions. Joining the treaty

would not only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the international community in developing the law of armed conflict, but would also allow us to reaffirm our
commitment to humane treatment in, and compliance with legal standards for, the
conduct of armed conflict.

Article 75 of Additional Protocol

I,

which

sets forth

fundamental guarantees for per-

sons in the hands of opposing forces in an international armed conflict,

is

similarly im-

portant to the international legal framework. Although the Administration continues
to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol
treaty that

is

consistent with our current policies

United States has

Our adherence

and

Article 75

practice

is

a provision of the

and

is

one that the

historically supported.

to these principles

ment of captured

I,

is

also

an important safeguard against the mistreat-

U.S. military personnel.

The U.S. Government

27

will therefore

choose
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out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles
ble to

any individual

it

detains in an international

nations to adhere to these principles as

set forth in Article

armed

conflict,

75 as applica-

and expects

all

other

well.-"

The comments of the Reagan administration and more recently of the Obama
administration would seem to belie the dismissive remarks of George Aldrich regarding the value of Additional Protocol

reported earlier in this essay. 56 In sharp

II,

and Obama administrations state

contrast to the Aldrich position, both the Reagan

forcefully that ratification of Additional Protocol

II

would

greatly

expand on and

strengthen the humanitarian provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. President Reagan pointed out that Additional Protocol
that

any deliberate

armed conflict

is

a violation of the laws of war

and

a

crime against humanity, and

While emphatically rejecting

same time

respect to Additional

ratification of Additional Protocol

humanitarian benefit

flicts.

ate

methods

results

if

I

that could be of

generally observed by parties to international

for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that

of this

and

customary international law.

as

soon

initiative as

as

it is

possible to

armed con-

do

so.

I

will advise the

govern our

Senate of the

58

appears that President Reagan never advised the Senate of the results of his

Obama administration appears to have

administration's initiative. For

its

acted without consulting

— although

allies

Article 75 of Additional Protocol

I

part, the

as

this

is

not clear

an international armed conflict," and expecting

these principles as well."
tion, this

would

59

If this

—

in deciding to treat

binding on the United States and choosing to

"treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to
in

he

We are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop appropri-

military operations,

It

I,

a desire to

devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol
real

is

57

more specifically adopted by the Obama administration with
stated at the

clear

message President Reagan foreshadows the approach

In another part of his

I.

"makes

of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international

killing

therefore also punishable as murder."

Protocol

II

policy

greatly strengthen the

is

"all

any individual

detains

other nations to adhere to

implemented by the

argument

it

Obama administra-

that Article 75

is

part of custom-

ary international law.

As

to

whether the Senate

will finally give its

advice and consent to U.S. ratifica-

hard to be optimistic, because the Senate has so

tion of Additional Protocol

II, it is

many other

issues before

that are likely to receive higher priority. But

the Reagan

and

Senate's giving

Obama

its

it

it

appears

administrations have set forth a convincing case for the

advice and consent to ratification.
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U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol

provisions to any

armed

conflict covered

law in non-international armed conflict

would be an important
vocative essay,

60

in transnational

third parties

—

there

much

3

substantive

would

also

make

of a will-o'-the-wisp. This

less

currently an emerging struggle between "states engaged

conflict [read non-international

courts, international institutions,

veloping and enforcing the law."

III.

Common Article

its

step because, as Eyal Benvenisti has noted in a recent pro-

is

armed

by

and application of

II

asymmetric warfare] and

NGOs, and

civil

—

society

in de-

61

Who Shall Determine the Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts?

As noted

Criminal Tribunal for the former

earlier in this essay, the International

Yugoslavia has concluded in

govern internal

strife."

62

its

decisions that "customary rules have developed to

For his part, Benvenisti

cability of international criminal

to internal

states

emphatically that the appli-

law

armed conflicts must be attributed to the jurisprudence of the International

Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), which has in only a few years of
adjudicating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the law on internal

armed conflicts. By formally asserting the law[']s customary status, the ICTY overcame
63
years of governmental resistance to regulating methods for fighting insurgents.

Benvenisti believes that the increased involvement of various third-party actors,

including domestic courts, foreign governments and courts, international organizations

and international tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global

civil society, in indirect

tutes a

monitoring, lawmaking and enforcement functions consti-

major challenge to

States.

As Benvenisti

suggests:

[T]he intensified involvement of third parties creates a

new conflict between

the con-

more discretion and fewer
and the third parties who insist on maintaining and even increasing constraints in warfare. We might call it a conflict between the "IHL camp," that emphasizes
the humanitarian aim of the jus in bello, which they refer to as International Humanitarian Law, and the "LOAC camp," that wishes to point out that the Law of Armed
Conflict is primarily designed to regulate the relations between fighting armies and
therefore must take military concerns seriously into account. The LOAC camp insists

ventional armies that fight insurgents or terrorists and seek
constraints

that this "lawfare"

is

manipulated by the
sibly fight

by their abuse of civilian immunities. In

IHL camp becomes
rectly

IHL camp is being
who endanger the population on whose behalf they osten-

not only hypocritical but also perilous: that the

terrorists,

a sense,

and

certainly unwillingly, the

a strategic ally of the terrorists because the terrorists benefit indi-

from whatever constraints the IHL camp would impose. 64
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It

is

summary of the arguments of the thirdbecause they couldn't be more in sharp contrast to the

worthwhile quoting Benvenisti's

some

party actors at

length,

arguments advanced by governments, and

their supporters,

armed

metric warfare characteristic of non-international

engaged

in the

asym-

conflict:

and certainly third party norm entrepreneurs, suggest
on transnational conflict must treat the stronger party as repositively protecting the population in the theater of operation from

In general, third party actors,
that the legal restraints

sponsible for

harm because the stronger party often
control over the population. In

fact,

exclusively, has effective

with recourse to

new

—even

if only

virtual

types of weaponry and re-

connaissance tools, with 24/7 presence of unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAV") over foreign territory, contemporary armies often have the capacity to control
activities
trol

the

can perhaps be regarded as virtual occupation. As the law stands, during conven-

armed

tional international

conflict, obligations to

demanding than those toward

This
not

some of

of the population on the ground effectively as an occupying power. Such con-

last

occupied populations are more

foreign civilians in the

combat zone.

point requires explanation: in symmetric warfare, the attacker's power does

amount

to an ability to fully control the lives of the enemy's population.

fending government

is still

in control

and in

The

de-

fact forcefully resists the attacker's effort to

gain exclusivity. Lacking such exclusive control, there

is

no

basis to

impose an obliga-

on the attacking army to ensure enemy civilians' lives (protecting them, for examfrom internal ethnic conflicts). Their army, which is still in control, has the duty to
ensure their rights. Instead, before and during the attack, the attacking army owes a
duty to respect enemy civilians' lives, consisting of the duty to avoid unnecessary harm.
In contrast, the same army will assume the duty to ensure the rights of enemy civilians
when they become subject to its effective control as prisoners of war or "protected pertion
ple,

An obligation to ensure the civilians' rights is fundamenfrom an obligation to respect them, applicable to parties to symmetric
conflicts. The vertical power relations that exist in transnational asymmetric conflicts,
particularly against non-state actors, seem to call for recognizing positive duties towards those civilians, like in an occupation. Such a duty will reflect the nature and
scope of the power that the "attacking" army (during an on-going, indefinite "attack")
sons" in occupied territories.
tally different

has over the attacked population.

The obligation to protect in transnational asymmetric armed conflict, if recognized,
would be quite demanding. It would call for three specific obligations. First, it would
require the consideration of alternatives to military action and the determination of

whether the decision to use force against legitimate military targets rather than exploring non-forcible, or less-forcible alternatives, was justified under the circumstances. In

ad bellum considerations, or human rights law, into
jus in bello analysis. Secondly, if there were no available alternatives, a second requirement would demand that the army invest significant resources to minimize harm to
fact

it

would imply

injecting jus
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army would be required

to conduct a transparent

and account-

able investigation after the use of force.

A case in point concerns the dispute about targeted killing. This policy treats individuals as

military targets per

gets of

se,

given the paucity of conventional

an irregular fighting

force.

individual combatants regard
tion between

them

LOAC camp

The

non-human military tar-

argues that armies that target

as legitimate targets in war, as there

is

no

distinc-

human and non-human military targets. But the alternative view is sensi-

tive to the fact that the laws

regarded the killing of combatants as a legitimate means to

achieve military goals, rather than a goal in and of itself. As the

1

868

St.

Petersburg Dec-

war was not about killing combatants; wars were understood to be
military goals and fighting was to be conducted against
an abstract, collective enemy. Therefore, it was possible to stipulate that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy; That [sic] for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the
greatest possible number of men." Although war always involved the killing of combatants, killing the adversary was never the goal. Applying this logic to the effort to preempt individuals from engaging in an attack would require a consideration of whether
it is possible to disable rather than kill them. This explains why the IHL camp insists on
pausing to consider alternatives to targeted killing; something that is viewed by the
laration envisioned,

fought to achieve

non-human

LOAC camp as injecting irrelevant requirements of human rights law into jus in

bello

analysis.

The tension between governments engaged

in transnational warfare

and third

parties

can therefore not be starker: whereas governments seek to deny or dilute the applicability

of conventional warfare obligations to transnational asymmetric conflicts, third

on their applicability and lean toward imposing even more stringent
constraints, which governments regard as impermissibly endangering their troops
and irresponsibly immunizing non- state fighters. Only time can tell if and how this
parties insist

tension can be resolved. 65

In the rest of his article Benvenisti argues that the growing involvement of third
parties in the

monitoring and assessment of military decisions "raises a third chal-

lenge to the legal regulation of warfare:
the military

commander."

66

the parties to the conflict are
interests of the other

from third parties to

He

how to regulate the exercise of discretion by

suggests that in conventional, symmetric warfare

presumed

to

promote

government involved

positively protect

their self-interests

in the conflict.

mation about such

But with the pressure

enemy civilians it has arguably become nec-

essary for governments involved in non-international
interests other than their

and not the

armed

conflicts to consider

own. He notes that the greatly increased access to

conflicts afforded

by technical advances

in technology

infor-

and im-

proved intelligence allows third parties to assess the exercise of discretion by the
military

commander. He adds,
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If

we accept

that attacking armies in transnational

asymmetric

to ensure" the lives of civilians in the area they attack then
treat all civilians

the

human

state).

It

perhaps they are expected to

with similar respect (obviously, such blindness would relate only to

rights of the relevant civilians

and not

can be expected, however, that the

stating that there

is

no moral or

to the national interests of the foreign

LOAC camp will

legal basis for the obligation to

resist

such a conclusion,

consider other-regarding

considerations in the absence of reciprocity and mutuality of obligations,

no assurance

have a "duty

conflicts

that others are equally

committed

to act selflessly.

when there is

67

In the conclusion to his article, Benvenisti states that

beyond the scope of this essay to assess if and how such a cleavage between two
visions of the law can be bridged and how the law would look in the future. Much
depends on the continued ability of courts, both domestic and international, to assert
positions independent of governments and the continued commitment of global civil
Even the domestic courts of those governsociety to constrain conventional armies
ments that engage in such conflicts resist the demand to yield authority to the execu[i]it is

tive. If

these attitudes persist,

it

can be expected that the recourse to third parties as

partners in the regulation of transnational

armed

conflicts will expand. 68

By way of initial comment on some of the points made by Benvenisti,

it

should

be noted that, although the domestic courts of some governments that engage in
non-international asymmetric

armed conflict have asserted positions independent

of their governments on the regulation of such conflicts, 69 other domestic courts,
including those of the United States, have been quite deferential to the executive

branch's decisions with respect to the conduct of hostilities in such conflicts. 70

good recent example of such deference by U.S. courts

is

the

A

December 7, 2010 deci-

sion of the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a suit brought to

enjoin the targeted killing of U.S. citizen

of Yemen.

71

standing to

The court ruled
bring the suit and

Anwar Al-Aulaqi, who was

operating out

that the plaintiff (AJ-Aulaqi's father) did not have
that the political question doctrine barred the court

from considering the merits of the

plaintiffs suit.

In describing the arguments of third-party actors, Benvenisti states that "the legal
restraints

on transnational

conflict

must

treat the stronger party as responsible for

positively protecting the population in the theater of operation

the stronger party often exclusively, has effective

over the population."

armed

conflicts,

72

many

cases involving

if

only virtual

—control

asymmetric non-international

however, the stronger party has no such control over the popula-

tion. In Afghanistan, for

selves

In

—even

from harm because

among the

example, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces embed them-

general population. Moreover, in Afghanistan,

note, the sovereign

power

is

it is

important to

not the U.S. government or coalition forces, but the

32
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Afghan government of President Karzai. Increasingly, the Karzai government has

demanded

no

that there be

civilian casualties

from drone or airplane

attacks, thus

denying the coalition forces an important military advantage.

Moreover, to impose an obligation on U.S. and coalition

some

third parties, to ensure that there are

no

forces, as

demanded by

civilian casualties in

asymmetric

armed conflicts would be a dramatic change in the law of armed
conflict and would ensure the failure of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan
and in other theaters where the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are operating. The reality is
that so-called "collateral damage" to civilians is unavoidable in armed conflict, and
especially in the asymmetric non-international armed conflict characteristic of today's wars. The current test under the law of armed conflict is whether the collateral damage is expected to be "excessive" in relation to the concrete and direct
non-international

military advantage anticipated. 73

In a recent essay, Samuel Estreicher has helpfully emphasized that "[d] angers to
civilians

during armed conflict are a joint product of both attackers and defenders,

and minimization of such harm

—presumably the overriding mission of IHL

requires establishing the right incentives for both attackers
Estreicher also quotes the observation of W.

War and

the

Protocol

I

Law of War,"

constitutes

Hays Parks in his

and defenders." 74

"classic" article, "Air

that

an improvement

in the

law of war in recognizing that an attacker

should, in most cases, give consideration to minimization of collateral civilian casualties.

The issue is the degree to which an attacker should assume this responsibility.

If the

new rules of Protocol I are to have any credibility, the predominant responsibility must
remain with the defender, who has control over the civilian population. 75
Estreicher elaborates

[i]t is

on

Parks's point

by noting

that

clear that attackers cannot, because of defender violations, claim excuse for their

non-compliance with,
tives to

say, their

duty to "do everything

be attacked are neither

57(2)(a)(i).

But the

feasibility

civilians

nor

feasible to verify that the objec-

civilian objects"

under

AP

I,

Article

inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(i), or the proportionality

inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(iii), necessarily requires that account be taken of

whether defenders have disguised military operations as
deliberately

embedded their

civilian operations or

military assets in close proximity to civilian areas,

violation of defender obligations

under IHL.

He

explains that he uses

33

in

76

In a subsequent, follow-up essay, 77 Estreicher focuses
ple of 'proportionality.'"

have
all

on the

"so-called princi-
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the qualifying adjective "so-called" because "proportionality" in this context

nomer. The actual obligation,

is

a mis-

and 57(2)(b) of AP

as set forth in Articles 51(5)(b)

I,

speaks in terms of prohibiting (and deferring) attacks expected to cause incidental
civilian losses

"which would be excessive

advantage anticipated."
of

text

AP

more

the

The

.

.

.

[T]he "excessive loss" formulation

but provides a sounder,

I

elastic,

in relation to the concrete

more

is

grossly unfair

principled basis forjudging

proposed by some third parties that

if violations

may be brought

would be

to such a standard

to bear

grossly dysfunctional, as well as

of this standard would subject the military

to possible criminal or civil penalties.

will

more

a fortiori a

asymmetric warfare "positively protect" enemy civilians. 79 To hold a mil-

commander

dard

direct military

principled basis for judging violations than

violations than the requirement reportedly

itary

and

not only truer to the

manipulable "proportionality" formulation. 78

"excessive loss" formulation

parties to

is

by third

Hence,

parties to

it is

commander

certain that despite pressure that

asymmetric armed

conflicts, this stan-

be rejected by the governments of States that are engaged

in

such con-

including most particularly that of the United States.

flicts,

IV. Conclusion

The

title

of this essay states there

conflicts. Perhaps,

is

a search for law in non-international

however, a more precise way to describe the current situation

a struggle for law in non-international
this

is

armed

a struggle
conflict

armed

armed

conflicts.

a

foreign governments

wide array of third-party

and

bunals, humanitarian

domestic courts,

and international

global civil society.

third-party actors are promoting an agenda that,
restrict the military capacity

in non-international

actors, such as

courts, international organizations

NGOs, and domestic and

if

as

As noted by Eyal Benvenisti,

between States that are actively involved

and

is

Some

tri-

of these

adopted as law, could severely

of the armed forces of States to deal effectively with

Al-Qaeda and other non-State actors employing various

strategies to negate the

military superiority of the States they are fighting against.

At

least to

some

extent, these third-party actors have

been able to be

influential

because of the inability of States to reform and develop the law applicable to noninternational

armed

update the law
siderations

in

conflicts

through the conclusion of global

treaties that

would

such a way as to resolve the tension between humanitarian con-

and the need

for military efficiency.

The

recent efforts of the

Obama ad-

ministration to carry forward the position of the Reagan administration to have the

United States
will

finally ratify

Additional Protocol

II,

while issuing a declaration that

it

not apply the high threshold requirements of the Protocol and will urge other

States parties to follow suit,

may

be a

first

34

step

toward overcoming the barriers

.

John

to expanding

F.

Murphy

and improving the law of non-international armed

the United States take this step,

and other

conflict.

States follow suit, at a

Should

minimum

it

should allow like-mined States to cooperate to improve the efficiency of efforts

conducting asymmetric warfare, and

to deal with the challenge they face in

could perhaps lead to State practice that evolves eventually into norms of cus-

tomary international law applicable

to non-international

of States like the United States and

its allies

to

win

armed conflicts with these third-party
negative effects on their national security.
international

armed

conflict. Failure

this struggle for

actors

law in non-

would have extremely
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PART III
TYPE OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW

Ill

Defining Non-International Armed Conflict:

A Historically Difficult Task

David E. Graham*

As

the initial speaker

on

the

first

panel of the Newport conference dealing

with non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the twenty-first century,

was asked to do two

things. First, establish the

framework for a broad and compre-

hensive discussion of NIAC by assessing, historically, the
tional

community has attempted

include the issue of whether there

termined whether to designate certain

hostilities as

Lauterpacht:

the law of war

is,

form of

now exist various types of NIAC.
manner

" [I] f international

way in which the interna-

to define this particular

to the U.S. practice with respect to the

In undertaking that mandate,

I

law

in

in

which the United

States has de-

NIACs.

some ways,

perhaps even more conspicuously,

at the

at the

is

at the

at the

I

would think

vanishing point of

international law, then, surely, the law related to non-international
is

Hersch

vanishing point of inter-

national law." And, given the nuances of our current subject matter,

appropriate to add to this statement: "If the law of war

Sir

vanishing point of law,

1

it

conflict, to

Second, speak

was reminded of the words of
is,

I

armed

conflict

vanishing point of the law of war."

* Colonel, U.S.

Army (Ret.); Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and

School, U.S. Army.

The author has prepared

this article in his personal capacity

and does not

purport to represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the

The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.

Army

or

A Historically Difficult Task

Defining Non-International Armed Conflict:

My
what

addition to the Lauterpacht quote results from the fact that the matter of

activities

—and do not—

constitute a

NIAC

making such

an exceptionally conten-

is

The

criteria to

be used

acceptance.

Time and

again these are said to be "evolving." Increasingly,

tious one.
sal

do

advised that today's

in

a determination enjoy

NIAC is no longer the NIAC of old.

tors speak in terms of a scant ten years ago.

Now,

no univer-

we are
And, by "old," commenta-

NIAC

the "traditional"

is

said to

have been joined by what are referred to as asymmetric "transnational" armed conflicts.

2

So, having set forth these uncertainties

how are we

to recognize such a conflict

In parsing this puzzle,

it is

in

when we

see one?

best to cast a large net, beginning with an assessment

of the concept of "armed conflict"

examine the direction

surrounding the nature of NIACs,

itself.

we can then move on to
community has moved in its at-

Having done

which the international

this,

tempt to more closely demarcate the boundaries of what

is

—and

is

not

—armed

conflict of a non-international character.

Let us begin with the fact that, as surprising as

the law of

"armed

armed

conflict,"

Article 2

and

conflict as

even though

also

this

no agreed

might appear, the law of war, or

known, provides no

term

is

both

1949 Geneva Conventions,

and non-international armed

test for assessing

definitive definition of

specifically referenced in

Common Article 3 of the four

deal with international

there exists

it is

it

when

Common

articles that

conflict, respectively. 3

And

certain actions have risen to the level

of an "armed conflict."

Having said

this,

however,

it is

also true that the International

Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on these articles
ically

been looked to

as the principal source

(Pictet's

Committee of the

Commentary) has

of their interpretation. 4 This

histor-

Commen-

when making a determination
non-international armed conflict exists.

tary references identifiable factors to be considered
as to

whether either an international or

The matter of determining the existence of a Common Article 2 international
armed conflict is, in fact, a rather straightforward one. The text of Article 2 speaks
in terms of "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them." The key here is that the use of force by opposing regular armed forces of two or more States evidences an international armed conflict.
The Commentary notes in this regard that the reality of the existence of such a conflict is

simply not affected by the scope, duration or intensity of the

volved. Instead, the use of the term

apply to de facto
actually

hostilities,

might have been.

Now, having noted
conflict

is

"armed

no matter

conflict" in this context

their duration or

hostilities in-

was intended to

how non-destructive they

5

that determining the existence of an international

not that complex,

I

would

armed

certainly caveat this statement with the
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observation that this determinative process
in those instances in

point,

become

which

may become much more
armed

a non-international

"internationalized." This occurs

problematic

some

conflict might, at

when one

or

more

external States

intervene in such hostilities. Given the focus of this article, however, the debate

over the degree of "effective" or "overall" control that a State must exercise over insurgent elements in order for this "internationalization" process to occur will not

be addressed. 6 Suffice

it

to say that the determinative factors related to interna-

armed conflicts contained in Pictet's Commentary really do very little to asor may not be
sist in making a judgment as to whether certain actions may
designated NIACs. And the ability to make such a determination is, of course, our
tional

—

—

ultimate goal.

Given

point in assessing the existence of a

this fact, the starting

essarily be

Common Article 3: "In the case of armed conflict not of an international

character occurring in the territory of one of the

Party to the conflict shall be
sions

."
.

.

.

The

bound

to apply, as a

difficulty, historically, in

nor the commentary to

ance regarding what

is

meant by the phrase

acter." Pictet, himself, has

"deliberately refrained

High Contracting

minimum,

the following provi-

this article provides definitive guid-

"conflict not of an international char-

noted that the negotiators of the 1949 Conventions

from defining the non-international armed

were the subject of Common Article

must be reached

3." 7

Thus,

it

conflicts

which

has never been clear what level of

—and how protracted the

order for such hostilities to be

actions in issue

must be

—

in

deemed a non-international armed conflict. Internal

situations that have reached a very high level of violence have often
certainly by the States in

each

Parties,

turning to Article 3 has been, of course,

that neither the text

violence

NIAC must nec-

which such violence has occurred,

which have not achieved the threshold of "armed

as

conflict."

been regarded,

mere banditry

—

acts

8

This uncertainty has persisted over the years, notwithstanding the fact that

Commentary offered what he referred
determining the existence of a NIAC:
Pictet's

(1)

some "convenient

criteria" for

That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized

military force, an authority responsible for

tory and having the

(2)

to as

That the

legal

its acts,

acting within a determinate terri-

means of respecting and ensuring

Government

is

respect for the Convention.

obliged to have recourse to the regular military

forces against insurgents organized as military

and

in possession of a part of the na-

tional territory.

(3) (a)

That the dejure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or

(b) that

it

has claimed for

itself

the rights of a belligerent; or
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has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the pur-

it

poses only of the present Convention; or

been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or
Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

ul) that the dispute has

the General

peace, a

(4) (a)

That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteris-

tics

of a State.

(b)

That the insurgent

authority exercises de facto authority over the popu-

civil

lation within a determinate portion of the national territory.
(c)

That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and

are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d)

That the insurgent

Convention.

Despite these

civil

authority agrees to be

bound by the

provisions of the

9

have, nevertheless, consistently resisted recogni-

criteria, States

armed conflict within their borders for fear, understandably, of affording some form of de facto status or legitimacy to those responsible for
tion of the existence of an

fostering the violence in issue

an

effort to displace the

—

that

is,

who are engaging in

to those

hostile acts in

de jure government. This lack of certainty and lack of con-

sensus regarding the scope of Article 3's applicability has, over the years, led to at-

tempts to better define

Common Article 3

conflicts as a

means of more

effectively

triggering the law applicable to them.

Protocols I

and II to

the 1949

Geneva Conventions

Each of the protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions attempted to bring more
clarity to activities

armed

conflicts.

10

which were

The

—and were not—

significance of Protocol

I

to be

deemed non-international

to this issue

is,

of course,

its

char-

acterization in Article 1(4) of certain essentially non-international, internal conflicts

as "international" in character

fighting against colonial

and

—

that

is,

"armed conflicts in which peoples are

domination [Portugal's colonies

in

sub-Saharan Africa]

alien occupation [Israel's occupation of territories captured in 1967]

against racist regimes [the then-existing regimes in Rhodesia

South Africa]

in the exercise

While the United
does not accept

—

this discussion

it

States

is

and

(now Zimbabwe) and

of their right of self-determination."
not a party to Protocol

I

and

is

not

— and

bound by

Article 1(4) as

customary international law, for the purposes of

must be noted

that the

ICRC Commentary on

Protocol

that the situations specifically set forth in Article 1(4) constitute

46
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states

an "exhaustive
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character.
nal,

may

of those types of internal conflicts that

list"

11

Accordingly,

apparent that the Protocol has no bearing on inter-

it is

non-international conflicts that do not

categories.

And,

fall

when

as a practical matter,

would meet

conflict that

be viewed as "international" in

within one of these three narrow

has there

last

these criteria? In sum, Protocol

better enable the international

community

to define

I

been seen an internal

really

does very

little

to

and determine the existence

ofaNIAC
Protocol

II

was, of course, the

first

attempt to regulate, by

and means of the employment of the use of force
purpose was to confirm,
tained in

Common

clarify

Article

3.

treaty, the

in internal

armed

methods

conflicts. Its

and expand upon the minimal protections con-

The inherent

difficulty

with Protocol

II,

given our

how to better define and determine the existence of a
NIAC, is the fact that this Protocol establishes a much higher threshold of applicastated purpose of discerning

tion than does

Common Article 3. While Common Article 3

said to apply to

is

conflicts "not of an international character," Article 1(1) of Protocol

applies only to

armed

II

all

states that

it

conflicts

which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible

command,

exercise such control over a part of

its

territory as to enable

out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement

This decision by the drafters of Protocol
conflict, thus triggering the application

objective criteria, has, in fact,

of

NIACs

strict

to

had the

II

them

to carry

this Protocol.

to define non-international

armed

of the Protocol's provisions on the basis of

result

of substantially narrowing the

which the Protocol might apply. The

criteria set forth

number

obviously re-

the Protocol's applicability to those conflicts of a high degree of intensity

The Protocol has seldom been deemed applicable to
the great number of internal armed conflicts that have occurred since its inception,
as insurgent groups have rarely, if ever, been able to meet the stringent requireessentially classic civil wars.

ments of Article

1(1).

Moreover, while Article 1(2) goes on to

state that the Protocol will

not ap-

ply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated

and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts," many cases of internal violence that do not meet the criteria of
Article 1(1) are, nevertheless, far

radic violence.

As a

non-international

bottom

line

is

more

result, these types

armed

conflicts to

intense in nature than are riots

and spo-

of scenarios might legitimately be viewed as

which

Common Article 3

that the criteria contained in Article 1(1)
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should apply. The
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greatly assist, as
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their intent, in

determining the existence of a NIAC. Indeed,

that the high bar of application established

ther excuse for
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governments

to

by

this provision

it

can be argued

has served as a fur-

deny the existence of non-international armed

conflicts within their borders.

summary, then, as a result of Protocols I and II, the Geneva Conventions now
recognize and regulate three distinct categories of non-international armed conthe very specifically identified and limited internal "wars of national liberflict:
In

1

(

)

ation," as defined in Article 1(4) of Protocol

Protocol
(3) the

I

I,

to

which

all

of the provisions of

apply; (2) classic "civil wars" as defined in Article 1(1) of Protocol

ambiguously defined

Common Article 3

II;

and

"conflicts not of an international

character." Thus, despite the stated intentions of the drafters of the Protocols,

might understandably be argued that we have returned to where we started
inability to systematically identify,

with very few exceptions,

occurring within States

may

armed

the case, where

conflicts. If this

is

it

—an

when violent activities

legitimately be characterized as non-international

do we next turn?

The 1995 Tadic Jurisdiction Decision
:

In

October of 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

(ICTY) issued what has become known
sion that

as the Tadic jurisdiction decision, 12 a deci-

many have since contended has considerably influenced the development

of the law of armed conflict. This assertion

ICTY's statements on when, and

in

is

centered on the argument that the

what manner, the basic principles of this body

of law should be applied serve as authoritative determinations on such matters. In-

some have embraced the Tribunal's pronouncements as an almost instant
form of customary law of armed conflict. And, while I am not among those who

deed,

give such weight to this decision, given our stated purpose,

the definition of "armed conflict" set forth by the ICTY:

whenever there

is

a resort to

armed

useful to

"An armed

examine

conflict exists

force between States or protracted

lence between governmental authorities

such groups within a State."

it is

armed

vio-

and organized armed groups or between

13

The Tribunal thus defined non-international armed conflict as "protracted"
armed violence that occurs between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or, significantly, between such armed groups themselves within a
State.

Important, as well,

is

the fact that the use of the term "protracted" in the Tri-

bunal's definition of non-international
that hostilities

armed

need not be continuous.
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conflict can

be viewed as meaning
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armed conflict arChamber opined the

In turn, in interpreting this definition of non-international

by the Tadic Appeals Chamber, the Tadic

ticulated

Trial

following:

The

test

applied by the Appeals

Chamber

purposes of the rules contained in

armed conflict for the
focuses on two aspects of a con-

to the existence of an

Common Article 3

and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not
flict;

the intensity of the conflict

14
subject to international humanitarian law.

These two aspects of internal armed conflict
ber

—the

"intensity" of the conflict

involved in the conflict

—

it

set forth

by the Tadic Trial Cham-

and the degree of "organization of the

might be argued, can

ognition of "de facto" non-international

armed

now serve

conflicts,

parties"

as a basis for the rec-

and thus

for the appli-

cation of Common Article 3 to such conflicts. Support for this view can be found
in the fact that, in

determining the existence of non-international armed conflict

within Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for
cisely this

Rwanda employed

approach, noting that in making such a determination,

to evaluate both the 'intensity'

and 'organization of the

"it is

pre-

necessary

parties' to the conflict." 15

Further endorsement of the reasoning contained in the ICTY's Tadic decision
is

reflected, as well, in the adaptation of the

u

Tadic formula" in the

Rome

Statute

of the International Criminal Court. The second sentence of Article 8(2)(f) of the

armed conflicts that take place in the
territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups." 16 This adaptation originated in a proposal submitted by Sierra Leone and was accepted in
an apparent effort to provide a positive definition of non-international armed
Statute states that the Statute applies "to

conflict. 17

Given these developments, even absent a detailed examination of the exact

meaning of the terms

"intensity" of a conflict

and "organization of the parties"

apparent that a legitimate argument can

now be made that the

to a

Tadic

conflict,

it is

formula

may well have had the effect of lowering the threshold required for the rec-

ognition of a non-international

armed

mains to be seen whether future

State practice will, in fact, sanction the validity of

this

conflict.

approach.

49

Very importantly, however,

it

re-
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"Global" Non-International Armed Conflicts?

At this juncture,

it is

essential to recognize that

all

of the preceding discussion re-

garding the nature and scope of non-international armed conflict has centered on
violence

that

armed

internal
text in

—

hostilities

conflict.

— occurring within the boundaries of

There

which NIACs have

is

good reason

historically

—and

for this. This

legally

—been

is

a State, thus,

the geographical con-

defined.

Common Arti-

"not of an international character" have, since the adoption of the

cle 3 conflicts
1

is,

949 Geneva Conventions, consistently and uniformly been viewed

And no

man-

in this

to

include the United States, has ever challenged this

So, given this reality,

what has recently driven an attempted move away from

ner.

State,

interpretation.

this historical interpretation

conflict?

The answer

of

Common

Article 3

resides in the events of 9/1

Bush administration

1

and non-international armed

and the

resultant attempts

to exercise the essentially unfettered

by the

"wartime" powers of a

unitary executive. This resulted in an unprecedented misapplication of international law, in general,

and the law of armed

conflict, in particular. 18

And, when

challenged by this overreach of executive authority, a compliant Congress failed to
step forward to exercise

its

responsibility to rein in an administration running

roughshod over the law, particularly that applicable

to detainees held in the cus-

tody of the U.S. government.

Recognizing
choice but to

this congressional failure, the U.S.

act.

And, while

it

can be argued that

its

Supreme Court had

little

intentions were good, the

Court's legal reasoning was both faulty and self-serving. In June 2006, the Court
issued

its

Hamdan

Common

decision. 19 Relevant to the topic at hand, the

Article 3 was, in fact, applicable to a "conflict not of

character" then being
tion Al Qaeda.
ter" appears in

conflict
literal

Its

waged between the United

States

and the

an international

terrorist organiza-

reasoning: the phrase "conflict not of an international charac-

Common

Article 3 simply to evidence a contradistinction to a

between nations. "In context," the Court opined,

meaning. And, while acknowledging that "the

[Pictet's

Court opined that

Commentary] accompanying

Common

phrase must bear

this

official

Article

3

its

commentaries

indicate

that

an

important purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protections to rebels
involved in one kind of 'conflict not of an international character,'
the Court then proceeded to note that "the commentaries also

scope of the Article must be as wide as possible.'"

20

i.e.,

a civil war,"

make clear 'that the

In referencing this statement,

however, the Court intentionally chose to ignore the context in which

ment was made. The Commentary

text,

this

com-

following the listing of criteria set forth to

50
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assist in

determining the existence of what clearly can only be viewed as "internal"

non-international

Does this mean

armed

that Article 3

country, but does not

view.

conflicts, reads as follows:

fulfil

is

not applicable in cases where armed

any of the above conditions

.

.

?

strife

breaks out in a

We do not subscribe to this

We think, on the contrary, that the Article should be applied as widely as possible.

There can be no reason against

this.

For, contrary to

what may have been thought, the

reduced form does not in any way limit the right of a State to put

Article in

its

rebellion.

Nor does

An

.

down

21
increase in the slightest the authority of the rebel party.

it

objective assessment of Pictet's

commentary

to Article 3 clearly evidences

the fact that the Court either failed to appreciate or deliberately chose to ignore the
historical

and consistent interpretation of

exclusively

—

internal

armed

Common

Article 3's application to

conflicts occurring within the territorial

boundaries

of one of the high contracting parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In
view,

it

was the

latter.

my

Unwilling to challenge the President's ill-conceived deter-

mination that the United States was engaged

in a "global

war against terrorism/' 22

the Court, in essence, said: "If you seek to invoke the law of armed conflict to in-

you must, at the very least,
afford such individuals the minimal safeguards provided by this body of law
definitely incarcerate individuals seized in this 'war,'

those of Common Article 3." And, rather than framing such safeguards as customary law of

armed

conflict provisions (given

both the administration's and the

Court's disdain for the legitimacy of customary international law), the Court was

determined to posture Article

3's

requirements as a treaty obligation. Thus, the

Court's clearly tortured interpretation of the phrase "conflict not of an international character."

And

was born the misguided notion of the potential existence of noninternational armed conflicts capable of spanning State boundaries. Indeed, the
so

Hamdan

decision has since been cited as definitive proof of this

Court's recognition of the existence of a "global"
3

was said to apply.

not

23

The

—and cannot—speak

reality

is,

NIAC

to

which

given the

fact,

Common Article

of course, that the U.S. Supreme Court does

for the international

community when

it

comes

to the in-

terpretation of multilateral international agreements. Nevertheless, the Court's at-

tempt to

armed
a

significantly

expand the definition and scope of

conflict has unquestionably triggered the recent

new form of conflict now said to be in play

—

This term has been used in different ways.
describe a hybrid

that

is,

a non-international

advocacy of the existence of

"transnational

armed

One commentator makes

conflict."

use of it to

form of conflict, neither international nor non-international

in

somewhere in between and which represent the
extraterritorial application of military combat power by the regular armed forces of
character, but hostilities that

fall
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flicts

as those that

State groups)
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as
ical

a transnational
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non-State entity. 24 Others have identified such con-

occur between a State and a non-State group (or between non-

on the

territory of more than

one

State,

and would characterize these

conflicts of a non-international character." In their view, the

geograph-

element should not serve as the determinative factor in assessing whether a

conflict

national

is

from

inter-

territorial

scope

international in nature. "Internal conflicts are distinguished

armed

conflicts

by the parties involved rather than by the

23

The most cited examples of what these commentators would adjudge to be "transnational armed conflicts" would appear to be the Israel Defense
Forces' incursions into southern Lebanon in 2006 and into Gaza in 2009. While I

of the conflict."

remain unconvinced of either the existence or the need for creation of

form of armed

conflict, the discussion

So where does

this leave us in

of such

is

new

certain to continue.

terms of being able to reasonably identify violence

that has risen to the level of a non-international

mon Article 3, Article

this

1(4) of Protocol

armed conflicts), Article
depending on future State practice,
ternational

I

armed

conflict? In brief, see

Com-

(which transforms certain NIACs into in-

1(1) of Protocol

II,

and,

at least potentially,

the determinative criteria articulated in the

Tadic decision.

Identifying Non-International Armed Conflicts: U.S. State Practice

Now to my second assigned mission at the conference:

U.S. State practice with re-

—

—

manner in which it determines the existence or non-existence of a
non-international armed conflict. Here, I am tempted to simply bring this article

spect to the

to a close with the concluding

conclusion

is

remark "there

perhaps untenable,

I,

is

none."

And while such a premature

nevertheless, believe the statement to be an ac-

curate one.

Hamdan, a product of the Bush adminlaw of armed conflict, the United States may now

Given the Supreme Court's decision
istration's bastardization
feel

compelled to

of the

in

at least give lip service to the possibility

of affording a slightly

broader view of the phrase "conflicts not of an international character." However,

would

see the

government, having given a nod

I

in this direction, then hastening to

community has been unable to achieve consensus on
an agreed definition of non-international armed conflict, and given that a transition from international to non-international armed conflict is often quite subtle in
note that as the international

nature, 26 a decision as to whether any

form of violence has

armed conflict is, ultimately,
armed threat in issue.

into a non-international

ernment faced with the
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—

or has not

—evolved

the responsibility of the gov-
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Having taken

United States

this position, the

those cases in which

it

may

well take the view that, in

engages in foreign internal defense operations (the provi-

sion of U.S. advice and/or assistance to a foreign government faced with an internal
threat

from

or does not

whether

a non-State actor), while the decision as to

—

by the United

constitute a non-international

The bottom

judgment on

line

conflict

and the host government, the United

States

defer to the latter's

armed

is

this matter.

From

armed

is

would

States

ordinarily

27

that past practice indicates that the U.S.

conflict

does

might be made jointly

the issue of determining whether certain combatant activity
international

this threat

completely self-serving, as

approach toward

is
is

it

or

is

not a non-

for every State.

a purely bureaucratic standpoint, a determination as to whether U.S. mili-

tary operations taken against an
a non-international

armed

armed non-State

conflict

might be cited

actor should be characterized as
as a

matter for U.S. interagency

coordination. In reality, however, U.S. practice again reflects the fact that in most,
if

not

all,

cases,

no

"official" U.S.

was certainly the case

in

government determination

both Iraq and Afghanistan

from international to non-international
historically

sought to protect

its

is

ever made. This

as these conflicts transitioned

conflict. Instead, the

United States has

personnel involved in military operations that

—
—

armed conflict or that might arguably be characterized as non-international armed conflict
and has sought compliance with the
basic provisions of the law of armed conflict by its adversaries in such situations
by formally stating that, as a matter of policy rather than law: "Members of the
DoD Components comply with the Law of War during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations." 28
I see no reason to expect a change in this U.S. approach toward dealing with the
matter of MAC characterization in the future. The U.S. government will continue
to make no "official" determinations regarding whether certain hostilities do or do
not constitute non-international armed conflicts. Again, while completely selfserving, it is an approach grounded in practicality and one that has produced a reafall

short of international

sonably successful track record thus

far.
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IV
Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line

between the Jus ad Bellum and the
Jus in Bello

Geoffrey S. Corn*
I.

Introduction

Conflict classification has been and will continue to be one of the most complex issues arising from the intersection of national security policy and in-

From the inception of what the United

dubbed the "Global
War on Terror," experts have been debating the meaning of the term "armed conflict," both international and non-international. The proliferation of remotely piloted warfare has only exacerbated the uncertainty associated with the meaning of
these terms. In response, the concept of self-defense targeting emerged as an ostensible alternative to determining if and when a national use of armed force qualified
as an armed conflict. In essence, this theory averts the need to engage in jus in bello
ternational law.

States

1

classification of counterterror military operations

ad bellum

2

by relying on the overarching jws

legal justification for these operations. Self-defense targeting, or

Professor Kenneth Anderson has called "naked self-defense," 3
legal

U.S.

offered as the U.S.

framework for employing combat power to destroy or disrupt the

* Professor of Law,

ters.

is

what

capabilities

South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. Previously Lieutenant Colonel,

Army, and Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War MatI would like to thank Nicholas Geohegan and Joel Glover for their excellent contributions in

support of completing

this article.
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of transnational terrorist operatives. 4 This essay will question the validity of substituting jus ad helium principles for those of the jus in hello,
is

a false solution to this

The

attack

extremely complex conflict classification dilemma.

on Osama Bin Laden's (OBL) compound

stark relief the

and why this substitution

importance of defining the

military force as a counterterrorism tool.

legal

The

in Pakistan 5

has exposed in

framework applicable

to the use of

focus of the public debate gen-

initial

erated by the attack was the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of the inherent right

of self-defense to launch a non-consensual operation within the sovereign territory

of Pakistan. 6 However, that focus soon shifted to another

critical legal

question:

even assuming the exercise of national self-defense was legitimate, what law regulated the tactical execution of the operation? 7

Qaeda, was

resort?

first

role as the leader of al

OBL a lawful military objective within the meaning of the law of armed

(LOAC), 8 and thereby

conflict

By virtue of his

subject to attack with deadly force as a measure of

Or was he merely an

much more

international criminal, subject to a

limited law enforcement use of force authority?

The

duality of the jus

implicated by the attack generated a two-pronged legal critique:

First,

belli issues

did the mis-

sion violate the international legal prohibition against use of force (Jus ad bellum) 7
.

Second, did the mission trigger the law of armed conflict, or was the amount of

employed during the mission

force

resulting in

OBL's death excessive to that which

was necessary to apprehend him? The self-defense targeting theory

failed to suffi-

ciently address this duality.

The

first

prong of

this dualistic legal

debate touches on an issue that appears

well-settled in U.S. practice: the use of military force to attack individuals

determined to be

how

al

Qaeda or Taliban

such attacks are

belligerent operatives.

legally regulated at the tactical

subject of uncertainty. Both Presidents

Bush and

are

The second prong

execution level

Obama

who

— remains

a

(with the support of

Congress) consistently invoked the inherent right of national self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as the legal basis for attacking

Qaeda

al

operatives. 9

However, the

superimposed an odd veneer on
ing.

10

this authority: the

Invoking the inherent right of self-defense,

resort to

jus

Obama

armed

force

administration seems to have

concept of self-defense target-

this

theory suggests that both the

and the execution of specific operations

ad bellum. In essence, because attacking

are regulated by the

terrorist targets falls within the

scope

of international self-defense legal authority, jus ad bellum self-defense principles

combat operations used to achieve this
obviating the need to assess whether and what jus in bello

regulate the execution of

self-defense ob-

jective,

principles apply

to these operations. Thus, so long as the targets

fall

of necessity and proportionality, attacking them

58

is

within the ad bellum principles
legally permissible.
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Background

nothing unusual about the assertion that the principles of necessity and

combat operations directed against transnational terrorist

proportionality regulate
operatives.

What

11

is

unusual

is

the assertion that jws ad helium variants of these

principles regulate operational execution. 12 Necessity

always been core principles of both branches of the jws
to

and proportionality have

belli

—

principles that apply

both the authority to employ military force and the regulation of actual employ-

ment. However, in the jus ad helium context, they have never before been viewed as
principles to regulate operational

and

tactical execution. 13 Instead, in that context

they frame the legality of national or multinational resort to military force in
defense.

Once

the decision

is

made to employ force pursuant to this

jus in hello variant of these principles (necessity of the mission

self-

authority, the

and proportionality

of collateral damage) operate to regulate the application of combat power during

mission execution (in other words, they provide the foundation for the regulation
of the application of combat power in the context of the self-defense-justified
mission).

This self-defense targeting paradigm
self-defense"

14

—

is

—Professor Kenneth Anderson's "naked

certainly responsive to concerns over the legality of extending

counterterror combat operations beyond the geographic limits of Afghanistan

(and to an increasingly

come

lesser degree Iraq).

However,

it

does not and cannot be-

a substitute for defining the rules that regulate the actual execution of such

may in some ways

missions. This ad helium targeting theory

be responsive to the

uncertainty related to the legal characterization of the struggle against transna-

more precisely the question of whether an armed conmeaning of international law when States employ armed

tional terrorism, or perhaps
flict

can

exist

within the

force to find, fix

and destroy terrorist operations

A subcomponent of this

in diverse geographic locations. 15

question regarding the existence of an armed conflict

is,

even assuming the answer is yes, does such a conflict follow the enemy wherever on
the globe he

may be and does it provide for a "springing" of the LOAC authority for

brief periods of time wherever he

is

Since the United States initiated

September

11,

located?
its

military response to the terrorist attacks of

2001, the uncertainty related to the legal nature of this response has

been a central theme
these questions

in policy

and academic discourse. Although the answers

seem increasingly settled

in U.S. practice (at least in the practical if

not legal sense), questions over the legality of killing
viable alternatives

While the United

—have again highlighted the

States

OBL

— or the

its

59

availability of

significance of this uncertainty.

seems to have abandoned the assertion that

against terror that spans the entire globe,

to

it is

in a

"war"

continued attack of what can only be

Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello

understood
have kept

as targets of

this

opportunity

Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan
of contemporary debate on counter-

in places like

uncertainty at the forefront

terror operations. 16

Various interpretations of what triggers the jus
I'.S.

military response to the terror attacks of September

from

theories ranged across a spectrum

emerged following the

in bello
1

1.

In general terms, these

adherence to the theretofore widely

a strict

accepted international/internal armed conflict paradigm, to the other extreme,
proffered by

me and

others, that military operations

conducted against interna-

Qaeda should be characterized as transnational
non-international armed conflicts of international scope. 17

tional terrorist organizations like al

armed

conflicts:

Within that range were included concepts such
extraterritorial

man

as militarized law

enforcement and

law enforcement (military operations within the framework of hu-

approaches shared a

rights principles). All of these

sought to define the rules of tactical execution applicable to
within a framework of established legal norms.

common

theme: they

this military

response

18

This essay will argue that the concept of self-defense targeting does not and cannot provide a substitute for resolving the debate about
transnational counterterror military operations.
eted. First, the jus

in bello applicability to

The reasons

ad bellum has never been understood

for this are multifac-

as a source of operational

or tactical regulation nor a substitute for the law providing that regulation. 19
Indeed, one of the central tenets of the jus

ance on the jus ad bellum to define jus
ture of tactical execution
in bello.

is

belli

has always been the invalidity of reli-

in bello obligations. Instead, the

de facto na-

the principal factor for assessing applicability of the jus

Second, because the jus ad bellum has never been conceived as a

regulatory framework, using

it

tactical

as a substitute for the jws in bello injects unaccept-

able confusion into the planning

and execution of combat operations.

Finally,

while the principles of necessity and proportionality are central to both branches of
the jus

belli,

meaning of these

the

fact, disparate.

As a

mission execution

result, the

will

principles

is

not identical in each branch but, in

scope of lawful authority to employ force during

be subtly but unquestionably degraded

if

ad bellum princi-

ples are utilized as a substitute for in bello regulation.

A. Transnational

Armed Conflict:

Genesis and Controversy

Transnational armed conflict as a legal term of art was nonexistent prior to Sep-

tember

1 1

,

200 1 Other writings provide extensive explanation of the term's origins
.

and the concept

it

proposed. 20 In essence,

chasm between the two

traditionally

it

was a concept intended

acknowledged

—and ostensibly only—

tions triggering the jus in bello: international or inter-State

non-international or internal armed conflicts.

60

21

to bridge the

Adopted

armed

in the

situa-

conflicts

and

1949 revisions to

Geoffrey

the

5.

Corn

Geneva Conventions, the concept of armed conflict, and these two categories of

armed

manifested an effort to ensure a genuine de facto law-triggering

conflict,

standard. 22 While this did not eliminate

all

uncertainty as to

when

the law applies,

preventing humanitarian law avoidance through reliance on technical legal concepts such as

war was unquestionably the primary motive behind the adoption of

armed conflict law trigger.
This was a profound development

the

history, a treaty-based legal test dictated applicability of

though

originally linked only to application of the

gers rapidly

LOAC.
armed

An

24

became the standard

LOAC application.

were only two types of armed

armed

However, they

Civil

War.

armed

However,

mon situation
not unknown.

it

between

conflicts

and

also learned that there

internal. 26

The

international/

clearly responsive to the

law avoidance

its

inception.

failed to

States

account for the possibility of extraterritorial

and non-State

belligerents. 28

Although not a com-

in the history of modern warfare, hostilities in such a context
29

Nor

that

World War II and the law inapplicability during the Spanish

that occurred during
27

regulation. 23 Al-

Geneva Conventions, these trig-

conflict: international

dichotomy was

conflict

time in

and international lawyers learned
25

This dichotomy was under-inclusive from
internal

LOAC

first

for applicability of the entire corpus of the

entire generation of military

conflict triggers

For the

in conflict regulation.

were

did the armed-conflict-law trigger account for the emergence

of other external military operations involving minimal

hostilities,

such as United

Nations peacekeeping missions. 30 Understanding the necessity of providing a reg-

commanders and

ulatory framework for such operations,

legal advisors thrust

into these zones of uncertainty resorted to policy-based application of jus in bello
principles, a

9/1

1.

31

methodology that proved generally

However,

national/internal

this

approach to

dichotomy

filling

effective in the

decade preceding

the regulatory void created

also averted attention

by the

from the underlying

inter-

issue of

regulatory under-inclusiveness. 32

This under-inclusiveness was fully exposed
military response to al

when

the United States initiated

Qaeda following the terror attacks of September

ll.

33

As the

United States began to preventively detain captives in that struggle, the implicit
vocation of

LOAC

authority

combatant" confirmed

this

became

invocation

clear.

—

34

turn to

hostilities.

However, pursuant

General, President Bush concluded that
these detainees.

36

Qaeda did not

fit

equation.

37

The basis

in-

Use of the designation "unlawful

these terrorist operatives were detained

not as criminals awaiting adjudication, but as
35

its

enemy operatives to prevent their re-

to the advice provided

LOAC

for this conclusion

by

his

Attorney

protections were inapplicable to

was

clear: the

armed

conflict with al

within the international/internal armed conflict law-triggering

Because

al

Qaeda was not

a State, the conflict could not qualify as

61
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international; because al

Qaeda operated outside the

territory of the

United

States,

the conflict could not qualify as internal. 38

This determination was problematic on
lawyers trained to ensure compliance with
erations

no matter how they might be

As

bling.

I

numerous

levels,

but for military

LOAC principles during all

legally classified,

39

it

military op-

was particularly trou-

have written previously, the concept of transnational armed conflict

evolved to respond to this newly exploited gap in legal protections for individuals
subjected to

LOAC-based

authority. 40

The

objectives of the concept were simple:

adopt a characterization for the non-international armed conflict with

al

Qaeda

consistent with the non-State but nonetheless international character of the orga-

LOAC principles; and deny al Qaeda

nization; require application of fundamental

any

from suggesting the

credibility windfall

meaning of the

armed

law. In short,

conflict (within the

it

conflict

was simply a term

meaning of Common

was international within the

to

denote a non-international

Article 3 of the four 1949

Geneva

Conventions) of international scope, what others have called an "internationalized non-international

armed

conflict." 41

Reaction to the transnational armed conflict concept has ranged the spectrum

from

rejection 42 to endorsement; 43 however,

derlying objective

is

it is

important to note that the un-

also reflected in other conceptions of the legal

framework

for

component of counterterror operations. As noted, these include "internationalized" non-international armed conflict and militarized extraterritorial
the military

law enforcement. 44 For the United

States, this

debate was essentially resolved by
Rumsfeld. 45

A

majority of the

Court concluded the term "non-international armed conflict"

in

Common

the

Supreme Court's 2006 decision

cle 3

is

in

Hamdan

v.

Arti-

not restricted to internal armed conflicts, but covers any armed conflict

that does not qualify as international within the

meaning of Common

Article 2. 46

This "contradistinction" interpretation effectively achieved the transnational

armed

conflict objective: a majority of the

Court closed the gap identified (some

might say exploited) by the Department of Justice analysis and
dent Bush.

47

By concluding

national" within the

that

any armed

ian protections of

government

and therefore

Common Article

3,

on by

Presi-

conflict that fails to qualify as "inter-

meaning of the Geneva Conventions

(irrespective of geographic scope)

relied

is

non-international

triggers the baseline

humanitar-

the Court created a simple equation:

if

the

Qaeda as an armed conflict, it must be eior non-international within the meaning of the Geneva

treats the struggle against al

ther international

Conventions. 48 Thus,

it

closed the gap in humanitarian law applicability and en-

sured that future invocations of armed conflict authority must trigger

humanitarian obligations.

49

62
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The Hamdan opinion has
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not, however, eliminated the uncertainty

and contro-

versy over the legal characterization of military operations directed against

Qaeda.

50

Experts continue to struggle with this question, and

to emerge.

between

al

51

It

al

new theories continue

remains indisputable, however, that characterizing the contention

Qaeda and the United

States as

an armed conflict defies indicators

tra-

armed conflicts. 52
Those most notably lacking include a sustained nature of combat operations directed against al Qaeda targets outside the Afghanistan zone of combat 53 (even
loosely defined), and the lack of continuous and concerted hostilities by al Qaeda
against the United States. 54 This lack of "intensity" and "duration" was in fact central to the conclusion by a working group of the International Law Commission
that counterterror operations cannot be properly characterized as armed conflicts,
even of the non-international type. 55 Following President Obama's election, expectations were high that the new administration might abandon the armed conflict theory altogether and revert to the international law enforcement approach to
dealing with the transnational terrorist threat. 56 Not only were these expectations
unfounded; the new administration opened an entirely new front in the legal charditionally applied to identify the existence of non-international

acterization debate. 57

A Third Rail?

B. Self-defense Targeting:
It

did not take long for the

Obama

administration to demonstrate that

it

about to abandon an armed conflict-based approach to dealing with the
threat.
al

58

was not

al

Qaeda

To this date, the United States continues to employ combat power against

Qaeda

operatives in locations both proximate to

hostilities in

force as a

Afghanistan.

measure of first

59

and

far

removed from ongoing

These operations involve the employment of deadly

resort,

an unavoidable indicator that the United States

continues to rely on an armed conflict-based legal framework. 60 The discomfort

with such an expansive concept of armed conflict

What

is

equally understandable

operations makes
ples.

61

armed
for

them

is

is

certainly understandable.

the pragmatic reality that the nature of these

inconsistent with peacetime law enforcement legal princi-

Nonetheless, the apparent aversion to recognizing
conflict

paradigm has produced not only opposition, but

an alternative

sification

legal

This alternative methodology

Anderson.

also a proposal

framework that avoids the need to address the

dilemma: self-defense targeting.
63

some type of "springing"

In a series of essays,

is

most notably attributed

Anderson began

jus ad bellum provides sufficient

conflict clas-

62

to Professor

to proffer the

—and ostensibly

exclusive

—

Kenneth

argument

that the

legal authority for

the regulation of attacks directed against terrorist operatives. 64 This theory has
also

been embraced by Professor Jordan Paust. 65 Although Paust has consistently

63
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an armed con-

rejected characterizing the response to transnational terrorism as
flict

the

00

(based primarily on a classical interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 of

Geneva Conventions),67

mate use of military force

non-State threats.

in self-defense against external

response would not qualify as an armed conflict, because
traditionally

acknowledge the

his position has evolved to

could not

it

fit

legiti68

That

within the

understood scope of the Geneva Convention law-triggering frame-

work. Instead, the jus ad bellum right of self-defense would be the exclusive source
of legal authority related to the response.
Professor Anderson characterizes this theory as "naked self-defense." 69 According to Anderson, this term characterizes the legal basis for drone strikes articulated

by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh: exercise of jus ad bellum

self-

be explained more

fully

defense does not ipso facto trigger the jus in

bello.

As

will

below, in the same essay Anderson signals a significant revision of this theory
retreat

—

motivated by his reflection on the inability to effectively define the geo-

What is signifi-

graphic scope of a transnational non-international armed conflict.
cant here, however,
possible to

is

that the theory itself presents a

employ military force pursuant

defense without triggering the jus in bello 7
.

complex question:
ad bellum national

to a claim ofjus

And

if

the answer

tional legal principles regulate the application of combat

is

yes,

is

it

self-

what interna-

power during the execu-

tion of such operations?

In this essay,

I

argue that jus ad bellum targeting

—or naked

self-defense

—

is

a

flawed substitute for embracing the alternate (albeit controversial) conclusion that

employing combat power
tives

in self-defense against transnational non-State opera-

must be characterized

say will expose what

I

as

believe

armed
is

the implicit

self-defense targeting that these operations
this

do indeed

and proportionality.

principles within the self-defense targeting
in bello

framework

70

belli

LOAC.

will

do

principles invoked

by

trigger the

in bello applicability

I

Contrasting the effect of these

framework with

their effect within a jus

will illustrate that self-defense targeting reflects

knowledgment of jus

es-

acknowledgment by proponents of

by exploring the nature of two fundamental jus

these proponents: necessity

///.

support of this argument, the

conflict. In

an implicit ac-

during operational mission execution.

The Traditional Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus

At the core of the self-defense targeting theory

is

in Bello

the assumption that the jus ad

bellum provides sufficient authority to both justify and regulate the application of

combat power. 71 This assumption ignores an axiom of jus

belli

compartmentalization of the jus ad bellum and the jus

72
in bello.

G.I.A.D. Draper noted in 1971, "equal application of the

64

development: the

As Colonel

Law governing

the
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is

This compartmentalization
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accepted as axiomatic in
is

armed forces and those
modern International Law." 73

illegally resorting to

the historic response to the practice of definingjws in

by reference to thejws ad helium

legality

of conflict. 74 As the jus in

evolved to focus on the humanitarian protection of victims of war, to include

hello

armed forces themselves, 75 the practice of denying LOAC applicability based on
assertions of conflict illegality became indefensible. 76 Instead, the de facto nature of
hostilities would dictate jus in hello applicability, and the jus ad helium legal basis
for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination. 77
This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation. 78 Adoption of the term "armed conflict" as the primary triggering consideration for jus in hello applicability was a deliberate response to the
more formalistic jus in hello applicability that predated the 1949 revision of the
Geneva Conventions. 79 Prior to these revisions, in hello applicability often turned
on the existence of a state of war in the international legal sense, which in turn led
the

to assertions of inapplicability as the result of assertions of unlawful aggression. 80

Determined to prevent the denial of humanitarian regulation to situations necessuch regulation

sitating

—any de

facto

armed

conflict

—the

1949 Conventions

sought to neutralize the impact of ad helium legality in law applicability analysis. 81
This effort rapidly became the
ysis

norm of international law. 82 Armed conflict anal-

simply did not include conflict legality considerations. 83 National military

manuals, international jurisprudence and expert commentary all

opment. 84 This division
pute.

85

In

fact, for

is

today a fundamental

many years

beyond

any military operation.

that States, or perhaps

LOAC tenet— and

86

This

more importantly

is

just

the

another manifestation of the

armed

ciding what rules apply to regulate operational

forces that

and

dis-

self-defense targeting concept.

87

do

fact

their bidding,

as irrelevant

when de-

tactical execution.

This aspect of ad helium/ in hello compartmentalization

by the

beyond

situations of armed conflict altogether so

view the cause or purported justification for such operations

tion

is

the United States has gone even farther, extending

application of LOAC principles
as to regulate

reflect this devel-

Nothing

is

not called into ques-

in the assertion that

combat

operations directed against transnational non-State belligerent groups qualifies as

armed

conflict suggests the inapplicability of

LOAC regulatory norms on the basis

of the relative illegitimacy of al Qaeda's efforts to

and other victim

States (although as

noted

inflict

earlier, this

Bush administration approach to the war on terror).
geting concept reflects an
conflict

law

trigger.

cause to deny

the United States

was implicit

in the original

Instead, the self-defense tar-

odd inversion of the concern

The concept does not

LOAC

88

harm on

that motivated the

armed

assert the illegitimacy of the terrorist

principles to operations directed against them. 89 Instead,
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relies

on the

legality

principles to regulate these
that

operations. w This

might not be

but

explicit,

clear

it is

an exclusive focus on ad helium principles indicates that these principles sub-

sume

in hello conflict

regulation norms. 91

There are two fundamental flaws with
traditional compartmentalization

war concept of LOAC

by contradicting the

this conflation. First,

between the two branches of the jus belli, 91

dangerous precedent. Although there

ates a

and

LOAC

of the U.S. cause to dispense with the need for applying

applicability,

is

it

cre-

no express resurrection of the

just

by focusing exclusively on

jus

ad bellum

legality

principles, the concept suggests the inapplicability ofjus in bello regulation as

the result of the legality of the U.S. cause.

To be

clear,

I

believe U.S. counterterror

operations are legally justified actions in self-defense. However, this should not be

even implicitly relied on to deny jus

against terrorist opponents, precisely because
invalidity of the

may

be viewed as suggesting the

somehow exempted from LOAC

discounting this detrimental precedential
bello principles to regulate the
is

it

opponent's cause deprives them of the protections of that law, or

that the operations are

This

operations directed

in bello applicability to

effect,

the conflation of ad bellum

execution of operations

because the meaning of these principles

is

regulation. Second, even

is

and

in

extremely troubling. 93

distinct within each

branch of the

jus belli?*

Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly

invoked to regulate operational execution

than that derived from their jus

in bello

counterparts,

95

is

more

this conflation

restrictive

produces a

potential windfall for terrorist operatives. Thus, the ad bellumlin bello conflation
is

ironically self-contradictory. In

in bello

one

sense,

it

protections to the illegitimate terrorist

the U.S. cause.
principles

it

96

In another sense, the

enemy because of the

restrictive

legitimacy of

nature of the jus ad bellum

substitutes for the jus in bello variants to regulate operational execu-

tion provides the

enemy with

consequences

beneficial,

tional jus

more

suggests the inapplicability of jus

is

ad bellum/jus

increased protection from attack. 97 Neither of these

nor necessary. Instead, compliance with the

in bello

tradi-

compartmentalization methodology averts these

consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict
regulation. 98

IV. Necessity

and Proportionality: The Risk of Authority Dilution

The most problematic

aspect of the self-defense targeting concept

is

that

it

pro-

duces a not so subtle substitution of jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality for
the jus in bello variants of these principles. 99 While these principles are
tal in

both branches of the jus

belli,

100

they are not identical in

66

effect.

fundamen-

The ad bellum
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variants are intended to limit State resort to force to a
in hello variants are
ity to efficiently

terest

enemy and the humanitarian
associated with armed conflict. 102

bring about the submission of an

a foundational principle of international law that the jws

resort to force

by

is

justification.

104

ad helium

—and

restricts

necessity justifies

103

In this sense, national

strikingly analogous to individual self-defense as a criminal law

In both contexts, necessity requires a determination of an

immi-

nent threat of unlawful attack, a situation affording no alternative other than
help measures.

105

Furthermore, even when the justification of self-help

gered by an imminent threat, both bodies of law

may be employed to respond to the threat.

that

in-

States to situations of absolute necessity

only proportional force to return the status quo ante.
self-defense

resort; 101 the

intended to strike an appropriate balance between the author-

of limiting the inevitable suffering

It is

measure of last

strictly limit the

106

self-

trig-

is

amount of force

States, like individuals,

may use

only that amount of force absolutely necessary to meet the threat and restore the
status

quo ante of

threat

is

security. 107

Using more force than

necessary to subdue the

is

considered excessive, and therefore outside the realm of the legally

fied response.

justi-

108

There is no question that these variants of necessity and proportionality are critical to

the stability of international relations. 109

judgment

The UN Charter reflects an obvious

that States are obligated to endeavor to resolve

all

disputes peacefully,

and that resort to force must be conceived as an exceptional measure.
ited conception of necessity requiring

1

10

A very lim-

an actual and imminent threat of unlawful

aggression serves this purpose by prioritizing alternate dispute resolution modalities

over uses of force

—the core purpose of the Charter.

111

Even

after a justifiable

resort to force, the requirement to provide notice to the Security Council
this

1

12

reflects

purpose by enhancing the probability of Security Council action to restore in-

ternational peace

and

security

and thereby

nullify the necessity for

continued use

113

The jus ad helium proportionality rule also serves this purpose by reducing the risk of uncontrollable escalation. 114 By limiting the justified
response to only that amount of force absolutely necessary to reduce the threat,
of force by the State.

proportionality operates to mitigate the risk of a justified self-defense response

morphing

into an unjustified use of military force to achieve objectives unrelated

to self-defense. 115

As a

result, conflagration is limited,

thereby enhancing the

effi-

cacy of alternate dispute resolution modalities.

These principles make perfect sense when assessing the justification for

a na-

tional resort to military force outside the umbrella of a Security Council authorization.

However,

as operational execution parameters, they

defense model onto wartime
in hello variants

impose

a peacetime self-

employment of combat power. This is because the jus
of necessity and proportionality have never been understood to
67
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function analogously with their peacetime variants. 11

have unique meaning

in the

context of armed conflict.

ply not interchangeable with the

*1

Instead, these principles

117

As

a result, they are sim-

ad bellum variants. As a result, the self-defense tar-

geting concept ostensibly regulates the execution of combat operations with
inconsistent with those historically

and

norms

logically suited for that purpose.

means something fundamentally different than self-defense
the context of armed conflict, necessity justifies a much broader ex-

Jus in bello necessity
necessity.

1

18

In

ercise of authority

— the authority

to

employ all measures not otherwise prohibited

by international law to bring about the prompt submission of the enemy.

cessity.

manner

19

Unlike

no "measure of last resort" aspect to jus in bello neAccordingly, armed conflict triggers authority to employ force in a

self-defense necessity, there
120

x

would

that

self-defense.

is

rarely (if ever) be tolerated in peacetime, even

when

acting in

121

The most obvious (and relevant for purposes of this essay) illustration of the difference between ad bellum and in bello necessity is the authority to employ deadly
force against an opponent. Like peacetime self-defense, jus
justifies a State's

use of deadly military force only as a measure of last resort. 122 In

contrast, jus in bello necessity authorizes the use of deadly

enemy

as a

measure of

first resort.

lawful object of attack. 123 However, once that status
ple of military necessity

124

against such "targets" as a

that justifies

measure of first

clear that this authority in

combat power against an

This necessity justification

through the rule of military objective, which establishes

It is

ad bellum self-defense

is

is

implemented

who and what qualify as a

determined,

it is

the princi-

employment of deadly combat power
resort. 125

no way requires manifestation of actual

the attacking force.

126

sumption of threat

that justifies the use of deadly force. 127 This

threat to

Instead, the status of military objective alone results in a pre-

presumption

itself

indicates the unique function of in bello necessity. This central premise of the jws in
bello

was

reflected as early as Rousseau's 1762 Contract social, in

that "[w]ar

and

State in

is

not a relation between

man and man,

which individuals are enemies only

zens, but as soldiers."

which he noted

but a relation between State

incidentally, not as

men, or

citi-

128

Because armed conflict involves a contest between armed belligerent groups,

and not merely individual
necessity

is

actors, the use

of force authority triggered by military

focused on collective rather than individual

unlike a peacetime exercise of necessity (which focuses
ual threat),

enemy

effect.

129

In other words,

on neutralizing an

individ-

wartime 130 necessity focuses on bringing about the submission of the

in the

corporate and not individual sense. 131 This collective vice individual

focus of justifiable violence applies at every level of military operations. At the
strategic level, nations seek to

break the

will

68
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commanders
seek to impose their will on forces arrayed against them by the synchronized employment of all combat capabilities. 132 The ideal outcome of such employment is
the establishment of full-spectrum dominance, allowing the friendly commander
133
This routo impose his will on the enemy at the time and place of his choosing.
tinely necessitates use of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in the
use that is often far more robust than may be required to overcome resisbattle

enemy

leadership the futility of resistance; at the operational level,

—

tance at that specific point. 134 At the tactical
to paralyze
ity

enemy forces,

of the battle,

level, forces

may use mass and shock

maneuver and adjust to the fluidand demoralize individual unit members. 135 All of these effects
disrupt their ability to

prompt submission of the enemy." 136
Employing overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time of battle
(known as the principle of mass in the lexicon of military doctrine) 137 would arguably be inconsistent with jws ad helium necessity. 138 Instead, a commander would
be restricted from employing any amount of force beyond what was actually necescontribute to "the

sary to

subdue the individual object of attack. 139 Thus, the assertion that the jus ad

helium suffices to justify necessary measures to subdue an opponent misses the
point.

The question

not whether the resort to force by the State

is

is

necessary

—

question that certainly must be answered through the lens of jus ad helium necessity.

140

The question

is

forces of the State to

whether the amount of force then employed by the armed

subdue the enemy

is

justified, a

question that must be an-

swered through the lens of a very different conception of necessity. 141

Even more problematic than the extension of jus ad helium necessity
erational regulatory

norm

ul

And

like necessity, the principle

each branch of the jws

belli.

an op-

the extension of jus ad helium proportionality. Like

is

necessity, proportionality is a core principle of both the jws
hello.

as

143

'

ad helium and the jws

in

has a significantly different meaning in

Conflating these disparate principles into a singular

regulatory norm substantially degrades the scope of lawful targeting authority and

confuses those charged with executing combat operations.

means proportionality. This might
seem like an odd statement, but it is critical when comparing the twojws belli variants
of the principle. Proportionality normally means no more than is absolutely necIn the jus ad helium, proportionality really

essary to achieve a valid purpose. 144
tification

of necessity.

145

Similarly,

It is

a concept that

is

normally linked to a jus-

under U.S. criminal law, actions

executed with more force than

in self-defense

is

necessary to reduce the threat. Use

of excessive force in that context, because not

146
strictly necessary, is unjustified.

are invalid

if

The;'ws ad helium reflects an analogous conception of proportionality. 147 First, the

amount of force a State is permitted to employ in self-defense is strictly limited
to that amount necessary to reduce the imminent threat. 148 Second, the source of
69
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aggression

is

the beneficiary of the proportionality constraint. 149 In other words,

as in the criminal

law context, a State

may be

aggression

from responding

(like

an individual) responding to unlawful

authorized to employ force in self-defense, but

to the source of aggression with

immediate

that necessary to reduce that

prohibited

is

any amount of force

threat.

mean

In contrast, proportionality in the jus in bello context does not really

may seem

portionality. Again, this

cursory review of the jus
First,

in bello

like

of

in excess

pro-

an odd proposition. Nonetheless, even a

proportionality principle validates this conclusion.

unlike traditional proportionality, the jus in bello variant in

no way protects

the object of deliberate violence (the lawful target). Instead, the beneficiaries of
the protection are the
civilians

and

deliberate attack

property in proximity to the lawful target. 150 Protecting these

civilian

potential victims

knowing but non-deliberate victims of a

from what

and incidental injury

referred to in colloquial terms as collateral

is

fundamentally different purpose for

reflects a

this

damage
propor-

tionality constraint. Unlike in the self-defense context, jus in bello proportionality
is

not directly linked to the necessity of subduing an imminent threat. Instead, the

objective of the principle

and property

to protect innocent people

is

in the vicinity

of a lawful object of attack from the consequences of employing combat power
against lawful targets.

As

for the lawful target

might be disproportionate

amount of force determined
justifies

a legal

is

the suggestion that an attack

oxymoron; the

enemy submission, which
resort. 151 The only limitation on

first

the prohibition against the use of

is

status alone justifies that

necessary to bring about

use of deadly force as a measure of

that use of force

itself,

methods

(tactics)

or means

(weapons) calculated or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.

However,

this rule

is

not synonymous with the protections provided by

and

the principle of proportionality,

rarely

is

considered a limitation on the em-

ployment of authorized weapon systems against enemy personnel,

facilities

or

equipment.
Second, beneficiaries of jus
eral

damage and incidental

but from excessive

effects.

bello proportionality

only

in bello

proportionality (potential victims of collat-

injury) are not protected
152

An

when

attack

the

is

unlawful within the meaning of jus

knowing but non-deliberate harm

cessive in relation to the anticipated military

ad bellum counterpart, does
that balance

is

made

is

fundamentally different. Excessive

To begin

will

with, the

is

in

be ex-

advantage. While the principle, like

trigger a balance of interests, the

analogous to disproportionate. 153

more

from disproportionate effects,

its

fulcrum upon which

not,

nor ever has been,

meaning of the word

is

far

elusive than that of traditional proportionality. Proportionality connotes

something

slightly

precise concept,

it

more than necessary to produce an outcome. While this
lends

itself to

is

not a

objective evaluation. Indeed, juries sitting in

70
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judgment of defendants claiming the justification of self-defense routinely critique
the amount of force employed by the defendant, asking whether it was more than
necessary to respond to the threat.
Excessive, in contrast, connotes a significant imbalance.

While the precise

damage or incidental injury remains nearly as elusive
today as it was when the concept was incorporated into Additional Protocol I, 154 one
meaning of excessive

thing

is

clear:

it is

collateral

not analogous to disproportionate harm as the term

lation to traditional proportionality analysis. Instead,

analogous to harm so overwhelming that

it

it

is

used in

re-

means something more

actually nullifies the legitimacy of at-

tacking an otherwise lawful target. Thus, the jus in bello proportionality principle

does not obligate commanders to

strictly limit

against a lawful target to the absolute
Instead,

harm

it

obligates the

harm, even incidentally,

tims of hostilities.
to a

155

In this sense,

commander because

amount of

is

force

when

the anticipated

beyond the realm of reason

so

reflects a total disregard for the

it is

employed

necessary to eliminate a threat.

cancel an attack only

to civilians and/or civilian property

flicting that

mind

commander to

minimum

the

almost as

if the

law imputes an

that in-

innocent vicillicit

state

of the disregard of the risk of overwhelming

of

harm

to the civilian population. 156

This jus in

bello variant

of proportionality

is

further distinguished

from

ad

its

helium counterpart because of the nature of operational and tactical targeting. In a

employment of force (individually or nationally) is justified for the sole purpose of eliminating the imminent threat. In armed
conflict, the potential effect to be achieved by employing combat power against a
lawful target often varies depending on mission requirements. Accordingly, elimitraditional self-defense context, the

nation of an individual threat

is

not the unitary objective of force employment. In-

commanders leverage their combat power to achieve defined effects against
the range of enemy targets in the battlespace, effects that collectively facilitate enemy
stead,

submission. 157 Destruction

obviously one of these

effects.

However, doctrinal

ef-

include disruption, degradation, interdiction, suppression and harass-

fects also

ment. 158 Each of these
achieve;

is

and each

effects requires a different type

effect therefore implicates a

and amount of force

to

very different proportionality

analysis.

This variable nature of justifiable effects in armed conflict
tional terms as "effects-based operations"
in bello proportionality principle,

and

159

finds

—

is

—known

in opera-

a critical factor in applying the jus

no analogue

in self-defense targeting.

Nations employ force to reduce the threat, and only that amount of force required
to

do so

is

justified.

Accordingly,

threat environment, the jus

if disruption

alone

is

sufficient to restore the

non-

ad bellum obligates the State to employ force limited

intensity to achieve this effect.

However, no analogous

71
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obligation exists pursuant to the jus in bello proportionality principle. Instead, each

employment of force is operationally connected to the broader overall objective of
compelling enemy submission. Thus, disruption and bypass of enemy forces may
be a selected course of action at one point in the battle, while total destruction may
be selected for a similar enemy force at another point in the battle. Obviously, these

amount of force employment required,
of collateral damage and incidental injury.

different selected effects will drive the

which

will in

turn influence the risk

Furthermore, under the ad bellum construct, proportionality

is

traditionally as-

sessed at the strategic (macro) level. 160

The importance of this aspect of/ws

in bello

proportionality

is

reflected in the

requirement that the consequences of force employment be assessed against the
overall operational objective,

and not the individual tactical objective.

A number of

macro conception of proportionality in understandings when
Additional Protocol I. 161 The motivation to enter such reservations

States included this

they ratified

armed conemployment against

seems obvious: attribution of the value of employing combat power
flict

for purposes of balancing the anticipated effects of that

collateral

how

it

damage and

incidental injury

in

must be framed by the broader concept of

contributes to the legitimate operational objective of compelling

submission, not through a micro assessment of whether

any given and isolated
once again

reflects the

tactical objective.

all

sufficient to achieve

This aspect of jus in bello proportionality

most fundamental difference between the two variants of

the principle: the beneficiary of the protection
Collectively,

it is

enemy

is

not the object of attack.

of these considerations indicate that extending jus ad bellum

making produces at worst a significant disoperational authority, and at best confusion as to the scope of

proportionality to jus in bello decision
tortion of legitimate

targeting authority. Are forces executing jus

gated to employ

minimum

force to

tack protected by the principle?

ad bellum self-defense missions

subdue the object of attack?

Must proportionality be

Is

obli-

the object of at-

assessed based

on an

exclusive consideration of reducing the threat presented by the immediate object

of attack, or

may the broader impact on enemy forces

tions are nullified

by maintaining the

be considered? These ques-

traditional division

between jus ad bellum

authority and jus in bello regulation. Pursuant to this division, the nation acts in re-

sponse to an actual or imminent threat and the armed forces executing operations

pursuant to that justification employ force in order to bring about the prompt sub-

enemy entity posing the threat. In so doing, they balance the risk of
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and civilian property in the vicinity of enemy objects of attack. But nothing obligates them to employ the minimum amount of force to achieve each individual tactical objective.
mission of the

72

Geoffrey

Broke Don't Fix It: Jus in Bello Principles and Tactical Clarity

V. If It Ain't

As noted earlier
bility

ofjus

Corn

S.

in this essay,

some commentators continue to assert the

in bello principles to the struggle against transnational

cannot qualify as armed

basis that this struggle

graphically restricted to zones of traditional

commentators

conflict,

or that

inapplica-

terrorism on the

if it

does

162

Some

combat operations.

it is

geo-

of these

ad helium self-defense to

also reject the legitimacy of invoking jus

attack terrorists. This rejection at least renders their position logically consistent.

The same cannot be

said for advocates of self-defense targeting: those

who

assert

the legitimacy of invoking the right of national self-defense to respond to the threat

of transnational terrorism, but

armed conflicts

insist

such operations cannot normally qualify as

triggering thejws in bello. 163

ism with military force

is

justified

If,

pursuant to the jus ad bellum, then the use of

combat capability to execute such missions is,
sufficient to qualify as

armed

responding to terror-

as they assert,

conflict.

in the

view of this author and others,

Why is there such aversion to acknowledging

jus in bello applicability to military operations executed to achieve these legitimate
self-defense objectives?

The most obvious answer appears to be the conclusion that

these operations, while justified as actions in self-defense,
tionally accepted elements to qualify as

armed

conflicts.

fail

to satisfy the interna-

164

This self-defense-without-armed-conflict approach reflects a visceral discom-

with the suggestion that States

fort

may

properly invoke jus in bello authority

whenever they choose to employ combat power abroad. Transnational armed conflict

less

opponents argue that since the inception of the "Global

Terror," un-

combat operations fit within the traditional Geneva Convention international/

internal

armed conflict equation, they cannot be characterized

Others (including the author) have responded to

ous

War on

articles.

166

However, what

when connected with
the use of

perplexing

to

by transnational

it is

that this

at

length in previ-

argument

loses

all

merit

defend the nation against an imminent and ongoing
terrorist operatives.

If this is the basis for refusing to

regulation,

is

argument

the self-defense targeting theory. That theory presupposes

combat power

threat posed

is

this

armed conflicts. 165

as

acknowledge the applicability of jus

in bello

the ultimate manifestation of willful blindness. Essentially,

self-

defense targeting proponents implicitly acknowledge operations conducted under
this authority involve

armed

hostilities against transnational

However, they then avoid assessing the nature of these

non-State threats.

hostilities,

and how they

implicatejws in bello applicability, by substituting ad bellum principles to provide a
regulatory framework for operational execution. 167

Professor Kenneth Anderson's latest essay on this subject
ful

on the

validity of the self-defense targeting concept.

73

168

is

particularly insight-

An

(or perhaps the)
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original

proponent of self-defense targeting, 169 Anderson candidly acknowledges

his reversal
to

on

this issue,

and

that

what he

calls

"naked self-defense"

is

insufficient

provide comprehensive regulation to transnational counterterror operations. 170

This

is

an important step

underlying and

critical

in the right direction, for

My

will better focus

opponent can qualify as something other than armed

response to this question has been consistent:

combat power in

a

manner that

indicates

it

not

As

mean

when

has implicitly invoked

(by employing deadly force as a measure of first resort),
conflict.

debate on the

question of whether a nation's resort to force in self-defense

against an external non-State
conflict.

it

it is

a State

employs

LOAC principles

engaged

in

an armed

bound to comply with core LOAC principles. This does
any use of armed forces qualifies as armed conflict. Such a view

a result,

that

171

it is

would certainly be overbroad, and I have argued against this approach consistently
in the past. However, when armed forces employed to achieve a national security

—

LOAC-based targeting authority statusthat combination of armed forces and engagement authority inutilizing the "tools" of war, and must respect, at a minimum, the

objective conduct operations pursuant to

based targeting

—

dicates they are

core principles of the "rules" of war. 172
Irrespective of the relative support for or opposition to this interpretation of

LOAC

applicability,

it

remains a

critical

self-defense targeting alternative.

If,

as

question that has been obscured by the

proponents

like Professor

Paust argue, an

exercise of national self-defense against transnational non-State threats

is

not

armed conflict, focus must be redirected to determine the alternative controlling
legal framework for regulating the execution of such operations. Can national selfdefense be executed with an employment of military (or paramilitary) force falling
below the threshold of armed conflict? For example, are there situations where a
State when asserting the right of national self-defense is obligated by the jws ad bellum
proportionality requirement to rely on police powers instead of combat power?
This seems a particularly
threats.

Terrorism

is

critical

obviously

first

question in an era of transnational non-State

on

that

list

(at least for

the United States), but

organized criminal syndicates operating across national boundaries, piracy and
non-State-generated cyber threats

all

share similarities with transnational terror-

ism. All of these threats challenge the national security of multiple States;

these threats
character;

all

emanate from

entities that are rarely

of these threats

may compel

all

of

organized in traditional military

reliance

on

military force in response.

Yet in the view of many, the lack of organization, territorial control and concerted
military-type operations by these threats exclude responses (even with military
force)

from the category of armed

conflict. 173

Invoking the jus ad bellum as a justification to respond to such threats

is

insuffi-

cient to resolve this important question. Instead, resolving this question requires a

74

—
Geoffrey

S.

Corn

careful assessment of the nature of the threat, the nature of the requisite response

and the very

real

consequences of subjecting operational execution to either a law

framework. Some experts (the author

enforcement or armed conflict

legal

cluded) continue to believe that

LOAC principles provide an effective and opera-

tionally logical

view

this

to regulate

is

is

in attempting to substitute jus

noted above,

arguably no value

—and indeed

substantial risk

ad helium principles to regulate operational execu-

However, there are plausible arguments that the nature of some self-defense

tion.

missions might justify a

of

as

on the principle of military objec-

a use of force that reflects reliance

In those situations, there

tive.

any combat operation. But

based on the conclusion that the key trigger for application of these

is

principles

framework

in-

LOAC

even

more

restrictive operational

and law enforcement

if true,

these principles

principles.

174

framework based on

What seems

would be applied

clear,

as the result

a hybrid

however,

is

that

of the nature of the

threat/response continuum, not as an extension ofjus ad helium principles to regulate

operational execution.

VI.

One Step Forward, One Step Back: Are We Missing Something?

The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S.
legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an articulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of
State.

175

Indeed, the fact that

the jus ad helium

and jus

interpretation of both

makes his use of a website titled Opinio Juris 176 esstatement by a government official in Koh's position

in hello

pecially significant (as such a
is

Koh articulated an official U.S.

clear evidence of opinio juris)

.

Unlike his earlier statement

American Society of International Law,

177

Koh

at a

meeting of the

did not restrict his invocation of

law to the jus ad helium. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was
justified

killing

pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's

was lawful pursuant to the jws

in hello.

Koh properly noted that as a mission

executed in the context of the armed conflict with
obligation

on U.S.

Laden's status as an

forces to

Qaeda, the

al

employ minimum necessary

LOAC imposed no

force. Instead,

Bin

enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure

of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order
to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces
to capture Bin

A
for

Laden before resorting

recent statement

were

in

to deadly force.

no way obligated to attempt
178

made by John Brennan, Deputy National

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,

istration's justification for using

further clarifies the current

deadly force as a

operatives:

75

Security Advisor

first

resort against al

admin-

Qaeda

.
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The United

States does not view

our authority to use military force against al-Qa'ida as

being restricted solely to "hot" battlefields

an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the
have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and
ing a separate self-defense analysis each time.

we are engaged in
position that ... we

Afghanistan. Because

like

.

its

legal

associated forces without do-

.

This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are
focused on those individuals

would cause

a significant

of al-Qa'ida and

bilities

turns principally

We

who

—even
its

whose removal
disruption of the plans and capa-

are a threat to the United States,

if only

—

temporary

associated forces. Practically speaking, then, the question

on how you define "imminence."

community that a more
flexible understanding of "imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist
groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in
the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts
Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recogare finding increasing recognition in the international

nize that the traditional conception of

be broadened

in light

what constitutes an "imminent" attack should

of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological in-

novations of terrorist organizations. 179

These two articulations of the
tional law reflect

Obama

administration's interpretation of interna-

an important evolution of the U.S.

legal

framework

for military

operations directed against transnational terrorist operatives. They leave virtually

no doubt

that the United States has

conflict, that the nation

is

engaged

embraced the concept of transnational armed

in

an armed conflict against

armed conflict is non-international within
transcends national borders. There
the jus in bello as the

framework

Koh's clear emphasis on the

is

the

Koh noted

mate self-defense

may use

is

it

Laden mission.

else.

qualifier that suggests possible uncertainty. Reject-

ing the criticism that attacks such as that
killings,

and that

of the principles of distinction and

proportionality cannot be read as meaning anything

Koh, however, included one

bello

this

that the United States invoked

to regulate execution of the Bin

in bello variants

Qaeda, that

meaning of the jus in

no doubt

also

al

that "a state that

is

on Bin Laden

engaged

in

are unlawful extrajudicial

an armed conflict or in

legiti-

not required to provide targets with legal process before the

lethal force." 180

What

the "or" in the statement.

Koh

preserved a division between armed conflict and other actions in legitimate

self-

state

defense.

It is

is

perplexing

significant that he asserts the right to

is

kill

as a

measure of first

either context (which

seems to rebut any inference that he

tions in self-defense

must be exercised pursuant

76

is

suggesting

to a law

resort in

some

enforcement

ac-

legal

Geoffrey

framework).

Why was that "or" necessary? What was Koh suggesting if he was not
some

suggesting a law enforcement limitation to

One

Corn

S.

possible answer

is

Koh

that Advisor

is

actions in self-defense?

simply preserving the authority of

the United States to act in limited self-defense against an
that

is

not considered associated with

al

Qaeda or

imminent terrorist

threat

the Taliban. In such situations,

armed conflict the United
States asserts is ongoing with these enemies. If this was the meaning of his use of the
"or," it produces little confusion: imminent terrorist threats to the United States
may justify military action as an exercise of jus ad bellum self-defense, and use of
the attack would accordingly be unrelated to the existing

force for such a purpose triggers

armed

conflict

applicability.

from self-defense with an "or" could

dorsement of self-defense
lated

LOAC

by the jus

However, distinguishing

also

be interpreted as an en-

targeting, suggesting that uses of military force are regu-

ad bellum

in hello or jus

dichotomy, and hopefully one that Advisor

principles. This

is

an unnecessary

Koh did not intend. There is no viable

reason to attempt to establish such a distinction; as discussed in this essay, the suggestion that ad bellum principles are interchangeable with their in bello variants

flawed and operationally confusing.

VII.

Conclusion

Transnational non-State threats are not going away any time soon. Indeed,
likely that identifying a rational

is

181

and credible

legal basis for national

it is

response to

such threats will continue to vex policymakers and legal advisors in the coming years.

These threats

will

almost certainly lead States to continue to invoke the inherent

right of national and/or collective self-defense to justify extraterritorial responses.

This legal basis

work
less,

is

not, however, an adequate substitute for defining the legal frame-

to regulate the operational exercise of this self-defense authority.

Nonethe-

the advent of the self-defense targeting theory purports to be just that.

The jus ad bellum was never conceived
cution of military operations. Instead,
viduals to act in self-defense

when

as a legal

it is

framework to regulate the exe-

analogous to the law that permits indi-

faced with an

imminent

threat of death or

grievous bodily harm. Like the domestic self-defense concept, jus ad bellum

self-

defense reflects a necessity foundation based on minimizing situations where
States resort to force

and limiting the

sort. Self-defense, as a

risk of conflagration resulting

form of self-help,

is

from such

re-

intended to be a measure of last resort,

and Xhtjus ad bellum principles of necessity and proportionality reflect

that foun-

on

dation. In contrast, the jus in bello variants of these

two principles

fundamentally different foundation:

prompt submission of opera-

tional

opponents

in the collective

facilitating the

— not individual—
77

are based

a

sense. Accordingly, the scope
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of permissible violence justified by the jus in bello
that tolerated

is

fundamentally different from

through the exercise of peacetime self-defense.

Attempting to substitute jus ad helium principles for their jus
is

not only confusing;

in bello variants

fundamentally degrades target engagement authority.

it

As discussed in this essay, this degradation is the result of imposing peacetime
concepts on wartime operations. It may be conceivable that some actions in selfdefense

—

especially in response to non-State threats

enforcement-type response. For example,
gan engaging

in violence

some action

of the President,
to

on the U.S.

augment law enforcement

if

— may permit only

to neutralize this threat,

armed

forces

judgment

might be used

during a mission to capture cartel members

for subsequent trial. In such a situation, the use of armed force

enforcement-type use of force authority. However, even

to law

law

members of Mexican drug cartels be-

side of the border requiring, in the

officers

a

might be subject
if

such situations

are conceptually lodged within the scope of national self-defense authority, this

abandonment of jus in bello principles. Instead, the nature of the threat and the authority invoked by the State to respond to that threat
must dictate the existence of armed conflict. When States utilize armed forces and
grant them the authority to engage opponents pursuant to the LOAC rule of milicannot

justify the wholesale

tary objective

—an invocation revealed by the employment of deadly
—
the
of an armed

measure of first
in bello,

resort

it

existence

indicates

and not thejws ad bellum,

that

must

force as a

conflict. It

is

the jws

regulate such operations.
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39, 114 (2010) (noting that a property's "status as a military objective justifies attacks being

directed against

it").

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 1 1 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1913) (1762).
129. See Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 831,
904-5 (2010) ("the principle of military necessity as defined in national military manuals is addressed to governments and senior military commanders and does not intend to restrict the in128.

dividual soldier's use of force against the enemy").

This term

130.

is

used colloquially to indicate situations of armed conflict that trigger the jus

in bello.

131.
132.
inafter

See Melzer, supra note 129, at 904-5.
See Headquarters, Department of the

FM

100-5]

("Commanders

Army,

set favorable

FM

100-5, Operations 6-15 (1993) [here-

terms for battle by synchronizing ground,

air,

and special operations capabilities to strike the enemy simultaneously throughout
and operational depths.").
Id. at 2-6 ("Army forces in combat seek to impose their will on the enemy.").
See generally id. at 8-4 (the term "overwhelming combat power" and nearly identical

sea, space,

his tactical

133.

134.

terms are used twenty-two times over the course of the manual).
135.

Id.

("The attack must be violent and rapid to shock the enemy and to prevent

his recov-

ery as forces destroy his defense.").
136.

AFP

110-31, supra note 119, at 1-5-1-6 (The U.S. Air Force defines military necessity as

the "principle which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by international law
for securing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possieconomic and human resources.").
137. FM 100-5, supra note 132, at 2-4 ("Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at
the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will
have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass.").
138. See Sloane, supra note 1 1, at 84 (stating ad bellum necessity allows for only the use of
force necessary to rebut a current and immediate threat).

which are indispensable
ble expenditures of

139.

Id.

140.

Michael N. Schmitt, The Resort

to

Force in International Law: Reflections on Positivist

and Contextual Approaches, 37 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW
sity queries whether force was necessary at all.").

88

105,

1

16 (1994) ("Jus ad bellum neces-

Geoffrey

141.

M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and

Jill

Law Prohibit

the Use of Nuclear

Weapons

5.

the

Corn
Laws of War: Does Customary International
20 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL

in All Circumstances?,

LAW JOURNAL
conflict

is

sidering

if

181, 239 (1996) (discussing how the amount of force that should be used in a
determined by balancing military necessity and humanitarian concerns and by con-

the goal of harming the

enemy can be achieved by causing

less suffering).

See Sloane, supra note 1 1, at 52-53 (discussing both ad helium and in hello proportionand at 67 ("Any use of force must be necessary and proportional relative to both the jus
ad bellum and the jus in bello.").
143. Id. at 73 (discussing proportionality's "distinct ad helium and in hello components").
144. Just War Theory, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/
142.

ality)

justwar/#H2

ment of
attack,

.

.

(last visited

Oct. 10, 2011); see also Taft, supra note 19, at 305 ("[P]roper assess-

proportionality

.

but also

at

whether

.

taken to deter future attacks,

require [s] looking not only at the immediately preceding

.

.

it

armed

was part of an ongoing series of attacks, what steps were already
and what force could reasonably be judged to be needed to suc-

cessfully deter future attacks.").

145.

Taft, supra note 19, at

303

("[I]t is generally

understood that the defending

State's ac-

must be both 'necessary' and 'proportional.'"). See also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 150 (3d ed. 2008) ("It is not clear how far the two
tions

concepts can operate separately.
and,

not proportionate,

if it is

146.

it is

is

use of force

difficult to see

is

not necessary,

how it

Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr.,

ed. 1986) (self-defense justifies

actor

If a

2

it

cannot be proportionate

can be necessary.").

Substantive Criminal

only the use of force that

is

Law §

reasonably related to the

10.4 (2d

harm

the

seeking to avoid).

147.

YORAM

148.

Id.

149.

Id.

DINSTEIN,

WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 217

(1988).

YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 19-25 (2004).
151. See AP I, supra note 85, art. 52(2). See also Blank & Farley, supra note 121. Some con150.

See

AP

I,

supra note 85,

temporary scholarship
against

asserts that

enemy belligerents

See also

art. 51.

an implicit proportionality restriction applies to attacks

an aspect of the general principle of humanity

as

of the jus in bello attenuated from operational logic and one
Geoffrey
Rights

S.

Corn, Mixing Apples and

Norms

to

Armed

Conflict,

Studies 30 (2010).
152. API, swpranote85,
153.

1

Hand

I

—an interpretation

have addressed previously. See

Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying

Human

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL

art. 51.

Definition of Excessive,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
what is usual, proper, necessary, or normal");
MERRIAM- WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

excessive (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) ("exceeding
Definition of Disproportionate,

disproportionate

(last visited

Oct. 10, 2011) ("being out of proportion"). See also

COMMEN-

TARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 124, If 1979.
154. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW

1,

171-76

AP I).
also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,

(1990) (discussing the use of "excessive" in
155.

AP

I,

supra note 85,

art. 57.

See

2204-15 (commentary on Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(a)(iii)).
Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the
LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337, 365 (2012)
("When a commander launches such an attack with awareness that the unintended harm to

supra note 124,
156.

Tflj

Geoffrey

S.
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of creating the risk (achieving the military

civilians will be excessive in relation to the benefit

objective), the law essentially

imputes to the commander the intent to engage

in

an indiscrimi-

nate attack.").
157. Corn, supra note 151, at 37; see also Jerrett W. Dunlap Jr., The Economic Efficiency of t lie
Army's Maneuver Damage Claims Program, 190/191 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1, 37 (2006/2007)
(discussing training events and the ways in which commanders prepare to accomplish their

mission
158.

when deployed).
Corn & Corn, supra note

156, at 362 ("it

is

effect of an attack need not be total destruction [;]

ploying indirect
tion,

fire assets

clear that the law recognizes that the desired
.

.

.

[f]or

example, a doctrinal mission em-

serves the purpose of not only target destruction, but also disrup-

harassment, and degradation").

159.

Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting 1-8 (2007), available at http://

www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_60(07).pdf.

While the Oil Platforms decision, supra note 19, by the International Court of Justice
"macro" assessment perspective into question, it is this aspect of the decision
that has triggered the most criticism. See Taft, supra note 19, at 302-3. The ICJ's application of
international law moves away from widespread, accepted understanding of self-defense targeting. Id. Generally, so long as the actions of one State affect another State, self-defense is warranted. Id. Whether the inciting State acted indiscriminately is irrelevant. Id. See also Ruth
Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self- Defense,
160.

(ICJ) calls this

99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
logic" applied
161.

by the ICJ

52, 57 (2005) (addressing the "questionable

in Oil Platforms regarding self-defense).

Australia, Belgium,

Spain and the United

LAW

Canada, France, Germany,

Kingdom

all

the Netherlands,

Italy,

New

included an understanding in their ratification to

Zealand,

AP

I

that

and 57 is to be considered as a whole and not
examined on an individual attack basis. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (then follow date of Reservation hyperlink for each
the "military advantage" referenced in Articles 51

country)
162.

(last visited

See

SECURITY

Mary

LAW

Oct. 10, 201

1 ).

Ellen O'Connell, Defining

Armed

Conflict,

13

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT &
armed conflict against ter-

393, 393-95 (2008) (asserting that the United States'

Graham, The Dual U.S. Standard for
the Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN LAW
JOURNAL 325, 331 (2009) (asserting terrorism and armed conflict are two separate things, governed by their own sets of laws); Rona, supra note 53, at 64-65 (stating American targeting of
terrorists in Yemen in 2002 was not part of an armed conflict between the United States and
ror

is

limited to Iraq and Afghanistan). See also David E.

terrorism).
163.

See Paust, supra note 62, at 251-52 (supporting the United States' use of force in

self-defense outside

its

own

territory even outside the existence of a "relevant international or

non-international armed conflict").
164.

See generally Final Report

on the Meaning of Armed

Conflict, supra note 53, at 10-18

(adopting a definition of armed conflict that requires satisfaction of both organization and intensity of hostilities elements).
165.

Rona, supra note 53,

at

60-65 (analyzing the

of armed conflict and finding they

Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Legal Case Against the War
WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 352-57 (2004)

don't always apply to the war on terror);

on Terror, 36 CASE

traits

90

Geoffrey

(arguing against a global war

armed

on

5.

terror because

it

Corn
does not meet traditional Geneva ideas of

conflict).

166.

See generally Corn, supra note 20; Delahunty

&

Yoo, supra note 20;

Farley, supra note 121. See generally Balendra, supra note

constitutes an
167.

armed

42 (the entire

Blank

see also

article discussing

&

what

conflict).

See Paust, supra note 62, at 258-60 (stating the United States does not need to be at war

armed conflict with, al Qaeda to use force in self-defense, that use of
outside the scope of an armed conflict would not be governed by ad helium principles).

with, or involved in an
force

168.

See generally Anderson, supra note

169.

See generally Anderson, supra note 63.

170.

See Anderson, supra note

3, at 8

3.

("The invocation of naked self-defense does not lower

would be

the standards-of-care conduct in the use of force below what the uniformed military

required to do in a formal state of armed conflict. Rather,

merely locates them in customary

it

law rather than in the technical law of armed conflict.")
171.

Corn

8c

Jensen, supra note 12, at 56-57, 75-76; Eric T. Jensen, Applying a Sovereign

Agency Theory of the Law of Armed
685,692-701 (2012).
172.

See generally

Corn

CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Conflict, 12

& Jensen, supra note

17. In this article, the

authors address the

com-

plex question of distinguishing constabulary uses of military force (for example, deployment of

armed

forces in the context of a peacekeeping mission)

LOAC

principles.

It is

from uses of armed

force that trigger

suggested that the nature of the use of force authority granted to the

forces to execute the mission

is

a key indicator of the line

between armed

conflict

and other

uses of military force falling below that threshold. In so doing, the authors categorically reject
the suggestion that any use of armed force abroad triggers

LOAC applicability. Instead, analysis

of the nature of the mission and the scope of authority employed will drive this determination.
The authors recognize this is not a talisman; however, they believe that this approach provides a
more operationally realistic method of assessing when compliance with humanitarian constraints

is

legally obligatory

than the elements approach.

on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, supra note 53.
Committee
against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 769/
e.g.,
02, Judgment (Dec. 13, 2006), 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf. In this case, which concerned the legality of targeted killings, the Israel High Court of Justice ultimately decided that it
173.

See generally Final Report

174. See,

Public

cannot be determined in advance that every targeted
ary international law, but

it

also

killing

is

prohibited according to custom-

cannot be determined in advance that every targeted

lawful under customary international law. Each circumstance

must be examined on

killing

is

a case-by-

case basis.
175.

Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the

OPINIOjURIS(May

19, 2011),

U.S. Operations Against

Osama

bin Laden,

http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us

-operation-against-osama-bin-laden/ ("[B]in Laden continued to pose an imminent threat to
the United States that engaged our right to use force, a threat that materials seized during the
raid have only further

documented. Under these circumstances, there

is

no question

that he

presented a lawful target for the use of lethal force.").
176.

Id.

Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and Inter177.

national

Law (Mar.

25, 2010), http://www.state.gOv/s/l/releases/remarks/1391 19.htm.
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Koh, supra note 175 ("The laws of armed conflict require acceptance of a genuine ofis clearly communicated by the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer
of surrender. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force against an
enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here.").
178.

fer

of surrender that

Brennan, supra note

79.

1

9.

180.

Koh, supra note 177.

181.

One

possible explanation

The

fact that the

looked.

Operations

cial

is

that

Koh may be

hinting at a consideration generally over-

Director of Central Intelligence (and not the

Command)

directed the Bin Laden mission

is

Commander of U.S.

Spe-

one of the most interesting

aspects of the publicly disclosed information about the mission. Concerning the prior wide-

spread reference to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone operations program,

David

S.

see, e.g.,

Cloud, CIA Drones Have a Widened Focus across Pakistan: Since 2008, the Agency Has

Been Allowed

to Kill

Unnamed

Suspects,

PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May

9,

2010, at A6. See

US Drone Strike Kills 20 in Pakistani Tribal Area, Say Intel Officials, WATERLOO CHRONICLE, Jan. 17, 2010, at I; Ken Dilanian, CIA Drones Joining Fight Inside
Yemen, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 15, 2011, at 18. This revelation was not particularly remarkalso Associated Press, Suspected

However, like the drone program itself, it does raise serious questions related to the legality of employing civilian intelligence personnel to execute missions under the rubric of;'ws ad
bellum self-defense. See Mary O'Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 325, 327-38 (2003) (discussing the legality of CIA operatives using drones to kill suspected al Qaeda operatives in
Yemen); Dave Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
able.

WILLIAM AND MARY Law REVIEW 957, 958 (2009) (stating under certain conditions the military
but not the CIA can legally kill or detain suspected terrorists under the law of war);
Gary Solis, Americas Own Unlawful Combatants, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17
(citing the illegality of the CIA's use of drones to kill members of al Qaeda). Perhaps that "or" is
a reference to some type of legal division that exists between self-defense operations executed
by the armed forces and those executed by the CIA. Is Koh's statement part of an effort to shield
the use of CIA operatives from the "lawful belligerent" requirement of the jus in bello, and to
suggest that CIA operations, while justified pursuant to the jus ad bellum, are technically not
part of the armed conflict with al Qaeda?

—

—

If this is

the genesis of Koh's "or,"

late the legal

it

should be explicitly acknowledged and he should articu-

theory for the use of deadly force outside the context of armed conflict. The relative

merits of such a theory are well beyond the scope of this essay. However,
sider
this

how

interesting to con-

may be

apparent attempt to preserve some jus ad bellum targeting carved out from jus

cability.

It is

well

known

that

Act of 2006 (as amended)

is

(2009) ("Murder in violation of the law of war.

shall

influencing

in bello appli-

one of the most contentious offenses in the Military Commission
murder in violation of the law of war. See 10 U.S.C. § 950(t)(15)

Any person subject to this chapter who intention-

one or more persons, including privileged belligerents, in violation of the law of war
be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chap-

ally kills

ter

it is

the U.S. view of war crimes liability for unprivileged belligerents

may direct.").
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V
War and Peace: Where Is the Divide?

Charles Garraway

5

Regarding the rules of warfare, whether we think of Hugo Grotius
Belli

ac Pacis),

1

Oppenheim

(International Law:

A

(De Jure

Treatise) 1 or Tolstoy

(War and Peace)? we look back at an earlier age. A hundred years ago, there was
war and there was peace. Each was clearly identifiable and subject to its own rules.
To codify one area, in 1907, the Hague Peace Conference agreed upon a Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (Hague Convention III). 4 For centuries, there
had been customary

rules dealing with armistices, capitulation, surrender

and the

The laws of war were applicable in the period between the
opening of hostilities and the restoration of peace.
The middle of the twentieth century began to place this system under strain.
States had sought to avoid the application of the laws of war by denying that hostilities amounted to a "war" within the legal definition. The Geneva Conventions of
19495 attempted to resolve this problem by changing the application threshold
from "war," with its legal technicalities, to "armed conflict," a factual assessment.
The spotlight turned from the initial threshold to a new problem. Whereas "war"
had always been looked upon as the use of force between States, the nature of
armed conflict was different. No longer did States hold a monopoly of violence.
The end of colonialism and the Cold War led to war by proxy, often fought between armed groups within a State fighting for control of that State. Sometimes,
restoration of peace.
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a Fellow of
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one group represented the recognized government fighting an insurgency; in other
cases, the fight was between groups and each might have recognition from States
on

different sides of the ideological divide.

known,

the laws of armed conflict, were

still

The laws of war, or

as they

were

now

primarily a matter of treaty law, appli-

cable only to wars between States,

now

limited provisions applied to these

new internal armed conflicts, now referred to as

non-international

and non-international armed

on extending the

the other hand, working

Only

conflicts.

on

conflict and,

rules applicable to non-international

conflict.

However,

come

armed

armed conflicts. The key issues became, on the one hand, defining

the distinction between international

armed

called international

in recent years, the initial threshold of

relevant. This has

armed

conflict has again be-

been caused to some extent by the success of those

who

have sought, for humanitarian reasons, to merge the rules relating to international

and non-international armed

conflict,

but also by politicians,

who have

sought to

take advantage of the greater freedom of action normally granted to States in time

of war by seeking to apply the laws of war in areas beyond their traditional

The tensions have

led to a debate that has suffered

ferent sides to understand

eted

and

in

some

article will seek to

room

for a

competing

at

how

been

lost in

will

It

has

inability

become

by dif-

multifac-

confusion over vocabulary. This

the problems have arisen

comprehensive approach that

and whether there

accommodate

to

some

extent

is still

all

the

factions.

In order to find a solution,

has arisen. As

it

it is

first

necessary to identify the problem and

has arisen from two separate confrontations, this

cated than usual; however, the attempt

arguments that have led
tional

seeming

a

where others are coming from.

cases issues have

look

from

field.

to the increasing

and non-international armed

As we have

must be made.

First, let

tional law involved States

us look at the legal

conflict.

was seen

and

more compli-

merger of the law relating to interna-

seen, this first arose as an issue after the

that time, the use of violence

is

how it

as the

not, for the

Second World War. Until

monopoly of States.

most

Similarly, interna-

part, private individuals.

The laws

of war therefore dealt with wars between States and what went on within the

boundaries of a State was for that State alone and not a matter for the international

community. This
where

is

to

some

extent reflected even in the United Nations Charter,

Article 2(7) states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
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Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures

under Chapter VII. 6

Sovereignty continued to rule but the

first

chink in the impregnability of the State

sovereignty doctrine could be seen here. Even sovereignty could not act as a shield
against action

munity,

The
no

by the Security Council, acting on behalf of the international com-

when using

lessons of the

longer,

if

its

powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.

War had shown quite clearly that States could
be trusted entirely to protect their own citizens. The

Second World

they ever could,

Holocaust was the ultimate betrayal of the duty to protect. While Article 2(7) created a small opportunity for intervention, lawyers were also working to see

if

the

work was in two strands.
Red Cross (ICRC), working

laws protecting peoples could also be strengthened. This

On the one hand, the International Committee of the
on

revisions of the law protecting victims of war,

tection

saw the need

to extend that pro-

down into non-international armed conflicts. At the same time, the United

Nations, reluctant as an organization pledged to the abolition of war to involve
self in revision

of the laws of war, sought to develop a

new branch

law designed to protect the individual from the powers of the
rights law, conceived in the cauldron of two

from the laws of war and seen,
rate

it-

of international

State.

Thus human

world wars, was developed separately

in essence, as part of the

law of peace.

It is

the sepa-

but contemporaneous development of these two powerful branches of inter-

national law that has contributed both to the increased legal protection available to
individual victims of

armed

conflict,

and

also to a

growing overlap between the

laws of war and the laws of peace. That overlap has, for the most part, been mutually beneficial,

but as the laws of war and

human

rights

law have expanded into

each other's "territory," tensions have occurred. These tensions
diately apparent

and indeed

for

many

may not be imme-

years have lain comparatively unexposed,

but recent political events, particularly "9/11" and the subsequent "war on terror,"

have exposed these tensions to view.
ist,

but

I

would suggest

Some still refuse to accept that the tensions ex-

that if we are to bring these

two branches into coexistence,

then the tensions must be faced and dealt with.

we need to see how the tensions have developed.
The ICRC had already been seeking to strengthen the laws relating to victims of
armed conflict prior to the Second World War. As a result, it was well placed to
make progress in developing "Geneva" law and gained the international commuFirst

nity's

agreement to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 7 These are often seen

the bedrock of

modern

international humanitarian law, but, again, they ap-

proached matters essentially from the viewpoint of the protection of victims.
ever, the

ICRC failed

in

as

one of its major

objectives.
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How-

The ICRC had recognized

that

War and Peace: Where Is
the nature of warfare was changing
the use of force.

As a

embodied

"Geneva" law,

as

armed

The ICRC

conflict.

1949

result, in

and

it

that States

had

in the four

failed. States

the Divide?

initially

no longer had

a

monopoly on

sought to apply the

full

weight of

1949 Conventions, to non-international

were not prepared to go that

far in

allowing

The result was that only one article,
four of the 1949 Conventions, was applied to non-international
Significantly, the wording of Common Article 3, 8 as it is called, is

international supervision of their internal affairs.

common
armed

to

all

conflict.

very similar to the wording used in

human

rights law.

However, the law

the conduct of hostilities remained frozen in the form that
in the

relating to

had adopted

it

in 1907

Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to

Hague Convention IV. 9 The Regulations had, however, been strengthened by the
pronouncement of the Nuremberg Tribunal that they now reflected customary international law and were thus binding on all States. 10
At the same time, the United Nations was drafting and promulgating the 1948
Universal Declaration of

Human

Rights. 11

Human

rights law,

however,

initially

developed slowly. The two international covenants on economic, social and cultural rights 12

and

civil

and

political rights

meantime, Europe had adopted
Rights in 1950, which

came

of the European Court of

it

were not adopted

until 1966. In the

own Convention for the Protection of Human
force in 1953. 14 Where this Convention was par-

its

into

was that

ticularly significant

13

had

Human

a judicial

enforcement mechanism

in the

form

Rights (ECtHR), a Court that has increasingly

taken a proactive line in terms of interpreting and enforcing the European

Convention.

Although the Universal Declaration was seen
ropean Convention's terms provided for
war.

Its

rights played

life

of the nation." 15

no part

States. Nevertheless,

States

—

it

continued applicability in times of

it

in

difficult, therefore, to

was generally accepted

argue that

at least for

that in time of "war"
priority.

The

human

European

—armed

conflict

position was less clear

armed conflict, where the law of armed conflict was still only in

Common

conflict, the application

problematic.

international

was

governing conduct in time of war,

rudimentary form. While

much more

It

was the laws of war that took

in non-international

armed

law of peace, the Eu-

derogation clause specifically referred to "war or other public emergency

threatening the

between

its

as part of the

armed

Article 3 clearly applied to non-international

of "Hague" law on the conduct of hostilities was

The Hague

conflict

treaties

almost exclusively dealt only with

between States and few,

if

any,

commentators were

prepared to argue that as a matter of custom, such law extended into noninternational

armed

riding consideration

conflict. States

still

considered that sovereignty was an over-

and they were not prepared

96

to allow international law to

Charles Garraway

how they conducted operations against rebel forces on their own territories. But human rights law was already beginning to do just that.
In 1974, the ICRC again attempted to extend the ambit of the law of armed con-

govern

flict. It

prepared two draft protocols for consideration by

notable features to these drafts.

First,

There were two

the text was clearly heavily influenced by

rights law. Second, the text not only dealt with

which the ICRC had operated, but

States.

human

"Geneva" law, the traditional area in

also contained substantial elements of "Hague"

law dealing with the conduct of hostilities. The two draft protocols dealt respectively

with international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.

These drafts were considered by a diplomatic conference convened by the Swiss

government between 1974 and 1977 before two

texts

were adopted

in

June 1977. 16

The original draft texts had again sought to bring together the law relating to the
two distinct types of conflict, but at the last minute the text of Additional Protocol
II relating to non-international armed conflict was substantially trimmed. States

much

again were cautious about allowing too
matters.

What remained was almost entirely "Geneva" law, expanding the minimal

provisions contained in
ticle 3

international control over internal

Common Article 3. Furthermore, although Common Ar-

had no "threshold of violence" and thus applied to any "armed

conflict not

of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties," 17 Additional Protocol
to non-international

armed

II

had

a

much

higher threshold, applying only

conflicts taking place

High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 18
in the territory of a

Thus "Hague" law still was seen

armed

as

conflicts.

All this

was

to change in the 1990s.

Socialist Federal

atrocities

The

conflicts caused

by the breakup of the

Republic of Yugoslavia were both bitter and complex. Neighbor

was pitted against neighbor and

which

having a minimal impact on non-international

it

was often

difficult to assess the legal

context in

were being committed. The United Nations Security Council

established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

passed the problem from the political to the judicial arena.

The Yugoslav Tribunal found

itself in

something of a quandary. The character-

ization of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia

doubt.

Were

they international, that

tween ethnic groups within the new

is,

and

19

was not without considerable

between the new

States, or internal, be-

States? Indeed, did the nature of the conflicts
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various points and,

at

hostilities

Protocol

I

if so,

were comparatively
to the

1

when? The rules on the conduct of international

clear following the

949 Geneva Conventions.

universal acceptance of the

the Divide?

20

adoption

Although

in

1977 of Additional

this treaty did

Geneva Conventions themselves,

its

not have the

key provisions, in-

cluding proportionality and precautions in attack, were accepted as custom even

by those States who,

as a result of objections to other provisions,

had not

ratified

it.

But what was the situation in non-international armed conflict? In the early 1990s,
even the

ICRC had considered that the concept of war crimes

armed conflict did not exist,

21

in non-international

those being matters within the jurisdiction of the do-

mestic courts as crimes under the States' domestic laws. While this orthodoxy had

been turned on
nal for

its

Rwanda,

22

head by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribu-

Rwanda

quite clearly being a non-international

there remained doubts as to

how far

the law could extend.

armed

As we have

conflict,

seen, treaty

law in relation to non-international armed conflict was almost entirely based on

"Geneva" law concepts. But here we had
tainly

conflicts fought with a ferocity that cer-

equated to that found in international armed

the participants

bound by "Hague" law on

conflicts.

To what

extent were

the conduct of hostilities?

The Yugoslav Tribunal met this challenge head-on in its first case, that oiDusko
TadicP While the Tribunal was not prepared to go as far as some wanted and declare a total assimilation of the law in international and non-international armed
conflicts, it stated that "a number of rules and principles
have gradually been ex.

tended to apply to internal conflicts." However,
that "this extension has not taken place in the

it

put

form of a

.

.

down an important

caveat

and mechanical

trans-

full

plant of those rules to internal conflict; rather, the general essence of those rules,

and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable
nal conflicts."
it

24

While the judgment

opened Pandora's box. Within

itself

to inter-

may have been understandably cautious,

a very short period, the caveat

seemed

to have

been forgotten.
In 1998, the Statute of the International Criminal

cision

Court followed the Tadic de-

by transposing some of the war crimes applicable

in international

armed

25

armed conflict. While most were still of the
"Geneva" law type, some were clearly "Hague" law, including pillage and directing attacks against protected persons and objects. The Secretary-General's
Bulletin on observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian
law of 6 August 1999 26 drew no distinction between international and noninternational armed conflict and the seminal ICRC study Customary International
conflict into non-international

Humanitarian Law, 27 while identifying 161 "Rules" of customary international
humanitarian law, found that no fewer than 147 applied across the board
international

and non-international armed
98

conflicts.

28

in

both

Furthermore, the study
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drew no

armed

distinction between high-intensity non-international

those covered by Additional Protocol

and those of a lower

Common Article

treaty law only to the provisions of
that, subject to those areas

II,

3.

The

conflicts,

intensity, subject in

clear conclusion

where there were obvious distinctions

(e.g.,

was

status of

prisoners of war), the rules, particularly those relating to the conduct of hostilities,

were the same. The unwillingness of States to accept such conclusions

in

1949 or more recently in 1977 was thus overcome by a combination of judicial
activism and interpretation of customary law.

now governed by the rules of international humanitarian law, where does that leave human
But if the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts

rights law?

ple die

Under international humanitarian law,

and things

Even

get broken.

it is

recognized that in war peo-

a degree of innocent death

counterbalanced by military advantage. This would seem to
rights

law with

its

more hardened

attitude based

on

is

is

fly in

acceptable

if it is

the face of human

the rights of the victim.

As

in-

ternational humanitarian law sought wider applicability in non-international

armed

conflict,

it

was inevitable that

it

would collide with human

rights

law as that

too sought to protect the victims of conflicts of all types.

While other bodies have

also played a part, the

ECtHR has been at the forefront

of this confrontation. Cases were referred to the Court arising out of the "Troubles" in

Northern Ireland and,

these ever reached the level of an

as the

United Kingdom never acknowledged that

"armed conflict," it was no surprise that the Court

dealt with the cases purely on the basis of human rights law with

ternational humanitarian law.

29

Slightly

no reference to in-

more problematic were

cases arising out

of the Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey. Again, the Court dealt with these entirely

on the

basis of human rights law, seemingly reluctant even to

acknowledge

30

The Court was also called
upon in cases arising from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent occupation, an international armed conflict. The signs of a disagreement
between the two bodies of law were apparent when the Court was asked to deal
with issues arising from the detention of prisoners of war. These cases were also
dealt with solely on the basis of human rights law. 31 In the light of Article 5 of the
any application of international humanitarian law.

European Convention
ternational

for the Protection of

Covenant on

Civil

and

Human

Rights, which, unlike the In-

Political Rights, contains

grounds for deprivation of liberty, 32

it is

hard to see

an exclusive

list

of the

how the detention of prisoners

of war can be lawful under the European Convention unless a State derogates from
the Convention.
side

its

own

No State has sought to do so in relation to an armed conflict out-

territory.

Insofar as the conduct of hostilities

volved in the Bankovic case,

33

is

concerned, the Court

involving the
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bombing by NATO

first

became

in-

forces of a Serbian
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television station during the

conflict
lies

The

of those

Kosovo

case was brought by

Had

killed.

campaign, again an international armed

air

some of those

relevant.

on the merits, a number of
humanitarian law would seemingly have

Was the TV station a military objective?

right to

life

How is

this

balance to be calculated?

under human

the Convention

34

rights law?

and so

to

If so,

how should the an-

and what was the expected incidental

ticipated military advantage be assessed

or damage?

injured in the attack and by fami-

the Court reached a decision

crucial questions involving international

become

the Divide?

How does

all

of this

fit

loss

with the

There was no derogation under Article 15 of

what extent could the Court take into account

international humanitarian law at

Should the Court deal with the matter

all?

human rights issue without any reference to international humanitarian
Much to the relief of many, but the chagrin of some academics, the Court de-

solely as a

law?

cided on a preliminary issue that the victims of such an air attack did not

fall

within

the "jurisdiction" of the Court.

However,
conflict

and

this

it

was not the end of the matter. This was an international armed

was

clear that

NATO had no control over the ground. Furthermore,

the territory involved, Serbia,

pean Convention. The armed
non-international
tion.

armed

was not within the "espace juridique" of the Euroconflict in

conflict

Chechnya provided

on the

a different scenario, a

territory of a State party to the

Conven-

Here the jurisdictional arguments that had prevented the Court from adjudi-

cating the Bankovic case did not apply.

The Court

This conflict involved both land and

operations and

involving the conduct of hostilities

air

came before

therefore
it

had

to bite the bullet.

was not long before a case

the Court.

The case involved the bombing from the air of what turned out to be a civilian
convoy of vehicles fleeing Grozny. 35 It hinged therefore, in international humanitarian law terms, on the issue of precautions in attack. The Court, however, dealt
with

it

entirely in

human

had been discussed

in

rights terms, although international

arguments before the Court. As

it

humanitarian law

happens, the

facts

were

such that the same result would probably have been reached under either system of

law and the Court used language very similar to that contained in international humanitarian law, particularly Additional Protocol
facts,

was able to evade some of the key

I.

However, the Court, on the

issues, including that

of proportionality.

Had the convoy turned out to be a military objective, perhaps because of a number
of military vehicles embedded in the convoy, would the issue of proportionality

have been dealt with differently under

human

rights

law and the right to

life

rather

than under humanitarian law, where a certain measure of incidental loss and damage

is

acceptable?

The

The

tectonic plates were beginning to rub together.

legal uncertainty has

perfect storm."

When

been accompanied by

political events to create "the

the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was once asked
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what he feared most, he

is

alleged to have replied, "Events, dear boy, events." 36

The

9/11 attacks were certainly such an event. Prior to that date, terrorism was, of
course, already a recognized

phenomenon; however,

it

was considered to be on the

"peace" side of the line and to be a matter for law enforcement authorities. The series

of United Nations conventions on terrorism drafted during the 1970s, '80s

and

'90s in response largely to acts carried out

on

international criminal law cooperation.

37

by Palestinian groups concentrated

It

was acknowledged that terrorism

could take place within armed conflict and "acts of terrorism" were specifically
prohibited under Additional Protocol
ferentiate

II.

38

between "terrorism" and armed

States, for the
conflict.

most

part,

sought to

dif-

On the one hand, Arab groups

refused to acknowledge that acts carried out by Palestinian factions were "acts of

terrorism" at

all,

but rather insisted they were legitimate acts of resistance. 39 Con-

United Kingdom consistently refused to accept that the campaign by

versely, the

the Irish Republican

Army

(IRA) and other Republican factions in Northern

Ire-

land amounted to armed conflict. Even the deployment of large numbers of British military forces did

of military aid to the

not change that position. They were deployed in the capacity
civil

power, 40 were subject to

civilian control

and were

at all

times subject to domestic law. Thus, insofar as the use of force was concerned, they

operated in a law enforcement paradigm, not in an armed conflict one. This led to
soldiers being investigated for

—and even charged with—murder where, under an

armed conflict paradigm, their use of force might have been entirely justified. 41
The United Kingdom, when ratifying Additional Protocol I in 1998, made a specific

statement of understanding in the following terms:

the United

Kingdom

that the

term 'armed

notes a situation of a kind which

is

conflict'

"It is the

understanding of

of itself and in

its

context de-

not constituted by the commission of ordinary

crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation." 42
It

should be pointed out that the United States seems to have adopted a similar

position.

As

late as April 17,

2000, Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, said

in a speech to the University of

World Economy and Diplomacy

at

Tashkent in

Uzbekistan:

Terrorism

is

a criminal act

ing the law fairly

and

world, that the best
bilities

and should be treated accordingly

consistently.

way to

We

—and

that

means apply-

have found, through experience around the

defeat terrorist threats

is

to increase law enforcement capa-

while at the same time promoting democracy and

human

rights.

43

The events of 9/1 1 were to change all that. While the world accepted that the attacks
of that day on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon amounted to an "armed attack" sufficient to

bring Article 51 of the

UN

Charter into play, 44 the legal categorization of
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what happened next was highly controversial. Most accepted that the subsequent
attacks
flict

on Taliban

forces in Afghanistan

amounted to an

between members of the coalition, most prominently the United

Afghanistan; however, that was where consensus seemed to stop. After

argument,

nal

armed con-

international

45

President Bush decided that there were two separate

one against the Taliban

in

The "war on

much

inter-

armed conflicts,

Afghanistan to which the laws of war applied and an-

other against Al Qaeda, the latter creating a
laws of war. 46

and

States,

"new paradigm" outside

the existing

had begun.

terror"

am well aware that the phraseology has now changed. The U.S. administration
appears now to have abandoned the concept of a "war on terror" under pressure
I

from the Supreme Court, but the consequences of that
with us

still.

Although the "war"

is

initial

categorization live

now stated to be an "overseas contingency oper-

Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, to some extent nothing has
changed. "Al Qaeda and affiliated forces" is a phrase that is remarkably difficult to
define to any degree of certainty. Al Qaeda itself has become like a chameleon,
changing its shape as circumstances change. It would seem that almost any terrorist
group whose aim is to destroy or damage the United States could be brought within
the definition on the basis that "my enemy's friend is my enemy." While the curation" against Al

rent administration does not like

it

to be stated as bluntly, the United States

seems

—

as

that this

is

to reserve the right to apply the laws of war to operations against "terrorists"

defined by the United States
self-defense

and the

right

—anywhere

from the

in the case

local authorities.

itself.

This has applied in both

of the former there

It is

is

territorial State

is

un-

Yemen and Pakistan,

may have been a degree of consent

perhaps ironic that when

similar right in the Entebbe raid, this
nity

The argument

would only be exercised where the

willing or unable to take action

though certainly

in the world.

Israel

sought to exercise a

was condemned by the international commu-

and even by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 47

no doubt, as we have already seen, that terrorism can take place in
armed conflict. What we are now seeing, however, is an increasing tendency to label
There

all

is

dissidents as "terrorists" and, as such, "unlawful combatants" in order to take

advantage of the looser controls on the use of force under the laws of armed conflict.

Furthermore, the increasing restrictions imposed by human rights law on the

right to detain

and

try individuals

under the law enforcement paradigm have

in-

creased the temptation to rely on emergency detention provisions, allegedly based

on the laws of armed conflict. As we have also seen, the United States appears to assert that in this area at least, the laws of armed conflict displace human rights law so
that human rights bodies and even domestic courts have little or no influence. 48
Faced with
tions of the

this

dichotomy, intensive

efforts

have been

two successive administrations. One
102

is

made

to justify the ac-

reminded of the old

Irish story

Charles Garraway

where the

lost traveler seeking directions to

Mullingar was advised, "If I was you,

would not start from here!" An admission that the original decision, to declare
a "war on terror" and invoke the laws of armed conflict as the authority for acts by
the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief, was wrong would have incalcusir, I

lable consequences.

It

could lay the United States open to lawsuits from hundreds,

not thousands, of "victims."

It

if

could also have political consequences that would

An attempt, therefore, has been made to alter the

go beyond the issue of terrorism.

making any concessions on the Tightness or wrongness
of the original course (though comments may be made as to its advisability). In
some ways, it is like trying to turn around a supertanker it cannot simply be
direction of travel without

—

thrust into reverse.

Lawyers and scholars in the United States have approached
different angles.

Some have

roughshod over

legal traditions

slammed into reverse.

49

this

problem from

castigated the successive administrations for riding

and have

demanded

effectively

that the ship be

While, in an ideal world, this might be advisable,

it is

prob-

ably impracticable in the political sense. Others have backed the extreme line taken
in the early days

and

see

any withdrawal from the original position

as a

weakening

of U.S. resolve and as a triumph for the powers of evil. 50 This does not help the position of the

United States in the

rest

of the world.

A third school is made up of what I will call "the pragmatists." Here are people
who

recognize the underlying principles of law and are keen to present the United

States as a

country steeped in the

new circumstances

legal tradition

and merely seeking

to

respond to

within the existing framework of international law. As such,

they seek to find innovative ways of justifying U.S. positions without undermining
international law as

it is

understood and accepted by the

ples of this particular school can be

Supreme Court, anxious not

under the separation of powers. The

in

clearest of these

Court found that persons held in detention were,
given under

Common Article 3.

51

of the world. Exam-

some of the pronouncements of the
impinge upon the President's authority

found

to appear to

rest

is

that in

Hamdan where the

at least, subject to the protections

This was immediately seized

upon by many as

a

statement by the Court that the "war against Al Qaeda" was a non-international

armed
tal

conflict. 52

question

However, with

—whether

respect, the

there was a "war" at

Court did not answer the fundamenall.

The Court

felt

that this

fell

within

the jurisdiction of others to decide and, therefore, for the purposes of its ruling,

it

accepted that there was such a "war." Others in this volume will deal in greater

depth with
I

this

and other Supreme Court

decisions. 53

also place within this school the writings of Professor Geoffrey

tured in this volume.
category of conflict,

54

Corn, also

fea-

Corn has long argued most eloquently for a new
"transnational armed conflicts," to reflect the nature of a
Professor
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conflict against a non-State actor with global operations
is

few non-international armed conflicts have been confined opera-

right in that

Most have had a transnational element,

tionally within the borders of a single State.

even

if only

cases,

by dissidents using a porous border to seek protection. In most of these

however, a distinction has been drawn between operations within the

tory of the State involved in the non-international
side.

and reach. 55 In one way he

Nobody,

for example,

non-international

Kingdom

armed

among

conflict

those

who

rallies,

conflict

and those out-

argued that Northern Ireland was a

would have

alleged that this gave the United

where IRA leaders were regular

the right to strike targets in Boston

speakers at fund-raising

armed

terri-

or even in Libya, from where

much

of the Semtex

used by the IRA came and which was a major player in both training and funding.

Corn seems to argue that once military forces are used, it should be
the laws of war that apply. This is, of course, in line with accepted Department of
Defense policy, 56 but I would suggest is based on a somewhat U.S. -centric view of
Professor

the use of military force cultured to a considerable extent by the Posse Comitatus
Act. 57

Other jurisdictions do not have the same

force for domestic law enforcement purposes.

restrictions

As already

on the use of military

stated, the

United King-

dom for decades relied upon military forces to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in

Northern Ireland, relying completely on a law enforcement paradigm. 58

Although
it

it

must be admitted

does not take away from the

was

that, to a certain extent, this
fact that the

a political decision,

UK armed forces were perfectly capable

of acting within the constraints of a law enforcement mode. Indeed,

gued that the

refusal

to the decision

obtain

its

by the

to enter into the political arena

aims through the ballot box rather than the

Perhaps a more striking example of this
a

could be ar-

UK government to "escalate" the conflict eventually led

by the IRA leadership

political

it

ability

and seek

to

bullet.

of UK armed forces to operate in

law enforcement paradigm can be found in the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980. 59

Terrorists seized the Iranian
tages, including Iranian

and

Embassy

in

London and took

a large

number of hos-

British staff. Negotiations with the terrorists

were con-

ducted by the Metropolitan Police as the lead agency, but a squadron of Special Air
Service (SAS) soldiers

Once

was put on immediate standby and deployed

negotiations broke

down and

a hostage

was

killed, the

the building, killing five terrorists, capturing one
hostages. In

some ways,

this

is

SAS

and rescuing

to

soldiers
all

London.
stormed

the surviving

comparable to the attack on the Bin Laden

compound.
Despite the intensity of the siege operation, this was treated throughout as a law

enforcement operation. There was an inquest into the deaths of each of those
killed

— hostages and

duly convicted)

terrorists alike

at the

—and the surviving

Central Criminal Court in
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terrorist

was

tried (and

London ("The Old

Bailey").

—
Charles Garraway

While the deaths of the hostages were

clearly unlawful killing, each of the deaths of

the terrorists had to be justified under a law enforcement paradigm.
ficient to say, "I

was hardly

saw this guy and I shot him!" The inquest was held

difficult in the

same time were

was not

suf-

in public, but

it

circumstances to satisfy the coroner that these deaths

were lawful. The soldiers involved did not hesitate to
the

It

perfectly capable of restraint

controlled use of lethal force

is

fire

when

when

appropriate, but at

appropriate as well. This

an essential part of training and, even in a situation

governed by the laws of armed

would be necessary

conflict,

to reduce the risk of

would therefore challenge those who maintain that the use of
military force must inevitably require the application of the laws of armed conflict.
collateral

damage.

Indeed,

could be argued that the use of restrained force, as under the law enforce-

it

I

ment paradigm, may be more appropriate in some armed conflict situations where
it is difficult to distinguish between fighters and civilians not taking a direct part in
hostilities.

would also note here the attempts by government lawyers, under both the
Bush and Obama administrations, to find legal justifications for U.S. actions. It is
I

not the case, despite the views of some right-wing commentators, that the United
States does not consider itself bound

by international

law, or, as

former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, would see
rior to the U.S. Constitution.

60

there

is

no law supe-

Successive administrations, while accepting the in-

adequacies of international law in

some

within the framework of that law. This
in the State

it,

John Bolton, the

Department. Whether

respects,

is

have sought to place themselves

particularly true of the excellent lawyers

officially

or in their private capacities, they have

sought to uphold the integrity of international law without seeking to undermine
their political masters.

Again an example

is

to be

of the principle of neutrality.

found with the arguments of Karl Chang on new uses
61

While there maybe disagreement with

to introduce the concept of neutrality into non-international
least
ity

his attempts

armed conflict, it is at

an acceptance of the need to justify actions under international law. Neutral-

has indeed been relevant in the past in high-intensity non-international armed

conflict,

which

but

this

has been linked to another doctrine, recognition of belligerency,

traditionally has internationalized a non-international

armed

conflict,

introducing the legal regime applicable to international armed conflict. This doctrine too appears to

be making a comeback in some

circles after

decades in the legal

wilderness. 62

The danger of all

this

debate

is

that developments in international law will be

seen to be being driven by the domestic law requirements of a single State.
ever powerful that State

may be,

How-

international law remains the "law of nations"
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—and while

plural
ers,

one

it is

inevitable that

the Divide?

some States will be more influential than oth-

State alone should not be in a position to set the rules for

all.

The confusion on the borders between law enforcement and armed conflict can
be seen clearly in the events of the Arab Spring in 201 1. The first two major States
affected were Egypt and Tunisia. In both cases, mass demonstrations toppled the
regime
tions

power. In Egypt, the military took over the control of the demonstra-

in

from the police and, indeed, on the

power

itself.

of the

fall

Mubarak regime took over

Despite the deployment of military forces and the existence of what

social scientists

as a "conflict," 63

would undoubtedly describe

few would argue

an "armed con-

that the confrontations reached the level necessary to constitute

invoke the laws of armed

flict" sufficient to

thus judged in

On

its

conflict.

The Egyptian

was

actions under a law enforcement paradigm.

the other hand, Libya clearly crossed the threshold of

NATO

before the

military

armed

operations conducted under the authority of

conflict even

UN

Security

Council Resolution 1973. 64 But what of Syria and Yemen? At the time of this writing (October 201

1 ), it

a non-international

seem

seems

armed

clear that

conflict.

65

Yemen is, at least, close to a state of civil war,
In Syria also, the intensity of violence

to cross the threshold, but the lack of organization of the opposition forces

may be considered to

rule out the existence of an

culty in identifying an opposition "party" to that
tary forces have

"armed

been deployed within

Syria,

"armed

armed

conflict"

conflict.

66

due

to the diffi-

Certainly, mili-

but does that automatically lead to an

conflict" bringing into force the laws of armed conflict?

I

would argue

the actions of the military forces, in such a context, will be judged under

law

rights
flict

as

—crimes

against

humanity

—

rather than under the laws of

issues. Military forces

troops from neighboring Saudi Arabia, but

I

has not yet developed into an armed conflict.

But does

ground or

this matter? Is the distinction a

is it

human

armed con-

cant, as

armed

it

would argue

that the situation there

67

matter of practical importance on the

how many angels

can

my opinion, resolution of this issue is hugely signifi-

coming together of the two tectonic plates, the laws of
and human rights law. Lawyers from each camp claim priority for

illustrates the

conflict

their legal regime, but

A common tendency today is to dismiss

can they all be right?

argument by saying
is

have been deployed, including

simply another example of lawyers debating

dance on the head of a pin? In

there

that

war crimes.

Bahrain also raises similar

the

would

that the

no underlying problem.

tion does not support this

Insofar as "Geneva" law

two systems are "complementary" and,
68

1

would

therefore,

suggest, however, that a closer examina-

"complementary" theory.
is

concerned,

it

can be accepted that there

able degree of compatibility. Both systems of law

106

is

grew from the same
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to protect those

who were

seen as victims. Although "Geneva" law was mainly de-

signed, in the early days, to protect combatants

human

law was designed to protect

rights

who were placed hors de combat and

civilians

underlying principles are similar. While there
and, in places, of detail

—

these can be

may

from the power of

States, the

be differences of emphasis

overcome and the two

legal

systems can

sit

reasonably comfortably together.

"Hague" law on the conduct of hostilities
acceptance of State

edged

which

here that the laws of

It is

rights law,

did not seek to prevent

time of war, people (including

that, in

broken.

it

which

starts

It

grew from the

armed

it

and, therefore, acknowl-

civilians) will die

and things

conflict begin to diverge

will get

from human

with the rights of the individual and limits the occasions on

can override those

States

different in origin.

use violence. While "Hague" law sought to re-

entities' right to

strain that use of violence,

is

rights.

The two systems therefore approach matters

from opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum.
Insofar as

"Hague" law seeks

gree of compatibility with
visions

and weaponry

However,

it is

difficulty lies.

ent

to limit the

human

conduct of States, again there

rights law. Thus,

restrictions

happily

sit

in the "authorizations" accepted

For centuries

it

many of the "protection"
alongside human rights

by "Hague" law

was accepted that the

is

a de-

prolaw.

that the greatest

right to use force

was an inher-

power of sovereignty. Those authorized by the sovereign were immune from

prosecution for acts of violence that would be criminal
context of war. This became
belligerents

known

were themselves lawful

as

if

committed outside the

"combatant immunity." 69 In return, such

targets

and could be

killed

without question

simply because of their status. The threat they posed was irrelevant. This customary
rule

became tempered over time by custom

protection,

who was

principle that a belligerent

was

Belligerents
ties.

killed
this

which developed the principle of

which subsequently developed into "Geneva"

protection to a belligerent

70

itself,

treaty law, affording

rendered hors de combat, but the underlying

a legitimate target

was unchallenged.

who were captured could be detained until the end of active hostili-

They were not

criminals; just as

it

was accepted

that belligerents could be

because of their status, so they could be detained for the same reason. Again

was mitigated

to allow for the early release of those seriously injured, 71 but the

general principle remained. Early release was the exception, not the rule.

Human rights law approaches both the use of force and detention from the opposite direction.
stances.

72

Use of lethal force is prohibited except in certain

Authority to use force

is

specified circum-

based on the threat posed by the individual on

whom the force is to be used. The right to life is a fundamental right and thus lethal
force

is

obviously a

last resort. It

may

only be resorted to in the most extreme
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circumstances. These provisions will be well understood by anyone engaged in law

enforcement.

may only be restricted in specific cir-

Similarly, the right to liberty of the person

cumstances.

73

Again, this would be assessed on an individual basis and the assess-

ment would be based on threat. It would not include the mass detention of
prisoners of war on the basis of status.
It

follows that the tests involved for both use of force

mentally different under

human

rights law

and detention are funda-

and the laws of armed

conflict. Let us

take the example of Bin Laden, leaving aside for these purposes issues of the

ad

helium authority for the operation being conducted in Pakistan.
the U.S. position that this operation was conducted as part of

It is

"war" against Al Qaeda, that

Osama

ongoing

its

Bin Laden was a "belligerent" within that

armed conflict and therefore a legitimate target. 74 On that basis, under traditional
"Hague" rules, lethal force could be used against Bin Laden because of his status. It
was not necessary that he pose any threat to the attacking forces
lethal force

and,

was used. Of course, the essential hors de combat rules would have applied

Bin Laden had sought to surrender, then that surrender should have been

if

accepted. However, the burden was

surrender, not

on Bin Laden

on the troops themselves

have been orders to capture Bin Laden,
ter

time that the

at the

to display a clear intention to

to inquire as to his intentions.

if possible,

There

may

but this would have been a mat-

of operational requirements, not international law.

On

the other hand,

human

if this

rights law, then the

to capture Bin Laden.

was a law enforcement operation conducted under

primary aim of the operation would have to have been

Any use of force would have needed to be directly responsive

to the threats posed to the troops

on the ground

in the

circumstances ruling

at the

Any use of lethal force in particular would have needed to be justified specifically on the basis of the threat faced at the moment that the lethal force was used
and not simply by the fact that this was Osama Bin Laden. The burden would have
time.

been on the troops to

justify their use

of force, not on Bin Laden himself.

As the example of the Iranian Embassy siege shows, the end
different. In a case

where hostages have been

killed

wired a building with explosives,

immediate use of lethal
simply,

it is

force.

little

justification

the difference between "kill or capture"

may be

from well-armed
is

However, the aim of the operation

While on many occasions, and

it

may be little

and there remains a serious

to other hostages, as well as to the troops themselves,

who have

results

terrorists

needed
is

and "capture or

risk

for the

different.

Put

kill."

may well be that the Bin Laden case is an exam-

same under either a law enforcement or armed conflict
operation, there will be others where the results may differ. An example is the
Bankovic case referred to earlier. 75 In that case, during the Kosovo air campaign,
ple, the results

the
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NATO aircraft attacked the main television station in Belgrade, causing a number
of civilian casualties. The families of the deceased and some of the injured initiated
proceedings against the European
life.

As

NATO States, alleging breaches of their right to

earlier stated, the case fell at the admissibility

the "victims" did not

fall

when

it

was ruled

that

within the jurisdiction of the European States. This meant

that the case did not reach the merits stage.

have argued that the

hurdle

TV station was

Had

it

done

so, the applicants

would

not a legitimate military objective under the

laws of armed conflict, which would have resulted in the

ECtHR being faced with

dilemma of deciding whether the loose language of Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I 76 is consistent with the strict standards on the use of force under human
rights law. Furthermore, even if the Court had decided that the TV station was a
military objective and therefore liable to attack, the Court might have then had to
the

rule

on the

issue of proportionality.

In cases involving the right of an individual to be free from torture and cruel or

inhumane treatment,
cannot

ECtHR has already ruled in deportation cases that a State

the

set against the rights

national security,

of the applicant the danger that the applicant poses to

and thus to the

rights of the

wider population. 77 With

this prece-

would have been interesting to see how the Court dealt with the balance between the anticipated collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage.
dent,

it

Nor

is

this a theoretical

from the Russia-Georgia

problem. Cases have been

conflict in 2008.

78

It

filed

therefore

is

with the

ECtHR arising

likely that the

Court

will

have to deal with these issues within the foreseeable future. To date, the Court has

shown a marked reluctance to consider the laws of armed conflict, preferring to approach matters from a

human rights perspective,

occasionally paying lip service to

law of armed conflict principles. This can be seen

Chechnya cases, where the Court held
tion the Court

in

at its

most extreme

one case that where there was no deroga-

was bound to consider matters on the basis of a normal law enforce-

ment paradigm. 79 That

case involved air operations,

and so

it

seemed

Court was taking a purely legalistic approach, refusing to accept the actual
the ground.

A

similar approach to the Russia-Georgia conflict

best, the interpretation

of law of conflict principles through a

and, at worst, a claim that
in international
If,

as

seems

in the

armed

likely,

would

human

that the
facts

on

involve, at

rights

prism

human rights law trumps the law of armed conflict, even

conflict.

we

are heading for a clash

phies of "Hague" law and

human

rights law,

is

between the competing philosothere any

way of avoiding such

a

One way would be to seek to incorporate human rights standards into the laws of armed conflict. The ICRC seems to
clash while retaining the key principles of each?

have encouraged

this

approach

in

its

Interpretive
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Participation in Hostilities under International

more

Humanitarian Law. 80 In one of the

controversial parts of this document, the

ICRC

states in Part IX:

In addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific
means and methods of warfare and without prejudice to further restrictions that may
arise under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of force
which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack
must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose
in the prevailing circumstances.

Despite
for a

careful wording, this has

graduated use of force. Indeed,

by Jean

If

its

81

it

been seen as incorporating a requirement

claims to be an interpretation of a statement

Pictet:

we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him;

can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not

means

to achieve the

the lesser

While

this

evil.

is

same

military advantage,

kill

we must choose

him.

If there are

if

we

two

the one which causes

82

entirely consistent with the underlying philosophy of "Geneva" law,

it

runs counter to the recognized interpretation of "Hague" law in which belligerents
are targetable with lethal force at

all

times because of their status. As such, this part

of the Interpretive Guidance has been criticized by States, particularly those involved in major operations, as an attempt to rewrite existing law in a manner that,

when

forms of armed

would be unrealistic on the ground.
Another possible way forward would depend on an acceptance that the compleapplied to

mentary view
legal

is

all

conflict,

not the answer and that there will be circumstances where the two

systems conflict. In such cases,

it

should have priority. This would not
overlap, but
tional

Justice,

two bodies of law.

It

be necessary to decide which legal system

affect the basic principle that there

is

to

stated:

As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human
law, there are thus three possible situations:

international humanitarian law; others
law; yet others

may be

some

may

rights

may be

rights

exclusively matters of

be exclusively matters of

human

rights

matters of both these branches of international law. In order to

answer the question put to

it,

the Court will have to take into consideration both these

branches of international law, namely
tional

sizable

make operational the Delphic dictum of the Internawhen it sought to deal with the relationship between the

would seek

Court of

will

human

humanitarian law. 83
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would seem clear that in international
armed conflict, priority should go to the laws of armed conflict. In cases falling
short of armed conflict, the laws of armed conflict do not apply at all and so human
rights law will govern. However, the situation is not so simple in relation to noninternational armed conflict or, within the sphere of international armed conflict,
situations of occupation. In each of these situations, as we have seen, the boundBut where should the division be?

It

between law enforcement operations and armed

aries

ficult to define.

The answer may be not

conflict are blurred

and

dif-

to look at the technical classification of the

armed conflict but at the level of violence within

it.

Some non-international armed

conflicts are low-level, consisting principally of individual incidents rather than

To permit "Hague" law

concerted operations.

armed
to be

conflicts

would encourage every despot

authorizations to apply to such

to declare his internal disturbances

an armed conflict in order to permit wider powers of detention and use of

force. In low-level non-international

armed

law should take priority when there

a conflict between

is

conflicts of this nature,

human

human

rights

law and the

rights

laws of armed conflict.

Other non-international armed
to that of an international

tion of belligerency"

armed

conflict.

armed

conflicts are of very high intensity, equivalent

conflict. In the past, these often led to "recogni-

and the application of the law relevant

However,

as "recognition

to international

of belligerency" has fallen away in

recent decades, the level of intensity to be found has certainly not.
civil

war

is

good example.

a

ment paradigm

84

To

require militaries to

The

comply with

in relation to the use of force in such circumstances

to suicidal. In cases of such intensity, the laws of armed conflict

Sri

Lankan

a law enforce-

would be

would

close

prevail.

A similar test could be applied to situations of occupation. Where resistance is
comparatively low-key and consists primarily of individual attacks, however effective,
as,

human

rights

law would normally have

for example, in Iraq

would take

conflict

85

—the

resistance

priority.

was of high

On the other hand, where
intensity, the laws of

priority.

This will not be a complete resolution of the problem in that there will
"gray" areas where authorities will need to
reflects

tional

make "good faith" decisions.

what already happens with respect to

armed

armed

conflict, there will

under the laws of armed

rules of engagement.

Even

still

be

In fact, this
in interna-

be occasions when, whatever the circumstances

conflict, soldiers

have already been restricted in their use

of force by rules of engagement that have been imposed for political or other
reasons.

However, what
service personnel

vestigation

which

is

not acceptable

is

for the current position to continue,

where

may find their actions subject to ex post facto investigation, an instarts

with uncertainty over the underlying legal regime. This
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neither fair to the personnel themselves nor conducive to respect for the law. There

must be

a better way!
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LEGAL STATUS OF THE ACTORS IN NON
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

VI
The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non
International Armed Conflict

Michael N. Schmitt*

The

treaty law applicable to the classification of participants in a

international conflict

Conventions

deemed

1

is

limited to

Common

and the 1977 Additional Protocol

reflective

Article 3 to the 1949
II.

2

The former

is

of customary international law, whereas the latter

though certain individual provisions thereof certainly

are).

3

Other

non-

Geneva

generally
is

not

treaties

(al-

apply

during non-international armed conflicts, but do not bear on the issue of classifying those involved in the conflict. 4

Common Article 3, which appears in each of the four Geneva Conventions, provides

no

specific

guidance as to

subsequent case law has
level

who

qualifies as a "Party to the conflict," although

clarified that the article

encompasses

conflict at a certain

of intensity that occurs between a State's armed forces and organized armed

groups, or between such groups. 5 Textually, the article merely refers to "persons

"members of the armed forces" who
somewhat useful in that it suggests a norma-

taking no active part in hostilities," including
are hors de combat.
tive distinction

armed
*

conflict

6

The

reference

between those

became

October 1,2011.

who

and those who do

Chair of Public International Law,

sor Schmitt

is

actively participate in a non-international

not. Yet, the failure to address party status

Durham

Law School, United Kingdom. ProfesLaw Department, U.S. Naval War College on

University

the Chairman, International
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directly

is

unfortunate, for

groups qualify
fact that

as a party.

it

II

contains slightly

more

granularity in

individuals or

classification

makes no mention of the category

instrument's material field of application. Article
conflicts"

when non-State

begs the question of

Complicating the issue of participant

Common Article 3

Additional Protocol

Non-International Armed Conflict

in a

the

"civilians."

its

provision on the

extends coverage to

1

is

"all

armed

between the armed forces of a State party to the Protocol and "dissident

armed groups which, under responsible comexercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." 7
armed
mand,

This

is

forces or other organized

a higher threshold of applicability than that of

gards. 8 First,

it

Common Article 3 in two re-

does not include conflicts that are solely between organized armed

groups; a State must be involved. 9 Second, the group in opposition to the govern-

ment must exercise a certain degree of control over territory. The higher thresholds
are not dealt with in this chapter, as they bear on the law that applies to a conflict,
not on the status of its participants. What is significant with regard to classification
of participants, though, are the references to dissident armed forces and organized
armed groups.
Additional Protocol
ticle 13

II

also adopts the notion of "civilian,"

on the "protection of the

eral protection against the

and

specifically prohibits

civilian population."

That

most notably

article

in Ar-

extends "gen-

dangers arising from military operations" to

civilians,

both attacks against them and any actions intended to

terrorize the civilian population, but

withdraws said protection "for such time

as

they take a direct part in hostilities."

10

in

contrast to

term

its

international

"civilian."

it

conflict counterpart, offers

no

II,

definition of the

11

Taking the two
status,

armed

Unfortunately, Additional Protocol

treaties together,

and

in light

of Common Article

3's

customary

can be concluded that two broad categories of non-international armed

conflict participants

lie

in juxtaposition: civilians

and organized armed groups.

The former can be subdivided into those who directly participate in hostilities and
those who do not. Organized armed groups consist of a State's armed forces, dissident armed forces or "other" organized armed groups.
This chapter examines the three types of "opposition fighters"

—

dissident

armed groups and civilians directly participating
in hostilities. A companion contribution to the volume deals with the status of
government fighters. The chapter does not address the criteria for the existence
of a non-international armed conflict, the subject of other contributions, except
12
Accordingly, it does not
as that topic bears on classification of participants.
explore such contentious topics as whether a non-international armed conflict

armed

forces, other organized

can exist during a belligerent occupation, the
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of a conflict with
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transnational terrorists, internationalization of a conflict through intervention of

another State or external State control of insurgent groups. Rather, assuming a
non-international

armed

conflict (whatever

form

takes),

it

force participants in the conflict are to be classified.

it

how opposition

asks

13

The significance of classification is limited. For instance, the international
armed conflict concept of combatancy and the related notion of belligerent immunity do not exist in non-international armed conflicts. 14 Members of the opposition forces

may be prosecuted for any acts that violate domestic law,

are not violations of the law of armed conflict

(LOAC),

as

is

even

if

they

the case with attacking

15

members of the armed forces. In light of the absence of combatancy in a noninternational armed conflict, this chapter has adopted the term "fighters" in lieu
of "combatants" to refer to those
is

no prisoner of war regime

who

participate in the conflict. 16 Similarly, there

in the context of a non-international

on detention,

although, as explained in the chapters

armed

conflict,

certain basic protections

do

inure to the benefit of detainees in these conflicts.

The key consequences of classification
tion determines whether

international

armed

no

in the

law of targeting, for

classifica-

LOAC prohibits an attack on an individual during a non-

conflict. 17

To

the extent

persons with a particular classification,
plays

lie

harm

no prohibition

exists

on attacking

to an individual within that

role in proportionality calculations (except as military advantage)

not be considered

when determining

take during attacks to avoid

and need

the precautions that attackers are required to
civilians. 18

become apparent, the
of opposition fighters is a matter of some

harming

targetability of the various categories

contention in

group

As

will

LOAC circles.

Before turning to an examination of the various categories of opposition fighters, it

should be briefly noted that

if the

forces of another State intervene

of the opposition, an international armed conflict ensues between that
the State against

on behalf
State and

whom the pre-existing rebellion is under way; the conflict has been

internationalized. 19 Unless the external State exercises a sufficiently high level of

control over the opposition forces, a non-international

between those forces and their government.
are involved in an international

combatants,

is

armed

conflict continues

Because the external

State's forces

armed conflict, their status, which would be that of

not examined below. 21

Individuals

As

20

Who Are Not Members of a

a general rule, individual criminals

tute "parties" to a non-international

"Traditional" Opposition Force

and purely criminal groups do not

armed

conflict, regardless

consti-

of whether they

engage alone in acts of violence against the government (or non-government
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organized armed groups) or operate in the midst of an ongoing non-international

armed

conflict. Since

they neither are a party nor operate on behalf of one, domestic

human

law and international

rights

norms

will usually

govern actions taken against

them.

The

official International

Common Article 3
to

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on

suggests that the drafters intended to preclude

its

applicability

common criminality. Early in the drafting process, a proposal to extend the

Geneva Conventions to

"all cases

1949

of armed conflict which are not of an interna-

tional character, especially cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion,

which may occur

in the territory

of one or more of the High Contracting Parties" 22

was met with objection on the basis that
ations involving "no
ther concern

more than

might be interpreted

a handful of rebels or

was expressed about the

to give themselves a

it

as applying to situ-

common

brigands." 23 Fur-

"risk of ordinary criminals being

semblance of organization

of the Convention, representing their crimes as

encouraged

as a pretext for claiming the benefit
'acts

of war' in order to escape pun-

ishment for them." 24 According to the commentary, numerous delegations concluded that "[t]he expression [not of an international character] was so general, so
vague, that

...

it

might be taken

form of anarchy,

text in question

that "insurgents ... are not

all

who

were

—any

25

sensitive to these concerns,

responding

brigands" and "the behaviour of the insurgents in the

would show whether they were

combatants

any act committed by force of arms

rebellion, or even plain banditry."

Proponents of the

field

to cover

in fact

mere

felons, or,

on

the contrary, real

deserved to receive protection under the Conventions." 26 The

ICRC's non-binding and non-exclusive

list

of sample criteria for non-international

armed conflicts, by making reference to "the Party in revolt against the de jure
Government" and "insurgents," adopts the same position, 27 one likewise strengthened by the ICRC Commentary's use elsewhere of the term "rebel Party." 28

As these examples

illustrate, the

law of armed conflict traditionally envisioned

non-international armed conflict as consisting of only those activities evidencing

some

sort of politically motivated challenge to State authorities in order to attain

political control

and authority or displace those of the government. However, the

evolving nature of criminality has brought this traditional understanding into
question.

Consider the criminal gangs active in Colombia and Mexico. 29 They

field forces

today that often outgun the regular armed forces. Unlike brigands, bandits and
other criminals
conflict, these

who merely take

advantage of the instability characterizing armed

gangs directly challenge State authorities in order to create zones in

which they can with impunity pursue
ernments must resort

their criminal activities.

to military force to
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respective gov-

counter the organizations, civilians are
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placed at great risk from the ensuing hostilities and criminal gangs often control

wide swaths of territory.
In other words, these are situations in which criminal gangs are highly orga-

nized and conduct hostilities with the government at a level of intensity consistent with the existence of a non-international

armed

conflict.

There

is little

to

them from the Commentary s description of Common Article 3 noninternational armed conflicts as "armed conflicts, with armed forces on either
distinguish

side

engaged in

hostilities

—

conflicts, in short,

which are

in

many respects

similar

30
to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country."

To

the extent that the law of non-international

militarily with high-order political violence

armed

conflict frees States to deal

through application of

LOAC

duct of hostilities rules, the same rationale would justify application to
ciently organized

and intense criminal

activity directed against the State.

consuffi-

Such an

commentary on
Common Article 3 that "the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as
possible." 31 Accordingly, it is at least arguable that in light of the context and
nature of the criminal armed activities States face today, imposing a political
motivation requirement, in addition to organization and intensity, for qualification as a non-international armed conflict makes little normative or practical
interpretation

would be consistent with the

assertion in the

sense.

Should members of a criminal group or individual criminals become involved
in a non-international

qualify as
ties,

armed

conflict

on behalf of one of the

members of an organized armed group

would

or direct participants in hostili-

With regard to groups,
a whole, would have to consti-

respectively, as those appellations are described below.

their activity in support of the party, considered as

tute

parties, they

what

is

in a sense

"group participation in

hostilities" before qualifying as

an

organized armed group involved in a non-international armed conflict. Key factors in such

an assessment include the nature of the group's activity and its nexus to

the conflict. For instance,

if a

dissident

armed force

that controls territory allows a

criminal group to engage in criminal activities in exchange for conducting attacks

on the

State's

armed forces, guarding its

military facilities or providing logistics for

combat operations, the criminal group would be operating on the dissident
group's behalf and therefore qualify. By way of contrast, merely paying a "tax" on

its

production or transhipment of drugs to an organized armed group in control of an
area, as

is

the case in Afghanistan with certain narcotics organizations,

render the criminal group an organized armed group.
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Dissident Armed Forces

The most straightforward category of opposition forces is dissident armed forces.
As noted, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II both utilize the term
"armed

forces," the

former with regard to protections that attach once members

thereof are hors de combat, the latter in

its

provision on material field of applica-

The context of the Common Article 3 reference clearly implies the possibility
of "armed forces" on both sides of a non-international armed conflict, since the
tion.

relevant provision applies to "each Party to the conflict." 33 This interpretation be-

comes express with Additional Protocol

II's

reference to "dissident"

In the latter instrument, the phrase "dissident
distinction to "other organized
that "other organized

armed

armed groups." On

armed groups"

forces, a point with

armed

forces"

this basis,

is

it

used in contra-

might be argued

constitutes a separate category

which the author disagrees since there

armed forces.

is

from dissident

no meaningful

difference in the legal regimes governing the detention or targeting of the
gories.

two

cate-

However, acknowledging that some commentators distinguish among vari-

ous members of an "other organized group" with regard to targeting, a point to be
discussed, this chapter treats dissident

armed

forces

and other organized armed

groups separately for the sake of analysis.

What is clear is that dissident armed forces do not attain civilian status by virtue
of their break from the State's regular military. According to the ICRC's 2009 Inter-

Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation

pretive

in Hostilities,

Although members of dissident armed forces are no longer members of State armed

do not become civilians merely because they have turned against their govleast to the extent, and for as long as, they remain organized under the
structures of the State armed forces to which they formerly belonged, these structures
should continue to determine individual membership in dissident armed forces as
forces, they

ernment. At

well.

34

While other aspects of the
elicited

no

Interpretive

Guidance proved controversial,

this text

from the international experts participating

in the

been members of the armed forces of a State does not

suffice

serious objection

drafting process. 35
Yet, merely having

to qualify individuals as

members of a dissident armed force. Only breakaway units

some degree of their original organizational structure qualify. 36 Fighters
who are former members of the armed forces but have not remained with their
units (such as deserters) are either members of other organized armed groups or
that retain

civilians directly participating in hostilities.
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members of
the State's armed forces, are targetable at all times under the law of armed conflict.
Stated with greater precision, it is not a violation of the law of armed conflict to "atNear-universal consensus exists that dissident armed forces, like

tack" them. 37 This
protects persons

is

evident from the plain text of

who

are taking

no

Common

active part in hostilities

Article 3(1),

from

which

acts of violence,

members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms or are hors
de combat. The only reasonable interpretation of the provision is that those members of the armed forces who are still "in the fight" lack protection from attack under LOAC during a non-international armed conflict. This position comports with
including

the

common

understanding of the principle of distinction, which requires an

tacker to distinguish between combatants

and

civilians

and

at-

direct attacks only

The principle is universally accepted as customary law in both
international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. 38
Although the notion of "armed forces" transcends the boundary between
international and non-international armed conflict, its precise parameters do
not. Plainly, members of the regular armed forces qualify as "armed forces" in a
non-international armed conflict, as do members of the regular armed forces in rebellion against the State. 39 The concept of armed forces in international armed con40
flict includes "militia and volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces."
It
is reasonable to extend this inclusion into non-international armed conflict such
that they would also qualify as part of the State's armed forces, or, if in rebellion, a
component of the dissident armed forces.
The case of paramilitary or armed law enforcement agencies involved in a noninternational armed conflict is more complicated. As a matter of customary international law in international armed conflict, they may be incorporated into the
armed forces, and thereby lose any claim to civilian status. 41 Additional Protocol I
against the former.

adds a further requirement, that incorporation be notified to the other party to the
conflict, 42

although by customary law incorporation

enemy does not preclude such

failure to so notify the

bers of the

The

armed

is

forces for purposes of targeting

situation in non-international

armed

solely a factual matter

groups' treatment as

and detention.

and

mem-

43

conflict differs markedly. In that op-

position fighters are in violation of domestic law by virtue of their

armed

activities,

law enforcement agencies necessarily engage in operations against them. Accordingly, in non-international

fighting lawlessness

is

armed

conflict there

is

no

logic for incorporation;

the very raison d'etre of law enforcement entities, a task un-

diminished by the existence of a non-international armed

conflict.

Thus, even

if

wholly separate from the military, perhaps even conducting autonomous operations that are not coordinated with those of the

similar agencies qualify as the

armed

armed forces, law enforcement and

forces for the purposes of non-international
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The Commentary to Additional Protocol

conflict classification.

embraces

in

explicitly

II

this interpretation:

The term "armed

forces" of the

broadest sense. In

fact, this

for example, "regular

High Contracting Party should be understood

term was chosen

armed

in preference to others suggested

forces", in order to cover

those not included in the definition of the

army

the

all

armed

in the

such

as,

forces, including

in the national legislation

of some

countries (national guard, customs, police forces or any other similar force). 44

To the extent any such groups
ment, they
Finally,

—or

—act

units thereof

in opposition to the

will

be considered and treated as "dissident armed forces."

it is

possible for State

armed

govern-

forces to be transformed into opposition

organized armed groups once they lose power. This was the situation in Afghani-

upon either adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in
December 2001 or the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim president during the

stan

June 2002 loyajirga. 45 Arguably,

from the perspective of those

it is

States,

also the situation of QaddafTs forces, at least

such as the United

States,

which have recog-

nized the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government of Libya.

Whether former military forces qualify as a dissident armed force or "other organized armed group" is unresolved as a matter of law, but this is of little practical significance in light of the position taken in this chapter that dissident
are but a category of organized

armed

forces.

armed

forces

46

Other Organized Armed Groups

A second

category of opposition forces consists, for the sake of analysis, of "other

organized armed groups," an expression drawn from the text of Additional
Protocol

II. It is

well established that the existence of an

the participation of an

armed

conflict, this

armed

force of

requirement poses

some

sort. In the

little difficulty.

armed

conflict requires

context of international

Armed

forces of one State,

By contrast, the situation
is more complex in non-international armed conflict, for armed conflict must
be distinguished from "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature." 47 In
which are organized by

definition, face those of another.

Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) made such a distinction by defining non-international armed
conflict as situations of "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State," 48 a
Tadic, the Appeals
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test

combining

and organization which has been adopted

intensity

in the

Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court. 49

Until recently,

it

was unclear whether organized armed groups other than the

who

dissident

armed

hostilities

or constitute a separate category of "non-civilians." 50 Neither

nor Additional Protocol

Article 3
civilian.

forces comprise groups

no

term without defining

Protocol

I,

international law,

52

altogether, instead simply extending

active part in hostilities, while the latter

51

on the conduct of hostilities. In
which is generally accepted

particular, Article 13 of Addias

reflective

of customary

provides:

2.

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,

ject

of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which

terror

3.

among the

civilian

as they take a direct part in hostilities.

members

hostilities. If not,

not be the obis

to spread

by this part, unless and for such time

53

are civilians, they are only targetable while participating in the

they maybe treated as analogous to

and thereby remain targetable even when not

The ICRC acknowledged
national Humanitarian

It

shall

population are prohibited.

Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded

So, if the

employs the

members of organized armed groups are civilians or a sep-

issue of whether

arate category bears
tional

it.

Common

directly addresses the scope of the concept of

As noted, the former avoids the term

protection to those taking

The

II

are directly participating in

this

members of the armed forces,

participating.

normative dilemma in

its

2005 Customary

Inter-

Law study:

can be argued that the terms "dissident armed forces or other organized armed

groups
tially

.

.

.

under responsible command"

in Article

1

of Additional Protocol

II

inferen-

recognise the essential conditions of armed forces, as they apply in international

armed

conflict

.

.

.

,

and

that

it

follows that civilians are

all

persons

who

are not

mem-

bers of such forces or groups. Subsequent treaties, applicable to non-international

armed conflicts, have similarly used the terms civilians and civilian population without
defining them.

While State armed forces are not considered civilians, practice is not clear as to whether
members of armed opposition groups are civilians subject to Rule 6 on loss of protection from attack in case of direct participation or whether members of such groups are
liable to attack as such,

independently of the operation of Rule 6 [which deals with the

issue of direct participation in hostilities]. 54
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This very issue occupied the attention of a group of international experts con-

vened by the ICRC from 2003 to 2008 to consider the notion of direct participation
by

Various suggestions were offered, including an approach by which

civilians.

members of an organized armed group might be treated as civilians who were continuously participating in hostilities, and therefore continuously legitimate targets.

However, the ICRC worried that the approach would "seriously undermine the
conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the principle of distinction,

most notably because

flicts

whose

later

entire

armed

it

would

forces

acknowledged by the

create parties to non-international

remain part of the

District

Court

armed con-

civilian population," 55 a point

for the District of Columbia in Gherebi. 56

Accordingly, the Interpretive Guidance took the reasonable position that "as the

wording and logic of Article

armed

forces,

3

GC I-IV and Additional Protocol II reveals, civilians,

and organized armed groups of the

ally exclusive categories also in

parties to the conflict are

non-international

armed

conflict."

57

mutu-

Individuals

who are members of organized armed groups are accordingly not civilians. 58 The
ICTY embraced this stance in Galic. 59 This is an important point, for if members of
an organized armed group are not
civilians

is

civilians, the

LOAC

inapplicable to them. For instance, they

extending protection to

may be

attacked regardless of

whether they are directly participating; their vulnerability to attack is status, not activity,

based.

Not
group

all

groups in a battlespace are "organized armed groups." To qualify, the

in question

must be both "organized" and "armed." With regard

ganized criterion, Article

1

of Additional Protocol

I

refers to a

group that

to the oris

"under

command." This phrase is explicatory of the notion of organization.
The ICRC commentary to the article explains that
responsible

[t]he existence of a responsible

insurgent
that there

armed group or
is

command

dissident

implies

armed

forces,

some degree of organization of the
but this does not necessarily mean

a hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular

means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the other, of imposing

armed

forces.

It

discipline in the

The ICTY

name of a de

facto authority.

60

dealt with the issue of the threshold level of organization in the case of

Limaj. In assessing the Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA), the Trial Chamber held that

some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the existence of an
armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that required for establishing the
responsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates within the organisation, as
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no determination of individual criminal responsibility is intended under this provision
of the Statute. 61

It

went on

for the

ICRC document submitted to the Preparatory Commission

to cite an

Rome

Statute's elements of crimes,

which stated that armed

conflict "pre-

supposes the existence of hostilities between armed forces organised
lesser extent.'"
ters,

62

Looking to factors like the existence of a general

a greater or

to

staff and

headquar-

designated military zones, adoption of internal regulations, the appointment

of a spokesperson, coordinated military actions, recruitment

uniforms and negotiations with the other

KLA was

side,

63

the

activities,

the wear of

Chamber concluded

that the

an organized armed group, 64 a determination consistent with those in

other cases examining the same issue. 65
Similarly, in the

Haradinaj case the ICTY surveyed

all

previous judgments rele-

vant to the issue of organization before concluding that no single factor was necessarily determinative. Rather, the Trial

Illustrative factors that

Chamber

bore on organization included

existence of a headquarters; the fact that the
ity

suggested a holistic approach.

group controls a certain

territory; the abil-

of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and mili-

tary training;

its

ability to plan,

troop movements and
military tactics;

and

coordinate and carry out military operations, including

logistics; its ability to

its

ability to

define a unified military strategy

and use

speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude

agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords. 66

These cases suggest two indispensable elements of the "organized"

criterion.

To

begin with, the group in question must exhibit a degree of structure. The structure

need not be

strictly hierarchical

or implemented in any formalistic manner,

al-

though such factors are highly indicative of the required organizational robustness.
For instance,

many non-military organized armed groups have

flat

and decentral-

ized structures. Yet, as has been noted elsewhere, while such organizational

may

models

complicate identification of a group's members, "operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq demonstrate

that these challenges are not insurmountable." 67

an organized armed group have

from established bases or

explicit ranks,

wear

distinctive

Nor need

emblems, operate

recruit in a particular fashion.

That said, a group that is transitory or ad hoc in nature does not qualify; in other
words, an organized armed group can never simply consist of those who are engaging in hostilities against the State, sans plus.

It

must be

a distinct entity that the

other side can label the "enemy" for reasons ranging from the development of field
strategy

and

tactics to the

capable of exercising

conduct of negotiations.

some degree of control over
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it

must be

in a

Non-International Armed Conflict

sufficiently organized to enforce

compliance with LOAC,

although failure to actually do so does not bar qualification as an organized armed
group.68
Additionally, to be "organized," a group

must be

fashion, albeit not to the extent of the regular

an

plies

ability to plan

and execute group

communicate among members,
to

combat operations.

armed

forces. This

activities, collect

deconflict operations

requirement im-

and share

and provide

must evidence

a

intelligence,

logistic

Collective action alone, in the sense of multiple

actions against the State (or another organized
actions engaged in

able to act in a coordinated

support

autonomous

armed group), does not

suffice; the

group character.

The organization requirement is especially relevant in three regards. First, there
is no non-international armed conflict equivalent of international armed conflict's
levee en masse. 69 An uprising against the government, no matter how intense, can
only constitute a non-international armed conflict once the opposition begins to
exhibit some degree of organization. Until then, it is an internal disturbance and
thereby excluded from the ambit of non-international armed conflict.
Second, an organized armed group cannot consist solely of those who share the
same basis for opposition to the government, for they lack the requisite degree of
organization and coordination. As an example, whereas individual terrorist groups
in a non-international armed conflict may qualify separately as organized armed
groups, it is only once they begin to affiliate and to coordinate their activities that
they become a single organized armed group. Consider al Qaeda, an organized
armed group consisting of loosely related subgroups. The fact that others may
share

al

Qaeda's ideology or are inspired by the organization does not alone suffice

to qualify

Instead, they are either

members of a

sepa-

rate

directly participating in hostilities or

mere

them as al Qaeda members.
organized armed group, civilians

violent criminals. Thus, there can, legally, be

no such thing as a "war on terrorism"

as such, because the generic category of terrorists

an armed

conflict.

It is

cannot constitute a single party to

only once particular groups are

or coordinate activities in concert that they

may be

somehow affiliated and plan

treated as a distinct organized

armed group.
Third, cyber attacks have raised the possibility of virtual organization. Online

commonplace in contemporary life. In many cases, the members
thereof never physically meet. They may not even know the identities of other
organizations are

members.

If a collection

of online hackers conducts related operations against a

government (assuming such operations
ter

of law), can

who conduct

it

meet the organization

rise to the level

criterion?

Along similar

lines,

can persons

members of a group constituted and coordinating
make up an organized armed group?

kinetic actions as

entirely online

of armed actions as a mat-
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Individuals operating autonomously, even

armed group. There

if

same

targeting the

State entities,

no organizational element and their
actions lack coordination. A similar conclusion would hold with regard to individuals who operate collectively, but not cooperatively. During the cyber attacks
are not an organized

is

against Georgia in 2008, for example, a website appeared containing hacker tools

and a

list

of Georgian government and civilian targets. 70 Using that

site,

hundreds

of individuals began conducting individual attacks. Again, the absence of organi-

would preclude characterization of the
members of an organized armed group.
and of cooperative

zation
ers as

activities

attack-

On the other hand, a virtual group can have a specific leadership and organizaand conduct highly synchronized cyber operations. The only ap-

tional structure

parent obstacle to qualification as an organized armed group would appear to be
the requirement that organizational structure allow for enforcement of

There

is

presently

no consensus

as to

have enforcing

LOAC precludes

that the virtual

members would

The second
cally, a

LOAC
fence."

group

criterion of

is

as "acts
71

whether the

qualification as
at

most

difficulty a virtual

it

group would

an organized armed group, such

qualify as civilian direct participants.

an organized armed group

armed when

LOAC.

is

that

it

be "armed." Logi-

has the capacity to carry out "attacks," defined in

of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in de-

Such acts must be based on the group's intentions, not those of individual

members. This conclusion derives from the

fact that

while

many members

of the

armed forces have no violent function, the armed forces as a whole are nevertheless
"armed" as a matter of LOAC. 72 Conversely, the mere fact that certain members of
a

group participate in

hostilities

does not render the group "armed" absent a

shared purpose of carrying out the qualifying attacks.

More problematic is a group that does not itself carry out attacks, but performs
acts that amount to direct participation in hostilities, such as collecting tactical intelligence for use by other groups in specific attacks. To the extent that acts constituting direct participation render individual civilians subject to attack,

it

is

a

reasonable extrapolation to conclude that a group with a purpose of directly participating in the hostilities

is

"armed."

context of a non-international

Of course, such groups could only exist

armed

conflict in

ducting attacks, for without attacks there

The one

is

in the

which another group was con-

no armed

conflict in the first place.

area of potential difficulty with regard to the

armed

criterion involves

groups that engage in cyber operations. By the approach taken above, a group of
this

kind would have to be mounting operations that rose to the

level

of a cyber "at-

tack" as a matter of law or otherwise be engaging in cyber activities that amounted,
as discussed, to direct participation in either cyber or kinetic attacks.

agreement

exists as to

While

dis-

which cyber operations constitute attacks under LOAC, 73
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there

is

in a

Non-International Armed Conflict

consensus that any cyber operation resulting in injury to or death of indi-

viduals or

damage

to or destruction of objects qualifies.

There

is

also

agreement

do not.
Certain organized groups consist of both armed and non-armed wings. This is
the case, for instance, with Hamas and Hezbollah. It is generally accepted that
that cyber activities that

merely cause inconvenience or

irritation

composed of subgroups, only those that engage in
hostilities qualify as organized armed groups. Individuals who straddle both wings,
such as the overall leader, are members of the armed subgroup, notwithstanding

when

the group in question

is

their non-hostile roles.

member of an organized armed
Specifically, the question is who among the members may be attacked when

Controversy surrounds one aspect of status as a
group.

A restrictive view, represented by the Interpretive
Guidance, adopts the notion of "continuous combat function" as the key to mem-

not directly engaged in

bership.

The term

is

hostilities.

defined as a "continuous function for the group involving his

or her direct participation in hostilities." 74

Although the question of which

somewhat contentious,

75

acts qualify as "direct participation"

the issue need not be explored here. Suffice

it

is itself

to say that

by the Guidance standard only those with a continuous combat function may be
treated as

members of an organized armed group and

therefore attackable at any

time during the period of their membership. Absent such a function, individuals
affiliated

with the group are to be treated as civilians

such time as they participate in the

hostilities.

who

can only be attacked for

76

In justification, the Interpretive Guidance correctly notes the difficulty during a

non-international armed conflict of distinguishing civilians from

members of or-

ganized armed groups, and points to the fact that membership in an organized

armed group is seldom formalized, "other than taking up a certain function for the
group." 77 Groups may not wear uniforms, operate from fixed bases or fight employing classic military tactics and they are often organized informally and operate
clandestinely. Complicating matters

may carry weapons for their own
uous combat function, by
civilian

is

the reality that civilians in the battlespace

protection. Therefore the requirement of contin-

setting a high bar for

membership, appears

to afford the

population enhanced protection from mistaken attacks.

These concerns are
stated. In fact,

valid, but, for

both practical and normative reasons, over-

organized armed groups often have a membership structure based

on more than mere function. Members frequently wear uniforms or other
guishing garb and

distin-

may operate from fixed bases, especially when in control of terri-

tory or operating from remote locations. 78 For example, the

Red Army, Hamas,
Hezbollah, FARC, Tamil Tigers and KLA were often distinguishable from the civilian population and operated in a manner not unlike the regular armed forces.
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Membership may also be confirmed by intelligence ranging from human sources
and communications intercepts to captured documents and interrogation of captured fighters. So, from a practical perspective, it is frequently a relatively simple
matter to discriminate between civilians and members of organized armed groups.

When it is not, the law itself takes account of the uncertainty. Article 50.
tional Protocol

I,

conflicts,

79

son

be considered to be a

shall

The

provides that

result of the

the law.

By

of Addi-

deemed reflective of customary internaarmed conflicts and non-international armed

a provision generally

both international

tional law in

1

"

[i]

n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian,

that per-

civilian."

continuous combat function criterion

the proposed standard, direct attack

on

a

is

therefore inequity in

member

of an organized

armed group without a continuous combat function is prohibited (indeed, such an
attack would be a war crime since the individual qualifies as a civilian), but a member of the State's armed forces who performs no combat-related duties may be attacked at any time. This

is

a rather curious result in light of the fact that the

organized armed group lacks any domestic or international legal basis for
participation in the conflict in the

first place.

The standard badly skews the

bal-

ance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that undergirds

allofLOAC. 80

A more

reasoned approach, and one that better comports with the underlying

logic of the distinction

between

civilians

and organized armed groups,

and members of the armed forces

is

to simply

members
of organized armed groups may be attacked so long as they remain active members
of the group, regardless of their function. It makes no more sense to treat an inditreat insurgent fighters

vidual

equally.

By

it,

who joins a group that has the express purpose of conducting hostilities as a

civilian

than

it

would

to differentiate

between the various members of the regular

armed forces. After all, and as noted in the Interpretive Guidance itself (albeit in the
context of international armed conflict),

it

would contradict the
under the more

logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular

forces

armed

protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population

fail to distinguish themselves from that population, to carry their
arms openly, or to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, all armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed forces of that

merely because they

party.

81

A final issue with regard to organized armed groups in non-international armed
conflicts involves

mixed

conflicts, that

is,
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Non-International Armed Conflict

in a

The Interpretive Guidance raises this prospect in
its assertion that "organized armed groups operating within the broader context of
an international armed conflict without belonging to a party to that conflict could
82
A
still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict."
non-international components.

group belongs

to a party

when

at least a

de facto relationship

group and the party to the international armed
long as

fices so

sition

is

clear for

straightforward

conflict, a

party.

it is

By

—

which

side the

conflict.

group

since only States

is

Mere

fighting.

83

may be party to an

exists

tacit

between the

agreement

The basis

suf-

for the po-

international

armed

non-State group would have to be affiliated with a State to qualify as a
contrast, non-international

one party that

armed

conflict necessarily involves at least

not a State or otherwise an extension thereof.

is

The prospect of groups appearing in the battlespace that do not belong to any of
the parties to an international armed conflict is far from hypothetical. For instance,
during the international armed conflict phases in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition
troops regularly faced forces that were not allied with the Taliban or the Baathist
regimes. In particular, certain Shia militia groups in Iraq opposed both the coalition forces

and those of the

Iraqi

government

in the

hope of eventually

seizing

power themselves.

From

a practical perspective,

an approach that automatically renders

hostilities

with a non-affiliated organized armed group as a separate non-international

armed

conflict

is

law to colocated
ble to ask

problematic in that

hostilities.

whether there

in question

is

requires application of separate bodies of

it

Therefore, an argument can be

made

that

it is

prefera-

an unambiguous nexus between the actions of the group

and the international armed

conflict. 84 If so, the

law applicable in inter-

armed conflict would continue to govern hostilities with the group. If not,
the group would qualify as an organized armed group in a non-international
armed conflict.
Regardless of one's position on this specific issue, there are undoubtedly situa85
For intions in which international and non-international conflicts coexist.
stance, a non-international armed conflict may survive in a situation where an
international armed conflict breaks out. In Afghanistan, non-international armed
conflict between the Taliban-led Afghan government and the Northern Alliance
national

was under way

at the

time coalition forces began operations in 2001. Until the co-

alition exercised "overall control"

of Northern Alliance operations, that conflict

continued alongside the international armed conflict between the coalition States

and Afghanistan. 86
Despite the complexity of classifying conflict,
fact that classification

it is

important to emphasize the

of participants in such conflicts tracks the criteria normally

applied in the two types of conflicts.

The fact that an
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ongoing in the same battlespace and

no bearing on
"organized armed groups."

conflict has

Civilians

at the

same time as a non-international armed

qualification of

any groups involved

in the latter as

Who Directly Participate in Hostilities

The final category of fighters in armed opposition to the government comprises individuals who are members of neither dissident armed forces nor any other organized groups. Their activities alone cannot constitute a non-international armed
conflict, for
least

one

such a conflict cannot

side.

exist

without an organized armed group on

Thus, the category of directly participating civilians only has mean-

armed
hostilities on

ing in the context of an ongoing non-international
Individuals

at

"who

directly participate in

sporadic or unorganized basis"

make up

the category.

87

conflict.

a

merely spontaneous,

Examples include those

who engage in individual acts for pay (e.g., a fee for emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) or for other reasons unrelated to

groups of individuals

who

group

affiliation, as well as

take part in the hostilities without prior organization

mob

By the Interpretive
Guidance's approach, the category would extend to those members of an armed
group who do not have a continuous combat function, but which at times take up
arms or engage in other acts amounting to direct participation.
The topic of direct participation in hostilities has been the subject of extensive
and lively discourse in the literature and need only be summarized here. 88 It is an
important debate, for, unlike members of the dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups, direct participants may only be attacked while they engage
in acts of participation. As noted in Additional Protocol II, Article 13.3, civilians
enjoy protection from attack, "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities." Resultantly, the options for targeting them are dramatically reduced.
With regard to the concept of direct participation, two questions are key: ( 1
what acts qualify a civilian as a direct participant in hostilities; and (2) when is he or
she participating? The Interpretive Guidance proffers three cumulative "constituand coordination

tive

(as in a

that attacks a military facility).

elements" of acts that constitute direct participation.

The

1

ity

act

must be likely to adversely affect the

of a party to an armed conflict

tion

on persons or

military operations or military capac-

or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury,

or destruc-

objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm),

and

There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
2.
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The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of
harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent
3.

nexus).

89

These

criteria generally

there

the

is

capture the essence of direct participation, although

some disagreement with
criterion could be

first

the standards around the margins. 90 For instance,

expanded

encompass

to

acts that

military capacity, rather than merely negatively affecting the

causal link as explained in the Guidance

is

overly restrictive.

cludes assembly of an improvised explosive device
tion

mdirect.

is

92

This assertion

flies in

human
spite

shielding as indirect, a position that

such concerns, the three elements

to be direct participation

—

manner and that are related
Much more problematic

is

sense;

no

it

ex-

participaState that

also labels voluntary

likewise highly questionable. 93 De-

capture what

fairly

As an example,

common

The Guidance

it.

enemy. Further, the

on the basis that such

the face of

engages in combat could reasonably accept

91

enhance one's own

is

generally understood

acts that militarily affect the parties in a fairly direct

to the
is

ongoing armed

the question of

conflict.

when may

direct participation be

immunity from attack during that pesuch time" verbiage in the direct participation norm,

said to be happening, for a civilian only loses
riod.

At issue

which

is

is

the "for

properly characterized as customary in nature. 94

The Interpretive Guidance asserts that "measures preparatory to the execution of
a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and
the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of the
act." 95

However, many of the experts involved

in the project of developing the

Guidance argued for a broader interpretation of "preparatory," such that the period
of participation should extend as far before and after a hostile action as a causal

connection existed. 96 As an example, the broader approach would include assembling an

IED and perhaps even acquiring

the necessary materials.

There was also significant objection to the Interpretive Guidance's assertion that

who

individuals

participate in hostilities

from attack between
attack. This

their operations, losing

dynamic has become known

ance somewhat curiously suggests

The approach

on

flies in

is

it

a recurrent basis regain protection

again only

upon launching the next

as the "revolving door,"

which the Guid-

an "integral part, not a malfunction of IHL." 97

the face of military

common sense and accordingly repre-

sents a distortion of LOAC's military advantage/humanitarian considerations bal-

ance. This
activities
If

is

especially so in the context of irregular warfare,

where clandestine

by insurgent groups are common. Again, consider the case of an IED

the insurgent

is

attack.

discovered deploying to the attack location, implanting the IED

or returning from the operation, the attack will likely be foiled since
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usually only successful

when

the devices can be laid secretly. As a result, the best

option for countering future attacks

is

through heuristic intelligence

which would reveal patterns of IED-implanting
ing those involved through
tive

human and

activities that

analysis,

allow for pinpoint-

technical intelligence. Yet by the Interpre-

Guidance position, they could not be attacked until launching the next

operation, an unacceptable result militarily.

The only viable approach is one in which a civilian who directly participates in
hostilities on a recurring basis remains targetable until he or she opts out of the
hostilities in an unambiguous manner. There is, of course, a risk that a direct participant

might actually have decided to cease

all

hostile activities without the

knowledge of the forces he or she has been attacking. But it
the participant,

who

enjoyed no right to participate in the

is

more sensible to have

first

place, bear the risk

of mistake rather than his or her former victims. The requirement to presume

civil-

ian status in the event of reasonable doubt further mitigates this risk.

Conclusions

In a non-international
categories

armed

conflict,

opposition fighters can be divided into two

—members of an organized armed group and

civilian direct participants

The former category includes dissident armed forces and other
groups that are both "organized" and "armed." The argument that a member of an
organized armed group must be treated as a civilian if he or she does not have a
continuous combat function in the group was rejected as both impractical and
in hostilities.

contrary to the logic of the law.

The

result of this binary classification

is

that there

is

no

LOAC prohibition on

members of organized armed groups at any time, just as there is no international law prohibition on attacking members of the government's forces. 98 Only
when dealing with a fighter who is unaffiliated with a group, and who is therefore a
attacking

civilian
arise.

temporarily deprived of protection as such, does a temporal limitation

This approach accords neatly with the foundational premise of the law of

armed

conflict

—

that the law

must balance

military necessity

and humanitarian

considerations. Further parsing of the prevailing binary classification or otherwise

complicating

it

will

only serve to confuse matters in what

fusing genre of conflict

—

that

which

is

is

perhaps the most con-

non-international.
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ICRC

conducted against a

force's

own government. There

is
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envisaged hostilities against the military forces of States with which the force's

that the

own

gov-

ernment was fighting as a non-international armed conflict. On the contrary, the commentary is
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Present and Future Conceptions of the Status

of Government Forces in Non-International

Armed Conflict

Sean Watts*
Introduction

seems there are two types of international lawyers — those who view apparent
Itlegal
voids as vacuums to be
by international law and those who view legal
filled

voids as barriers to the operation of international law. Voids, and for that matter

ambiguity, provoke different reactions from different international lawyers.

an international lawyer or tribunal regards an apparent

row a poker term, one of the

legal

void

may be,

How

to bor-

great international law "tells." In addition to provid-

ing doctrinal or descriptive clarity, resolutions of voids usually expose a lawyer's
level

of confidence in the international legal system as well as his or her outlook on

the propriety of sovereignty-based regulation.

Disagreement over the significance of international
ademic.

To

legal voids

is

not merely ac-

the contrary, debate over perceived or real legal voids between inter-

camps quickly brings questions of abstract legal theory
into the practical worlds of international policy and practice. Even the hardened
international-rule skeptic must see that States' conceptions of international law
translate almost directly into policy. With respect to the international law of war,
national law interpretive

1
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such interpretations can produce widespread life-or-death consequences and,
with the rebirth of international criminal law, severe criminal sanctions.
Legal voids exist

and operate nowhere more

clearly

and widely

in international

law than in the laws of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts
classically as civil wars. 2 In

(NIACs), understood

positive law of NIAC pales in

between

to conflicts

States.

3

comparison

to the law-of-war provisions applicable

For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including

hundred substantive

their 1977 updates, contain well over five

to international

There

is

armed

purely quantitative terms, the

conflict

(I

AC)

4

yet fewer than thirty applicable to

thus no small irony in the fact that the

modern law of war

beginning to a document created to regulate conduct in a

its

since, States

have rejected invitations and proposals to

between IAC and NIAC. The
voids regarding the

latter.

articles applicable

civil

actually traces

war. 5 Yet ever

level the positive legal

been what some regard

result has

NIAC.

gap

as glaring legal

6

Status of government actors in

NIAC provides an intriguing and specific exam-

Whereas the protections and obligations of the law of IAC
premised almost entirely on the status of affected persons, the law of NIAC

ple of just such a void.

are

spurns such classifications, as well as the IAC taxonomy of status-based protection
generally. International lawyers have long regarded status of persons as largely

ir-

NIAC. Yet modern forms of conflict and State responses may soon
place pressure on the NIAC status void. Increasing media attention, growing international oversight and progressively heightening sensitivity to the suffering produced by NIAC conspire to match the legal protective regime of NIAC with that of
7

relevant to

IAC, including perhaps the

latter's

use of status.

IAC describes a number of circumstances and legal relationships (e.g.,
wounded, wounded at sea, prisoner-of-war, or civilian status). This chapter
Status in

focuses

on the use of status

or what

is

to determine lawfulness of participation in hostilities,

sometimes referred

to in

IAC

as

combatant

status. 8 In particular, this

chapter explores the extent to which the international law of NIAC regulates the
status of persons

who

participate in hostilities

on behalf of the

State.

This chapter begins by addressing the descriptive question whether the international law of NIAC speaks to

government

forces' status at

accompanies, offering explanations of the
law.

A

all.

likely influences

An

analytical section

behind the

state

predictive effort follows, addressed to the question whether the law

tled or instead likely to change. This section identifies a

spiring to

fill

limitations

the

NIAC

status void.

on government

forces in

of distinction, and then rebutted by

of the
is

set-

number of pressures con-

An argument in favor of imposing status-like
NIAC is derived from the law-of-war principle
logical, structural

and operational arguments.

The chapter concludes by addressing a series of considerations
146

related to the chapter's
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opening generalization about international

more

on an appropriate

deliberately

legal voids as

interpretive

an opportunity to

approach to the law of NIAC.

The International Legal Status of Government Forces

The law of war

is

riddled with categories

—

reflect

in

NIAC

categories of conflicts, 9 categories of

weapons, 10 categories of persons. With respect to persons, the primary byproduct
of these categories

is

caught up, in armed

an elaborate system of status for individuals participating, or
conflict. Principled application

derstanding of how the law of war employs status.
status to

implement

its

11

of the law requires a deep unJust as the

law of war confers

humanitarian goals, the law's denial of status often pro-

duces disappointing or even inhumane

results. Frequently, the

complexities and

nuances of status seem to frustrate alignment of legally correct outcomes with
tuitively

moral or normatively desirable outcomes.

in-

A great many of the present and

past errors in the application of the law of war are attributable either to failure to

understand how status attaches and operates in armed conflict or simply to unwillingness to accept the practical consequences of correct status determinations. 12
In war between States, status plays out primarily in the allocation of the
protections and obligations of the law of war. Nearly every important protection of
the law of IAC requires a predicate determination of the status of persons seeking
protection. 13

A prominent commentator observed with respect to IAC, "Every per-

son in enemy hands must have some status under international law

enemy hands can be

outside the law."

14

In

targeting requires the status of civilian,

15

most

cases, protection

.

.

.

;

nobody in

from intentional

that of wounded person 16 or, generally,

that of hors de combat. Persons qualifying for

wounded

or civilian status receive

protection from attack "unless and for such time as they take direct part in
hostilities." 17

To

benefit

tions, persons in the

from the most elaborate law-of-war treatment obliga-

hands of an adversary must qualify for wounded and

prisoner-of-war 19 or protected-person status. 20

sick, 18

The 1949 Geneva Convention on

Civilians includes subcategories of civilian, including the "populations of countries
in conflict," 21 "national[s] of neutral state[s]" 22

and "interned protected

per-

23

The law further classifies members of the armed forces into subcategories
of combatant and non-combatant. 24
In addition to allocating protection, the law of war uses status to deny protection and treatment obligations. Designation as a spy, mercenary, or, somewhat
more controversially, an unprivileged belligerent, unlawful combatant, saboteur
sons."

or guerilla can greatly reduce or alter a person's protection or treatment under the

law of war. 25 Status has been the focus of not only operational, humanitarian and
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academic attention but also some of the most significant criminal
force the law of war.

litigation to en-

:t1

The law of NIAC, however, stands generally as an exception to law-of-war reliance on status. Whereas the legal regime applicable to IAC is replete with categories
of status, no such system or taxonomy operates in the law of NIAC. The traditional
response to the question whether international law regulates status in

been a confident no.

27

While Additional Protocol

treaty law applicable in

NIAC, speaks

in

II

NIAC

of 1977, the most developed

terms of a "civilian population,"

offers

it

neither qualifying criteria nor any definition of the term "civilian." 28 Perhaps
significantly, the Protocol offers

tional Protocol

To

I

no counterpart

status of combatant.

the uninitiated, the

has

to civilian status such as the

more
Addi-

29

most noticeable

legal

void of NIAC might be the absence

wounded and

of prisoner-of-war status. Along with protection of the
prisoner-of-war status has long been one of the

consummate law-of-war

sick,

topics. 30

Few of the major law-of-war treaties addressed to the protection of victims of
armed conflict have failed to address prisoners of war. While treatment provisions

and

living conditions of the captured garner the lion's share of

tention, the

popular

at-

most important aspect of prisoner-of-war protection has been

—

immunity from prosecution for lawful hostile acts so-called combatant immunity. Combatant immunity protects most prisoners of war from prosecution by
their captors for mere participation in hostilities. 31 Thus, nearly all law-of-war
prosecutions of prisoners of war have concerned the manner in which they conducted hostilities rather than the fact of their participation in war or their otherwise lawful, warlike
Fighters

32

acts.

captured in

NIAC do

not share the status, immunity or regime of

treatment obligations afforded to their

IAC

counterparts. 33 Despite development

of a separate protocol dedicated to developing humanitarian protection in NIAC,
the law of war affords

attachment of status in

no prisoner-of-war

NIAC. 34

States' desire to

avoid

NIAC is perhaps apparent in the Additional Protocol II label

for the captured, "[p]ersons
label,

status in

even by international

whose

liberty has

legal standards;

been

it is

restricted." 35 This

likely States

is

a strained

wished to avoid any

implications of status or legitimacy arising from use of a term of art to describe de-

NIAC. The international law of NIAC affords captured fighters treatment obligations no different from those applicable to the general, non-hostile
population. 36 Neither efforts to comply with criteria of conduct or appearance nor
any offer of reciprocal observance of the law can compel recognition of prisonerof-war status by a captor during NIAC. 37 Instead, opposition fighters captured in
NIAC, no matter their appearances or conduct, are likely to be regarded as mere
criminals, fully subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State. 38 The
tention in
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comment

nearest
nity

is

Additional Protocol

Article 6(5). 39

However,

II

offers

this provision

on the

topic of combatant

immu-

merely charges States to "endeavor"

Amnesty is by no means an international legal obligation in NIAC. Domestic law represents the far more relevant legal source for both
treatment obligations and immunities if any arising from participation in NIAC.
The law of NIAC is nearly silent.
The NIAC status void is even more pronounced with respect to the status of
government actors in NIAC. Investigation reveals no treatment in relevant treaty
law, nor any significant international custom or usage on the topic. The wellknown criteria used to evaluate combatant status in IAC appear nowhere in the
positive law of NIAC. 40 And while some States' military manuals address NIAC,
none of those reviewed acknowledges international legal input to government
forces' status. 41 Instead, most emphasize that the existing law of NIAC has no effect
on the legal status of the parties to the conflict. 42 Finally, there is there no evidence
of internationally based prosecutions of government actors for their mere participation in NIAC or based on the nature or composition of such forces.
States thus appear to be free from international regulation of the status or
nature of government actors they employ against rebels in NIAC. Although States
have created rules regulating the conduct of their forces in NIAC, no positive into grant

amnesty to

fighters.

ternational rules limit the nature of persons or organizations governments

NIAC. Nor does the law of NIAC provide any general status for such
In fact, government forces' status in NIAC generally can be said to consti-

employ
forces.

tute

may

in

one of the remaining voids of the international laws of war. Three explana-

tions for this void

seem apparent: one

practical, a

second probable and a third

speculative but possible.

The most practical explanation may be that there has simply been little need.
Government actors involved in NIAC have not looked to international law for the
legitimacy of their participation or for their legal mandate to carry out acts that are
essentially internal or non-international in character. Actions taken to

State

from

internal threats

lie at

defend the

the heart of sovereignty. Even the highly interna-

tionalized collective security system of the United Nations includes a barrier to

outside intervention in internal conflicts. 43
forces used in

NIAC

has been an area

The nature and status of government
dominated by municipal law. Responses to

insurgency or rebellion, though typically of greater intensity than routine crime,

remain

essentially

There are
hostilities

law enforcement operations. 44

lively debates

concerning domestic

—none more timely and

of national security authority.
strict

45

legal status

relevant than the U.S. Title

and participation
1

0— Title 50 division

Conceptions of U.S. domestic law might well

authority to engage in combat to the

armed forces as organized under Title
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of the United States Code. Although likely envisioned in extraterritorial contexts,
debate also swirls around permissible roles for private security contractors (PSCs)
in

armed

conflict.

Episodes such as the Blackwater Nisoor Square shootings 46 and

other examples of excessive use of force by PSCs have fostered efforts to restrain

them from

direct participation in hostilities. 47 Proposals to limit

pear to have gained

PSC activities ap-

momentum, notwithstanding the considerable economies that

have developed around that corner of the military-industrial complex. Clearly,

may

States

resort to domestic law to limit the activities of their agents in

armed

The question remains apart, however, from whether they have resorted or
will resort to international law to do the same.
To be certain, government actors may very well find themselves called to task
for the international legality of specific conduct and means and methods used in
combat. 48 International criminal tribunals of the late twentieth and early twentyconflict.

first

NIAC jus in hello through extensive cases. Yet
mere participation in NIAC itself has not been addressed in

centuries have developed the

the legality of their

any forum applying international law.

A related factor contradicting indications of international legal treatment of status

may be that States have tended to

use forces practically appropriate to the task,

armed forces. When the activities of opposition fighters reach a scale or level
of intensity sufficient to cross the threshold from mere banditry or riot into armed
conflict, resort by the government to the armed forces of the State becomes an obvious, often necessary response. Indeed, forcing the State to resort to armed forces
is often regarded as a condition precedent to classifying a situation as armed conthat

is,

flict

in the first place. 49

By

contrast, the prevailing view of the law of

forces States

may employ

IAC seems

to limit the types of

as direct participants in hostilities while preserving the

protections of the combatant class, most obviously prisoner-of-war status. 50

upon

pect prisoner-of-war status for their forces

capture,

it is

To ex-

generally agreed that

must employ regular armed forces or their equivalent in direct hostilities. 51 If
this view is correct and if one extends it by custom to NIAC then it's likely the case,
States

as the late Louis

time. 52

Henkin might

Thus the problem,

if

say, that

there

is

most

one

States are in compliance,

at all,

may

most of the

frequently be preempted by

supposed compliance.

A

second, highly probable explanation for

plicitly regulate status

of government actors in

why

international law does not ex-

NIAC concerns States' general atti-

tudes toward the relationship between international law and
steadfastly resisted creating parity
likely the

States have

between the law of IAC and that of NIAC.

absence of international law

luctance to

NIAC.

is

It is

simply a byproduct of States' general

re-

commit to positive rules in NIAC. The reasons for this reluctance are by
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now well known.

Fear of conferring legitimacy on rebels, concerns over failure of

reciprocal observance, 53 fear of limiting operational

freedom of action and

fear of

who take up arms against
the State have all driven States to resist expanding the law of NIAC to match that of
IAC. States simply do not view opposition fighters in NIAC as legal equals.
erecting obstacles to domestic prosecutions of persons

Equality of status between sanctioned combatants has long been bedrock of the
international law of IAC. Indeed, equality before the law has been a distinguishing
feature of the;ws in bello, setting

bellum. Yet

it

no "equal application"

apart from

its

law-of-war counterpart, the;ws ad

principle operates in the present law of NIAC. 54

Indeed, States conditioned their consent to what

on an

explicit

little

positive law of NIAC exists

guarantee that legal status would form no part of the law. 55 The con-

cluding clause of

Common

Article 3 of the 1949

"The application of the preceding provisions

shall

Geneva Convention provides,
not affect the legal status of the

Parties to the conflict." 56

The point

is

made

highly developed

ment

forces.

when one looks to the law of IAC. Even in its current,
the law of IAC does not fully regulate the status of govern-

again

state,

status has ancient law-of-war roots. 57 Yet

The concept of combatant

commit to this area. The Third Geneva
Convention does not address combatant status, or immunity for that matter, at
the positive law does not directly address or

all

—

surprising, perhaps, for a prisoner-of-war convention comprising over 130

articles.

Building on the Third Convention, Additional Protocol

combatants "have the right to participate directly in
tive

of custom. Yet this

commitment

of 1977 states that

I

hostilities"

represents only a partial

and

is

likely reflec-

comment on

the

is-

sue of combatant status. For instance, the relevant article does not affirmatively
indicate whether combatants' right to participate in hostilities
is

is

exclusive.

Thus

it

unclear whether international law actually proscribes or even regulates participa-

tion in hostilities
perts

by persons not qualifying

might posit that the right

that international law

is

combatants. Most law-of-war ex-

exclusive to combatants but the soundest view

is

merely

as

silent

on the matter of privilege with respect

is

to

The matter is not committed to international law whatsoever. It is left to
prerogative and hence to municipal law. Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3),

civilians.

State

which merely outlines the targeting consequences of civilian participation,

most the law of IAC

offers

on the

topic.

is

the

58

Commentary indicates the Additional Protocol I drafters intended to codify and
clarify international

custom on the point of combatant

privilege. 59

Still,

experts

IAC do for combatants in terms of
Some describe international law of armed conflict (LOAC) as a source of

debate what exactly that article and the law of
authority.

authority to participate in hostilities

—

a

combatant's privilege. 60 Others disagree,
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characterizing the article as merely

—

immunity

insulation

from prosecution

rather than an affirmative grant of authority, a right or permission. 61

phrasing

may be

The

better

that the article merely prohibits prosecutions rather than consti-

tutes affirmative authority or positive sanction.

pretations by the 2009 United States Congress

Supreme Court, the majority view

is

Notwithstanding contrary

inter-

and the mid-twentieth-century U.S.

that the law of

IAC does not concern

itself

with the question of criminal consequences for mere direct participation in
62

The best view is that IAC regulates combatant status only as an instrumentality a means to effecting other ends, such as treatment upon capture or for
purposes of contrast with persons protected from attack.
The point for purposes of this chapter is that States' apparent reluctance to commit combatant status fully to international law in IAC makes the prospect that they
hostilities.

—

would do so

in

NIAC

extremely unlikely. Nothing even approaching the partial

coverage offered by Additional Protocol

I

appears in Additional Protocol

do any of the usual indicators of customary norms, such
statements of opinio juris, indicate any State

NIAC to

as military

II.

Nor

manuals or

commitment of combatant

status in

international law.

A final and possible reason for NIAC's void concerning government actor legal
status is lack of consensus. The details of how to treat NIAC have long split the
authors of international law. 63 Balancing the competing interests of humanity and
respect for sovereignty has

bogged down nearly every law-of-war treaty diplomatic

conference. But this balance has been particularly elusive with respect to

Both

Common

Article 3 to the 1949

Conventions and Additional Protocol

proved to be especially contentious on topics
military objective.

64

as

fundamental

Each instrument generated highly

spective diplomatic conference.

NIAC.
II

as the definition of

divisive factions at

its

re-

65

For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions diplomatic conference generated a

NIAC. 66 Consensus that the Conventions would
only operate in conflicts analogous to classic civil war required fifteen weeks of
work and twenty-three meetings on NIAC. 67 Later, at the diplomatic conference
lengthy report on the scope of

that

produced the 1977 Additional Protocols, the scope of covered

NIAC

again

proved contentious. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of delegations appeared

more concerned with contracting LOAC rather than expanding it to cover the en68
These delegations scored a partial victory in the comparatire range of NIAC.
tively stingy application provisions

of Protocol

II.

Protocol

II

applies to a narrower class of conflicts than

Article 3.

69

Thus, while there

nity,

would consent

may well

its

It

is

generally agreed that

1949 counterpart,

Common

be a faction of States who, given the opportu-

to international regulation of government forces' status in

they seem not to have garnered sufficient support at major treaty conferences.
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In the final analysis
clear

it is

commitment of the

overwhelmingly apparent that States have not made any

government

issue of

forces' status in

NIAC

to interna-

tional law. Considerations including lack of necessity, general reluctance to yield

sovereignty over internal affairs and lack of consensus have

all

contributed to the

NIAC legal void. Yet given evolving notions of the formation of international law,
including the law of war, the staying power of this void may be in doubt.
Pressures on the Existing NIAC

A

host of developments

Framework

question whether government actor status in

call into

NIAC

will

States

have previously evaded international regulation of the status of their forces

remain unregulated by international law.

First,

as

if,

argued above, 71

NIAC because they have largely conformed to what some regard as limits applicable in IAC, this may not hold true much longer. It seems the threats posed by

in

modern

insurgencies and hostile non-State actors are steadily provoking

more

comprehensive responses from States than previously. Leveraging technology, social

media and increasingly open borders,

trum of national power
tactics feature

prominently

to counter today's non-State actors.

broader spec-

Modern

strategy

and

informational and economic elements of State power almost as

more

as

current threats.

States appear to resort to a

traditional military

and diplomatic elements

in countering

72

Although intelligence work has always played an important part in armed conflict,

modern NIAC appears

ing. Insurgencies

on

intelligence gather-

and terrorist groups have frustrated many traditional intelligence

collection practices

mand and

to place even greater emphasis

by operating

as diffuse

control" organizations.

networks rather than as rigid "com-

To counter

these adaptations, national intelli-

gence assets outside the Department of Defense appear to provide not just strategic

and operational assessments but

also tactical-level intelligence

engagements. Civilian intelligence assets appear to provide
tailed,

constantly updated information

used in small-unit

tactical operators de-

on enemy locations and

activities far

more

analogous to that provided by reconnaissance spotters and scouts than to the
templated, prepackaged and static information previously provided. 73

The involvement of
against

intelligence

community

Osama bin Laden provoked not

actors in the recent operation

only questions concerning the lawfulness

of the operation but interest in the status of the various actors and agencies
involved. Reports indicate that in addition to special operations

members, Cen-

Agency personnel were deeply involved in preparations for and
conduct of the raid. 74 Defending the operation on PBS Newshour, the Director
tral Intelligence

of the Central Intelligence Agency explained the mission as a so-called
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operation, which

he

commanded

is

a covert operation." 75 Elaborating, the Director explained that

Command,

of Joint Special Operations

though

his

a

motives for the characterization were unclear,

sonable to detect

some

military operation

advised

later

commander" was the Commander
component of the armed forces. 76 Al-

the mission but that "the real

him

effort to

it

would not be unrea-

fend off allegations that civilian participation in a

would have been

illegal.

Although agency lawyers might have

otherwise, particularly given the non-international nature of

the conflict with al-Qaeda, 77 the Director's response reveals at least intuitive or

implied concern for the impact participation in

hostilities

might have on the status

of his personnel.
Similar intermingling of the missions and assets of the military and civilian
intelligence

communities

is

apparent in the growing use of aerial drones. 78

conceived as intelligence-gathering platforms, drones are
out highly lethal and destructive kinetic attacks.

79

now capable

Initially

of carrying

Reports indicate the U.S. armed

forces are not the sole operators of the nation's arsenal of lethal drones. 80 Intelli-

own and

gence organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency

"pilot"

drones capable of attack operations, providing a compelling example of blurred

between intelligence

lines

activities

and conduct of

United States no longer holds a monopoly on

lethal

hostilities.

Moreover, the

drone technology,

if

indeed

it

ever held one. States such as Israel, China and France are reported to possess lethal

drones, broadening the scope of involved international actors. 81 Although perhaps

only

now

in

its

infancy, drone use has already

provoked intense

legal debate.

The

majority of debate currently concerns authority for States to use lethal force
outside the traditional confines of battlefields. 82 Yet strains of debate concerning
the authority of non-military personnel to participate in hostilities are gaining

momentum. 83
Further intermingling of government civilian and military communities
visioned in emerging mid- and postwar nation-building doctrine.

is

en-

An outgrowth

of admitted failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, stability operations seek
to build

government capacity either

to hasten or to sustain transitions

peace.

84

tural,

economic and humanitarian

Stability operations

emphasize

"soft

power" such

from war

to

as education, agricul-

assistance to address the deeper causes of

armed conflict. Consistent with popular notions of the "three-block war," stability
operations may occur at the same time as, and very near, active hostilities. 85 In
2005, stability operations received a high-powered endorsement in the form of a

Department of Defense

directive. 86

The

to give stability operations "priority

directive instructed

forces

must perform only

U.S.

commanders

comparable to combat operations." 87 Yet the

centerpiece of military stability operations doctrine

armed

all

is

the conviction that the

a supporting role. Stability operations envision
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heavy, often lead-agency roles for civilian governmental organizations such as the

Department of State, Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency

U.S.

tional

Development.

hind expectations,

88

While actual

stability

missions, particularly in
rise

and

A

emerging

final

operations that intermingle civilian and military

complex or dynamic

field

security environments,
hostilities.

seem on the

89

of warfare also illustrates the intermingling of agencies

provoked by modern armed
critical

agency participation has lagged be-

civilian

notions of participation in

likely to blur

for Interna-

domain of national

conflict. States increasingly recognize

security.

90

Few steeped

in this evolving

cyberspace as a

form of conflict

are unfamiliar with stories of empty legal formalism with respect to personnel in-

volved in cyber operations. Informal discussions of practices associated with State

involvement in cyber operations frequently

member who

clicks

"Send"

at the

recall stories

of the uniformed service

conclusion of a cyber operation otherwise pre-

pared, designed, scouted and executed exclusively by civilian personnel. Although
off-the-record and susceptible to exaggeration,

no doubt, the anecdote may be

dicative of both the extent of civilian participation in U.S. cyber operations

and

likely including the

what constitutes lawful

moment

in-

up

to

of attack, and ingrained or intuitive notions of

civilian participation in hostilities. 91

Second, as the armed conflict in Libya showed, a stronger international spotlight shines

complex.

on NIAC than

It is

clear that

previously.

The

legal character

by February 2011,

of the Libyan conflict

hostilities rose

beyond mere

riot

is

and

armed conflict, resulting in a NIAC for legal purposes. Yet
international intervention on behalf of the rebels in mid-

crossed the threshold for

not long afterward,

March

likely

converted portions of the conflict into

IAC

for the legal purposes of

participating States. 92

Whether the situation devolved into two separate conflicts,
an IAC between Libya and the NATO States conducting attacks on one hand, and a
NIAC between the Libyan government and the rebels on the other, is debatable. 93
The better view acknowledges each as a separate conflict, notwithstanding practical complications. Either

government reactions
instantly public. 94

way, media and social networking

to civil disturbances

Even the academic

NIAC to

when

especially the rebel

the details of

armed groups

community responded, producing
to the conflict. 95 The information age
could rely upon the internal nature of

legal

near-instantaneous analysis and reactions

appears to have ended the era

and

made

States

shield the nature of their responses

from public

attention.

whether the same can long be said with respect to international

One wonders

legal attention.

armed conflict may bring
pressure on the government forces status void. "Transnational armed conflict" typically describes armed conflict between a State and non-State actors not confined to
Third, and

the State's

finally,

own

the rise of so-called transnational

territory. 96 U.S. operations against
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an example of transnational armed conflict given their extension beyond

cited as

the sites of the original 2001 attacks to at least four continents. Although of limited
legal recognition

conflicts

and acceptance among law-of-war

remain related to

NIAC

in their likely

armed

experts, transnational

scope of international regulation.

At present they remain, in the most important respect for purposes of conflict

That

sification, non-international.

national

armed

conflicts

still

is,

do not

clas-

despite crossing international borders, trans-

two

pit

States directly against

one another.

Yet the broader geographic and political scope of transnational armed conflicts

may render increased input from international law attractive to important international legal personalities. Transnational
territorial

armed

conflict greatly strains traditional

or politically based claims of exclusive sovereign prerogative on the part

NIAC

of the government under attack. Classic, non-extraterritorial
greatly

on

regulation.

has relied

traditional notions of territorial sovereignty to fend off international

With

associated

their

cross-border

incursions

and movements,

armed conflicts unmoor NIAC from many of its traditional claims to
general freedom from international regulation. To be sure, the soundest approach
transnational

looks for such regulation from the traditional sources of international law

agreements and binding practices of

legal

meddling seem

significantly

But from a normative perspective,

States.

rights of non-intervention in internal affairs

97

and insulation from international

weaker in transnational armed

The emerging forms of warfare showcased above
to cyber operations,

worked cyber

it

—the

conflict.

reinforce the point.

To

return

appears nearly impossible to conduct an effective, net-

attack within the territory of one State. 98 For instance, although of

uncertain origin, the denial of service attacks suffered by Estonia in 2007 are

mated to have transited servers and networks located in as many as 178
Cyber attacks are

likely to

esti-

countries. 99

appear attractive to non-State actors challenging better-

resourced government opponents in NIAC. 100 Cyber warfare offers insurgents

anonymity, economy and access to destructive potential often
with respect to kinetic means.

101

To

difficult to acquire

the extent cyber operations can be expected as

a feature of NIAC, these conflicts will continue to involve transnational elements,

such as attacks either originating from the territory of third-party States or
transiting servers therein.

be

less

Government responses

to insurgent cyber attacks

than discriminating given the difficulties of cyber attribution.

foresee false positives leading

neutral third-party States.

governments

The temptation

in

at least

may

One can easily

NIAC to unwittingly attack assets of

to resort to international

law of war to

regulate such events, to the extent they are not already regulated in the jus

bellum and law of State responsibility,

may be

Ultimately, the effect of each of these

great.

phenomena of modern armed

mixing of traditional missions, increasingly available information on
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conduct

NIAC and the enlarged geographic scope of NIAC

ened scrutiny of State responses to NIAC.

If,

—

is

likely to

be height-

as the prior section asserted, State re-

sponses have largely conformed to tradition,

modern

conflict's

demand

for

interagency responses will likely involve actors not traditionally associated with
direct participation in

NIAC.

If States

could formerly rely on the fog of war and

geographic borders to obscure the details of how and with

make

military operations, the networked world will certainly
tactics

apparent and subject to scrutiny.

NIAC permitted States

And

if

whom they carried out
their practices

and

the previously internal nature of

to defend claims of sovereign prerogative, the increasingly

transnational nature of NIAC will surely increase pressure to internationalize the
applicable legal regime, perhaps even with respect to status.

Re-examining Status

in

NIAC

The extent to which one concludes the international law of NIAC regulates the status
and composition of government forces may be a function of the level of legal generality at

which one operates. As demonstrated above, the

national regulation of the topic

address the subject directly.

is

positivist claim to inter-

weak. Certainly, no specific treaty provisions

Nor does one

find extensive signs of State consent to

international regulation of the topic through recitation of custom or litigation generally.

Yet drawing back to the level of principles, one might find evidence to un-

dermine the voids previously described. Paired with looser interpretive
such as giving tangible

effect to the

practices,

perceived objects and purposes of such legal

norms, a colorable case for limits on government forces in

NIAC emerges. 102 This

section examines briefly the case for principle-derived international law limits
State participation in

NIAC similar to the

on

status-based limits found in IAC.

The principle of distinction has been called "the grandfather of all principles" of
the law of armed conflict. 103 Enumerated alternately as "distinction" 104 or "discrimination," 105 in both practice and custom warriors have long recognized the
principle. Distinction's first clear codification

documents of the law of armed

conflict.

The

appeared in one of the founding

U.S. Lieber Instructions, drafted in

1863, state:

[A]s civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily

advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country
principle has been

more and more acknowledged

itself,

that the

with

its

men

unarmed

in arms.

citizen

is

The

to be

spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit. 106
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The modern
larly in

Most

international law of

Additional Protocol

I,

armed

conflict expresses the principle simi-

Article 48, titled appropriately

on the

frequently, distinction operates

targeting practices of combatants,

and enemy combatants

restricting lawful attacks to legitimate military objectives

and

fighters.

hostilities

108

Distinction forbids attacks

and on

civilian objects.

The

on

civilians

not participating directly in

principle also forbids attacks producing

cannot be contained or limited to their intended

effects that

Beyond limiting

attacks

the Additional Protocol
statuses, Article

and

I

Located

among

44 requires that combatants "distinguish themselves from the

ratory to an attack."

by

civilians.

111

engaged

in

setting themselves apart

an attack or

in a military operation prepasatisfied this aspect

from

spatially

civilians

both

and

Uniforms and the practice of carrying arms openly, combined with

distinction a relatively simple matter. Recognizing

ticle

modern

tactics in-

made

practices of militia

manner

in

some

Under

instances.

and

in twentieth-century warfare, however, Ar-

44 permits combatants to derogate from distinguishing themselves

ditional

of

in appear-

volving tight formations and relatively confined battlefields, formerly

movements

civil-

combatants have

Historically,

other organized resistance

com-

provisions related to prisoner-of-war and combatant

ian population while they are

distinction

targets. 110

their effects to lawful targets, distinction also

duty to distinguish themselves from

prises combatants'

ance.

109

"The Basic Rule." 107

in the tra-

Article 44, in occupied territory

and

wars of national liberation, unconventional combatants need merely carry arms
openly during and in preparation for attacks. 112 Relaxing the uniform and insignia
aspects of the distinction requirement, Article 44 proved
tious provisions of Protocol

I.

113

Yet the general duty for participants in

to distinguish themselves clearly during

combat

I,

Article 58 outlines precautions against attacks

pect of the principle of distinction.

remove or separate
objectives.

114

status,

Additional Proto-

and reinforces the second

as-

Article 58 generally requires that parties

civilians located in their

Commentary to

hostilities

persists.

Addressed more squarely to targeting operations than
col

one of the most conten-

the rule clarifies

own

its

territories

from

likely military

intent also to prevent construction

of military buildings near civilian populations and objects. 115 The rule's relationship to distinction

lies in its facilitation

ple themselves. In

some

sense, Article 58 responds to critiques that the targeting

provisions of Additional Protocol
experts have observed that in
attack

is

of attackers' efforts to observe the princi-

I

focus too narrowly on attackers. 116 Law-of-war

many

targeting scenarios, the defender or object of

better positioned to limit civilian casualties

ian objects.

117

Though perhaps not

and

collateral

damage to

to the entire satisfaction of Protocol

Article 58 remedies a portion of the

I

civil-

critics,

supposed misallocation of the distinction

burden.
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Carried to

IAC and NIAC,
ries

logical conclusion, the

its

18

1

above conception of distinction, in both

can be understood to carry an implicit limitation on the catego-

of government actors authorized to take part in

ment use of

hostilities. In

NIAC, govern-

agencies or actors indistinguishable from the civilian population or

from government agencies not participating

directly in hostilities frustrates insur-

gents' efforts to observe the principle of distinction in their attacks. For instance,

co-location of an interagency intelligence analysis
assets

not engaged in a

mer.

More

with other civilian agency

NIAC effort might frustrate discriminate attacks on the for-

important, widespread use of personnel from civilian government

agencies to conduct hostilities in

gard

cell

all civilian

NIAC could easily induce

government personnel

as hostile,

insurgent forces to re-

even those not actually taking di-

rect part in attacks.

As

critics

of Additional Protocol

government,

is

I

observe, the defender, in this case the dejure

usually better positioned to prevent

harm

to civilians. Either

by

on behalf of the
members of the armed forces, the

clearly identifying persons taking direct part in hostilities

government or by

restricting

government could

such

activities to

greatly aid efforts to ensure discriminate attacks.

proposed principle-based

Under

the

any contrary course of action would be character-

rule,

ized as inconsistent with the principle of distinction or at least inconsistent with
its

object

Such
though

and purpose.

a rule

might

easily translate into a status-like

conception for NIAC. Al-

NIAC generally rejects the use of status to apportion authority and protec-

tion, a distinction-derived rule limiting participation in hostilities to

the government

armed

practical terms, the rule

whose

forces

members of

might operate similarly to a status-based

would

create

NIAC: those
of distinction and those

two categories of persons

direct participation does not frustrate the principle

rule. In

in

whose direct participation in hostilities violates the principle. Such bifurcations are
entirely parallel to the status-based legal

ing only the familiar

regime of IAC in important respects, lack-

taxonomy of combatant and

Finally, in addition to the rule's logical

civilian.

connection to the most important

principle of the law of war, proponents might point to recent trends toward parity

between the international law of IAC and that of NIAC. The very late twentieth

and

early twenty-first centuries have seen an expansion of international instru-

NIAC as well as extensions of existing IAC treaties into NIAC.
Major treaties expanded to cover NIAC include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
ments applicable

in

Convention; 119 the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, including
protocols;

120

the 1997 Ottawa

its

five

Landmines Convention; 121 the 1993 Chemical

Weapons Convention; 122 and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. 123 Additionally, 118 States

have

ratified the

Rome
159

Statute of the International Criminal
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Court, which includes a highly developed article of war crimes in

NIAC 124 Beyond

application of the technical provisions of these treaties, such expansions might signal

an important erosion of State hostility toward international regulation of the conduct of hostilities in NIAC.
In

be

sum,

made

attractive logical,

humanitarian and even mildly

for status-like limits

purposes of argument,

on government

this section

positivist cases

forces participating in

might

NIAC. For

imagines a distinction-derived rule that would,

some consider is the case in IAC, limit direct participation in hostilities in NIAC
to armed forces or militia similarly organized and belonging to a party to the con125
flict.
In fact, a recent book dedicated to the topic of combatant status in NIAC asserts as much, arguing, "By definition, any person who participates in an internal
armed conflict who is not a member of the states' armed forces is an 'unlawful'
combatant that is, a person who is not immunized for their warlike acts." 126 Deas

—

spite

apparent humanitarian payouts, the imagined rule runs afoul of important

structural

and technical

facets of the

law of war. Logical, structural and practical

reasons counsel against recognition of the rule as lex lata and perhaps even as lex
ferenda.

among

First

The

logic of the

logical objections, the distinction-derived rule proves too

proposed rule would extend to practically absurd conclusions. For

example, the appearances of some non-military government actors in

Many

not frustrate the principle of distinction.

would appear

much.

to

most observers

as

domestic security forces

States'

combatants. Few,

if

NIAC would

any,

NIAC

fighters could

claim to have been misled by the uniforms, armaments and even vehicles used by

such actors despite their non-military character. Yet because they are not actually

armed

forces or, alternatively, not subject to a system of

command and

internal

would be excluded from conducting hostilities under the supposed
rule. The same might easily be said of private security contractors employed by
States in NIAC. For all the complexities PSCs have introduced to the modern bat-

discipline they

tlefield,

confusion with innocent civilians

Additionally, a blanket rule limiting
to

members of the armed

forces

appearance of the hostile actor
sight attacks

seem not

self through visual

to

is

not typically

among them. 127

government conduct of hostilities

in

NIAC

would extend beyond situations that implicate the
at

all.

So-called over-the-horizon or non-line-of-

provoke concern that the attacker distinguish him- or her-

means. In

this respect, there

is

great danger that the distinction-

derived rule would operate too broadly in a logical sense. That
rule requiring the wearing or display of distinctive insignia or

over-the-horizon warfare

fails

to serve the rule's intended

the defender's efforts to distinguish attackers

Limiting the conduct of attacks to

application of a

uniforms applied to

purpose of

facilitating

from innocent, non-hostile

members of
160

is,

the

armed

parties.

forces in such
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circumstances amounts

at least to

empty formalism

—and

at

worst to absurdity

harmful to the reputation and perceived legitimacy of the law of war.

As

number of important inrecently been expanded to NIAC. By their

related above, the material field of application of a

ternational law-of-war instruments has

terms, these treaties formerly regulated only IAC. Previously, their extension to

NIAC

could only be achieved by proof of customary status

with ambiguity and subject to vexing caveat.

It

—

a technique fraught

may be, as previously observed, that

these expansions reflect a reduction of State hostility to international regulation of

NIAC. Yet

closer examination suggests evidence of a

more

restrained enthusiasm

for international regulation of NIAC.

With the notable exception of the Rome Statute, each of the treaties recently expanded to cover NIAC concerns means and methods of warfare. They are primar128
ily weapons treaties consistent with the Hague tradition of the law of war.

Weapons treaties have long been an exception to the use of status to apportion protection in IAC. In contrast to the instruments of the so-called

and protect"

tradition,

weapons

treaties associated

with the Hague tradition have

operated universally, benefiting both combatants and
a collateral sense with respect to the latter.

Geneva or "respect

civilians,

though

typically in

Weapons treaties usually do not concern

interpersonal interactions or the control of individuals and have not been a source

of protected or privileged status under the law of war.
ties

introduces to

NIAC

a

new

None of the expanded trea-

or protected status. While certainly humanitarian

advances and arguably a boon to the prospect of international regulation of NIAC,

no alternation whatsoever to the general
NIAC. The larger significance of these expan-

the recent expansions actually reflect

dearth of status-based regulation in
sions

may not be general

State willingness to

NIAC, but rather recognition of the
essary suffering

By contrast,

produced by certain
the

submit to international regulation of

near-perfect alignment of concern for unnecclasses of weapons in

both IAC and NIAC.

Rome Statute's significant NIAC jurisdictional grant to the

ternational Criminal Court (ICC) spans both traditions of the law of war.

NIAC-relevant portions of the

Rome

In-

The

Statute undoubtedly represent a significant

concession to the international legal system.

And

other international tribunals

NIAC. 129 Yet the extent
to which the mandates of these tribunals reflect willingness to commit NIAC to the
international legal system should not be overstated. First, it should be remembered
share the ICC's broad authority with respect to conduct in

that the jurisdiction of the ICC, through the principle of complementarity, takes a

backseat to domestic proceedings. 130 States willing and able to hear claims arising

from participation

in

NIAC

Complementarity stands

as a

in their

own

courts preempt

ICC

jurisdiction.

powerful bar to international intrusion into NIAC.
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Second, the most legally significant outcomes of the decisions
tional Criminal Tribunal for the

at the Interna-

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have been achieved

only through controversially broad outlooks on the scope of customary law applicable to

NIAC. None

better illustrative than the

ICTY

decision in Prosecutor

v.

which the Appeals Chamber observed that the distinction between IAC

Tadic, in

and

is

NIAC had lost much

of its value and weight. 131 The Tribunal's observation

only defensible under the

is

rigorous conceptions of customary international

least

minor powers, involved in unquestionably inhumane conduct, the Appeals Chamber's observation attracted only minor protest.
One wonders whether applied to agents of more influential international actors,
law. Applied to the nationals of

and

to less obviously atrocious circumstances, the

Chamber's bold pronounce-

ment would have weathered as well.
Third, and most important, it should be understood that criminal tribunals deal
with conduct, as distinct from status. For the tribunals, status is examined solely
for the

duct

purposes of evaluating jurisdiction or determining whether charged con-

satisfies the

elements of an enumerated offense. For instance, a tribunal vested

with jurisdiction to hear grave breaches of the Third Geneva Convention must

determine whether any alleged victims held the status of prisoner of war as understood by that Convention. 132 Similarly, grave breaches of the Fourth Convention
require that purported victims be protected persons as defined by Article 4 of that

Convention. 133 Criminal tribunals do not resolve questions of status for their

own

sake or for such inherently political purposes as determining the legitimacy of participation

itself.

None

of the tribunals has litigated status as such or

at least in the

sense applied by this chapter. Despite a rich jurisprudence concerning
international case has

mere

examined

The preceding argument
status. Status
legal

status of any fighter with respect to lawfulness of

participation. Claims advancing a distinction-derived rule

participation in hostilities in

is

NIAC likely confuse

conduct with

illustrates a critical point,

instrumental;

NIAC, no

it is

an intermediary for

on government

status.

namely, the function of
larger,

more meaningful

outcomes. Under the laws of war, status confers protection, treatment, obli-

gations and, in the case of combatants, a limited form of immunity from prosecution.

While protection from

hostilities,

treatment standards upon capture and

other obligations concerning handling of captured combatants share an essentially

humanitarian impetus, immunity remains an end distinct from the human-

itarian status-derived ends.

from prosecution

is

is

is

quintessentially political.

for participation in hostilities

the classes of persons
status

Immunity

who may

claim immunity

and the
lie at

conceived as a gateway to immunity, then

the prize for which fighting

is

waged."

134
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The

Immunity

derivative rule limiting

the heart of sovereignty. If

it is

true that in

NIAC

"status

suggestion, such as that advanced

Sean Watts

by the distinction-derived rule on government forces in NIAC that States would
surrender the ultimate prize of revolutionary war to the international legal system,

is

odds with both the

severely at

is

NIAC, and

to lawful participation begs the question of the conflict

itself.

From

a

still

all

it

be

fairly

with respect to government forces in NIAC.

wider perspective,

difficult to reconcile serious

it is

NIAC parity with the positivist record.
tently,

a

Only if status

conceived as an instrumentality to purely humanitarian ends can

said to operate at

their

NIAC as

terms of logical argument, conceiving status in

clearest self-interest. In

means

historical experience of

by compelling

135

As emphasized above,

majorities, rebuffed invitations to

tinction in law-of-war treaties.

norms, they have made

136

Even where

States

States

have consis-

drop the IAC-NIAC

dis-

have consented to overlapping

The Martens

critical caveats.

claims of IAC-

clause

made an

early appear-

ance in the Hague Conventions and has reappeared in nearly every major law-of-

war instrument
the clause

first

since.

An eponymous homage to an influential Russian

diplomat,

resolved an impasse of the treatment of resistance fighters during

belligerent occupation

by referring to the

common law of war and to more general

norms of humanitarian treatment. 137 Since then, the clause has served the function
in treaties of holding a place for the customary law of war, and also as a sort of residual clause for the operation of peacetime humanitarian norms.

While the clause appears

it

138

The Protocol II iteration ex"law of nations'V'international law" and "established cus-

bears crucial alterations to
cludes reference to

tom." 139 Also omitted
civilized peoples."

in the NIAC-specific Additional Protocol II of 1977,

140

is

its

traditional form.

the traditional reference to "usages established

Academic commentary

to Additional Protocol

these were deliberate omissions, intended to

honor

commit NIAC

plain, each

to international law.

141

As

is

others reference to the international legal system.

II

among

indicates

States' historical reluctance to

omission shares with the

A clearer desire to keep interna-

norms at bay in NIAC is difficult to conjure. That
modern period of positive law-of-war development require

tional

States

would

in the

alterations to such a

widely accepted and fundamental precept of the law of I AC certainly bears witness

IAC-NIAC divide.
some IAC norms transpose easily to NIAC.

to the persistence of the

To be

sure,

and respected non-governmental and academic
cases to close the substantive legal gap

International tribunals

studies have

made compelling

between the two recognized conflict types. 142

For instance, minimal treatment standards for persons in custody applicable in

IAC

present few,

But even

if

if

any, NIAC-specific obstacles to military or political necessity.

many IAC norms

transpose

easily, status

does not appear to be one of

them. Although a certain parity between treatment obligations and protections in

IAC and NIAC can be conceded, it is worth noting that status has not made the leap
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between two
tality,

of

conflict types. Conferral of status, even as a

humanitarian instrumen-

has proved the point where State willingness to level the law of I AC and that

NIAC

ends.

The

remains of sufficient

issue

political

NIAC to
existing NIAC

importance to

withstand even the considerable aforementioned pressures on the
status void.
Finally,

NIAC

law of
law

is

and aside from descriptive debates,
with that of

IAC

fail

to

make

calls for leveling

the normative case that international

the best answer to perceived problems in

norms have migrated

to

NIAC

the international

NIAC. Typically claims

appeal to strong humanitarian logic.

that

How

IAC

could

persons, especially victims of hostilities, be less deserving of protection simply by
virtue of conflict classification?

While compelling on some

to appreciate the entire calculus of
legal system.

sirable

Commitments

commitment of an

levels, these

claims

fail

issue to the international

to international law reflect not only normatively de-

outcomes, but also the judgment of States that such outcomes are best

achieved collectively rather than independently.

No

single theory of international

law prescribes a comprehensive formula for such determinations. States appear to

make such determinations on an ad hoc

basis,

balancing multiple and dynamic

variables.

Since the late nineteenth century, States have judged international law as a good

armed conflict largely by virtue of the identities of the actors.
Coincidence of interests and guarantees of reciprocity continue to inform the international bargains struck through treaties. By definition, the parties to NIAC upset the logic of this prescription. Assumptions concerning capacity and willingness
to observe internationally based legal obligations do not migrate from IAC to
fit

for international

NIAC as easily as rules themselves. Moreover, domestic legal systems' implementations of international law are often imperfect. Legal nuances are often lost in translation, frustrating expectations of uniformity
at

diplomatic conferences

may be

and

universality.

selectively or not at

all

ing the inherently internal, sovereign nature of issues in

Hard-won bargains

implemented. Consider-

NIAC,

the likelihood that

norms would be implemented to the credit of international law legitimacy seems dim. Finally, modern perceptions of the laws of war themselves may
be part of the problem. Characterizations of the law of war as exclusively humanitarian mislead and present an incomplete picture of its true object and purpose. 143
While many of the humanitarian aspects of the law of IAC have proved well disposed to migration to NIAC, the use of status generally, and particularly to apporinternational

tion political

outcomes such

willingness to submit to

as

immunity, appears to be the current

IAC-NIAC

legal parity.
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Conclusion

As the chapter's opening

assertion, a gross generalization to be sure, suggests, in-

ternational lawyers' reactions to purported voids in international law coverage

vary greatly according to interpretive preferences and general outlooks on inter-

Whatever one's

national law.

interpretive bent,

it

seems undeniable that positive

no longer mean what they used to. Substantive gaps in
treaty coverage seem to represent neither the end of descriptive debate, nor the
beginning of the end, but only perhaps the end of the beginning of such discusvoids in international law

sions. 144 In addition to the possibilities

of international custom, theories accept-

ing a proliferation of "international lawmakers"

now

include suggestions that

non-State actors might form international law, greatly increasing the likelihood
that perceived voids will be filled to the satisfaction of interpretivist schools of

thought. 145
fect

it

will

With

The

all

around that

if the

NIAC status void is to remain in ef-

have to be defended rather than assumed.

respect to the status of government forces in

rule limiting
is

signs are

more than

government

NIAC

a distinction -derived

forces' participation in hostilities explored in this chapter

a rhetorical straw

man. Accepting evolution

in

NIAC,

the prospect of

international regulation appears highly possible. In addition to changes in international law interpretive theory, evolutions in State military doctrine applicable to

NIAC and increased popular attention to how NIAC is waged by States provide fertile

ground

for transplanting

IAC norms

into

NIAC.

Despite their shortcomings, jus in hello treaties have been highly successful at

humanizing IAC. The

desire to

import such success to

understandable. Yet voids are not in

Voids

are, as in the case

all

NIAC is both laudable and

cases invitations to interpretive gap-filling.

of status in NIAC, often reflections of States' general out-

look on the propriety and likely efficacy of international regulation.

To

preserve

the legitimacy of the law of war generally, a sound and principled methodology

is

needed to regulate the migration of norms from IAC to NIAC.

maybe fair to say the jus in hello is under-theorized and thus not up to the task.
Compared to domestic legal regimes, international law generally and even its legal
It

sibling the jus

erate

ad helium, the law governing the conduct of hostilities lacks a

and well-defended

interpretive theory.

compliance theory in jus ad helium than jus

One

delib-

finds far greater attention to

in hello. 146

That law-of-war

haven't paid particular attention to interpretive theory is to

specialists

some extent forgivable.

The pressing practicalities of its relevance, the life-and-death implications of its
operation, and the still unsorted doctrinal and descriptive challenges are enough to
occupy

a career.

However,

in addition to the possibility of resolving a pressing
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doctrinal question, the

NIAC status void may offer an opportunity to spark more

deliberate discussion of interpretive theory in the jus in hello.

The temptation to address voids from a purely humanitarian perspective can be
great. Yet purely
ties

moral reasoning

fails

to account for the current positive dispari-

between the law of IAC and that of NIAC. Ultimately, deliberate and principled

interpretive efforts, such as this chapter has endeavored to provide, present the

more promising

course, unveiling areas of potential progress, while sustaining the

underlying logic and nature of the current international legal system.
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part in hostilities." Id., art. 13(3). An influential manual on the law of armed conflict applicable
to NIAC concludes, "Today, it is indisputable that the principle of distinction is customary
international law for both international and non-international armed conflict." NIAC MANUAL,
supra note 32, ^1 1.2.2. Similarly, an ICRC-sponsored study of customary international law concludes distinction is a norm of customary international law in both I AC and NIAC. CUSTOMARY
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 32, at 3.
119. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 22, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter 1999
Second Protocol to 1 954 Hague Convention] The base 1954 Hague Convention applies to international armed conflict and occupation. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict art. 18, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. The 1999 Second Protocol
rule protecting civilians

.

expands application to "conflict not of an international character, occurring within the territory
of one of the Parties." 1999 Second Protocol to 1954 Hague Convention, supra, art. 22.
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Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note

120.

10. In

2001, States parties

amended

the

scope of material application of the Convention. Previously the Convention only applied to international

armed

conflict.

Currently the scope of application reads:

This Convention and

annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations referred to
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection
of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Article I of Addi1

common

in Article 2

tional Protocol

I

to these Conventions.

This Convention and

2.

its

to the

its

tions referred to in paragraph

mon

to the

annexed Protocols
1

shall also apply, in addition to situa-

of this Article, to situations referred to in Article 3 com-

Geneva Conventions of

12

August 1949. This Convention and

its

annexed

Protocols shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
ots, isolated

ing
3.

armed

and sporadic

acts of violence,

and other

conflicts.

In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the terri-

tory of one of the

High Contracting

Parties,

each party to the conflict shall be bound to

apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this Convention and
4.

ri-

of a similar nature, as not be-

acts

Nothing

in this

Convention or

its

annexed Protocols

shall

its

annexed Protocols.

be invoked for the pur-

pose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by
all

legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law

and order

in the State or to

defend

the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.
5.

Nothing

annexed Protocols shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of
which that conflict occurs.
6.

The

in this

Convention or

its

and

application of the provisions of this Convention

its

annexed Protocols

to

which are not High Contracting Parties that have accepted this Conannexed Protocols, shall not change their legal status or the legal status of

parties to a conflict

vention or

its

a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.
7.

The provisions of Paragraphs 2-6 of

Protocols adopted after

1

this Article shall

January 2002, which

may apply,

not prejudice additional

exclude or modify the scope

of their application in relation to this Article.
Id., art. 1.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction art. 1.1(a), Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
1 22.
121.

Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1.1(b), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
123. Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 1, May 30, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 357 (2008) (stating, "Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to
use cluster munitions").
124.

Rome

125.

The

Statute, supra note 48, art. 8(2)(c)-(f).

criteria

here referenced are derived from the Third Geneva Convention, Article

and are supposed by many

to constitute criteria for privileged participation in hostilities.

include belonging to a party, being

commanded by

a

4,

They

person responsible for his subordinates,

having a fixed distinctive sign, carrying arms openly and conducting operations in accordance
with the law of war. 1949 Geneva Convention
126.

III,

supra note

3, art. 4.

Emily Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the

Law of Armed Conflict 68

(2010).
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127.

Private security contractors

may

have been, however, intermingled with the

population inconsistent with the object of Additional Protocol

I,

civilian

Article 58 or a customary rule

to similar effect.
128.

William H. Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict

129.

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

amended

2 (2008).
art. 3,

Sept. 2009, available at http://www.icty.Org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute

_sept09_en.pdf (criminalizing violations of the customs of war, including those applicable

NIAC); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.

8,

for

Rwanda

1994) (criminalizing violations of

Geneva Conventions and Protocol
130.

Rome

131.

Prosecutor

132.

1949 Geneva Convention

art. 4,

Common

S.C. Res. 955,

in

U.N.

Article 3 of the 1949

II).

Statute, supra note 48, art. 17(1) (a).
v.

Tadic, supra note 12, ^ 97.
III,

supra note

3, art. 130.

1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 147.
CULLEN, supra note 2, at 56 (quoting Eldon Van C. Greenberg, Law and the Conduct of
the Algerian Revolution, 1 1 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 37, 70-71 (1970)). In full,
133.

134.

Greenberg's
135.

maxim

addresses "revolutionary war."

See, e.g.. Prosecutor

v.

law of IAC and that of NIAC

Tadic, supra note 12,

Id.

^fl[

97-98 (observing the distinction between

as irrelevant).

The International Committee of the Red Cross prepared the first draft of what would beThe most ambitious passage of the draft would have applied the Conventions to all conflicts. Article 2 of the Stockholm Draft would have made the
Conventions applicable in their entirety not only to armed conflict and belligerent occupation
between States parties, but also to "armed conflict not of an international character which may
occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties." Draft Convention for the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, reprinted in I 1949 GENEVA CONFERENCE
FINAL RECORD, supra note 65, at 113. States rejected the proposal. II-B 1949 GENEVA
CONFERENCE FINAL RECORD, supra, at 41-43. Among other conceptual concerns, States noted
that applying the Civilians Convention to insurgents would be problematic because the Convention relied on enemy nationality to define the civilian protected-person class. Id. at 41.
137. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 9 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed.
2000) (citing Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Report of the Second Subcommission in the official report, Conference Internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 18 Mai-29 Juillet 1899, at 49-51
(Imprimerie Nationale, The Hague, 1899); WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES
and Their Contributions to International Law 215-20 (1908)).
136.

come

the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

138.

See

CRAWFORD,

The

supra note 126, at 29.

and to "established custom" appear, respectively, in the Hague and Additional Protocol I versions of the Martens
clause. 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 30, pmbl.; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note
139.

references to "international law," to "the law of nations"

24, pmbl.; Additional Protocol
140.

The reference

I,

supra note

to "usages established

4, art. 1(2).

among civilized

peoples" appears in the 1899/1907

Hague expression of the

clause, as well as the 1949 Geneva Convention expression. 1899 Hague
Convention II, supra note 30, pmbl.; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 24, pmbl.; 1949
Genva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 158.

141.

Michael Bothe et

Commentary on the Two

al.,

1977

New

Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts:

Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of

1949, at 620 (1982).
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1

42.

See

NIAC MANUAL, supra note 32; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,

supra note 32; Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the
flict,

12

143.
1

44.

ited

CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 685

Law of Armed Con-

(2012).

See DlNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 13, 16-20.

Describing British efforts to defeat

with the phrase,

"Now

this

is

Germany in North Africa, Winston

not the end.

It is

Churchill

is

cred-

not even the beginning of the end. But

it is,

perhaps, the end of the beginning." The Churchill Society, http://www.churchill-society-london

.org.uk/EndoBegn.html (quoting Winston Churchill, The End of the Beginning, The Lord Mayor's
Luncheon, Mansion House (Nov. 10, 1942)).
145.

Anthea Roberts

& Sandesh

Sivakumaran, Hybrid Sources of Law: Armed Groups and the

Creation of International Law, 37 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (201 1).
146. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations

THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas
Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002); Michael W. Doyle & Geoffrey S. Carlson, Silence of the
Laws? Conceptions of International Relations and International Law in Hobbes, Kant, and Locke, 46
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 648 (2008); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, An
Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under International Law, 9 AMERICAN
Law & Economics Review 72 (2007).
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VIII
Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of
Civilian Immunity in Non-International

Armed Conflict: Making Progress through
Practice

Stephen Pomper*
I.

A

quick glance

at the

Introduction

and Overview

Geneva Conventions and

sufficient to reveal that the treaty rules

a non-international

armed

conflict

(NIAC)

ing parties engaged in international

armed

there

is

is

is

governing the conduct of parties to

are less developed than those governtotal

number of

number governing

the former

conflicts (IACs).

treaty provisions governing the latter outstrips the

by many dozens. While there

their Additional Protocols

a range of historical

also a core practical question that appears to

and

The

political reasons for this,

have hampered the develop-

ment of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) with respect to NIACs: How do we identify the specific actors to whom the rules in this area would apply?
Finding a satisfying answer to this question

—which

in a variety of ways requires

us to translate from familiar concepts and categories in the world of international
*

This article closely derives from a presentation given at the U.S. Naval
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1

when

War College on June 21,

the author was serving as the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs at

the U.S. Department of State. This article (like that presentation) was prepared in his personal

capacity

and does not

U.S. government.

necessarily represent the official views of the

Department of State or the

Toward a Limited Consensus on
armed

conflict into the

difficult

and

critically

the Loss of Civilian

Immunity in NIAC

world of non-international armed conflict

important.

phous, clandestine nature of the organizations with which

both very

is

NIAC

very difficult because in

It is

—

the

we are dealing

amor-

—and

the

often mercurial nature of the relationship between individuals and these organizations

—challenges the

tween the

instinctive desire that lawyers

have to draw tight parallels be-

which we are used

clearly defined actors with

to dealing in

IAC

(including uniformed soldiers fighting on behalf of often declared enemies with legal
personality and right authority)

and the murkier ones

that

we

are required to deal

with in NIAC. The parallels are there but frequently they are not as tidy as

we want
if we define categories too rigidly, we will

them to be, and operators will tell us that
impede their ability to meet the threat they
drawn, then there

is

are facing. Yet,

a risk of sanctioning deprivations of life

criticized as illegitimate

and

if

they are too loosely

and

liberty that will

be

arbitrary.

Unsurprisingly, efforts to develop a clearer answer to this question have been at
the center of

some very important

Guantanamo habeas litigation, the
late in numerous pleadings how to
the Taliban or associated forces,

conversations in recent years. In

legal

U.S.

government has been required

assess

whether someone

and the U.S.

is

"part

of

to articual

Qaeda,

federal courts (in particular the District

of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit) have built up some jurisprudence in this area. There

have also been efforts to synthesize expert opinion

—

notably,

if

not fully success-

Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive
Guidance that was released in 2009. Finally, and most significantly for purposes of

fully, in

the International
1

the emergence of shared international norms, States have been talking to each

other about their experience,
places like Afghanistan, Iraq

some of which

is

of course shared experience, in

and Libya.

This article will touch briefly on the ways in which the conversation about

when

an individual loses protection from attack through membership in an organized

armed group (and
ties)

related questions of what

means

it

to take direct part in hostili-

have developed in the course of the last several years. In so doing,

it

will

under-

score that the development of the law in this area remains for the time being largely
in the

hands of States, and,

in particular, their executive branches.

It

will also give a

sense of where like-minded States with which the U.S. government works particularly closely

have reached consensus in

where there remains
able, the

paper

will

a range of views.

this area, as well as identify

To keep

some

the scope of this exercise

areas

manage-

keep a narrow focus on the threshold for membership in orga-

armed groups and direct participation in hostilities on the non-State side of a
NIAC. It will not address a number of important related questions that also have a
bearing on the question of when individuals lose immunity from being made the
object of attack in non-international armed conflict, including questions about the
nized
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deemed an armed conflict, the level of cohesion that is required in order to deem an organization an "organized armed
group," the circumstances under which an organized armed group can be said to
be engaged in armed conflict, the geographic scope of armed conflict and the circumstances in which legal rules outside the law of armed conflict may be relevant.
point at which armed violence can be

//.

When

Guantanamo Litigation

2008 the Supreme Court decided in the Boumediene case 2 that

in June

Guantanamo detainees would have an opportunity to challenge the legality of their
detention in U.S. federal court, without addressing the standard for
detained,

it

left

who

could be

the lower courts poised to engage in a sustained lawmaking exercise

with potentially significant implications for the question of who forms part of a
non-State organized armed group
forces) that

is

(like al

Qaeda, the Taliban or their associated

engaged in an armed conflict against a

State.

The issue came pointedly to a head when, shortly after the present administration came into office, Judge Bates asked the government to file a brief in the
Hamlily case 3 describing

its

the Use of Military Force

The

U.S.

detention authority under the 2001 Authorization for

(AUMF). 4

government complied by

filing its brief

of March

13, 2009,

which

ar-

when giving content to the broad language of the AUMF the U.S. government, consistent with the Supreme Court's 2004 Hamdi decision, 5 would look
gued that

(i)

to the principles of the law of armed conflict,

and

(ii)

because of the lack of codifi-

cation in the law of armed conflict relating to non-State actors

it

would sometimes

be necessary to draw analogies to the international laws of war applicable to international
that

armed

conflicts

between

when viewed through

States.

this lens the U.S.

present conflict to hold individuals

ported"
cases

al

The

brief then asserted (in relevant part)

government had the authority

who were

Qaeda, the Taliban or associated

in the

"part of" or "substantially sup-

forces,

but

what the precise contours of those terms would

left

to be explored in future

be.

As of mid-20 1 1 two years (and roughly fifty trial court and appellate decisions)
later, what do we see? As concerns the topic of this article, one thing that appears
,

to have

come

emerged

is

an increasingly clear picture that the courts are unlikely to be-

the laboratory in which the metes

and bounds of armed group membership

worked out. Initially, the district courts sought to draw parallels between
armed groups and traditional armed forces in wrestling with the question of how
are

LOAC

ought to apply. Notably, the 2009 Hamlily (Judge Bates) 6 and Gherebi

(Judge Walton) 7 opinions took the view that although

conclusion that

LOAC

it

was possible

to reach the

permitted the detention of certain individuals working
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within the
the

al

Qaeda

command

structure based

Immunity in NIAC

the Loss of Civilian

on

status,

it

was necessary

that they be part of

structure in order for this to be the case. There was arguably

some

on the question of whether the command
structure must be within the military wing of the armed group, and how the issue
distance between these two opinions

of "support" should be addressed for purposes of determining status (either treating

it

as contributing to

were operating very
opinions that
cepted

it

membership

much

may have

analysis or treating

within the

LOAC

it

framework,

as irrelevant),

as

were

later trial court

varied in their interpretation of LOAC but essentially ac-

framework.

as the analytic

This has decidedly not, however, been the case at the appellate court
relevant decisions are

but they

marked

in part

by the following

level,

where

characteristics: First, while

the law has not been entirely settled yet, at least one panel has, in the Bihani case,
overtly dismissed the importance of international law in interpretation of the

AUMF in

an opinion

that,

although effectively overruled by an en banc decision

that described this feature of the panel decision as dictum,

marks

a disinclination

law of armed conflict as a tool with which to excavate the

to use the international

meaning of the AUMF. 8 Second, although the appellate court continues to offer its
views about what sorts of fact patterns would suffice in its views to establish detention authority for purposes of the

my view)

that the Circuit Court's

AUMF, commentators have noted
approach to the definition of who

tained has been far less important to the
tiary issues. Professor

outcome of cases than

Stephen Vladeck noted in

its

(correctly in

may be

focus

on eviden-

May 2010 that although he found

the D.C. Circuit caselaw governing the scope of the government's detention
to be troubling, in his

vidual cases. In

view

"[it]

marked contrast

affect district court

is

the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence concerning the
cases,

claims." Third, as the D.C. Circuit has increasingly focused

government

effect

to

meet

its

evidentiary burden,

its

idence must

mosaic

in

rise

or

fall

on

their

rulings in this area have

had the

trial

court views that items of ev-

own, instead requiring that they be looked

which suspicious data points are taken

not fully proven on their independent merits.

And

some

a fine parsing of LOAC,

on

its

part to decide de-

become a sigon that body of law,

and therefore

nificant engine driving refinements to the U.S. perspective
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Circuit judges have

11

the D.C. Circuit's caselaw indicates a disinclination

on

even

although "preponderance of

suggested that a lower standard might be appropriate.

tention decisions based

at as a

as corroborating each other

the evidence" continues to be the governing standard,

If

on what is required for

of creating a substantial zone of deference for executive branch judgment. In

the al-Adahi decision, 10 the Circuit Court rejected

if

and how that bur-

assessments of the facts of individual detainees'

9

the

power

has not yet had a meaningful impact on any indi-

government's burden of proof in post- Boumediene habeas

den should

de-

to

Stephen Pomper

then

it is

hardly clear that the Supreme Court will be any

more eager to wander into

Supreme Court has very much been the
final word on the extension of key rights and privileges to Guantanamo (as was the
case in Rasul (2004), n Hamdan (2006) 13 and Boumediene (2008)). There is reason,
however, to believe that the Court may not wade in so dramatically on the issues
being addressed in the present litigation. The composition of the Court has
these thickets.

To be

sure, in the past, the

changed since the pathbreaking decisions of 2004-8 (including through the addi-

who, because of her involvement as

tion of Justice Kagan,

number of cases

Solicitor General,

maybe

would present the Court with core detainee
status questions) and so have the atmospherics. Criticism of review procedures and
treatment issues issues that may have helped draw the Court's attention in the
recused from a

past

—have

that

—

largely

been addressed over the past few years through a combination

of judicial decisions (in particular the confirmation that

Common Article 3 applies

Qaeda detainees in the Hamdan decision, and the extension of habeas to
Guantanamo in the Boumediene decision) and executive acts (including the treatment guarantees offered under Executive Order 13,491 ). 14 Whether a set of facts or

to al

an issue of law might
be seen, but

it

arise that the

would not be surprising

continue to maintain
It

Court considers

its

if in light

in

need of its review remains to

of the above the Court were to

posture of reserve.

bears mention that the judicial review of Guantanamo detainees has occurred

in the detention context,

and that there are questions about whether issues relating

armed conflict would even be justiciable. Even if
they were, however, the courts seem to have placed their decisions in a framework
to targeting in the context of an

where

it

appears that they are essentially creating a broad zone of deference for the

exercise of reasonable military judgment. In

its

current form,

it is

somewhat

diffi-

draw from the caselaw more than broad guidance about the boundaries of
that zone, and there is a great deal that is left unsaid about the specific factors that a
cult to

specific decision

maker

in a specific set of circumstances

should weigh in taking a

targeting decision. For at least the time being, then, the core issues remain very

much

for the executive

III.

If the

branch to work through.
Experts' Processes (the

D.C. Circuit has created a de facto zone of deference around military deci-

sion making, the

same cannot so

readily be said of the

ance on the Notion of Direct Participation in

much

ICRC Report)

discussed,

it

will

Hostilities.

ICRC's

Interpretive Guid-

Because the report has been

be addressed here only briefly with the following few

observations.
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the Loss of Civilian

ICRC

in 2003, the

Immunity in NIAC

(together with the Asser Institute)

mounted an effort to provide guidance on the question of when civilians lose their
immunity from attack in both international and non-international armed conflict.
They convened an experts group to study the question and produce a report. The
process was guided by, among others, Nils Melzer, who has done his own scholarly
work on the issue of targeted killings. Among the main findings in the report were
that individuals who perform a "continuous combat function"
i.e., a role that involves direct participation in hostilities on a persistent, non-sporadic and nonspontaneous basis on behalf of the military wing of an organized armed group
that is party to a conflict become targetable on the basis of their status as "members" of the organized armed group until their status changes. With regard to direct
participation in hostilities, the report also found that three components must be

—

—

present in order for an action to constitute direct participation in hostilities: a

threshold of harm must be met; there must be causation; and there must be a "bel-

—

ligerent

nexus"

conflict.

Each one of these

forth

lists

i.e.,

a sufficient connection

between the action and the armed

was explored

criteria

at

some length, and

the report set

of activities that would, or would not, satisfy the criteria as conceived by

the report. 15

The ICRC

produced a report

effort

that,

although a contribution to the

litera-

amount of criticism, and has not become the
have been hoped for. There were some major

ture in this area, has generated a fair

gold standard that might originally
issues over content.

As has been much discussed, the report included

guing that there was a
least

foundation for the principle that militaries must use the

harmful means in addressing

among
that

legal

it

certain

legal targets,

which generated great concern

prominent experts who participated

in the process,

who

that the report

was too

rigid

From

the operational perspective, the feedback

and complex, and did not give an accurate picture

of State practice or (in some respects) of a practice to which States could
cally aspire.

Many

clined to be

named

made

believed

lacked a basis in law or practice, and was not consistent with what had been

discussed in the drafting process.

was

a section ar-

clear that

it

of the experts

who had

in the report,

participated in the

and the U.S. government

ICRC

in

its

realisti-

process de-

habeas

filings

did not regard the study as an authoritative statement of the law.

In the final analysis,

it

appeared that the "experts' process" through which the

product developed could not substitute for the

difficult,

painstaking and necessary

process of allowing States to develop the law in areas such as

this.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the issues that have been raised with respect to

ICRC report, we should not lose sight of two very important contributions that
made one substantive and one procedural. Substantively, it is critical to recog-

the
it

—

nize that the study

is

in

some ways pathbreaking
186

in the level of recognition that

it
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gives to the concept that individuals

who become members

of organized armed

groups lose their civilian status and, while members, can be targeted on the basis of
their status alone for the duration of a

NIAC. Moreover,

has helped to catalyze important discussion

among

the U.S. government

partners about the topics that are addressed in the report.

of views on

this subject

is

procedurally, the report

and

its

The emerging spectrum

addressed in the following section.

IV. State Practice

When

the

offered

vide

ICRC

was

that

it

would take some time

some feedback on where

noted above,

this process

it

tracked

for States to digest

—and did not

has in fact been under

its

readership

contents and pro-

—

track

State practice.

As

way and, based on conversations

with interlocutors in a number of partner governments,
eral

some of its

report emerged, one reaction that at least

it is

possible to offer a gen-

assessment of the spectrum within which the views of the United States and a

number of its closest partners fall. These observations draw from personal and professional exchanges over the past several years, but are relayed in the author's per-

sonal capacity. 16

A. Overarching Considerations

There

is

civilians

a strong

consensus that the point of departure for any analysis of when

become liable to attack under LOAC is the customary principle of distinc-

tion. Consistent

with this principle, both Additional Protocol

and Additional Protocol
ians enjoy protections

II

18

(in Article 13(3))

I

17

(in Article 51(3))

provide that in armed conflict

from being made the object of attack "unless and

time as they take a direct part in

hostilities." 19

civil-

for such

Moreover, with respect to NIAC, the

commentary on Article 13(3) additionally explains that "[t]hose who belong to
armed forces or to organized armed groups may be attacked at any time. If a civilian
participates directly in hostilities,

it is

clear that

he

against attacks for as long as his participation lasts."

Taken

together, the Additional Protocols

will

not enjoy any protection

20

and the quoted passage from

their

commentary suggest that in armed conflict the following individuals (in addition
to the members of regular armed forces who are liable to attack) relinquish their
protection under international humanitarian law from being made the object of
attack: (i) individuals who become members of organized armed groups (i.e., those
referred to in the

first

commentary) and

(ii)

sentence of the above-quoted passage from the Article 13(3)
civilians

who

are taking direct part in hostilities without be-

longing to an armed force or organized armed group

second sentence of the above-quoted passage).
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(i.e.,

those referred to in the

Taking into account that current
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treaty law does not provide specific guidance

on what

an organized armed group, or to take direct part in
ples

emerge from

tional Protocol

A critical

•

and are supported by

II,

their

I

and

NIAC

in

member of

to be a

following princi-

Article 13(3) of Addi-

Commentaries:

difference between individuals

membership

means

hostilities, the

Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol

tack because of their

who

it

Immunity

who

lose their protection

from

at-

an organized armed group and individuals

in

lose such protection as a result of direct participation in hostilities without

belonging to an organized armed group

is

because of membership in an organized
time." Because his or her

who loses protection
armed group may be attacked "at any
that an individual

membership deprives him or her of protection, such an

individual does not then need to be actually involved in particular hostilities to be

who

mem-

lawfully attacked at any point in time. 22

By contrast,

ber of an organized armed group and

taking direct part in hostilities loses pro-

tection

from attack only "for

is

a civilian

is

not a

as long as his participation lasts."

The determination whether an individual is a member (or ceases to be a
member) of an organized armed group or is taking direct part in hostilities should
be taken by the decisionmaker based on information reasonably available to him
or her at the time and taking into account the considerations set forth below.
•

a

making targeting decisions based on a determination that an inmember in an organized armed group, or is taking direct part in hos-

may

not act in the absence of sufficient confidence in the information

Individuals

•

dividual
tilities,

is

establishing the factual basis for the determination. 23

When

there

confidence in the information, the determination should not be
until such time as sufficient information to

been

identified.

an individual
other

(e.g.,

is

Depending on the

member

a

Membership

As

to

in

facts, deferral

insufficient

made

unless

and

a reasonable determination has

of one determination

(e.g.,

that

of an organized armed group) need not foreclose the

that an individual

B.

make

is

is

directly participating in hostilities).

Organized Armed Groups

whether an individual has become a member of an organized armed group

and therefore

is

liable to attack at

United States and

its

partners

any time, there

on the

is

a range of views

among

the

precise "test" that should be applied to deter-

mine membership. Some partners appear to believe that the test for membership
must be based fundamentally on the function performed by the individual in question.

But there

is

also a

view that, because of the clandestine and decentralized nature

of certain organized armed groups,
ture that
ies,

and

is

clearly

that

it

it

maybe difficult to discern a command struc-

analogous to the structures that would be found in State militar-

is

accordingly important to be cautious about focusing too
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stringently

on functions

command structure.
the

membership

test,

that can be analogized to those

Notwithstanding
there

is

this

performed

in a traditional

how to define
following factors may bear on

spectrum of views about

a shared sense that the

such a determination, with the precise weight given to any of these factors dependent on,

among other

things, the test that

applied:

is

The extent to which an individual performs a function on behalf of an organized armed group that is both analogous to a function traditionally performed by
a member of a State military who is liable to attack and that is performed within
•

the

command

structure of the organization

(i.e.,

the individual

out or giving orders to perform such a function).

would likely
and combat

qualify include those that

would

service support functions if

24

is

Examples of

constitute combat,

performed

either carrying
activities that

combat support

for a regularly constituted

armed force and carrying arms openly, exercising command over the group or one
of its units, or conducting planning related to the conduct of hostilities. 25

The frequency of the individual's preparation, command or execution of
operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities and the intensity of the
damage or harm likely to be inflicted by such participation.
•

•

Other similar factors determined

in the reasonable military judgment of the

decisionmaker to demonstrate an individual's integration into the organized

armed group, such

as the

adoption of a rank,

title

or style of communication; the

taking of an oath of loyalty; or the wearing of a uniform or other clothing, adorn-

ments or body markings that mark out members
context and

manner

in the

group

—

in each case in a

indicating that these acts of identification reliably connote

meaningful assimilation into the group. 26
Relevant factors in determining that an individual has ceased to be a

member of

an organized armed group include the amount of time that has passed since that
individual has taken relevant action

on behalf of the group

in question,

and

whether he or she affirmatively has disassociated himself or herself from the organized armed group. Decisionmakers should base these determinations on the stan-

dard of reasonableness in the prevailing circumstances.

C. Direct Participation in Hostilities

With

respect to determining

what

it

threshold matter there seems to be a
tilities

means

to take "direct part in hostilities," as a

common view that direct participation in hos-

stands in contrast to support by a general population to a nation's war effort.

who are contributing to a nation's war effort accordingly do not by dint of
this alone lose their protection. Any determination that a civilian is taking part in
hostilities (and thus loses immunity from being made the object of attack) will be
Civilians
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made by

Immunity in NIAC

a decisionmaker taking the following

considerations into account:
•

Nature of the harm:

Is

the individual's activity directed at

(i)

adversely affect-

ing one party's military capacity or operations or enhancing the capacity/operations

of the other, or
•

killing, injuring

(ii)

or damaging civilian objects or persons?

Causation/integration between action and harm:

causal link between the individual's relevant act
act otherwise

(Although

form an

it is

Is

there a sufficiently direct

and the relevant harm, or does the

integral part of coordinated action resulting in that

not enough that the act merely occurs during

harm?

hostilities, there is

no

requirement that the act be only a single causal step removed from the harm.)
•

Nexus

conflict
ests

and

to hostilities: Is the individual's activity linked to an
is it

ongoing armed

intended either to disadvantage one party, or advance the inter-

of an opposing party, in that conflict?

The period during which an
ing in hostilities
vidual

is

is

individual can be

deemed

to be directly participat-

generally viewed to include the period during which that indi-

deploying to and returning from the hostile

but there

act,

is

a range of

views about whether the acquisition of specific materials necessary for an attack

might under certain circumstances be considered part of the deployment period,

and whether the period

in

which an individual goes into hiding following an attack

might under certain circumstances be considered part of the return. There

is

also a

range of views about whether each of the foregoing three factors must be present in
order to
ties

make a determination that an individual is directly participating in hostili-

(or whether a "totality of the circumstances" approach should govern),

and

about whether certain types of activities must be excluded from the definition of

Moreover, there

direct participation in hostilities (e.g., financial support).

is

a

range of views concerning the relevance of geographic and temporal proximity of

an individual's actions to particular hostile acts in ongoing

hostilities.

At some point, as noted above, the frequency or intensity of an individual's
rect participation

may

establish that the individual

organized armed group, and there
participation in hostilities

is

is

a functional

part in hostilities,

may establish the individual in question to be continu-

membership.

it is

a

acts,

or

is

27

if it is

insufficient to

Accordingly, where an individual takes direct

important to determine whether the nature and frequency of

the direct participation

of specific

of an

also a perspective that persistent direct

ously liable to attack for the period of persistent activity even
establish functional

member

di-

is

such that the loss of protection

lasts

sufficiently persistent that the individual

wider period, including the periods between the specific
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acts.
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V.

Conclusion

The above description of views suggests in some ways a clustering by the U.S. government and its partners around certain views that are put forward in the ICRC
study on direct participation in hostilities. There is increasing convergence, for example, around the notion that there are two roads to loss of immunity membership and direct participation in hostilities. Among the considerations that bear on
membership, there is growing consensus that functional factors echoing some of
the factors from the ICRC's "continuous combat function test" are at least rele-

—

number of States look at in

vant. Moreover, the factors that a

assessing whether an

action constitutes direct participation in hostilities parallel, to
three factors that were captured in the

There
ticle

are,

ICRC

is

described in the

extent, the

study.

of course, important differences between what

and what

some

is

described in this ar-

ICRC study. The tests and factors described here,

reflecting States' operational experience, are less rigidly constructed.

have the complexity of the tests and factors articulated in the

They do not

ICRC document. And

no reference to the ICRC's suggested rule that parties must use the "least
harmful means" for subduing opponents as described in Section IX of the Interpre-

there

tative

is

—

Guidance

which

a test for

among the United

States

But, as noted above,

it is

difficult to detect

much,

increasingly clear that

it is

it

will

be State practice

common view within

the international

—

ward,

we may

States

on the question of how individuals

well see an increasing level of accord

of attack in

among

—

rather

that will drive

community.

already seeing the outline of a limited consensus emerging, and, as

ject

any, support

and like-minded partners.

than international expert groups or the courts of any one country
the development of a

if

We are

we move

for-

certain like-minded

immunity from being made the obthe context of non-international armed conflicts.
lose
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conflict

is

different

mem-

bership threshold lose their civilian status (and are therefore unprivileged belligerents) or re-
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PARTY
MEANS AND METHODS IN NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

IX
Law of Weaponry
When Applied to Non-International Armed
Differences in the

Conflicts

William H. Boothby*
Introduction

sensible to pose the question whether there
a meaningful distinction beIttween
the weapons law that applies during international armed conflict and
is

is

that

which governs

philosophically,
tion.

Why,

it

hostilities

during a non-international armed

could be argued that there

the rhetorical question

dividuals during a civil

war

would

to injuring

is

no

conflict. After

rational basis for such a distinc-

go, should

it

mechanisms

be legitimate to expose in-

that have been

unacceptable for employment during wars between States?

1

If this is

that the law applicable in these classes of conflict be merged, that

pose of this

article.

Rather, the intent in what follows

are in fact such differences in the law as

it is,

all,

is

is

to consider

found to be

seen as a plea

not the pur-

whether there

to identify the precise extent of

any

such divergences and to ask whether they make sense.

* Air

Commodore, Royal Air Force. The views expressed in

author in his personal capacity and are not intended to
the United

Kingdom Ministry of Defence

or the United

this article represent the

reflect the

views of the

views of the Royal Air Force,

Kingdom government.

The Law of Weaponry When Applied

to

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Fundamental Principles and the Conventional Weapons Convention
So,

is

there

armed

still

conflict

a meaningful

weapons law

and international armed

distinction

between non-international

conflict? Well, the

fundamental principles

prohibiting weapons that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 2

and weapons

that are indiscriminate

by nature 3 apply equally

4

both types of conflict. For the seventy- five States that have
sion in scope of the Conventional
tion's

ratified the

Weapons Convention (CCW),

5

in

2001 exten-

the

Conven-

scope and thus that of its protocols extend to both types of conflict.

Amended

Protocol

II

(AP

II)

6

CCW always did, of course, apply to both

to the

categories of conflict. 7 Equally, the

Chemical Weapons Convention, 8 the Biological

Weapons Convention, 9 the Ottawa Convention 10 and the Cluster Munitions Convention 11 were
activities that

all

drafted as arms control treaties in that they prohibited a range of

went significantly beyond mere use of the relevant weapons. Thus, by

prohibiting possession of such weapons and by including undertakings to never

under any circumstances assist, encourage or induce
in

any activity prohibited to a State party,

12

in

any way anybody to engage

the use of these

weapons was effectively

prohibited in non-international as well as in international

armed

conflicts.

Expanding Bullets
It is

not, however, correct to say that the

equally to both classes of armed conflict
is

whole of the

—indeed

rest

of weapons law applies

in certain

important

details that

not currently the case. Expanding bullets pose particular and complex issues in

this regard. Let us therefore at this

particular issues that have

point consider that specific munition and the

been brought into sharp focus

as a result of a recent in-

ternational conference.

The Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court adopted on June 10, 2010, by consensus, Resolution 5, which
amended Article 8(2) (e) of the Statute. It achieved this by inserting additional offenses

under the heading of "other serious violations of the laws and customs ap-

armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law." 13 Those additional offenses are the following:

plicable in

(xiii)

Employing poison or poisoned weapons;

(xiv)

Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other

materials or devices;
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gases,

and

all

analogous liquids,
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(xv)

Employing

bullets

which expand or

flatten easily in the

human

body, such as

bullets with a

hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or

with incisions.

14

is

pierced

The reference to "the established framework of international law" makes it clear
that the States that adopted this provision by consensus were asserting that the
listed activities, when conducted in the course and context of an armed conflict not
of an international character, constitute activities that, in their view, are offenses
only

if

they were committed in such a

way

as

is

prohibited by the existing frame-

work. The significance of that implicit assertion, of course,

is

that, so far as those

States are concerned, these activities constitute offenses irrespective of whether the

perpetrator's State has ratified this addition to the

themselves breach international law and

Rome

Statute, if the activities

amount to war crimes. 15 There would not

appear to be any controversy about that assertion as

soned weapons, asphyxiating and poisonous

gas,

applies to the poison, poi-

it

and analogous

liquids, materials

or devices provisions. International law already prohibits the use of such weapons

by any State

in

both international and non-international armed

conflicts 16

can safely also conclude that the use of those weapons in such conflicts

under customary international law.

"[t]o abstain

an offense

17

However, the position in relation to expanding
In negotiating the third

is

and we

bullets

Hague Declaration of 1899,

18

is

rather

more complex.

the plenipotentiaries agreed

from the use of bullets which expand or

flatten easily in the

human

body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or
is

pierced with incisions." 19 When negotiated, the Declaration was subject to a gen-

eral participation clause

ceased to apply

if

such that

it

only applied to a war between States party and

a non-party State joined the conflict. 20

Hays Parks has made the point that militaries of all nations used only full-metaljacketed bullets before and after the adoption of the Declaration, mainly because

they were the only ones that would function reliably

weapons.

21

when

fired

from military

He therefore speculates whether compliance was due to law of war con-

siderations or military reliability concerns.

But there

is

a wider matter to consider here. Christopher

Greenwood has

portedly expressed doubts that the 1899 Declaration was customary law.
sidered the matter in relation to the distinction principle.
the type of expanding

ammunition

that

He was

He

re-

con-

contemplating

may be more accurate or less likely to rico-

chet or over-penetrate than full-metal-jacketed ammunition, thus reducing the
risks to

innocent civilians during urban or counterterrorist operations. In such

cir-

cumstances, he wondered whether some increased potential for injury to the combatant or terrorist target would necessarily
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amount

to superfluous injury.

The
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thought he was putting forward was that the protection of civilians under the principle of distinction in those circumstances

tional injury to the targeted individual.

might outweigh considerations of addi-

22

To take this analysis one stage further, in particular military circumstances expanding bullets may be the weapon of choice, for example, in order to stop a terrorist
from detonating a bomb or abducting a hostage or in other similar circumstances. 23

Expanding Bullets under Customary Law
However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in its Customary
International Humanitarian Law study, finds the following rule: "The use of bullets
which expand or

The ICRC study

asserts that this

and non-international armed
tion

is

ways.

could

mean

will

prohibited." 24

25

One

difficulty

in

both international

with the ICRC's formula-

which expand" can be interpreted

in a

number of

which are designed, or designed or adapted,

"bullets

which

to expand," or "bullets

is

customary rule applies

conflicts.

that the phrase "bullets

It

human body

flatten easily in the

in the

in order

normal or intended circumstances of their use

normally or inevitably expand" or even "bullets which are capable of expand-

ing."

While there

panding

ICRC

bullets,

study.

is

no doubt that there

is

a rule of customary

law in relation to ex-

one may doubt that that rule has been correctly formulated

On

balance,

it

would seem most

likely that

any such rule would be

based on the design purpose and intent of the weapon, rather than on

might behave

in unspecified

design purpose

which should

is

how

it

but perhaps particular circumstances. In short, the

to be preferred to the effects as the basis for

any customary rule,

author would suggest, be linked to the superfluous injury/

also, the

unnecessary suffering principle in
Interestingly, the

in the

ICRC

its

application in both categories of conflict.

study acknowledges that several States have decided to

use such ammunition in domestic law enforcement operations. 26 Kenneth Watkin,
in a

2006

article, indicates that

rather

more

States

have done

this

than the word

27

The ICRC asserts, however, in the customary law study
that the use of such ammunition by police forces occurs in situations other than
armed conflict and that the bullets are fired from firearms which deposit less en"several"

would

ergy than a

indicate.

rifle bullet.

28

The purpose, of course,

for using such bullets in

usually be to stop the individual quickly

domestic law enforcement

and before he has the opportunity to

will

act in

damaging way. The range and circumstances of use of the
weapon by law enforcement officers may or may not be different from the circumstances in which members of the armed forces would be inclined to use such weapa potentially extremely

of course, the point that, for a

number of countries, the weapons

and ammunition used by members of the armed

forces are likely to be substantially

ons. There

is

also,
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the

same

as those

used by the internal security or police force. The

customary law study, frequently argued that rules that apply

armed

conflict in the field of weapons

conflict because the
conflict.

29

in

its

in international

law also apply in non-international armed

weapons used by the armed forces are the same in both types of

While that may not necessarily be a particularly convincing argument,

nevertheless,
it

ICRC has,

would seem illogical to take that line and then,

it

in the next breath, as

on expanding bullets apply as between police
recognizing as one must that in many States the

were, to suggest that different rules

forces

and armed

forces units,

weapons used, and sometimes even the

Expanding Bullets

at the

users, are the same.

Kampala Conference

When the Kampala Conference delegates adopted the additions to Article 8 that we
have been discussing, they inserted into the Resolution the following important

preambular paragraph:

Considering that the crime referred to in article
lets

which expand or

flatten easily in the

8,

paragraph 2(e) (xv) (employing bul-

human body), is also a serious violation of the

armed conflict not of an international character, and understanding
that the crime is committed only if the perpetrator employs the bullets to uselessly
aggravate suffering or the wounding effect upon the target of such bullets, as reflected

laws applicable in

in

customary international law

When we

it

.

.

is,

we should

usefully suggests that the offense

armed

international

conflicts if the bullets are

therefore, that if there

injury or suffering
will

.

seek to interpret this paragraph,

tive sense that

implication

30
.

—

is

is

start

by noting

only committed in non-

used "to uselessly aggravate." The

military utility attached to the additional

for example, in the sense discussed earlier

—then

not have been committed. The important question to consider

implication

is

made

legally effective

relevant element of crime.

Of course,

in a posi-

is

the offense

whether

this

by the language of the preamble and of the
if this

preambular language and the element

of crime are interpreted by the Court as restricting the circumstances in which the
use of such ammunition constitutes an offense under the

Rome

Statute, this

would be of fundamental importance. In order to determine whether the
preambular language and the element of crime are legally effective in this sense,
we must therefore consider first the law which the Court is obliged to apply and
thereafter the legal significance of the elements of crimes.

Applicable

The Rome
shall

Law under the Rome Statute
Statute prescribes the law that the International Criminal

apply in the following terms:
201

Court (ICC)
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(a) In the first place, this Statute,

to

Non-International Armed Conflicts

Elements of Crimes and

its

Rules of Procedure and

Evidence;

In the second place,

(b)

where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and

rules of international law, including the established principles of the international

law of armed conflict;

(c) Failing that, general principles

legal

that

of law derived by the Court from national laws of

systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of the States

would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those princiand with international law and internation31
recognized norms and standards.

ples are not inconsistent with this Statute
ally

The effect of this language

is

that the

Court

ements of the crime of using expanding
flict

when

is

obliged to take into account the

bullets in a non-international

el-

armed con-

interpreting that offense for the purposes of proceedings before the

Court. Because of the effect of Article 9 of the Statute, however, the Court
specifically required to apply the elements,

is

not

merely to take them into account. 32

The elements of the war crime of employing prohibited bullets are prescribed in
paragraph 3 of Annex II to the Resolution of the Kampala Conference and, so far as
relevant, include the following: "The perpetrator was aware that the nature of the
bullets was such that their employment would uselessly aggravate suffering or the
wounding effect." 33
This language, which a judge of the ICC considering a prosecution for such an
offense would be obliged to take into account, makes it clear that the offense is only
made out if the person concerned knew that the employment of the ammunition
would uselessly aggravate suffering or wounds. Such aggravation is not useless if
there is a corresponding military purpose for it. This would be the case, for example, if expanding ammunition is used to target a hostage taker, hijacker or suicide
bomber in circumstances where the resulting instant disabling of the targeted individual

is

essential to protect civilians.

moment, a careful analysis of the
preambular words may be interpreted by some as implying that the use of such
bullets in all circumstances in the context of a non-international armed conflict
breaches international law. Such an interpretation may suggest the Kampala delePutting that aspect to one side for a

gates intended that while the prohibition applies in

international
vision.

armed conflicts,

all

circumstances during non-

the preambular caveat only apply to the offense pro-

However, such a conclusion applies

concerns discussed above.
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Significance of the

Kampala Preamble and Associated Element of the Crime

Paragraph 3 of the elements of the crime in relation to expanding bullets
fore of vital importance.

It

is

should indeed be borne in mind that established

there-

human

norms may be breached if, in circumstances other than armed conflict, the use
of high-velocity ammunition would be less discriminating than expanding bullets,
rights

e.g.,

because of greater over-penetration or ricochet risks that needlessly put

ians in the vicinity at

enhanced

risk.

Equally, the customary principle of distinction arguably

manner

referred to earlier

difficult to believe that

iting a

weapon

that

is

and

as

comes

into play in the

noted by Christopher Greenwood. Indeed,

customary international law should be regarded

more

likely to

cumstances of acute danger than

civil-

34

less

it is

as prohib-

be effective in protecting the innocent in

cir-

apparently legally controversial high- velocity

ammunition.
Returning to the broader theme of this

panding

bullets

seem

article,

the

main point to note

to represent a limited point of distinction

applicable in international

is

that ex-

between the law

and non-international armed conflicts. In international

armed conflict the offense under the Rome Statute is also tied to superfluous injury
and unnecessary suffering by the application of a similar element of crime to that
appearing in the annex to the Kampala Resolution. However, the treaty prohibition, which, as we have seen, applies only in the case of international armed con35
flicts, make no such reference to superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Equally, it remains to be seen what approach the ICC will adopt in interpreting the
Resolution, in particular with respect to the words of the preamble and of the element of the crime. While the 1969 Vienna Convention's rules on interpretation of
treaties 36 would suggest the need to interpret the main body of the Resolution by
reference to the preambular words as text adopted by the participants at the Conference, there can be no certainty that a Court, confronted by proceedings under
the Statute for an offense alleged to have been committed in a non-international
armed conflict, will do so. 37
Extension of the Scope of the Conventional Weapons Convention

The CCW provides another point of difference between the law applicable in international and that in non-international armed conflicts that, although fairly obvious, is nevertheless worthy of mention
namely, that the CCW protocols (other

—

than

AP II)

apply equally to both classes of conflict only for States that have ratified

the relevant protocol
ratified the

and the 2001 extension of scope. For the

scope extension, protocols to which that State

is

States that

have not

party will continue

only to apply in international armed conflicts. This has the equally obvious result
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that fewer States are
conflict,

a

bound by those

which may, but

will

to

Non-International Armed Conflicts

rules with respect to non-international

armed

not necessarily, have the effect that the achievement of

customary rule based on the language of a particular protocol may happen more

armed conflict. This
would clearly suggest that the ICRC should have been rather more hesitant when
finding customary weapons law rules applying in non-international armed conflict
based on the relatively recently adopted CCW protocols and on the CCW extenquickly in respect to international than non-international

sion of scope.

The Natural Environment
Something should be

said about the natural environment.

Under

the Convention

on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

any other

(ENMOD), 38 States party undertake not to engage in military or

hostile use of

environmental modification techniques having wide-

means of destruction, damage or injury
technique is not employed by a State party or if the

spread, long-lasting or severe effects as the
to

any other State

party.

39

If the

damage or injury is not applied to another State party, it is at face value
hard to see how this provision is engaged. Accordingly, this would seem to be another treaty provision that applies in armed conflicts between States but not in an
armed conflict that is internal to a single State.
destruction,

While the

ENMOD

was concerned with the use of the environment

weapon, the focus of Articles 35 and 55 of 1977 Additional Protocol

on

collateral

damage to

I

(AP

I)

the environment resulting from an attack directed at

as a

40

was

some

other objective. These articles apply to weapons and means of warfare and, thus,
are also provisions that

these provisions are
treaty.

form part of the law of weaponry.

one of the reasons

It is

well understood that

for the U.S. decision not to ratify the

41

Putting that to one side, the fact remains that for States that are party to
treaty rules apply only in an international

of

its

armed

conflict.

The ICRC

in

AP I, the
Rule 43

Customary International Humanitarian Law study suggests that there are

rules that protect the

environment

as a matter of

customary law and that these

armed conflict. 42 In the same
rule the ICRC finds an additional sub-rule requiring that methods and means of
warfare must be employed with due regard for the protection and preservation of
the natural environment. The rule goes on to require that in the conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid and, in any event, to
minimize incidental damage to the environment. 43 The ICRC adds as a further element to the rule that a party to the conflict is not absolved from taking such
rules apply in international

and

in non-international
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precautions by lack of scientific certainty as to the environmental effects of certain
military operations. In the associated

commentary, however, the editors conclude

that while State practice supports the conclusion that these are

armed

applicable in international

non-international

armed

conflicts

conflicts, their status as

is

"arguable." So, while

customary rules

customary

it is

rules in

clear that there

difference in the application of the treaty rules, the position at customary law

is

is

a

the

subject of some controversy.

Weapons Procurement and Expanding Bullets
Given budgetary constraints on weapons procurement by
that

weapons procured

available for use
stricted to a

for

by armed

law enforcement purposes

States,

it is

foreseeable

will increasingly

be

made

forces personnel, such use being not necessarily re-

law enforcement context. The author acknowledges that the custom-

ary nature of the expanding bullets prohibition was readily and widely accepted
until relatively recently.

However, the advent

in

more

recent years of certain re-

sponses to asymmetric inferiority, such as aircraft hijacking, suicide bombing, hostage taking or
targets,

or

is

armed

liable to

detonation of devices directed

render expanding ammunition the weapon of choice for police

activity

may be

at the direction

criminal in nature, or

Such

it

may foreseeably be employed

of a party to an armed conflict, for example, a State, in fur-

therance of its strategic war aims.
tive

at civilian infrastructure

forces personnel seeking to respond effectively to such challenges.

asymmetric

by or

command

It

seems most unlikely, however, that a less

effec-

response than expanding ammunition will be employed by States simply

because the particular context

may be regarded as hostilities associated with an in-

armed conflict. Equally, it is inconceivable that the authorities will
pause in what is likely to be an urgent, highly charged and dangerous situation in
order to debate the existence and status of any associated armed conflict and, thus,

ternational

the nature of the applicable rule.
If States in

any

number do retain expanding ammunition for use in
armed conflict in the sense discussed in the preceding

significant

the context of international

paragraphs, or indeed

if

such use occurs on any regular

tence of the customary rule will become, at the very

basis, the

least,

continued

exis-

questionable and, per-

haps, unsustainable. States party to the 1899 Declaration would, of course, remain

bound thereby. Arguably, however, practice of States party to the Declaration that
is contrary to its provisions would be rather potent evidence that the treaty is being
overtaken by events, a circumstance not unknown in the law of weaponry. 44
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Do

Now

we have

that

Non-International Armed Conflicts

to

These Differences

established that differences in the law applicable in our

classes of conflict exist, the final question to

sense.

Here we return to the

Should, indeed, the law that

is

posed

issue

conflicts confined to a State

and

Alternative,

pose

is

at the

two

whether such differences make
beginning of

this short piece.

designed to limit the sufferings of combatants and to

seek to ensure that the law of distinction

wrong question.

Make Sense?

is

properly complied with differ between

conflicts not so confined?

and perhaps altogether more

But perhaps that

is

the

revealing, questions are

these:

How long will

•

it

be before

all

States party to the

CCW ratify the 2001

scope

extension?

How long before the thinking that underpins ENMOD is seen by States to be

•

equally applicable

How long before the points we have discussed in relation to expanding bul-

•

lets

when the conflict occurs within the boundaries of a single nation?

are seen to have resonance in international

flict,

not just in relation to the

Rome

and non-international armed con-

Statute offenses?

And how long before States that accept the environmental rules in AP I do so

•

with regard to both classes of conflict?
States are

and

it is

and

will

remain

in charge

States that therefore will

developments
vergence

is

in recent years as

under way.

It will,

of the process of creating international law

determine the answers to these questions. Legal

noted above suggest that the process of legal con-

however, be for individual States to decide whether

to regard that process as complete.

In conclusion, while the general trend seems to be toward convergence, achiev-

ing complete convergence

would require

a collective willingness

the limited adjustment of some detailed legal interpretations.

whether States see

this as a priority

and whether

It

among States and

remains to be seen

State practice develops so as to

bring about complete convergence.

Notes
1.

Indeed, elementary considerations of humanity and

common

sense

make

it

pre-

posterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between

when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals
own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in interna-

themselves be allowed

on

their

tional wars,

Prosecutor

on

v.

cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible

on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision

Jurisdiction, ^

1

19 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for

in civil strife ....
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

2.

Protection of Victims of International
[hereinafter

AP I]

("It

is

Armed

Conflicts

art. 35.2,

June

8,

1977,

125 U.N.T.S. 3

1

prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of

warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering"). This

is

a rule of cus-

and which the International Committee of the Red
to apply in both international and non-international armed
conflicts, l Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 70 at 237 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study]. Under the rule, the
legitimacy of a weapon must be determined by comparing the nature and scale of the generic
military advantage to be anticipated from the use of the weapon in the applications for which it is
designed to be used with the pattern of injury and suffering associated with the normal, intended
use of the weapon. See further William J. Fenrick, The Conventional Weapons Convention: A
Modest but Useful Treaty, 279 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 498, 500 (1990); W.
Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW
tomary law which therefore binds
Cross customary law study found

all

States

REVIEW 511, 517 n.25 (2006); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 55-68 (2009).
3. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is restated in Article 5 1 (4) of Additional Protocol I. The innovation of that provision was to spell out what indiscriminate attacks are, namely:
those which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(a)

(b) those

which employ

a

method or means of combat which cannot be

directed at a

specific military objective; or

those which employ a

(c)

method or means of combat

the effects of which cannot be

limited as required by [the] Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a

nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

AP

I,

supra note

This rule

is

international
244.

It is

2.

also reflective of customary

law and was found by the

ICRC study to apply in both

and non-international armed conflicts. See ICRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 71 at
paragraphs (b) and (c) in the treaty text that provide the rule as it applies in weap-

really

ons law.
4.

ICRC

Treaty Database, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/

IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf
5.

March

(last visited

22, 2012).

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional WeapMay Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct.

ons Which
10, 1980,
flicts

1342 U.N.T.S. 137. The Convention, on adoption, applied to international armed con-

covered by

Common Article 2 to the

in scope agreed to at the

2001

1949 Geneva Conventions. By virtue of an extension

CCW Review Conference, the Convention and

apply, for the States that ratify the extension, to the non-international
in

Common Article 3 to the
6.

Amended

its

protocols

now

armed conflicts referred to

1949 Conventions.

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps

and Other Devices (Amended Protocol

II),

May

3,

1996,

S.

Treaty Doc. No. 105-1 (1997). See

An Impetus of Human Wreckage?: The 1996 Amended Landmines Protocol, 27
California Western International Law Journal 205 (1996).
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Alicia H. Petrarca,

Protection of Victims of Non-International

Armed

U.N.T.S. 609.
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8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter
Chemical Weapons Convention].
9. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacterial (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T.

583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
10.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter

Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept.

Ottawa Convention].
11. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
357 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Ottawa Convention, supra note 10, art. l(l)(c).
13.

Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187

U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
14.

Uganda,
I

(June

Rome

Statute].

Review Conference of the

May 3 1-June

16,

1 1,

2010,

Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court, Kampala,

Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, RC/Res.5, Annex

2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG

.pdf [hereinafter Article 8

Amendments].

5. The author is grateful to Professor Charles Garraway, a member of the UK delegation to
Rome Diplomatic Conference, for his clarification of this issue.
16. ICRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 72 at 251, Rule 74 at 259.
1

the

1

7.

However,

riot control agents are

lawful when, during an

armed

prohibited as a

method of warfare, but their use remains

conflict, international or otherwise, they are

not being used as a

method of warfare. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
18. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Supp.) 157, 157-59 (1907) [hereinafter Expanding Bullets
Declaration].

operative paragraph.

19.

See

20.

The second and

id., first

third operative paragraphs of the

provide: "The present Declaration

between two or more of them.

It

is

Expanding

Bullets Declaration,

id.,

only binding for the contracting Powers in the case of a war

be binding from the time when, in a war between

shall cease to

the contracting Powers, one of the belligerents

is

joined by a non-contracting power."

W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55, 69 (2005).
22. Comments attributed to Professor Greenwood during a keynote speech at Legal Aspects
21.

of Current Regulations, Third International Workshop on
reported by Parks,

id. at

Wound Ballistics (Mar. 28-29, 2001),

89-90 n.23.

23.

BOOTHBY, supra note

24.
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25.

Id.

26.
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2, at

Study, supra note

2,

147 n.4.

Rule 77

at 268.

270.

Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and Expanding Bullets: Limited Law Enforcement Exceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs?, 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 52 (2006).
28. ICRC Study, supra note 2, at 270. It is worth noting that the UK's Manual of the Law of
Armed Conflict does not list expanding bullets among the weapons prohibited in non-international
armed conflicts, although weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are SO listed. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF Defence, The Manual of the Law of
27.

ARMED CONFLICT J
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BOOTHBY, supra note
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29.
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Study, supra note

2, at

246,

2nd paragraph under "Non-international armed

conflicts."

Amendments, supra note

preambular para.

30.

Article 8

31.

Rome Statute, supra

32.

Article 9 provides that the elements "shall assist the court" in interpreting the crimes in

note 13,

art.

14,

9.

21(1).

by those who negotiated the treaty as qualifying the
The effect on international law of these
two provisions will be determined by applying the Article 31, Vienna Convention interpretation
rules. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
It seems to the author that it will, in practice, be for the judges of the Court to decide whether
the Article 2 1 requirement to apply and the Article 9 assertion that the elements shall assist produce an ambiguity of meaning or a clarity that the elements are non-binding or, indeed, a clarity
that they are binding. The interpretation reflected in this article is coherent with that understood
during the negotiations and the author is grateful to Professor Garraway for clarifying these
the Statute. This seems to have been intended

Article 21 requirement to apply, inter alia, the elements.

matters.

v.

Amendments, supra note

Annex

33.

Article 8

34.

An analogy may be drawn with the European Court of Human

Turkey.

The Court

The Court,

14,

II.

Rights decision in Giileg

said:

like the

Commission, accepts

that the use of force

may

be justified in the

present case under paragraph 2 (c) of Article 2 [of the European Convention], but

it

goes without saying that a balance must be struck between the aim pursued and the

means employed

to achieve

it.

The gendarmes used

a very powerful

weapon because

they apparently did not have truncheons, riot shields, water cannon, rubber bullets or

The lack of such equipment is all the more incomprehensible and unacceptable
because the province of §irnak, as the Government pointed out, is in a region in which a
tear gas.

state

of emergency has been declared, where

at the material

time disorder could have

been expected.
Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. H 71.
There seem to be two important aspects to this case. The

Giileg v.

weapon because

the alternative, impliedly preferable,

first

was the use of one type of
available. It seems that it

weapon was not

was the potential lethality of the weapon that was used that was a crucial consideration. The final
cited sentence suggests, furthermore, that riot control equipment should have been made available as the authorities should have understood the nature of domestic emergencies in §irnak. It
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35.
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wound-

ing effect." International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept.

9,

2002).
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Rome
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41

Yoder

Law

See, e.g. ,

for

Implications

(May 8,

1986); Michael

of Customary International Law

to the

J.

Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2

1977 Protocols Additional

American University Journal of International Law and Policy 419 (1987).
42. ICRC Study, supra note 2, Rule 43 at 143. The rule asserts, non-controversially,
general principles

that the

on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment, but then states:

A.

No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective;

B.

Destruction of any part of the natural environment

is

prohibited, unless required by

imperative military necessity; C. Launching an attack against a military objective which

may be expected to cause incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete

and

direct military advantage anticipated

These suggested rules seem to go somewhat beyond the rules
is

in

AP

I.

It

is

prohibited.

may be argued that there

not yet sufficient depth and generality of State practice to support

all

of the sub-rules as

drafted.

Rule 44

43.

Id.,

44.

For an example of a treaty whose operative provision was overtaken by events consider

the 1868

St.

at 147.

Petersburg Declaration. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in

sive Projectiles

Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec.
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Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in
Non-International Armed Conflicts

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction

The

body of law applicable to international armed conflicts. Accordingly, it applies to an armed conflict between
two or more States, including conflicts involving State-sponsored forces. 2 Whether
the law of naval warfare also applies to situations of non-international armed conflicts is a contentious issue. Therefore, the distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts is important when it comes to the applicability
of the law of naval warfare to a particular armed conflict.
Unfortunately, the distinction between international and non-international
armed conflicts is less clear than it seems at first glance. On the one hand, the "facts
on the ground" may make it difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the
law of naval warfare

is

part of the larger

1

two. 3 Additionally, international scholars have taken quite different positions. For

some, the distinctive criterion
issue being

tional law.

4

the identity of the parties to the conflict, with the

whether or not those parties qualify
For others,

raphy of an armed
international

armed
5

it is

under public interna-

they are prepared to apply the law applicable to

conflict to
if one

that the distinction has

as States

not the identity of the parties alone, but also the geog-

conflict;

ders of the state," even

* Professor

is

any case

in

of the parties

become

which armed
is

conflict "crosses the bor-

a non-State actor. 6

Still

others believe

irrelevant, because, they maintain, the formerly

of Public Law, Europa-Universitat Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
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separate bodies of law have

merged

in Non-International Armed Conflicts

into a single

both international and non-international armed

With regard

body of law applying equally
conflict.

to

7

acknowledged that there has been a
remarkable development of the law of non-international armed conflict during
the last decade. Some treaties no longer distinguish between international and
to the alleged merger,

non-international

armed

it is

conflicts. 8

strictly limited to international

The concept of war crimes, until recently
armed conflicts, has been introduced into the law

of non-international armed conflict. 9

ment

justifies the

Still, it is

doubtful whether that develop-

conclusion that the two bodies of law have merged.

First,

those

do not distinguish between international and non-international
armed conflict have not become customary international law. Second, one of the
prime references relied upon by the International Criminal Tribunal for the fortreaties that

mer Yugoslavia when addressing international and non-international armed conflict issues, the German Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual is under
revision. The first edition did not distinguish between the two; however, the forthcoming second edition will contain a separate section on non-international armed
conflicts. Third, those who advocate a merger focus on the obligations and prohibitions imposed upon the parties to the conflict. In other words, they maintain
that in both international and non-international armed conflict the parties are increasingly bound by the same rules, while ignoring the fact that the law of international armed conflict offers belligerents certain rights, especially vis-a-vis the
nationals of other States (neutrals). This especially holds true for the law of naval

warfare, which provides for prize measures, blockade

and various maritime zones.

It is

doubtful that the proponents of merger would be prepared to accept the exer-

cise

of the

full

even

conflict,

spectrum of belligerent

if

by the

exercised only

rights

during a non-international armed

State actor.

Those who focus on the identity of the

parties to the conflict to determine the

nature of the conflict are correct insofar as a non-international armed conflict pre-

supposes that

at least

one party to the armed

not mean, however, that geography

irrelevant.

is

is

a non-State actor. This does

To

the contrary, according to

conflict

Common Article 3, which appears in each of 1949 Geneva Conventions, the armed
conflict

must occur

ticle 1(1)

"in the territory of one of the

of 1977 Additional Protocol

place in the territory of a
that non-international

II

applies to "all

High Contracting

armed

conflict

Those who take the position

is

High Contracting

Party."

11

armed
Hence,

Parties." 10 Ar-

conflicts
it

which take

cannot be denied

characterized by a territorial element.

armed conflict comes into existence as soon as there is a trans-border element seem to base that position on a literal reading of the provisions of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.
However, mere "spillover effects" into the territory of another State do not
that an international
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necessarily change the character of a non-international

an international armed conflict
hostilities against

each other.

Differences of opinion

under scrutiny does not
stance, the

conflict into that of

long as the governments concerned refrain from

12

on how to characterize

easily

conflicts in

fit

into

a conflict increase if the situation

one of the traditional

Gaza and

categories, as, for in-

in Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Very often the

approaches to distinguishing international from non-international

different

armed

armed

as

armed

conflicts

seem

to be guided

by desired

result rather

than by a sober analysis

of customary international law. Although the different characterization ap-

proaches are interesting,
distinction nor to
ries

this article

is

not designed to provide further

of

add yet another category of armed conflict to the existing catego-

of international and non-international.

that the law of international
•

"whenever there

•

if the

is

armed

a resort to

It starts,

therefore, with the premise

conflict applies

armed

force between States"; 13

non-State actors in a non-international armed conflict obtain recogni-

tion of belligerency

by the government; 14 or

for States parties to Additional Protocol

•

criteria

I,

15

if

the conditions of Article

1

(4)

are fulfilled.

armed

In those

conflicts the

insofar as measures taken

tral

its

State

may

also apply

it

methods and means of naval warfare

enemy. However, the non-State actor

shipping unless the neutral State has

nized

at least

by the State party to the conflict are concerned. The non-

State party to the conflict

against

law of naval warfare undoubtedly applies,

—

may not interfere with neu-

either explicitly or implicitly

—recog-

as a belligerent.

A non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is "protracted armed
armed groups or between such groups within a State." The focus of the present article is on the question of whether, and to what extent, the parties to a non-international armed

violence between governmental authorities and organized
16

conflict are entitled to exercise belligerent rights

The

first

under the law of naval warfare.

part gives a short overview of nations' practice involving the use of meth-

ods and means of naval warfare during non-international armed

ond

part addresses the question of a geographical limitation of the

third part deals with the conduct of hostilities

sures taken

The sechostilities. The
discusses mea-

conflicts.

and the fourth part

by the parties to the conflict that interfere with the shipping and/or avi-

ation of other States.

It will

be shown that the law of naval warfare can be applied to

non-international armed conflicts, albeit partly modified, between the parties to
the conflict.

If,

however, the parties interfere with the shipping and/or aviation of

213

Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in Non-International Armed

Conflicts

other States beyond the outer limit of the State party's territorial sea or contiguous
zone, an additional legal basis for the measures in question must be found.

Part
A. American Civil

I.

Practice

War

The blockade during the American

Civil

War is an important example of applying

the law of naval warfare to a non-international

armed

conflict. It

must be borne

in

mind, however, that the declaration of the blockade by President Abraham Lincoln

was considered

as recognition of belligerency, 17 thus triggering the applicability of

the law of blockade

and of the law of naval warfare. Moreover, the

ernment had proclaimed

its

British gov-

neutrality, thus also recognizing a state of belliger-

ency between the United States and the Confederate

States. 18 Accordingly, the

blockade of the American Civil War serves as a precedent only in a limited manner
for the general applicability either of the law of blockade or of the law of naval warfare to non-international
that,

armed

conflicts. Nevertheless,

it

needs to be emphasized

although recognition of belligerency has occurred only infrequently in recent

State practice,

continues to exist as a legal concept. 19 Moreover, as illustrated by

it

the blockade of the Confederate States, recognition of belligerency

may be explicit

or implicit.

B. Spanish Civil

War

During the Spanish

Civil

War

nationalities supplying the

(1936-39) a number of merchant vessels of various

government

were attacked by

forces

aircraft

and

submarines. The identity of the State or group to which the attacking aircraft and

submarines belonged
conflict.

20

is

uncertain; however,

it is

clear that

In response, nine States, including the United

it

was not

a party to the

Kingdom and

France,

concluded the 1937 Nyon agreements 21 and decided on collective measures against
submarines, surface vessels and aircraft that were, or that were suspected of being,

engaged

in

unlawful attacks against merchant vessels. For the purposes of the pres-

ent paper, the treatment of those attacks as "acts of piracy"

should be noted, however, that the parties to the
ble

is

unimportant.

It

Nyon Arrangement in the pream-

emphasized that they were not "in any way admitting the

right of either party to

the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights or to interfere with merchant
ships
is

on the high

seas even

probably correct to

if

the laws of warfare at sea are observed." Therefore,

any party to the

of hostilities involved and the de-

state that "despite the scale

gree of international intervention
conflict

any

on both

sides

.

.

.

,

no European

state

right to interfere with neutral shipping."
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C. Algeria

Both prior to and during the conflict between France and Algerian groups seeking
independence, France instituted an extensive maritime control zone in the Mediterranean. Acting under a decree of March 17, 1956, 23 the French

more than 2,500 ships per year
Algeria.

25

24

in

visit

tons were also subjected to

taken within

fifty

visit

than one hundred

that extended fifty

After 1958, vessels of more than one

and

search.

hundred

Whereas most of the measures were

number of vessels were visited
were diverted when boarding was im-

kilometers of the Algerian coast, a

beyond the "customs zone."
due

26

of arms to rebels in

vessels of less

and search inside the "customs zone"

kilometers off the Algerian coast.

possible

effort to prevent the flow

According to Articles 4 and 5 of that decree,

tons were liable to

well

an

Navy intercepted

27

Vessels

to adverse weather conditions or the nature of the cargo, including

cargo consisting of arms and explosives. In the latter case, the cargo was confiscated unless
in a

it

manner

was determined that the arms and/or explosives were not

to be used

that constituted a danger to French forces in Algeria. 28 In

stances, the ships

in-

were released. The French measures that met sharp protests of

the affected flag States were justified
self-preservation.

most

by reference

to the rights of self-defense

and

29

D. Sri Lanka

The armed

conflict in Sri

naval element.

The "Sea Tigers"

the Tamil Tigers
to

Lanka (1983-2009) was characterized by a considerable

unconfirmed

—proved

—

the naval wing, which was established in 1984, of

to be a serious threat to

government

forces.

reports, the Sea Tigers deployed small suicide boats

According

and fast patrol

boats that sank twenty-nine government fast patrol boats and attacked naval bases

of the Sri Lankan Navy. The Sea Tigers did not limit their operations to
forces,

but also interfered with innocent shipping in the Indian Ocean. As a

on May

enemy
result,

Navy announced that it would increase its presence in
the Palk Strait and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles in the region. 30
In December 2004, demands were made in India to neutralize the Sea Tigers because they had become a "credible third naval force in the southern part of South
14,

2007, the Indian

Asia." 31 In 1984

and again

in 2009, the Sri

Lankan government

forces

were alleged

to have established naval blockades against parts of the coastline controlled

by the

Tamil Tigers. However, those references to naval blockade are misleading. The
measures taken by the government forces in 1984 were indeed aimed

at

preventing

entry and exit to and from the coastal area, but their
the Tamil Tigers

from receiving both training

main purpose was to prevent
and equipment from the southern

Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Additionally, the maritime interdiction operations oc-

curred within the Sri Lankan territorial sea and contiguous zone, and were directed
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weapons or supplies to the

against vessels suspected of being engaged in smuggling

Tamil Tigers. The

Sri

Lankan government did not

assert the right to interfere with

neutral vessels encountered in high seas areas. 32

all

The

so-called "blockade" of the

Mullaitivu coast in 2009 was part of a major military operation against the headquarters of the Sea Tigers that eventually resulted in
Sri

E.

Lankan armed forces did not claim any right to

its

neutralization. Again, the

interfere with neutral shipping.

Gaza

On

August

13,

2008, the Shipping Authority at the Israeli Ministry of Transport

published a Notice to Mariners calling upon shipping to refrain from entering the
waters off the Gaza coast. 33 That measure was considered inadequate,

territorial

and was followed on January

3,

2009 by a Minister of Defense-ordered naval

blockade of the coast of the Gaza Strip that extended to a

maximum

distance of

twenty nautical miles from the coast. The Notice to Mariners advising of the establishment of the blockade provided: "All mariners are advised that as of 03 January

UTC, Gaza maritime area is
blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until
2009, 1700

closed to

traffic

further notice. Maritime
." 34

closed by the following coordinates.

maritime

all

.

.

The

and

is

under

Gaza area

notice was published

is

en-

on the

websites of the Israel Defense Force, the Shipping and Ports Authority and the

Ministry of Transport, and on several standard international channels, such as

NAVTEX, an international satellite network that collects and distributes notices to
vessels worldwide.

Moreover,

this notice

was broadcast twice

a

day on the emer-

gency channel for maritime communications to vessels that sailed within three

hundred kilometers of the
tilla,"

F.

including the

Israeli coast.

On May 31,

Mavi Marmara, was

2010, the so-called "Gaza

intercepted.

flo-

35

Libya

The 201

conflict in Libya

1

international

the rebels.

armed

On

was

conflict

a

"mixed"

conflict.

On

one hand,

between the government forces

the other hand,

it

it

loyal to

was an international armed

was

a

non-

Gaddafi and

conflict

between

Libya and the international alliance that exercised certain belligerent rights on the
basis of
is

UN Security Council Resolution

irrelevant

1973. 36 For the purposes of this article,

whether the measures taken by the alliance were

the terms of the resolution. During the conflict,
eral boats

operated by Gaddafi forces that were laying anti-shipping mines outside

much of its food and supplies

sea link with the rebel capital Benghazi. British Brigadier

rector of

compliance with

NATO warships intercepted sev-

the harbor of Misurata, a city that was dependent for

on the

in

it

NATO operations

in Libya,

condemned

Rob

Weighill, di-

the minelaying by stating:

"We

have just seen Gaddafi forces floating anti-ship mines outside Misurata harbour
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today.

It

again shows his complete disregard for international law and his willing-

ness to attack humanitarian delivery efforts." 37

Part II. Region of Operations

and Territorial Sea
As non-international armed conflicts occur
A. Internal Waters

flict

are not prohibited

and

territorial sea, as

do not

the conflict

from conducting

within a State, 38 the parties to the con-

hostilities in that State's internal

those are defined by the law of the sea. As long as the parties to

interfere with the navigation of other States, they

methods and means of naval warfare against
At the same time, however, other
passage. There

is

no indication

of innocent passage

waters

is

may

apply

their adversary in those sea areas.

States continue to enjoy the right of innocent

in either treaty

law or State practice that the right

automatically suspended at the

commencement

of a non-

international

armed

coastal State,

under Article 25(3) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the

Law

conflict. Rather, the general rules

of the Sea (LOS Convention), 39

may

in certain circumstances temporarily

suspend innocent passage in specified parts of
the suspension

The

continue to apply. The

its

territorial sea.

To be

effective,

must be "duly published."

reference to "weapons exercises" in Article 25(3) as a basis for suspending

the right of innocent passage

is

not the exclusive circumstance in which suspension

may occur. The article goes on to indicate that suspension may occur when "essential

for the protection of its [the coastal State's] security." In determining

such suspension

is

essential, the coastal State enjoys a

whether

wide margin of discretion. 40

The existence of a non-international armed conflict certainly constitutes a threat to
the coastal State's security; hence, the authorities of the coastal State are entitled to

suspend the right of innocent passage in order to prevent foreign shipping from
navigating in close vicinity to the conflict area. In view of a lack of conclusive State
practice,

it is

ritorial sea.

unclear whether innocent passage

While suspension

maybe suspended in the entire ter-

in a State's entire territorial sea

would appear

to be

inconsistent with Article 25(3)'s "in specified areas," the circumstances of a given

non-international

armed

conflict

may

be such that the government considers

necessary to close the entire territorial sea to foreign navigation.

If,

it

however, the

armed hostilities are limited to a certain region, it would be difficult for the
government to justify a suspension of the right of innocent passage in coastal sea
areas remote from the area of operations.
The non-State party to a non-international armed conflict is not entitled to suspend or otherwise interfere with the right of innocent passage. This clearly follows
from the wording of Article 25(3) ("The coastal State may ."). 41 If the non-State
.

217

.

Methods and Means of Naval Warfare

in

Non-International Armed Conflicts

party nevertheless takes measures affecting foreign shipping, the authorities of the
coastal State

under Article 24(2) must "give appropriate publicity to any danger to

navigation, of which
is

it

has knowledge, within

its

territorial sea." 42

The government

not obligated to actively take measures with a view to protecting foreign naviga-

tion against interference

by the non-State party to the

B. International Straits

and Archipelagic Sea Lanes

conflict.

Neither the government nor, a fortiori, the non-State party to a non-international

armed

conflict

is

entitled to interfere with the rights of transit passage

archipelagic sea lanes passage within international straits

and of

and archipelagic waters.

Even during an international armed conflict the belligerents are obliged to preserve
those passage rights. 43 There

is

no

indication in State practice that the existence of a

non-international armed conflict would entitle the government to adopt laws and
regulations relating to passage that are in excess of that permissible under the law of

the sea. In particular, there
cise

As

maybe no suspension of transit passage even if the exer-

of navigation or overflight were dangerous to the transiting vessel or

is

aircraft.

the case with dangers to navigation within the territorial sea, the authorities of

the States bordering an international strait
give "appropriate publicity to
again, the

government

is

and the archipelagic

State are obliged to
overflight." 44

any danger to navigation or

And,

not obliged to take active measures against the non-State

party to the conflict in order to protect international navigation and aviation.

C. Sea Areas

beyond the Territorial Sea

The government of the

State

concerned

tion/interception operations within

33 45 of the

LOS Convention

established

and enforced by

its

is

entitled to exercise

contiguous zone

if the

maritime interdic-

conditions of Article

are met. Hence, the "special naval surveillance zone"
forces in 1984

and the mea-

sures taken against foreign vessels that were engaged in smuggling

weapons and

supplies to the Tamil Tigers were "justified under ordinary customs

and policing

Sri

Lankan government

powers available within 24 nautical miles of Sri Lanka's baselines."
State practice

seems to provide

sufficient evidence that there

is

no

ary international law prohibiting the parties to a non-international

from engaging
tional

armed

in hostilities against

conflict, there

is,

46

rule of custom-

armed

conflict

each other in high seas areas. As in an interna-

however, a positive obligation to pay due regard for

the rights enjoyed by other States. 47 Moreover, the parties are prohibited from

damaging submarine cables and pipelines that do not exclusively serve either party
to the conflict. 48

Hostile actions taken within the exclusive

economic zone or on the continental

shelf of another State during a non-international conflict are
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While the law of international armed
ducting

hostilities in

non-international

those areas, 49

armed

it is

conflicts. In

possible to reach a clear conclusion

conflict contains

no prohibition on con-

doubtful whether this also holds true for

view of a lack of conclusive practice,

on

that issue.

It is,

however, safe to

it is

not

state that

measures taken by a non-State party to a non-international armed conflict within
the exclusive

economic zone or on the continental

likelihood, not be tolerated

by

shelf of another State will, in

that State. This certainly will be the case

if

all

either

party to the conflict decides to lay naval mines in those areas. If such minelaying
occurs, the coastal State

is

entitled to

remove or otherwise

neutralize the mines.

Part III. Conduct of Naval Hostilities
This section addresses only relations between the parties to a non- international

armed conflict, and not their relations with non-parties. Its object is to determine
which rules of the law of naval warfare are applicable in a non-international armed
conflict by focusing on the rules and principles applicable to the methods and
means of naval warfare.
A. Entitlement

Under

the law of international

armed

only warships are entitled to

conflict,

exercise belligerent rights. 50 This rule goes back to the prohibition of privateering

under the 1856 Paris Declaration. 51 Warships are those
ria set forth in Articles

2-5 of the 1907 Hague Convention VII,

1958 High Seas Convention

on the

vessels that

53

52

meet the

crite-

Article 8(2) of the

and Article 29 of the LOS Convention. 54 Limitations

exercise of belligerent rights are

most important with regard

to interference

with neutral navigation and aviation; thus, neutral vessels and aircraft must accede
to such interference only

No

if

the measures are taken

by warships.

such limitation applies to non-international armed conflicts vis-a-vis the

parties. 55 It follows

belligerent rights

of the warship

—

from the object and purpose of the

under the law of naval warfare

—

i.e.,

rule limiting the exercise of

the transparent entitlement

that the non-State actor will obviously not have ships that

the criteria for classification as a warship since one of the criteria
vessel.

is

that

The government forces may make use of any vessel or aircraft,

it

meet

be a State

including, for

example, those used for law enforcement and customs enforcement, in the conduct of hostilities. This

may not be the case, however, if the government takes mea-

sures against foreign shipping.

I

will return to that issue. 56
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B.

in Non-International Armed Conflicts

Lawful Targets

armed conflict, members of the
regular armed forces, dissident armed forces and an organized armed group
formed by the non-State party to a non-international armed conflict are lawful tar57
The International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive Guidgets.
Under

the international law of non-international

ance on the Notion of Direct Participation

in

under International

Hostilities

Humanitarian Law provides that members of organized armed groups "consist
only of individuals whose continuous function
('continuous combat function')."

58

The

is

to take a direct part in hostilities

Guidance provides that "con-

Interpretive

tinuous combat function" "requires lasting integration into an organized armed

armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict." 59 Persons that accompany or support an organized armed group but "who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions" are civilians
who have "protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly
participate in hostilities." 60 Members of the regular armed forces, however, regard61
less of the function they serve
are not considered to be civilians and are subject to
group acting

as the

direct attack. This introduction of a
text of armed conflicts.

It

double standard

would have been

preferable

is

not practicable in the con-

had the Interpretive Guidance

accepted the conclusion of the ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian

study which rightly

states,

"Such imbalance would not

exist if

Law

members of orga-

nized armed groups were, due to their membership, either considered to be continuously taking a direct part in the hostilities or not considered to be civilians." 62
In the context of the Libyan conflict, the Libyan rebels were lawful targets at that

when the rebellion against the Gaddafi government passed the threshold to
become a non-international armed conflict. They were not protected under Secupoint

rity

Council Resolution 1973, which afforded protection to

civilians,

but not to

members of organized armed groups. Civilians, more generally under the law of
non-international armed conflict, are not subject to direct attack unless (and for
such time

as)

they take a direct part in

hostilities.

erwise have been entitled to protection,

by attacking

who

63

Thus,

civilians,

who would oth-

directly participated in the hostilities

either the Gaddafi or the rebel forces

became

lawful targets during

their period of participation as well.

When it comes to objects
it is

—which

are,

of course, the focus of naval operations

generally agreed that the definition set forth in Article 52(2) of Additional

Protocol

I

is

customary

in character

non-international armed conflicts.

64

and thus applies

All objects that

to

both international and

have an "intrinsic military sig-

nificance" are to be considered lawful military objectives "by nature." 65 Hence, the
military equipment, such as fast patrol boats

headquarters of either party

may be

and ammunition depots, or military

attacked at
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used by the Sea Tigers for naval operations, as well as their stronghold in
Mullaitivu, were lawful targets.

the Sri

Lankan government forces.

may become
It

The same holds

follows

66

true for the military

equipment of

All other objects, although of a civilian nature,

lawful military objectives by either their use, purpose or location.

from the foregoing

rectly attacked.

67

that civilians

and

civilian objects

may

not be di-

Moreover, the parties to a non-international armed conflict are

members of armed

obliged to always distinguish between

armed groups and

civilians,

Civilians are those

who

forces or organized

and between military objectives and

are neither

civilian objects. 68

members of an organized armed group nor

directly participating in the hostilities. 69 Civilian objects are objects that

do not

constitute a military objective under the customary international law definition. 70

armed

In a non-international

whether an individual

is

a

conflict,

member

may

it

be

of an organized armed group or a civilian or

whether an object constitutes a military objective or a
the parties are under

no obligation

civilian object.

For instance,

marked or otherwise
This does not render the rules on lawful

to use vehicles that are

clearly identifiable as military in nature.

targets

difficult to clearly establish

and the principle of distinction

obsolete;

it

simply increases the difficulty in

applying them.

Use of Naval Mines
As was seen in the Libyan conflict, the use of naval mines by the forces loyal to
Gaddafi was condemned as being in "complete disregard for international law." 71
C.

That statement, however, referred to interference with "humanitarian delivery
efforts";

Resolution 1973 required Libyan authorities to "take

tect civilians

and meet

their basic needs,

passage of humanitarian assistance."

have been

difficult to

72

and

and unimpeded
it

would

armed

conflict

The mines were laid within

had Libyan authorities

the Libyan territorial sea

purpose seems to have been to prevent supplies from reaching Misurata

via the sea.

armed

to ensure the rapid

condemn the laying of naval mines as a violation of interna-

publicized their employment.
their

measures to pro-

In the absence of Resolution 1973,

tional law or of the law of non-international

and

all

Such conduct does not

conflict.

Moreover,

it

violate the

would be

law applicable to non-international

difficult to

conclude that the laying of naval

mines violated the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks or any specific prohibition
under the law applicable to such weapons or

The

fact that the

sufficient to

mines were

their use.

laid within the

Libyan

territorial sea

is

not alone

determine that the establishment of the minefield accorded with the

A

applicable international law, however.
right of innocent passage.

As was seen

minefield certainly impedes

earlier,

cent passage requires prior notification,

e.g.,

221

any suspension of the

by issuing

upon

the

right of inno-

a Notice to Mariners. 73
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Libyan authorities neither publicly announced the laying of mines nor issued a

warning to international shipping. Even
effort to deliver

if

the mines were not directed against the

humanitarian supplies, but were employed merely as a method of

naval warfare applied against the rebels, the minelaying was
it

was conducted
mines

conflict does not prohibit the laying of na-

in the internal waters or in the territorial sea of the State.

The law recog-

mines serve legitimate purposes, to include area

denial, coastal

nizes that naval

defense and maintaining and enforcing a blockade.
tacks,

unlawful because

in disregard of the right of innocent passage of other States.

The law of non-international armed
val

still

i.e.,

74

Of course,

indiscriminate at-

"attacks that are not specifically directed" against lawful targets, 75 the use

of weapons that are indiscriminate by nature 76 and the indiscriminate use of weap-

ons 77 are prohibited both in international and

The
is

fact that naval

not sufficient in

mines

armed conflict.

may equally hazard military objectives and civilian objects
conclude that the laying of mines

itself to

these prohibitions. Moreover, the law of naval

on indiscriminate

in non-international

attacks,

is

in violation of any of

mine warfare contains a specific rule

by explicitly prohibiting the use of "free-floating mines,

unless they are directed against a military objective

and they become harmless

within an hour after loss of control over them." 78
If Misurata
it

off

had constituted

a rebel stronghold,

it

would have been lawful

to cut

from outside resupply. However, the laying of naval mines by the Gaddafi

forces

was

illegal

because

it

occurred in disregard of the obligation to take

ble precautions for the safety of peaceful shipping

79

all feasi-

(the failure to provide notifi-

community) and of the obligation to provide for
humanitarian relief consignments. With regard to relief consignments, the parties
to an armed conflict are obliged to provide for their free passage if the civilian
population is "inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its
survival." 80 While this obligation originated in the law of blockade it is, I would ascation to the international

sert,

customary

in character as a specification of the principle

In conclusion, the use of naval mines in non-international
ther

is

armed

conflict nei-

expressly prohibited nor ab initio violates the principle of distinction or the

rules of the law of non-international
tacks.

of humanity.

It

must be borne

in

armed

conflict prohibiting indiscriminate at-

mind, however, that

this

is

true only

if

naval mines are

laid within the internal waters or, subject to prior notification, the territorial sea

the State. In sea areas

beyond the outer limit of the

territorial sea, naval

be used by the parties to a non-international armed conflict only
rected against a military objective.
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mines may

they are di-
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D. The Natural Environment

The Customary International Humanitarian Law study states that " [i]t can be argued
that the obligation to pay due regard to the environment [in international armed
conflicts] also applies in non-international armed conflict if there are effects in another State." 81 Although the arguments are based on the law of peace,
tional environmental law, this
is

no

i.e.,

interna-

may be a correct statement of the law because there

rule of general international law that

would absolve

a State of

its

obligations

under either general international law or international envi-

vis-a-vis other States

ronmental law merely because that State has become a party to a non-international

armed

conflict.

Unfortunately, the study
obligation to pay
it

fails

to be sufficiently clear as to

due regard. The commentary only

who

refers to obligations

does not clarify whether non-State actors are also bound by

indicate that non-State actors are

bound may be

bound by the

is

The

it.

of States;
failure to

correct, because there are

good

reasons to assume that the obligations under international environmental law exclusively apply to States as subjects of international law.

Far more interesting than the reference to the obligation to pay due regard to the
natural environment

beyond the

territory of the State

is

the following conclusion

bythelCRC:
[T]here are indications that this customary rule

[i.e.,

the duty to pay due regard]

may

where the armed conflict is taking
place. Some support for drafting a treaty rule for this purpose existed during the negotiation of Additional Protocol II. It was not adopted then, but the general acceptance of
also apply to parties' behaviour within the State

the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-international

has considerably strengthened since 1977. In addition,

flicts

treaties

apply to a State's behaviour within

its

own

armed con-

many environmental

territory.

There

is

law

also a certain

amount of State practice indicating the obligation to protect the environment that applies also to non-international armed conflicts, including military manuals, official
statements and the
the Nuclear

many submissions by States to the International Court of Justice in

Weapons

case to the effect that the

environment must be protected for the

benefit of all. 82

to be noted that this statement

It is

"indications,"
tice"

—

"may

also apply,"

is

characterized by cautious formulations

"some support,"

"certain

amount of State

prac-

that indicate that the authors of the study are less than convinced of the cor-

rectness of their assumptions. In

from the suggestion

any event, those formulations do not

that the authors

aspirations, rather than

were guided by

by a sound analysis of State

their political

and ecological

practice. State practice

non-international armed conflicts does not provide sufficient
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evidence to
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determine that the parties to the conflict are obliged to take into consideration
to

pay due regard to

—

—or

the natural environment of the State in which the conflict

is

occurring.
It

should also be noted that there

term "natural environment."
certain sea areas or

marine

83

still is

But even

no

generally accepted definition of the

if there

were agreement

living resources constitute "natural

that, for

example,

environment,"

this

would not have an impact on the lawfulness of naval operations during a noninternational armed conflict that have, or may have, detrimental effects on the
marine environment of the State concerned.
Part IV. Interference with the Navigation of Other States

The law of non-international armed conflict contains no prohibitions going beyond those applying to land or air operations with regard to naval operations of the
parties that occur within the internal waters and the territorial sea of the State party
to the conflict so long as they do not interfere with the navigation of other States.
State practice during the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian conflict seems to
provide convincing evidence that the parties to a non-international armed conflict
are not allowed to interfere with the navigation of other States in sea areas beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea (unless such measures are lawful under the law

of the sea or general international law). This finding

measures taken by non-State

actors.

is

certainly correct as concerns

As regards interference by government

forces

one author has taken the position that
the right of states to implement measures against neutral vessels in
best an unsettled question.
states

actors

The most one can

say

is

NIACs

is

thus at

that in higher- intensity conflicts

have sometimes acknowledged or acquiesced in blockades targeting non-state

However,

in equally violent conflicts

such a right has sometimes not been rec-

ognised and attempts to assert rights of blockade or similar measures have been protested (for instance, the Spanish Civil

War and

the Algerian rebellion).

Where such

measures are protested as contrary to international law those protests must weigh
against the conclusion that there

opinio juris supporting the rule of custom invoked.

is

On the basis of relevant state practice one can at most hazard a suggestion that irrespective

of the precise classification of a

conflict, states are likely to tolerate the assertion

of a

blockade only in cases of higher-intensity conflicts on a par with the traditional understanding of war. 84

A. Neutral Vessels and Aircraft as Lawful Targets
It

must be emphasized that the doubts expressed with regard to the authority of the

State party to a non-international

armed

conflict to interfere with neutral vessels
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and

aircraft

have only concerned measures short of attack,

i.e., visit,

search and

and blockade. To date there has been no study addressing the question of
whether foreign vessels and aircraft may qualify as lawful targets under the law of
capture,

non-international

armed

conflict.

of lawful military objectives in an international armed conflict

If the definition

also applies in non-international

armed

conflict, 85 there

is

no convincing reason

would justify its limitation to vessels and aircraft of the nationality of the State
concerned. Accordingly, any vessel, regardless of the flag it is flying, and any air-

that

craft,

wherever registered, used by an organized armed group in the course of a

non-international
objectives

armed

by either

assistance of the

conflict for military purposes constitute lawful military

their nature or use.

government

If,

forces, the

for instance, another State

comes

to the

warships and military aircraft deployed by

that State will qualify as lawful military objectives

by

their nature. If the govern-

ment of the State party makes use of vessels operated by a private military/security
company that flies the flag of another State, that vessel will be a lawful target by reason of its use. In such cases, it does not make a difference whether the vessel or aircraft is encountered in the territorial sea or national airspace or in sea areas beyond
the outer limit of the territorial sea or in international airspace.
that the parties to a non-international

armed

It is

conflict will refrain

such vessels or aircraft simply because they have departed the
national airspace.

such vessels and

It is

unimaginable

from attacking

territorial sea or

equally unimaginable that other States will protest attacks

aircraft

on the

sole basis of the attacks' occurring

on the high

on

seas

or in international airspace.

The correctness of these findings cannot be questioned even in view of the practice of States during the Spanish Civil War, during which the parties to the 1937

Nyon agreement were not prepared

to recognize a right of the parties to that

armed conflict "to exercise belligerent rights or to interfere with merchant ships on
the high sea even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed." 86 The fact that those
States

were not prepared to recognize the exercise of belligerent

rights,

including

on neutral merchant vessels qualifying as lawful targets, does not mean that
the law of non-international armed conflict is the same today. While the law as it
attacks

stood in 1937

may have contained a prohibition preventing the parties to a non-

international

armed

conflict

from exercising

belligerent rights

on the high

seas,

no longer the case under the contemporary law of non-international armed
conflict. The customary definition of lawful military objectives contains no excepthis

is

tions for objects that have the nationality of foreign States.
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B. Visit, Search

The

Non-International Armed Conflicts

and Capture

interceptions of foreign vessels conducted by the French

gerian conflict
less

in

Navy during

the Al-

met strong resistance from affected flag States. France, however, was

than impressed and continued to intercept foreign merchant vessels for years.

O'Connell rightly observes that since the nineteenth century there had not

been such an extensive invasion

—

for security reasons

of the seas as in the case of the Algerian operation.

—of

The

the principle of the freedom

large

number of ships

affected,

and the large number of countries which became diplomatically involved, would have
led one to imagine that more attention would have been paid to this situation. Since
only a few ships had their cargoes removed, and those ships were clearly engaged in the
smuggling of arms into Algeria, the operation did not seriously affect the navigation of
the high sea, and this, together with the political situation prevailing, would seem to ex-

on the part of flag States of the ships affected with respect to demands
of the French government. The fact that France was able for so long and in so extensive a
manner to exercise naval power on the high seas on the ground of self-defence causes one
to ponder on the extent to which a conservative appreciation of international law has a
plain the reticence

role in defence planning.

There

is

Part IV.C,

87

also the question of the Israeli

it is

blockade of Gaza. As

will

be discussed

in

the view of this author that the conflict should be classified as an in-

armed conflict. However, it is also useful to consider what the legal position would have been if it were considered to be non-international in nature, as it
is by some scholars.
Beginning in 2008, and continuing until the establishment of the blockade of
the Gaza Strip on January 3, 2009, Israel exercised the right of visit and search in
order to prevent the flow of arms into the Gaza Strip. The few measures taken
against foreign vessels that were suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of being engaged in the transportation of arms destined for Hamas did not give rise to strong
ternational

protests. Either the flag States implicitly recognized Israel's security interests or

they simply did not want to admit that ships flying their flags had been engaged in
the smuggling of arms

and ammunition. Whatever the

rationale, there

parallel to the Algerian operation insofar as security interests

defense

may

and the

is

a clear

right of self-

serve as a justification for interference with foreign shipping by the

armed conflict.
Both the Algerian and Gaza conflicts seem to justify the conclusion that the State
is entitled
party to a non-international armed conflict
not the non-State actor
to intercept foreign vessels on the high seas if the following conditions are met:
State party to a non-international

—

( 1 )

vital security interests

of the State are
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there are reasonable grounds for believing that the foreign vessels are en-

(2)

gaged in

activities

jeopardizing those security interests

the non-State party with arms);

by supplying

and

the measures are undertaken in close proximity to the conflict area.

(3)

must be emphasized

It

(e.g.,

that the recognition of the right of interception (visit,

search and capture) does not imply recognition of the right to exercise measures
short of attack under prize law. Prize law stricto sensu only applies in international

armed conflicts. Rather, the legal basis
customary right of self-preservation
integrity of the State. This right

international

armed

conflict.

is

is

found

in the right of self-defense or in the

in order to protect the territorial

and

political

equally exercisable in an international or non-

The finding by

the International Court of Justice in

the Wall advisory opinion that the right of self-defense does not apply if there

trans-border element

C. Blockade:

1.

88

is

no

has no basis in State practice.

The Gaza Case

General Considerations

Unaddressed thus

armed

is

the question of whether the parties to a non-international

conflict are entitled to establish

Blockades

are,

airspace, apply to

tinguished from
tive

far

and enforce

by necessity, established
all

a naval or aerial blockade.

in international waters or international

vessels or aircraft regardless of their nationality, 89

and are

dis-

more limited actions such as measures undertaken with the objec-

of preventing exit from or entry into a given part of the coast or a port

armed conflict. These latter
law of armed conflict as long as

controlled by the other party to a non-international

measures do not qualify

as a

blockade under the

they are limited to the territorial sea of the State, or are not applied against foreign
vessels or aircraft.

As noted previously

in the context of the

declaration of a blockade

by the government

American

as

Civil

War,

it

may

be the

an implicit recognition of belliger-

ency of the non-State party to the conflict that triggers the applicability of the law
of international armed conflict and, thus, of the law of naval warfare. 90
If,

however, the declaration of blockade cannot be understood as an implicit

recognition of belligerency
as

—

either because the concept

is

no longer recognized

being part of the lex lata or because the circumstances surrounding the decla-

ration

do not justify

a conclusion to that effect

party to a non-international

blockade.

One author who

armed

conflict

is

—

doubtful whether the State

entitled to establish

classifies the conflict
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it is

between

Israel

and enforce

and Hamas

a

as a
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armed

non-international

conflict has

in

come

Non-International Armed Conflicts

to the conclusion that in view of the

had no

sporadic, on-again, off-again nature of the hostilities, "Israel

pose a blockade on the Gaza Strip and
against the

flotilla

.

.

.

blockade
writer's
is

is

no consistent

state practice

opinion of the

legality

a correct statement of the

of the

Israeli

contemporary law

armed

ency, the parties to a non-international

and enforce

2.

blockade

a naval or aerial

that,

According to that

and opinio

armed

available outside an [international

is

im-

enforcement of that unlawful blockade

act incurring state responsibility." 91

was an

author's view, "there

its

right to

is

juris suggesting

conflict]." 92

While that

not shared by this author,

it

absent recognition of belliger-

conflict are not entitled to establish

blockade against foreign vessels or

aircraft.

The Gaza Case

The legal classification of the Gaza conflict is a contested
lawyers

who

blockade of the Gaza Strip

is illegal

is

93

and hold

that Israel's

arrive at that conclusion because they charac-

terize the conflict as a non-international

tion

manner

deal with the subject in a serious

Those international

issue.

armed conflict. 94 Even if that characteriza-

correct, their finding that the blockade

is

therefore unlawful does not

necessarily follow, because recognition of belligerency continues to be a valid concept.

The mere

fact that a given rule or

concept of international law has not been

made use of for an extended period does not mean that the rule or concept has become void by reason of desuetude. 95 There is no evidence that States, by refraining
from recognizing a

status of belligerency, have abolished that concept for good.

Rather, States are unwilling to bring into operation the legal consequences that

flow from a recognition of belligerency, but by the very study of the consequences
they acknowledge that the concept

is

alive

and

well.

However, while this author accepts that others have reached a contrary position,

armed conflict. There
are convincing reasons to conclude that it is an international armed conflict in view
of the continuing belligerent occupation. 96 The Supreme Court of Israel does not
the

Gaza

conflict

cannot be

classified as a non-international

share this opinion, because, according to the Court, Israel, since the 2005 disen-

gagement, no longer exercises effective control over the Gaza

Strip. 97

The Court,

however, takes the position that international humanitarian law applies to an

armed conflict between
is

Israel

and terrorist organizations not merely in an area that

subject to occupation, but "in any case of an

character

—

in other words,

armed

one that crosses the borders of the

not the place in which the armed conflict occurs
tion." 98

conflict of

is
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state

—whether or

subject to a belligerent occupa-

Thus the Court reaches the same conclusion,

than belligerent occupation.

an international

albeit

by

a different route
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The Turkel Commission, which was

established

by the

Israeli

government

to

examine the circumstances surrounding the boarding of the Mavi Marmara on

May

concurred with the Supreme Court that the conflict in the Gaza

31, 2010,

Strip

"international in character." 99 Additionally, the

is

consideration (1) the degree of de facto control that

Gaza

Strip,

the significant security threat that

(2)

Commission took

Hamas
Hamas

into

exercises over the

presents,

and

(3)

Hamas's attempts to import weapons, ammunition and other military supplies by sea.

The Commission then concluded that it "would have considered applying the
rules governing the imposition and enforcement of a naval blockade even if the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip had been classified as a non-international
armed conflict." 100
The Palmer Report, which was prepared by the panel appointed by the UN
Secretary-General to examine the boarding of the Mavi Marmara, also concluded
that the conflict was international in nature, stating:
The Panel considers the conflict should be treated as an international one for the purposes
of the law of blockade. This takes foremost into account
against

armed

attacks

from outside

its

Israel's right to self-defence

territory. In this context, the

status, in particular its relationship to Israel,

should not obscure the

debate on Gaza's
realities.

The law

does not operate in a political vacuum, and it is implausible to deny that the nature of
the armed violence between Israel and Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters. In
101
fact, it has all the trappings of an international armed conflict.

The

Commission and the Secretary-General's panel lend
government of Israel's determination that it was entitled to

findings of the Turkel

further support to the

establish the naval blockade.

A naval blockade is a lawful method of naval warfare. 102 As such, it overrides the
peacetime right of all States to freely navigate in the high seas areas covered by the
blockade. 103

The blockading power is not only entitled to prevent vessels from either

entering or leaving the blockaded area, but, in

fact,

has an obligation to achieve that

104

The blockading power must use whatever means it has available to prevent entry and exit of all vessels; if it fails to do so
the blockade becomes ineffective and legally void. In other words, if the blockading
power permits some vessels to cross the blockade, while denying that ability to
goal

by ensuring the blockade

other vessels,
tive blockade,

lawful.

Gaza,

it is

effective.

not effectively enforcing the blockade. In the absence of an effec-

any interference with the navigational

Hence,

it

is

if

rights of vessels

would be un-

the Israeli government wishes to maintain the naval blockade of

has no choice but to prevent

all

vessels

blockaded area.
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Under the international law of naval blockade, all vessels, irrespective of the flag
they fly, must be prevented from entering or leaving the blockaded area. In this instance, if they breach the blockade by crossing the blockade line twenty nautical
miles off the Gaza coastline, or if they attempt to breach the blockade, they are liaany other measure taken by blockading units to prevent a con-

ble to capture or to

tinuation of their voyage. 105

On some

occasions

blockade. That

is

it

may

be

difficult to establish

not the case with the "Gaza

flotilla."

and the

stated their intent to breach the blockade

an attempt to breach the

The organizers had expressly

vessels'

approach to the block-

aded area constituted an attempted breach of blockade. Given the expressed intent

and the approach of the vessels, the
to act until the vessels

Israeli

Defense Force units did not need to wait

were either close to the blockade

line or crossing

it.

Rather,

they were entitled to take the necessary measures at a considerable distance because
the attempt to breach the blockade was obvious. 106

must comply

Vessels either breaching or attempting to breach a naval blockade

with

all

legitimate orders

by the blockading power.

If

summoned to stop

not continue their voyage nor attempt to escape. They are obligated to
ing team

on the

vessel

escape or resistance
if

and

to allow the

team

they

let

to take control of the ship.

may

a board-

Any act of

maybe overcome by the use of proportionate force, including,

necessary, the use of deadly force. 107

Humanitarian considerations play a
blockade.

or

role in determining the lawfulness of a

A naval blockade is unlawful if "the damage to the civilian population is,

may be

expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military

advantage anticipated from the blockade." 108 "Excessive" does not
sive."

Applied to the blockade of the Gaza

Strip, there

mean

"exten-

can be no doubt that

it

has

resulted in inconveniences for the civilian population, but certainly not in excessive

damage. In

gained,

i.e.,

this context

it is

important to note that the military advantage

the prevention of the flow of arms

and the entry of terrorists,

is

quite

substantial.

Moreover, the blockading power
if

is

obliged to provide for relief consignments

no longer adequately provided
with food, water and medical supplies. 109

the civilian population of the blockaded area

with goods essential for

The "Gaza
civilian

flotilla"

its

survival,

i.e.,

is

was allegedly on a purely humanitarian mission

population in Gaza with such essential goods.

It is

to provide the

immaterial whether this

was true, whether the cargoes indeed consisted of essential goods only or whether
the

flotilla

was only pursuing

had been on

a purely

political

and provocative

Even

if

the

flotilla

would have had no right to apRather, the blockading power could prescribe "the

humanitarian mission

proach the Gaza coastline.

goals.

it

technical arrangements, including search, under which the relief consignments are
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permitted." 110

It is

important to note

pared to allow the shipment of the
it

was unloaded

tions.

in

an

Israeli

that, in 2010, the Israeli

flotilla's

port and

its

government was pre-

cargo to Gaza under the condition that

distribution entrusted to the United

Na-

That proposal was well in accordance with the applicable law. The mere

claim of pursuing humanitarian goals or to be a humanitarian organization does

not give

rise to a right to

breach a blockade.

Any refusal

to accept reasonable tech-

arrangements offered by the blockading power and any continuation of the

nical

voyage without complying with the legitimate orders of the blockading power
entitle the latter to take

will

appropriate and proportionate measures, including the use

of force, to prevent the vessels from entering the blockaded area.

Conclusion

It

has been shown that the parties to a non-international armed conflict are not

obliged to confine the

may make

armed

land territory of the State and that

hostilities to the

means of naval warfare. As long as
the measures they take against each other have no detrimental impact on international navigation and aviation there are no considerable legal obstacles.
While there seems to be widespread agreement that neither party to a noninternational armed conflict is entitled to interfere with foreign shipping and aviation in sea areas beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, the State party to a
non-international armed conflict continues to enjoy the right to enforce its domestic law under the law of the sea. Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain
they

use of recognized methods and

that the definition of lawful military objectives that

international
ical

armed

conflicts ceases to

undoubtedly applies

in

non-

be valid merely by reason of the geograph-

position of the target. Hence, foreign vessels

and

aircraft that contribute to

the enemy's military action by, for example, providing targeting data are lawful
targets even if they are located

on the high

As regards measures short of attack,
prepared to tolerate such measures

armed conflict,

if vital

if

seas or in international airspace.

i.e., visit,

search

and capture,

States

seem

to

be

taken by the State party to a non-international

security interests are at stake

and

if the

are taken in the vicinity of the coast. Similar considerations

interception measures

may apply if the

State

party decides to establish and enforce a naval blockade.
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XI
Perfidy in Non-International Armed
Conflicts

Richard B. Jackson*
Introduction

Perfidy is a grave breach, or serious crime, under the law of war. It is generally
defined as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead
that he

is

entitled to, or

is

him to believe

obliged to accord, protection under the rules of interna-

armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Examples include using the white flag to lure an enemy into the open, or feigning
incapacitation by wounds or sickness; the most egregious violations include using

tional law applicable in

1

protected status, as a civilian or a medical professional, to treacherously

kill

or

wound an enemy.
In the current and recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan,
all

of which are non-international armed conflicts of varying degrees of intensity,

actions that

armed

would be described

conflict are

used an ambulance
ing five and
ians.

2

On

rampant.

bomb

wounding

as perfidy if they

On

January

to attack

19,

had occurred

in

2011, for example, Iraqi insurgents

an Iraqi police station in Diyala province,

seventy-six individuals, the majority of

the afternoon of July

5,

an international

whom

Colonel, U.S.

civil-

2011, a suicide bomber, disguised as a civilian,

detonated a truckload of explosives near a municipal building in

*

were

kill-

Taji, Iraq; as

Army (Ret.); Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for Law

of War Matters. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author alone and not necessarily

those of the U.S. government or the U.S. Army.
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and neighbors, including young

friends

children, rushed to help the injured, a second

bomber attacked from among the crowd. 3 In Afghanistan, on April 7, 201 1, a
suicide bomber used an ambulance to infiltrate a police checkpoint and then detonated his bomb, killing six. 4 In Somalia, Al-Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-affiliated group
suicide

fighting the fledgling Somali government, has trained

women to be suicide bomb-

so they can launch their attacks while appearing to be innocent civilian females,

ers,

dressed in traditional

Moslem garb. 5 And Pakistani insurgents have employed sim-

asymmetric tactics.

ilar

On May 13, 201 1, just days after the death of Bin Laden, the

Pakistani Taliban returned to the practice of launching suicide attacks

the civilian populace.

from among

6

The question to be addressed is whether the war crime of perfidy exists in the
law of war pertaining to non-international armed conflicts. Or phrased in another
manner,

is it

where the

appropriate to apply this term outside of international armed conflict,

rules are defined

Law

by treaty and customary international law? The Manual

of Non- International

Armed

some of the
conduct defined as perfidy when occurring during an international armed conflict
7
is also perfidious when occurring during non-international armed conflicts. What
are its parameters and how many of the concepts from international armed conflict
are to be incorporated into the law of non-international armed conflicts?
on the

An
col

answer to these questions requires an examination of the Additional Proto-

(AP

I

I)

definition of perfidy in international

(Additional Protocol

AP I
II,

II

(AP

for international

conflicts.

AP

armed

conflict

and

anteced-

its

an analysis of the existing treaty law of non-international armed conflict

ents,

in

Conflict suggests that at least

II))

armed

8

conflicts into the

Although many of the

Additional Protocol

suggests that the

more

II

and an extrapolation of the principles established
law for non-international armed

specific provisions of

includes the

AP I were

not included in

same general protections

specific provisions of AP

I

that give

as

AP

I,

which

form and substance

to

the general protections can be used to enforce compliance with those general

protections in non-international
tional law.
cols,

As Bothe, Partsch and Solf suggest

"The concept of general protection

which flow

as necessary inferences

basic principle of distinction
flict

armed conflict,
...

is

as a matter of customary interna-

in their seminal

work on

the proto-

broad enough to cover protections

from other provisions of Protocol

II."

9

The

and the protective principle of the law of armed con-

(also referred to as international

humanitarian law) logically lead to the incor-

poration of the prohibition on perfidy, by inference, into the law applicable to
non-international armed conflict. In addition, the near-universal condemnation

of perfidious attacks and current State practice in those conflicts, the practice of

some

international criminal tribunals, the practices adopted by States fighting

these conflicts

and recent U.S. military commission
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support for application of a rule against perfidy in non-international armed conin order to provide a sanction for the perfidious use of internationally recog-

flicts

nized

emblems and protected

statuses.

Protection of the civilian populace
U.S.

Army and Marine Corps'

of civilians
conflict:

is

the

is

essential in these

complex conflicts. As the

Counterinsurgency Manual indicates, the protection

paramount requirement of the State in a non-international armed

COIN

"The cornerstone of any

[counterinsurgency] effort

is

establishing

10

The prosecution of perfidy, as a serious crime or
grave breach under the law of war, is required to protect the civilian population and
respect humanitarian efforts in this prevalent form of conflict, whether labeled
"transnational" or "intra-State non-international armed conflict."
The law that applies to the conduct of armed forces in a non-international
armed conflict is derived from treaty law and customary international law. Howsecurity for the civilian populace."

ever, the

customary international law status of perfidy in non-international con-

flict is difficult

law.

11

to establish

under the current U.S. view of customary international

There is little or no evidence of perfidy violations being prosecuted under in-

ternational law in non-international

armed

conflicts,

nor

is

there clear opinio juris

on this matter. Emerging customary international law must be inferred,
therefore, from the principles of the law of armed conflict supported by evidence

by

States

provided by jurists,

official

evidence of State practice.

statements, statutes, the works of eminent writers and

12

Treaty Provisions

General Principles
Treaty provisions adopting perfidy as a crime in non-international armed conflict
are nearly non-existent. 13

The law of armed

conflict provisions

from which

a rule

may be derived, however, are clearly enunciated in Additional ProThe United States has signed AP II and three presidents have recom-

against perfidy
tocol

II.

mended

it

be

ratified

by the Senate under the U.S. advice and consent

constitutional process. 14 At a
to the

minimum,

purpose and intent of the

treaty to the Senate for advice

tarian provisions of

who

are hors de

The United

AP

II,

treaty.

U.S. forces are
15

bound not

to act contrary

President Reagan, in transmitting the

and consent, noted the importance of the humani-

focusing on the provisions designed to protect those

combat from intentional

States has traditionally

been

killing:

in the forefront

of

prove the international rules of humanitarian law in armed

efforts to codify

conflict,

and im-

with the objective

of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of such conflicts, consistent with
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legitimate military requirements.
16

The agreement
toward

I

am

transmitting today

is,

with cer-

by the United States
continuing to exercise leadership in the international community
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is essentially an exin these matters.
pansion of the fundamental humanitarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva
tain exceptions,

a positive step

this goal. Its ratification

will assist us in

.

.

.

Conventions with respect to non-international armed

conflicts, including

humane

treatment and basic due process for detained persons, protection of the wounded, sick,
and medical units, and protection of noncombatants from attack and deliberate starvation. If these fundamental rules were observed, many of the worst human tragedies
of current internal armed conflicts could be avoided
This Protocol makes clear that
any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international armed
conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a crime against humanity, and is therefore

punishable as murder. 17

In addition, various U.S. officials have signaled the intent of the United States

government to comply with provisions of the treaty, including the protection of civilians and the prevention of intentional killing or serious bodily harm of those
that are protected

under the humanitarian provisions of the law of war. 18 In his dis-

cussion of President Reagan's intent to ratify AP

II,

Judge Abraham Sofaer, the De-

partment of State Legal Advisor in 1987, expressed the desire of the U.S.

government

to "guarantee that certain

fundamental protections be observed,"

in-

cluding "protection from intentional attack, hostage taking, and acts of terrorism
[against] persons

care for the sick

who take no active part in hostilities," "protection and appropriate

and wounded, and medical units which assist them" and "protection

of the civilian population from military attack [and] acts of terror." 19

Additional Protocol

II

contains several provisions that articulate general princi-

ples of the law of armed conflict that are relevant to the crime of perfidy. Article 4

provides for
ties;

Article

humane treatment for those no longer taking a direct part in hostili7 protects the wounded and sick; and Articles 9 through 12 provide

protection to medical personnel, units, transports, and functions, via the internationally recognized red cross, red crescent

cludes that the
civilians "shall

emblems

"shall

and red

lion

emblems. 20 Article 12 con-

not be used improperly." Article 13 provides that

not be the object of attack

.

.

.

unless

and

for such time as they take a

direct part in hostilities." Article 16 provides protection to cultural objects

places of worship. Relief societies,

marked with the aforementioned emblems,

also allowed to "offer their services" to

tion to the victims of armed conflict
vices of an "exclusively

perform

and
are

their traditional functions in rela-

under Article

18, so

long as they provide ser-

humanitarian and impartial nature." All of these provisions

provide for the general protections that are enforced through the prohibition of the
grave breach of perfidy.
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Origins of the Prohibition of Perfidy

The

origins of the prohibition of perfidy are

and

tises

treaties

and

deceit

of War,

were lawful and

every species of deceit

Van Bynkershoek wrote

lawful, perfidy only excepted.

is

ernor of the Canary Islands,

as

Francis Lieber,

the

"For
." 21
.

.

my part,
He

think that

I

decried as an ex-

sea captain of passage to the gov-

whom, when the governor accepted, the captain made

going to an

upon

tention to seize

the

Dutch

offer of a

ransom. Van Bynkershoek likened

same

cisely the

law of war trea-

that he believed that fraud

essential stratagems of war:

ample of perfidious conduct the
a prisoner for

in the early

of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his 1810

Law

Treatise on the

found

first

enemy under

this to

an act of perfidy: "pre-

the protected flag of truce, with an in-

favourable opportunity to take away his

life."

22

who gathered in his Lieber Code much of the law of nations from

same Napoleonic period, noted:

—

Art. 16. Military necessity does not

admit of cruelty

for the sake of suffering or revenge,

nor of maiming or wounding except in

that

is,

the infliction of suffering
fight. ... It

admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity

does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily
difficult.

Art. 65.

for the
all

The use of the enemy's

national standard,

purpose of deceiving the enemy in

flag,

battle, is

an

or other

emblem of nationality,

act of perfidy

by which they lose

claim to the protection of the laws of war.

While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility,
and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war allows even capital
punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they
are so dangerous, and it is so difficult to guard against them.

Art. 101.

Art.

the

1

17. It is justly

considered an act of bad

enemy by flags of protection

Finally, Lieber

faith,

of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive

[including flags of truce

and

23
hospital designation].

provided that these "rules of war" are appropriate for a

civil

war,

without reference to the legitimacy of the "rebels," as "humanity induces the
adoption of rules of regular war toward the
entire, [while]

it

rebels,

whether the adoption

is

does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowl-

edgement of their government." 24 In

its

earliest

form of codification, the law of war

provided for the grave breach of perfidy, even in non-international armed

The 1907 Hague Regulations
of perfidy.

25

partial or

codified, in a broadly

Article 23(b) provided that

it
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treaty, the

was "especially forbidden"

concept

to "kill or
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wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
ticle 23(f)

or army" and Ar-

prohibited "improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the

military insignia

and uniform of the enemy,

as well as the distinctive

badges of the

26

Geneva Convention." Although the Hague Regulations applied between States
parties, the famous "Martens clause" in Article 2 arguably extends many of these
forms of warfare

rules to other

in stating that "the inhabitants

and the

belligerents

remain under the protections of and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,

from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."

as they result

War Rights on

In Spaight's 1911 seminal
rule against perfidy to a

Bluntschli, Spaight

ted

broad range of conduct. Quoting Hall, Oppenheim and

found that use of an enemy uniform, insignia or

"up to the commencement of actual

ous examples of strict and
Civil

Land, he noted the application of the

fighting."

27

less strict interpretations

flag

is

permit-

Spaight also provided numer-

of this provision from the U.S.

War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Crimean War and the Boer War. 28 As

clear case of "treacherous attempts to kill or

clothes

by belligerent troops of the Japanese

wound," he

in the

a

cited the use of civilian

Russo-Japanese War. 29 And, as

an example of the perfidious use of a protected emblem, Spaight cited both the
"treacherous overt act

white

flag]

,

sickness or

he

kills

the

wounds"

—

for instance,

if,

enemy commander"

in the

Civil

Wars) armed

tion of the prohibition

30

a

sudden attempt [under

a

—and the "treacherous simulation of

Russo-Japanese War. 31 These examples, applied in in-

ternational (Franco-Prussian

and U.S.

by making

and Crimean Wars) and non-international (Boer

conflicts, validate the strength,

breadth and applica-

on perfidious conduct across the spectrum of conflict.

Application of the Rules against Perfidy

Skorzeny Case

As evidenced by documents and

treatises

antecedent to the Second World War,

perfidy was a crime that included treacherous use of the

enemy uniform. A signifi-

cant case that arose during the prosecutions before the International Military Tri-

bunals illuminated the difference between the ruse of infiltration using the

uniform, and the "improper use" of the
tion of Article 23(f) of the

brated

Hague

enemy uniform

to

kill

or

wound

enemy

in viola-

Regulations. Colonel Otto Skorzeny, the cele-

German commando who had rescued Mussolini from

Italian partisans,

was

prosecuted, along with nine of his soldiers, for the "improper use of American uni-

forms by entering into combat disguised therewith and treacherously

and

killing

mony

that

32

firing

upon

members of the armed forces of the US." The trial produced testiSkorzeny's commandos, who were charged with seizing bridges and
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road intersections in advance of the Battle of the Bulge, were instructed to use

American uniforms to
At
in

trial,

enemy uniforms.
soldiers being killed or wounded by Germans fighting

infiltrate the lines,

no evidence of U.S.

American uniforms was produced, so

but to avoid fighting in

all

the accused were acquitted. 33 Since the

published report contains only the findings of the court, without explanation, the

"Notes on the Case," prepared by the

War Crimes Commission,

provide the only

They explain the decision by noting the lack of treacherous killing or wounding, as well as citing the U.S. Rules of Land Warfare of October
1940, which permitted the use of enemy uniforms and insignia as a ruse, but prorationale for the decision.

hibited their use during combat, requiring that they be discarded before opening

upon the enemy. 34 While the prohibition on use of enemy uniforms in combat
has survived, even into non-international armed conflict, 35 the modern grave
breach of perfidy has not included the misuse of enemy uniforms. 36
fire

Perfidy during the Cold War: Special Operations Forces
In a 2003

article,

W. Hays Parks described numerous examples of the use of civilian

clothing in special operations missions that ranged from clandestine direct action

missions to special reconnaissance missions deep within enemy-held territory. 37
Several reported cases of soldiers wearing civilian clothes while

on

a mission to at-

tack civilian objects arose from the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia in the

A Malaysian case, Krofan and Another

1960s.

conflict

;

arising

from the international armed

between Malaysia and Indonesia over the status of Singapore (then a part

of Malaysia) and other nearby
violation of the law of war.

38

territories, illustrates the

use of civilian clothes as a

While the case turns on the issue of the lack of status of

the Indonesian soldiers as prisoners of

war due

to their mission of sabotage, the

Singapore court decried the tactic of wearing civilian clothes because of

dency to endanger civilians: "Both

[spies

it

means by carrying out their hostile operations
difficult to distinguish them from civilians." 39

Parks also

cites several

ten-

and saboteurs] seek to harm the enemy by

clandestine

render

its

in circumstances

which

examples of Soviet Spetsnaz (Special Operations) Forces

and Israeli commandos using civilian clothes to infiltrate and capture or kill enemy
forces. 40

None of these cases

on claims of "unlawful

resulted in charges of perfidy, however, as they rested

belligerency"

and the crimes of espionage or sabotage un-

der domestic statutes, rather than law of war violations. Parks cautioned military
forces to avoid perfidy,

ing" under the

Hague

which he said was synonymous with "treacherous wound-

Regulations, 41 and noted that the principle of distinction

"at the heart of the balance"
nally,

between lawful military operations and perfidy.

is

Fi-

he concluded that the drafters of the 1977 Protocols decided to criminalize
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use of civilian clothing "in the most egregious circumstances, such as terrorism and

treacherous use of civilian clothing." 42

A Modern Definition
While

it

of Perfidy: Additional Protocol

may be difficult to trace the precise application

I

of the "treacherous killing

Hague Regulations to the present,
Additional Protocol I, which unified the Hague and Geneva traditions of the law of
war, specifically addresses the definition of perfidy in international armed conflict:
or wounding" provisions of Article 23 from the

It is

prohibited to

kill,

injure, or capture

an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting

him to believe he is entitled to, or is obliged to acarmed conflict, with
shall constitute perfidy. The following are examples of

the confidence of an adversary to lead

cord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in
intent to betray that confidence,
perfidy:
(a) the feigning

of an intent to negotiate under a

(b) the feigning of an incapacitation
(c)

flag

by wounds or

the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status;

(d) the feigning of protected status

of truce or of a surrender;

sickness;

and

by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the

United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the

conflict.

43

on to distinguish "ruses of war," or acts "intended to mislead an
which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of

Article 37 goes

adversary

.

.

.

an adversary with respect to protection under the law." A distinction between these
concepts

is

essential to

understanding perfidy. As Oppenheim notes, "whenever a

belligerent has expressly or tacitly engaged,

gation to speak truth to an enemy,

it is

constitutes a breach of good faith."

44

and

is

therefore

perfidy to betray his confidence, because

While the prohibitions on perfidy contained
breaches that are prohibited are narrowly defined.
to those violations of the

mens

rea element)

bound by a moral obli-

in

AP

First,

I

are broad, the grave

grave breaches are limited

law of war that are "committed willfully" (incorporating a

and cause "death or serious injury to body or

health." 45

specific provisions of perfidy that constitute grave breaches only include

internationally protected emblems, outlined in Articles 37

death or serious bodily harm.
include a
field,

it

46

and

And the

misuse of

38, that result in

So, while perfidy may be

number of "breaches of faith"

more broadly construed to
on the international armed conflict battle-

the violations of the law of war that are designated as "grave breaches," with

the requirement to "prosecute or extradite" perpetrators, 47 are few.
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So what elements of perfidy,

as described in Protocol

can be extrapolated to non-

I,

armed conflict? The Manual on the Law of Non- International Armed
(NIAC Manual) describes perfidy in non-international armed conflict

international
Conflict

rather broadly.

surrender, be

ing so

is

to

It

prohibits "[displaying the white flag falsely, or pretending to

wounded, or otherwise have a protected

kill

or wound an adversary."

dard established by Bothe, Partsch and
is

48

status

.

.

.

intent in do-

if the

How much of this definition fits the stan-

Solf:

"The concept of general protection

.

.

broad enough to cover protections which flow as necessary inferences from other

provisions of Protocol H"? 49 In other words, do the general principles adopted in

AP

II

support a customary international law application of the specific provisions

that prohibit that

same conduct in international armed conflict? Are the provisions

of this proposed rule consistent with the protective principle and the principle of
distinction?

And how many of these rules have been adopted in

practice?

The Principles of Additional Protocol II and Their Connection to Perfidy
The principle of distinction is clearly enunciated in Protocol II, the treaty governing non-international armed conflicts that cross certain thresholds, and customary
international law. Article 13 provides that civilians are to be protected "against the

dangers arising from military operations
direct part in hostilities." 50

crimination")

is

The

Common

objectives

and

.

unless

and for such time

as they take a

also enshrined in treaty law applicable to non-international

ample, Article 3(8) of the
to

.

principle of distinction (also characterized as "dis-

conflict in protocols of the Certain

plies

.

Conventional Weapons Convention.

Amended Mines

Article 3

conflicts,

Protocol

II,

51

armed

For ex-

which by its provisions ap-

requires distinction between military

civilians or civilian objects. 52 Finally, distinction

is

clearly recog-

nized in customary international law as applying in non-international armed
conflicts. 53

slavia

For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-

(ICTY) noted in the Kupreskic

conflict,

Article 13 of AP

tions.

"The protection of

civilians in

whether international or internal [non-international],

modern humanitarian
civilian

case,

law."

II sets

is

armed

the bedrock of

54

forth a general "protective principle" 55 to protect the

population and individual civilians from the dangers of military opera-

As the International Committee of the Red Cross's Commentary notes, the

protection extended to civilians in Article 13 reflects the

of Article 51 of Additional Protocol
Article 51 (4),

I

56

—

more detailed protections

in particular the principle of distinction in

which defines "indiscriminate attacks"

as those attacks

a nature to strike military objectives (including combatants)

245

which "are of

and

civilians or

Perfidy in Non-International Armed Conflicts

civilian objects

without distinction." 57 The Commentary goes on to explain that

States are required to formulate rules that give

form and substance

to the principle

of distinction:

This radical simplification does not reduce the degree of protection which was
envisaged, for despite

its

brevity, Article 13 reflects the

initially

most fundamental rules. How
and this means that the safety

implement them is the responsibility of the parties,
measures they are obliged to take under the rule on protection will have to be developed so as to best suit each situation, the infrastructure available and the means at
to

their disposal.

58

Other provisions of Additional Protocol
inforced by the prohibition

forbidding perfidy

on

II

emphasize the principles that are

perfidy, thereby strengthening the

re-

argument that

an essential tool for States as "measures they are obliged to

is

The "fundamental guarantees" of
Article 4 prohibit murder and other violence to life and health, as well as the giving
of "order[s] that there shall be no survivors," 59 a ban reflecting the "no quarter"
provision of the Hague Regulations. 60 These prohibitions reinforce the requirement to protect the lives of those that are hors de combat, which is so fundamental
take" to emphasize these protective principles.

to the basic guarantees in

Common Article 3. 61 Additional Protocol II emphasizes

the importance of extending that protection principle to abolish the feigning of

"protected person status" to gain an advantage on an enemy; failure to respect
those prohibitions on perfidy will encourage
principle

and murder

soldiers

and

civilians, alike,

longer taking an active or direct part in

Additional Protocol
tive

II

enemy soldiers to ignore the protective

who

are hors de combat, or

hostilities.

also extends the protections outlined in

emblems and medical personnel and

units,

AP

I

to distinc-

key targets for protection that are

shielded by enforcement of perfidy provisions. Article 12 of AP
distinctive

no

emblems, which should be "respected

II

clearly protects

in all circumstances"

and never

"used improperly." Both of these provisions require the rule against perfidy as an

enforcement mechanism to be adopted by States.
be "respected and protected" under Article
should be "respected and protected
tack,"

under Article

their status

11

of

AP

at all

9,

and punish offenders,

medical personnel are to

and medical units and transports

times and shall not be the object of

Without the

II.

Finally,

at-

rules against perfidy to guarantee

States lack the

enforcement mechanism neces-

sary to guarantee these key protective principles.

Capture as Perfidy?

emblem to capture an enemy in nonnot become customary international law. As the

Perfidy in the form of misuse of a protected
international

armed

conflict has

246

Richard B. Jackson

commentary

in the

NIAC Manual points

out,

"The reference

to capture does not

appear in the original 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 23(b), prohibition

and

is

not binding on non-contracting Parties to Additional Protocol

tion, as

I."

62

In addi-

noted above, the grave breach provision of Article 85 of AP I applies only to

Committee of the Red
Cross's Customary International Law Study notes that "killing or wounding an
adversary by resort to perfidy" is a serious crime, even in non-international armed

The

acts causing "death or serious injury."

conflict. 63 In the

Dusko Tadic

non-international

ICTY noted

that serious crimes, even in

armed conflict, not only must "constitute a breach of a rule pro-

tecting important values,"
also

case, the

International

which the

rule against perfidy certainly protects, but

"must involve grave consequences

for the victim." 64 Finally, Article 8.2(e) (ix)

of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) only applies perfidy

armed

to non-international

an adversary.

conflict in the case of killing

and wounding of

65

State practice supports the

view that misuse of protected emblems that is not the

proximate cause of death or serious injury is proscribed, even in non-international

armed

conflict,

but

it is

example can be found

not considered to be as serious as the crime of perfidy.

in the dramatic rescue operation

An

conducted by Colombian

Colombian and U.S. hostages from the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 66 The Colombia military infiltrated the radio
net used by the guerrillas and fooled the FARC into believing that the Venezuelan
government had provided "humanitarian airlift" to remove the hostages and sevmilitary forces to free

who were guarding them to a more secure location. Despite the oversenior officials in the Colombian government, who instructed the

eral guerrillas

sight of

members of the rescue team to avoid the misuse of protected emblems (and had
them removed from the aircraft), one of the team members wore a shirt with the
red cross emblem clearly visible. Though the Colombian military explained that
the misuse of the emblem was unintended, it was roundly criticized in the press for
this mistake.

While the misuse of the emblem,

if intentional,

may have violated the

AP II, the elements of the grave breach of perthey require "kill[ing] or wound [ing] treacher-

prohibition on misuse in Article 12,
fidy require

more than

ously," in the

capture;

words of the Hague Rules. In the end,

cries

of "perfidy" were muted,

community about
the validity of characterizing the conduct as perfidious when the misuse of the em-

presumably because there

blem

is

is

no consensus

used to capture, rather than

kill.

in the international

67

Law Enforcement Tactics
armed conflicts, particularly those character"counterinsurgencies" by the government forces, often adopt law

States involved in non-international

ized

as
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enforcement

and the
tinely

tactics,

which can blur the distinction between government forces

civilian populace.

wear

civilian clothing

wear uniforms.

68

A

close

and agents

civilian

in

law enforcement agencies rou-

some law enforcement

agencies never

working relationship between the military and

law enforcement can be a
This

Members of

critical

component

in

civilian

counterinsurgency operations. 69

may include clandestine operations conducted

in civilian clothing

by law en-

forcement and military authorities, particularly with respect to surveillance and
other intelligence collection operations.
reluctant to be seen speaking with
nel, for

example. There

non-international

is

An

informant or ordinary

uniformed law enforcement or military person-

no prohibition on "spying" by government

armed conflict,

may be

civilian

as espionage

is

forces in

domes-

generally recognized as a

law violation, not a violation of international law, 70 and representatives of the

tic

commit "espionage"

host nation or supporting foreign forces cannot

nized armed groups in an internal
cle,

"A 'double

armed

conflict.

As Parks notes

against orga-

in his

2003

arti-

standard' exists within the law of war for regular forces of a

recognized government vis-a-vis unauthorized combatant acts by private individ-

armed conflict, therefore, government forces (including both law enforcement agents and military personnel acting
under the color of the law of the host nation) can often be expected to don civilian
uals or non-State actors." In non-international

clothes

While
the

when

this

gathering information or providing support to civilian authorities.

would not

government

constitute perfidy, there

in the

is

a fine line between representing

performance of quasi-law enforcement functions and

"feigning civilian status," thereby putting civilians at

risk, in

an attempt to gain an

advantage in attacking insurgent forces.

Feigning Civilian Status

The

critical

focus of perfidy, in the area of feigning civilian status,

ple of "distinction,"
classified as

which protects

civilians

is

on the

princi-

from combatants (including those

"unlawful combatants" and "unprivileged belligerents") on the inter-

national and non-international battlefield. Feigning civilian status to gain advantage over an

enemy in an attack is an act of perfidy that goes to the very heart of the

protective principle and, as such,

armed

its

designation as a crime in non-international

conflicts. In Tadic, the very first

ICTY case, the Tribunal recognized the im-

portance of perfidy as a crime under customary international law:

State practice

shows

that general principles of

customary international law have

evolved with regard to internal armed conflict also in areas relating to methods of
warfare. In addition to

what has been stated above, with regard to the ban on

civilians in the theatre

of hostilities, mention can be
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made of the

attacks

on

prohibition of perfidy.
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Thus, for instance, in a case brought before Nigerian courts, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that rebels

must not

feign civilian status while engaging in military opera-

71
tions (citation omitted).

It is

important to note that Additional Protocol

in Articles 1(4)

armed

collectively

deviation from this principle

expand the notion of international

conflict to the traditional non-international

liberation"
status

and 44(3), which

I's

armed

and allow members of organized armed groups

merely by carrying their arms openly, was

Protocol. In expressing the

critical to

conflicts of "national

to claim

"combatant"

the U.S. rejection of the

Reagan administration's concern regarding Protocol

I,

Judge Sofaer, the then Department of State Legal Adviser, decried the failure of Articles 1(4)

and 44(3)

to protect civilians, stating that these provisions,

when taken

together, allow terrorists in wars of "national liberation" to avoid being charged

with perfidy
tack,

when hiding among

the civilian population until the

even though thereby putting the

tinction at risk.

72

civilian

moment

of

populace and the principle of

at-

dis-

This deviation from the general prohibition of feigning civilian

armed conflicts of
non-international armed con-

status to gain a military advantage only applies to international

armed groups in
launch attacks from the civilian populace.

"national liberation"; organized
are not permitted to

flict

Jawad and al-Nashiri Cases

Two

U.S. military

respect to perfidy

Mohammed

commission

cases illustrate the current U.S. practice with

and the offense of launching an attack while feigning

civilian status.

Jawad was a young Afghan who was alleged to have thrown a hand

grenade into a vehicle in which two American service members and their Afghan
interpreter

murder

were

riding.

He was

in violation of the

flicting serious

law of war and three specifications of intentionally

crowd of civilians

The government alleged that Jawad was concealing
civilian clothes and that he launched his attack from a

that

in the streets of Kabul. In support of the charges, the govern-

by

his conduct, "the accused unlawfully

fighting outside of responsible
tive

in-

bodily injury.

the grenade while dressed in

ment argued

charged with three specifications of attempted

command, by

engaged in combat by

fighting without wearing a distinc-

emblem, by failing to carry his arms openly, and by flaunting the laws and cus-

toms of war by feigning

The second

case involves

non-combatant." 73

Abd al-Rahim Hussayn Muhammad

bomber of USS

al-Nashiri, al-

bomber of USS The
who has been charged with perfidy and attempted murder as follows:

leged to be the
vanSy

to be a

Cole and the attempted
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Charge

I:

Violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950t(17), Using Treachery or Perfidy

Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al NASHIRI
an alien
enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission, did, in or
around Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated
with hostilities, invite the confidence and belief of one or more persons onboard USS
COLE (DDG 67), including but not limited to then FN Raymond Mooney, USN, that
two men dressed in civilian clothing, waving at the crewmembers onboard USS COLE
Specification: In that

.

.

,

.

unprivileged

(DDG 67),

and operating

a civilian boat,

were entitled to protection under the law of

make use of that
confidence and belief to detonate explosives hidden on said civilian boat alongside USS
COLE (DDG 67), killing 17 Sailors of the United States Navy
and injuring one or
more persons, all crewmembers onboard USS COLE (DDG 67).
war, and intending to betray that confidence and belief, did thereafter

.

.

.

.

Charge

III:

Violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950t(28), Attempted

Murder

.

in Violation

of the

Law of War

Abd

Rahim Hussayn Muhammad

NASHIRI
did,
Law of War, attempt to
intentionally and unlawfully kill one or more persons onboard USS THE SULLIVANS
Specification

1:

In that

al

al

.

.

.

.

.

.

with the specific intent to commit Murder in Violation of the

(DDG 68), in violation of the law of war, to wit: by committing an act of perfidy
to effect the commission of Murder
bombers dressed in civilian clothes.

.

Both these cases

illustrate the

in Violation

of the

a

is

crime when

it

the

two

.

.

and

suicide

74
.

.

view of the United States that the wearing of civil-

ian clothes to perfidiously gain an advantage over an

attack

Law of War,

.

opponent when launching an

occurs during an international armed conflict. As of the

date of this writing, only in the Jawad case has there been a ruling regarding the offense of perfidy. In that case, Judge Henley ruled that the

tempt to prove

at trial that the

government could

at-

attempted murder of the U.S. service members was

perfidious conduct that violated the law of war. 75

Government Forces

in Non-International

Armed Conflict

Foreign forces supporting the sovereign government and government forces in a

armed conflict have a hybrid mission, partly based on armed
and partly based on law enforcement concerns. The law of armed conflict

non-international
conflict
is

invoked because the normal domestic (law enforcement) authorities are over-

whelmed by organized armed groups, who threaten the very existence of the State.
In recommending some criteria for application of Common Article 3, Pictet noted
that a key element in distinguishing "a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of
banditry or an unorganized or short-lived insurrection" was whether the legal gov-

ernment

"is

obliged to have recourse to regular military forces against insurgents

organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory." 76 But the
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armed conflict do not reprovide minimal protections to

national security risks entailed in a non-international

abandonment of societal norms intended to
populace. As Pictet notes in commenting on the minimum standards of Com-

quire
the

mon Article

3:

merely demands respect for certain

It

in

civilized countries,

all

rules,

and enacted

which were already recognized

as essential

in the municipal law of the States in question,

long before the Convention was signed.

What Government would dare to claim before

which could justly be described as mere acts of
it was entitled to leave the wounded
torture and mutilations and to take hostages? However useful,

the world, in a case of civil disturbances

banditry, that, Article 3 not being applicable,

uncared

for, to inflict

therefore, the various conditions

[of

Common

may

Article 3]

be, they are not

no Government can object to respecting, in its dealings with interbetween it and them, a few essential
fact respects daily, under its own laws, even when dealing with com-

indispensable, since

nal enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict
rules

which

it

in

mon criminals. 77
As the U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Manual

COIN forces are constantly moving through the spectrum
ment involved in

a pitched battle with organized

in the next village) supporting host nation

ing

civil

security operations,

raison d'etre of

which
it is

is

COIN

is

the

armed groups and

at

one mo-

in the next (or

law enforcement personnel in conduct-

under the rubric of "stability operations." 78 But the

same

for

"efforts to secure the safety

law enforcement

of conflict,

indicates,

both aspects of the counterinsurgency

and support of the

efforts to "protect

and serve"

local populace."

(as

many

79

fight,

Whether

local police forces

demonstrate by the motto displayed on their police cars) or military forces in-

on securing the "safety and support of the local populace" 80 by applying the
law of armed conflict through the protective principle discussed above, both have
the same objective. For example, most military forces operating in a COIN environment apply self-defense rules of engagement, which in application differ little
from law enforcement rules for the use of force. 81 Law enforcement agencies
tent

within the United States invariably conduct their "takedowns" of criminals in uni-

forms emblazoned with the logos of their agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation or

Drug Enforcement Administration,

protect the agents

for example).

While such

tactics

by preventing confusing law enforcement agents with criminal

gangs and by asserting the lawful power of the government to conduct

arrest,

search or seizure, they also protect innocent civilian bystanders by isolating the activity

The tactical distinctions between COIN operanon-international armed conflicts conducted for law enforcement

from the

tions in

civilian populace.
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purposes and those operations conducted with a military purpose fade away when
the

commander's

intent to avoid civilian casualties

is

factored into the equation. 82

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

Twice

in the last year, U.S. forces in Afghanistan

principle

and

this

have applied the protective

approach to perfidy to actions by U.S. forces

in the current

non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan.

The first instance involved the
wearing of civilian clothes by members of the U.S. armed forces working in support of Afghan civil authorities, such as in the "Afghan Hands" program, where
military members work outside of NATO facilities within the Afghan community
performing duties that are not directly combat related. A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) position paper analyzed the impact of military personnel wearing
civilian clothes

itary

and concluded, "The

personnel to wear uniforms

if

LOW [law of war]

they are not performing a combat-related op-

eration or attempting to deceive the
perfidy)."

83

The

enemy

for a military advantage

rationale for this approach, at least in part,

identifiably distinguish!]
vilian

does not require U.S. mil-

combatants from the

was

(i.e.,

to "clearly

civilian population," to

and

avoid

ci-

exposure to combat operations and the "corresponding risk of harm." 84

The paper noted, "Winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population is a
must in a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight and thus protection of the civilian
population must be a priority." 85 The paper quoted from a 2003 paper by Major
William

Ferrell

III:

"[0]nce combatants begin distinguishing themselves

ians, or failing to distinguish

the enemy, civilians will

themselves from civilians to gain an advantage over

become

suspect and ultimately targets." 86

paper concludes that the wearing of
potential law of

war violation

(perfidy)

and counsels against such
87

The paper opens with

May

12,

is

USFOR-A

2011 on the car-

the classic military "bottom line

front":

The rules governing how weapons are carried find their origin in the law of war, specifically the tenet of distinction. The standard for US military members, while in Afghanistan, is to carry their weapons openly. Service members in the CENTCOM Area of
Operations (AOR) must wear their weapons openly at all times. Service members may
not conceal their weapons with a perfidious intent. 88
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a

practice, as

In a related issue, the

Advocate issued an "Information Paper" on

rying of weapons.

The USFOR-A

civilian clothes in offensive operations

"this violates the basic principle of distinction."

Staff Judge

as civil-

up

Richard B. Jackson

The paper goes on

"A

to conclude,

military

member may not

weapon
weapon or to

conceal his

with an intent to deceive people into believing he does not have a

make them
tent"]."

89

believe he

is

noncombatant [which the paper

a

Current State practice,

at least

by U.S. forces

"perfidious in-

calls a

in Afghanistan, reinforces

the existence of the concept of perfidy in non-international

armed

conflict.

Conclusion

A colleague remarked after the Naval War College presentation on perfidy in nonarmed

international

lieve that all the rules
ter

—you be-

he "now understood [my] worldview

conflict that

of international armed conflict should be followed, as a mat-

of law, in non-international armed conflict."

conclusion.

90

But there

is

much to be said for an approach that applies general pro-

tective principles derived

from Additional Protocol

suggest in their comparison of Article 51 of AP

Article 13 of Protocol

Protocol
arising

I.

It

II

respectfully disagree with that

I

I

and

II

as Bothe, Partsch

Article 13 of AP

restates the provisions of the first three

II:

paragraphs of Art. 51 of

declares that civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers

from military operations.

.

.

.

The

Article does not, however, explicitly provide

protection against indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, nor does
plicitly the

and Solf

use of civilians to shield military operations. Moreover,

it

it

prohibit ex-

omits any direct

reference to a prohibition against direct attacks or disproportionate collateral

with respect to civilian objects.

.

.

.

Some

damage

of the specific protection thus omitted may,

however, be inferred from the general protection provided in para. 1, but the construc-

from the abbreviated

tion of balanced protection for civilians

burden on the term "general protection."

Art. 13 places a

heavy

91

They also suggest that the crime of perfidy can be extrapolated from the basic principles recognized in

protection from

wounded

Common Article

harm

and Additional Protocol

for those that are hors de

combat

or surrendered on the battlefield), civilians

pating in hostilities, those
battlefield (protected

those

3

who

who

who

by the red

cross, red crescent

treatises, the

flag

crystal

on the
emblems) and

Customary International Humanitarian Law

law of war in non-international armed

opinio juris

have been

of surrender.

war criminals and

customary international law provides that perfidy

in Internal Armed Conflicts^

who

are not directly partici-

and red

study, the findings of international tribunals prosecuting
practice,

(fighters

which provide

are providing basic humanitarian services

have displayed the white

As evidenced by

I,

conflict. In

is

State

a violation of the

her excellent work,

War Crimes

Eve La Haye notes that the amount of State practice and

on the protective

principle of distinction "fulfils the criteria of an
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and

extensive
ple

is

virtually

uniform

legally obligatory."

92

practice,

coupled with the belief that

Law on

A.P.V. Rogers, in

the Battlefield, concludes that

perfidy consists of conduct that results in killing or

through "treachery," including "killing by feigning

this princi-

wounding an adversary

civilian status" or hors de

com-

emThe ICC

bat status, or "improper use of the flag of truce, the red-cross or red-crescent

blems, or the flag or military insignia or uniform of the enemy."

93

wounding treacherously a combatant adversary" an
"other serious violation!] of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not
of an international character." 94 And the jurisprudence, cited above, both domestic and international, supports this view of perfidy as a crime in non-international
Statute

armed

makes

"[k]illing or

conflict. 95

Finally, State practice has

tus in non-international
cases,

developed not only to prohibit feigning of civilian

armed

evidenced by the Jawad and al-Nashiri

conflict, as

but also to affirmatively prevent violations of

forces supporting

government

sta-

this provision

efforts in non-international

armed

by military

conflict.
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XII
Non-International Armed Conflicts in the
Philippines

Raymundo B. Ferrer and Randolph G. Cabangbang*

Many

U.S. soldiers serving in Joint Special Task Force-Philippines, with

extensive experience in Afghanistan, Iraq

repeatedly described the non-international
as particularly

armed

complex. In an area where there

residents are part-time insurgents

how indeed do we

NIACs

conflicts

a strong

theaters of war, have

(NIACs)

gun

in

culture,

and where kinship ties serve as force

distinguish civilians

This article discusses

is

and other

Mindanao

where

local

multipliers,

from armed insurgents?

in the Philippines

and

briefly notes the challenges

they pose to the security sector in applying the rules of international humanitarian

law (IHL). To provide a basic framework in understanding the nature of conflict in
the Philippines,
ever,
els

in

it

we begin with an organizational-level analysis of the NIACs. How-

must be noted that on the ground, from the individual and operational

of analysis,

it is

lev-

not so neatly delineated. For example, organizational identities

southern Mindanao, unlike in the West, are highly temporal and

fluid. Civilians

can be recruited to work seasonally for an insurgent group and then quickly and
seamlessly resume their civilian lives after operations are completed.

Added to

this

complexity are the changing organizational labels civilians effortlessly assume
without
*

much question. Some civilians may work for one insurgent group that has

General

Raymundo

B. Ferrer,

Armed

Forces of the Philippines, and Lieutenant Colonel

Randolph G. Cabangbang (INF), Philippine Army.
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an outstanding peace agreement with the government and then on the same day

command

join a

known terrorist group. Then they very quickly
and kin who belong to a group currently in peace

structure of a

switch to supporting relatives

negotiations with the government.

Organizations in the Philippines revolve around personalities rather than positions.

1

While the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

strives for interoperability

Mindanao is an enemy for whom
interoperability seems like second nature. The NIACs in the Philippines are largely
a homegrown phenomenon with some components heavily influenced by foreign

among

its

branches and with

its

allies,

in

elements. Conflicts rooted in ideologies outside the Philippines have been co-

opted to provide a philosophical justification to a grassroots-driven insurgency.
This article will primarily focus on two major

NIACs

facing the Philippines. For

convenience, they will be referred to as the two "Ms": the Maoist group and the

Moro

group. Their origins will be traced and a description provided of their basic

strategies

and

structures.

The Communist Party of the

armed wing, the New
armed struggle against the

Philippines (CPP) and

its

Army (NPA), use Maoist ideology to justify the
government. The CPP is considered the biggest threat to the security of the
People's

ippines. 2 Its scope

is

nationwide. While strongest in the northern region of the

Philippines, the Maoist

Mindanao.

It

Phil-

group

also has a presence in

northern and eastern

tends to target farmers in the rural areas, workers in the mining in-

dustry, teachers, youth,

women's groups and many other segments of the work-

ing-class population that are vulnerable to the persuasion of the
for recruitment.

The Moro group, on the other hand,

Maoist ideology

limits itself to the southern

—

homegrown a secessionist movement
that has been fighting for independence for more than a hundred years. Islamic
ideology inspires its members to fight for self-determination and recognition of
Philippines. Like the

CPP-NPA,

it is

also

their ethnic identity.

The Maoist and Moro groups both exploit conditions of poverty and
marginalization in marshalling their armed struggle against the government. According to the Asian Development Bank, in 2008 about twenty-six million Filipinos out of a

total

population of ninety- two million lived below the Asian poverty

on about US$ 1 .35 per day. The poorest of the poor
live in Muslim Mindanao. The Muslim poor are particularly marginalized from
mainstream Filipino society and this fuels much of their grievance against the
Philippine government. While the Maoist group targets people through their occupation, the Moro group appeals to ethnicity and shared history in its recruitline.

3

ment

In other words, they lived

efforts.
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The Maoist Movement

—

The communist insurgency the longest-running Maoist insurgency in the
world is waged by the CPP and the NPA. In August 2002 the United States designated the NPA as a foreign terrorist organization. Not long after, in November
together with its legal arm, the
2005, so did the European Union. 4 The CPP-NPA
seeks to overthrow the
National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) 5

—

—

—

Philippine government.

The CPP was

established in 1968 as part of a larger sociological

Many scholars

traced back to the

Laban

sa

that

was

—
of student activism
1960s and
however,
organization could be
of
Hukbalahap — contraction of
term HukbongBayan

then taking the world by storm
1970s.

wave

the rise

in the

that the roots

argue,

the Filipino

a

mga Hapon, which means

the

"People's

Army

against the Japanese." 6 Also

known as the Huks, these fighters mobilized against Japanese occupation. The
Huks were largely farmers from central Luzon, and were estimated by one source
to have about fifteen to twenty thousand active members and fifty thousand members in reserve in the early 1940s. After World War II, the Huks moved on to wage a
guerrilla

war against the government of the newly independent Philippines. 7 By the

Huk campaign began to wane and the Sino-Soviet split at that time
further fractured the group. The CPP established itself as separate from the Sovietstyle Huk organization and in 1969 renamed the remnants of the Huks the New
early 1960s, the

People's

Army. The current strength of the

NPA is estimated to be around 4,200.

The Maoist group believes that the power of the gun is necessary to protect ordinary citizens from human rights abuses perpetuated by the government and local
politicians. The NPA envisions a protracted people's war, ideally, that would bring
about the downfall of the status quo and the replacement of the Philippine government by a socialist State. The modus operandi of the NPA involves the targeting of
foreign investors and businesses for extortion, or what it euphemistically terms
"revolutionary taxes." The ultimate goal is to drive these investors out of the Philippines and to bankrupt the economy. The NPA also assassinates individuals such
as politicians, members of the media and other personalities who, it deems, stand
in the way of its attaining its objectives.
It is observed that the general trend of the rise and fall of the CPP-NPA membership coincides with the level of violence associated with each presidential administration.

During the Marcos era (1965 to 1986), rampant human

fueled the rise of

membership

in the

CPP-NPA.

Followers of

rights abuses

Marx and Mao

in

Philippine colleges and universities formed student organizations that protested

and the urban poor. Anti-government

ac-

tivism was fashionable back in the 1970s. College students then did not carry

cell

the plight of farmers in the countryside
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when

phones. Instead, they carried a small red book which they used as a reference

they gathered together to talk about the ideology of Mao Tse-tung and a classless
society.

In 1972,
dictatorial

Marcos declared martial law and
regime the

CPP

attracted

many

for the next thirteen years

under

That trend shifted

recruits.

his

in 1986

when Corazon "Cory" Aquino, the mother of the current president, Benigno
"Noynoy" Aquino, came to power. She became the first woman president through
the seminal People's Power movement in 1986 that was largely propelled by the
outpouring of outrage against Marcos over the assassination three years

earlier

8

her husband, Ninoy. Early in Cory's term (1986 to 1992), a ceasefire with the

was declared,

political prisoners

were released and peace

NDFP were initiated. When the talks collapsed in
The

situation

talks

1987, the

with the

of

NPA

CPP-NPA-

NPA returned to arms.

worsened when security forces violently dispersed and

some

killed

peasants rallying for land reform one year after Cory assumed power. Acting under
the advice of the United States,

Cory launched

a total

war against the NPA.

Sustained military offensives successfully reduced the communist forces from

25,200 in 1987 to 14,800 in 1991.

A two-pronged strategy was

used that could be

described in current counterinsurgency parlance as hard power, or military offen-

combined with soft power, or socioeconomic development. In addition to the
government actions, there were also brutal purges within the Maoist group that
sive,

further demoralized

the

its

rank and

file.

9

Following the attacks of September

11,

2001,

NPA declared an all-out war against the central government, believing it to be

controlled by the United States as part of

NPA

is

unlikely to

its

global

war on

terror.

win a military victory against government

persists in the countryside

where poverty,

injustice

Although the

forces,

its

presence

and the lack of social

services

provide conditions for marshaling people's grievances against the government.

— Three Forms of Struggle

The Moro Front
In addition to fueling the

CPP insurgency,

the oppressive rule of former President

Marcos's martial law in the 1970s triggered the

ernment, which they believed to be the cause

NPA,

Moro outcry against the central govof Moro suffering. As with the CPP-

the perception of marginalization drives the underlying anger that fuels the

Moro armed

struggle. In contrast to the

CPP-NPA,

the secessionist

Moro

insur-

armed struggle to the southern portion of the country,
where the majority of Muslim Filipinos reside. For three centuries under Spanish
rule and nearly fifty years of U.S. dominance in the Philippines, the Moros were
gency largely limits

its

never conquered as a group. Today, they
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government and abide by its non-Islamic way

of governance.
Philippine

ements
cal

in the

Muslim academic Macapado Muslim

Moro

Moro and

domination, physical insecurity, threatened
is

ment,

illiteracy

remain among the poorest regions

and poverty

Islamic identity, a

most Muslims

in the Philippines.

Muslim Mindanao.
government, Muslims in Mindanao

11

they do not have a voice in the central government. 12

made over the

And

reside in

UnemployIn terms of

still

level.

past several years to reduce the extremist hold in

There

more

is

to be

Mindanao and change

business investments in

feel that

while tremendous

the various islands in Mindanao, physical security for the residents has

reached an acceptable

el-

destitution, politi-

rates are highest in

political representation in the

gains have been

key

on the matter of economic

marginalization and destitution, the regions where
still

six

the principal culprit and a perception of hopeless-

ness under the present order of things. 10 Indeed,

Mindanao

summarized

economic marginalization and

grievance:

perception that government

neatly

done

in order to

still

not

encourage

rampant law-

the perception of

lessness in the islands.

on the notion of a Moro and Islamic identity as justification for their right to have some form of self-determination.
One of these groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was seeking independence for southern Mindanao, but a Supreme Court decision held that a draft
settlement with the government that would have given the MILF control over large
areas of Mindanao was unconstitutional. Now under the peace process it is pursuing with the central government, the MILF is asking to become a sub-state of the
Philippines in which the political structure would be similar to the federal system
Secessionist

Moro groups have been

insisting

of the United States. 13

The

fifth

and

sixth elements are also related to the

Moro

—namely, the

identity

perception of the inability of the central government to understand Muslim

Mindanao and

the general apathy of most politicians in the north toward matters

concerning the south. Marginalization of the south has always been an effective
rallying cry for those

who

seek to manipulate

Moro

grievances to gain support for

The perception of the hopelessness of the status quo is
partly driving the moral justification for an armed struggle in southern Mindanao.
The current Philippine president is trusted, however, by many Muslims and the attempt by the central government in Manila to extend various social services into
the far reaches of Mindanao is slowly defeating the perception of hopelessness in
many Muslim sectors in the southern Philippines.
These six elements of Muslim grievances have been used in one form or another
ultimately extremist causes.

in the rhetoric of

many

insurgent groups. There are three major
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groups engaged in violence in the southern Philippines. These are the

Moro Na-

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the
MILF. As defined by IHL, only the MILF among these three can truly be considtional Liberation Front

(MNLF),

the notorious

15

14

ered as engaged in a

NIAC

—

has a clear leadership and an organizational struc-

it

ture to

implement whatever agreements

armed

force that

it

though

it

may

forge with the State, as well as an

The MNLF, on the
Peace Agreement with the government in 1996, 16 al-

can use to pursue

other hand, signed a Final

it

its

belligerent agenda.

argues that such has not been fully implemented. For

its

part, the

ASG

command and control and in many ways, like the MNLF, no longer possesses
a formidable armed capability. The MILF remains as the largest fighting force with
lacks

an agenda of carving a distinct territory for

itself in

the southern Philippines.

The MNLF and the Origins of the MILF

Around

much

the

same time the CPP-NPA was formed, Nur Misuari, who was very

influenced by Maoist ideology, founded the

underground youth movement
what he described

and

in

and independent

"country" or "nation." Moro

is

in 1972

Mindanao. His goal was

as the terror, oppression

to secure a free

MNLF

to free

and tyranny of

State for the

and

started

an

Muslims from

Filipino colonialism,

Bangsamoro. 17 Bangsa means

derived from the term early Spanish colonizers used

Moors and has over time become the collective word used for all the
various Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao. Muslims in Mindanao turned this pejorative term into a badge of honor. Bangsamoro means "Moro Nation." When
Nur Misuari declared jihad against the Philippine government in 1972, the MNLF
led the armed resistance of all Muslims in Mindanao against martial law. The
MNLF became the organizational vehicle that symbolized the Moro cause of thirto refer to the

teen disparate Islamized ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao; their
the establishment of an independent

Moro

aim was and is

nation.

Mindanao prompted the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation to pressure the MNLF to accept some form of political autonomy in
lieu of secession and independence. The MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement in
Four years of bloody war

in

18

1976, 19 but frustrations over

armed

its

implementation a year later led Misuari to revert to

struggle, while his Vice

Chairman, Salamat Hashim, broke away from the

MNLF to establish the MILF as the second Moro secessionist group in

1984.

MNLF-MILF

and ideo-

split

was

largely based

on

differences in political strategy

The

The MILF could be described as Islamic revivalist, while the
MNLF is more secular-nationalist. Hashim of the MILF wanted to push the peace
process under the Tripoli Agreement; this commitment to peace negotiations remains one of the defining points of the MILF. The MNLF, however, believes the
logical orientation.
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which the Maoists of the

NPA en-

necessary to the achievement of peace in the southern Philippines.

is

The MILF wants

to govern the

Shari'ah law. Religion
active

Ferrer

is

Moro homeland under

central to the workings of the

the ideals of Islam

MILF,

as

and

can be seen in the

involvement of ulama, or Islamic scholars, in the leadership and internal or-

The MNLF, on the other hand, largely concerns itself with
independence. The leadership style of the MILF is consultative with a

ganization of the group.
fighting for
central

committee that drives the organization's agenda, while the

tralized decision

MILF
the

is

making

that revolves

around the group's

MNLF has cen-

leader. In addition, the

mostly dominated by the Maguindanaos from central Mindanao, while

MNLF is largely composed of ethnic Tausugs, the warrior class, from the Sulu

Archipelago. Traditionally, these two

Muslim

tribes

could not stand each other.

The rise of the MILF coincided with Misuari's declining
became increasingly fragmented in 1982 and ceased to be
force after signing the Final Peace Agreement.

grated into the

armed

hood programs

forces

to help

and national

them

The

MNLF

a formidable fighting

Some of the MNLF rebels were inte-

police,

and some joined various

reintegrate into society.

programs were successfully sponsored by the United
tional

influence.

Many

States

liveli-

of the livelihood

Agency

for Interna-

Development and the United Nations Development Program.

seaweed farming and various other livelihood programs benefited

Fisheries,

many former

MNLF rebels in the Sulu Archipelago.
The MILF Today

The twelve-thousand-strong MILF is the largest Muslim guerrilla group today and
the most potent security threat in Mindanao. It is mainly based in central
Mindanao, although it has a presence in Palawan, Basilan and other islands in the
Sulu Archipelago. Since 1997, it has been pursuing what many describe as an onand-off peace negotiation with the government. During this period, however, several

breakaway groups have continued to engage government forces

flict.

To

date,

in

armed con-

about 120,000 people have been killed and about two million people

displaced from their

homes

as a result of

MILF-led encounters with government

forces.

The

latest

major

conflict

was

in

2008 when the government of the Philippines

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
the MILF its own distinct territory, with 'a governing body called the

initialed the

that gave

Bangsamoro

Juridical Entity. 20 Before the

agreement could be signed, however,

non-Muslim leaders in central Mindanao received a copy of the embargoed
MOA-AD and began a campaign to undo the agreement, claiming that part of the
certain
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territory covered

by the

MOA-AD

included areas that were never under Muslim

leadership.

A Christian Vice Governor of a Mindanao province declared that if the

MOA-AD

was signed there would be bloodshed. Other non-Muslim leaders

in

other parts of Mindanao filed a separate petition asking the government not to sign
the agreement.

The non-Muslim groups were able to bring enough political pressure to prompt
the Supreme Court to issue a temporary restraining order preventing signature of
the agreement. When the signing ceremony of the MOA-AD was aborted, MILF
renegade commanders went on a rampage and attacked villages in northern and
central Mindanao. 21 Hundreds died and about 390,000 people were displaced in
what is considered to be a NIAC. The Supreme Court eventually declared the
MOA-AD to be unconstitutional and Philippine military forces engaged the three
renegade MILF commanders. One of those commanders, Ameril Umra Kato,
broke away from the MILF and recently spoke of taking up arms if the current government of the Philippines-MILF peace process fails again or is endlessly delayed.
The MILF leaders put forth significant effort to bring an international audience
into the peace negotiations. An International Monitoring Team, composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan, Norway and the European Union,
oversees the 2001 ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the government of
the Philippines. With international monitoring, over seventy agreements have
been reached between the MILF and the Philippine government since 1997.
Alliance with the Abu Sayyaf Group

One Moro group without any form

of ceasefire agreement with the government

is

ASG. Although the conflict with the ASG now consists of isolated and sporadic
acts of violence and thus does not meet the threshold requirement of a "protracted
armed conflict" against an "organized armed group" to be classified as a NIAC, 22
the ASG does have tactical alliances with the MILF and in the conflict's early years it
could be argued that it was a NIAC.
The inspiration for the al Qaeda-linked ASG came from radical Islamism notably the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Around the time that the
MNLF was engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government in the
late 1980s/early 1990s, an underground movement of disenchanted youth began to
be mobilized by a charismatic preacher in Basilan, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani.
He wanted an independent State for the Muslims in Mindanao. Academics conthe

—

tinue to debate whether Janjalani participated in the fighting against the Soviets

during the Afghanistan war. Regardless of whether he did or did not participate,
the primary driving force behind the ASG's formation was the perception by
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Muslim youth that the MNLF had engaged in a jihadist war that it failed
to complete. The disenchanted Muslim youth felt that the older cadres had abandoned the spirit of the Bangsamoro's 1970s struggle against the government. They
idealistic

felt

the

MNLF

leaders

government when

its

founded the

on the following arguments:

Christian

allies,

and acquiesced

their cause

to the Philippine

entered into peace negotiations.

it

Janjalani formally

lence

had betrayed

ASG
( 1 )

in 1992

and

justified his jihad-based vio-

the Philippine government with the help of

notably the United States, severely oppressed the Bangsamoro

people; (2) this oppression occurred because of the

unwelcome

intrusion of Chris-

Muslim homeland; (3) to defeat this oppression, the struggle for the
cause of Allah must be waged against the Christian invaders; and (4) it was the personal obligation of every Muslim to carry out this jihad and failure to do so would
tians into the

be a sin against Allah.

many of the ideals espoused by the group overlap with those of the
MILF; thus, the movement of members between these groups tends to be seamless.
Additionally, many of the members of the two groups are related through blood
Obviously,

ties.

Driven by

its

secessionist

and extreme Islamic

internationalized with the involvement of the
establish a

Janjalani

Muslim

ASG

has

down,

now been

Jemaah Islamiyah, 23 whose goal

With

caliphate throughout Southeast Asia.

and the demise of several key ASG

fervor has died

ASG quickly became

ideology, the

particularly

among

leaders, the

the rank

reduced to a criminal band.

consistent staple for the

ASG

to raise funds,

24

and

ASG's
file.

is

to

the death of

jihadist ideological

Many

argue that the

Kidnapping has always been a

prompting many observers

to argue

become a cloak to justify the criminality of the ASG. While
the long-time ASG members remain loyal to the original cause that led to the orgathat Janjalani's jihad has

nization's establishment, the financial pressures, lack of loyalty

among

the rank

and file and the U.S. -backed military offensives against the ASG have degraded the
once notorious

Moro

fighters into a

bunch of thugs.

Challenges in Applying the Rules oflHL

IHL rules, for humanitarian reasons, seek to limit the harmful effects of wars and
armed conflicts on non-participants. While these rules do not prevent the use of
force by the State, IHL restricts the means and methods that may be employed.

Memorandum Order

on August 7, 1998, directed Philippine security
forces to implement the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights
and the International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) that was signed by the
NDFP and the Philippine government five months earlier in The Hague. 25 Prior to
9,

issued
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the issuance of the order, the issue of human rights protection and the application

of IHL rules were not clearly spelled out to the parties to the ongoing NIAC.

For over forty years, the two concurrent
extracted an exorbitant

toll in

the

NIACs in the southern Philippines have

number of lives lost, damage to property, expen-

government resources and economic opportunities

diture of

lost

due

to the pro-

The social cost of the conflict in terms of damaged social cohesion
and the diaspora of Muslims in Mindanao is arguably much greater. During the
early years of the conflict, there were indeed IHL violations committed by the major
government forces, Moro rebels and communist insurgents. Most of the
players
abuses blamed on the government forces happened during the martial law years
from 1972 to 1981. Reports on the protracted conflicts, however, make it appear
that there were widespread and continuing violations of human rights. 26
In fact, during the early years of the Moro secessionist and the Maoist communist insurgencies, NIAC rules were not at all clear to State security forces. The Cold
War period was characterized by wars of national liberation or internal wars. The
four 1949 Geneva Conventions were a product of World War II and, except for
Common Article 3, applied only to international armed conflict. Additional
Protocols I and II to the 1949 conventions, the latter of which applies to noninternational armed conflicts, were not agreed to until 1977. These rules would
emerge after both the NPA and the MNLF had initiated hostilities with the State
longed

conflicts.

—

military forces.

The AFP has been involved in internal security operations since martial law was
declared by President Marcos in September 1972. Since then, the AFP and the Philippine National Police have been performing both law enforcement and combat
operations against insurgent groups. For lack of an understood legal framework,

human rights law and IHL rules were confusing when applied to these two types of
missions.

The nature of the NIAC in the Philippines today and the operational strategies
employed by insurgent groups pose serious challenges to adherence to IHL. Discussed below are some of these challenges.
Principle of Distinction

The

principle of distinction requires that combatants be distinguished

from non-

combatants in carrying out military operations and that only the former

may

be

the direct object of attack. This principle has, at times, been difficult to implement.

The often-used phrase to describe the dilemma faced by the AFP is "a farmer by day
and a guerrilla by night." This phrase is literally true in the case of NPA militia
members, who can be both farmers and fighters. Even though IHL permits these
farmer/ fighters to be targeted at all times, since they are members of an organized
272

Raymundo B.

and Randolph

Ferrer

armed group performing a continuous combat

G.

Cabangbang

function, this

in practice, because their failure to distinguish themselves

lation

makes the

Another

issue

is

extremely

from the

difficult

popu-

civilian

issue of identification a difficult one.

NPA routinely engages in conduct that would be per-

that the

is

fidious in international

armed conflict. Regular communist guerrillas

guns similar to those issued to the State security

usually carry

forces. Disguised in regulation

government uniforms and bearing arms, the insurgents deceive civilians enough to
avoid detection and get inside police stations or military detachments to successfully

conduct

raids.

In addition, the

NPA routinely uses unarmed civilians as couriers and messen-

gers, as

an early warning system and

though

this

is

participation in

ernment

not a distinction

NPA activities.

until the intelligence

tured

on

forces based only

enemy

as bearers of logistics for their fighters. Al-

issue,

when

arrested they simply

deny

their

In most cases such arrests are carried out by govintelligence information.

While no

arrest

made

is

information has been corroborated by informants or cap-

personnel, courts hold this

is

insufficient to gain a conviction with-

out accompanying physical evidence that, in most cases, cannot be supplied. The
result

is

by

a cycle of arrest followed

release

and return

to participation in

NPA

operations.

In their operations,

communist

guerrillas are

known

to mingle with civilians.

They move around villages, engaging in propaganda work and
stuffs. When government troops come upon them in the villages,

soliciting foodcivilians

can get

NPA camps, civilians, who are generally relatives of the rebels, are utilized as cooks, for various errands in support of the NPA
caught in the

crossfire. Also,

or as lookouts. While these

within

camps

are situated well

away from

civilian villages

and

can be targeted without risk to the inhabitants of those villages, endangering the
vilians within the

camps can be characterized as a human

rights issue for the

ci-

NPA's

propagandists to exploit.

For the members of the MILF, on the other hand, their camps are also their

communities.

It is

not

uncommon

firing positions, outposts,

lims build a

for

MILF villages

to be fortified with trenches,

guard posts and other defense structures. Usually, Mus-

mosque or madrasah within

their

camps around which, because of the

communal nature of their society, houses are clustered. During ceasefires, the MILF
members have their families staying in the camps to farm and do other chores.
The AFP does not have precision-guided munitions/in its inventory. While the
munitions employed by the

ments of the law of armed

bombs

AFP

are sufficiently discriminate to

conflict, civilian objects are

meet the require-

sometimes

hit

by the AFP's

or artillery rounds. In order to minimize these occurrences, the
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established a rule of

ward observer

is

engagement (ROE) whereby a forward

air controller

or a for-

required to be present before engaging a target with indirect

Most MILF members

are part-time farmers

and part-time

fighters.

fire.

During en-

gagements with military forces, they shift easily from civilian status to fighters. The

MILF also has women members who serve as auxiliaries and are employed to carry
the ammunition, food and medical supplies. Because of these circumstances, military

operations frequently result in internal displacements, especially to the families of

MILF members. It is required, therefore, that before offensives, evacuation areas be
coordinated with the local government to ensure the safety of the internally displaced persons (IDPs),
fighters.

many

of

whom

are family

members of

MILF

the

active

MILF
IDPs have been known to

This humanitarian consideration can work to the advantage of the

members. Food and medical supplies distributed
end up with the MILF

to the

fighters, legitimately raising the

tion of relief goods to ensure they are not passed

need to control the distribu-

on by the IDPs

to the

MILF

combatants.

Principle of Proportionality

and Limitations on the Use of Means and

Methods of Combat
This principle

is

generally addressed in

operational commanders.

bombs

to attack

27

and

to cause excessive fear

In the case of the
it is

issued

is

authorities to

NPA uses

well fortified, since the

since the use of higher-order

among

by higher

for example, generally prohibited to use artillery or

NPA camps unless the camp

only light weapons,

nities,

It is,

AFP ROEs

weapons has the

potential

civilians living nearby.

MILF, which has well-fortified camps in or around its commu-

sometimes necessary to use artillery or bombs to neutralize these strong-

holds. Care

is

taken during the early stages of the

targeting the center of the
that these could

still

hostilities,

however, to avoid

camp, where the houses are clustered, on the assumption

be occupied by

civilian family

members.

Children Involved in Armed Conflict
Both the Maoist group and the

been

MILF

use children as child soldiers. There have

many incidents when our troops have captured child soldiers, both male and

female.

Landmines
Landmines of various types continue to be used by all rebel groups NPA, MILF,
MNLF, ASG. Some are used in accordance with IHL; some are not. In the period
2000-2006, total reported casualties (killed and wounded) from landmines and

—

improvised explosive devices were 362, of which 299 were soldiers and policemen,
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some of them children. The NPA commonly uses improvised
command-detonated anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines. In recent years
it has extensively used improvised claymore mines in command-detonated mode,

while 63 were civilians,

CPP-NPANDFP made certain commitments which were generally consistent with IHL rules
using scrap metal in lieu of steel

balls.

Because of

CARHRIHL,

the

on the use of landmines.

Unexploded Ordnance and Explosive Remnants of War
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW) left in the battlefield pose danger to IDPs returning to their homes and farms in conflict-affected
areas.

As a result, during the cessation of hostilities, the AFP

effort to recover these

is

undertaking an extra

UXOs and ERW. 28

Proliferation of Small

Arms and Light Weapons

Small arms and light weapons proliferate in the Philippines, complicating the

armed

conflicts, particularly in the

southern Philippines. There are an estimated

one million licensed firearms in the country and more than two million

illegally ac-

quired firearms in Mindanao alone. 29 The proliferation of small arms and light

weapons contributes to the formation of private armed groups and warlordism,
and

well as the frequency

intensity of lawlessness

and clan wars

in

as

Mindanao.

Addressing NIACs in the Southern Philippines

There are

parallel

peace tracks currently under

way in connection with

the non-

armed conflicts in the southern Philippines under which the Philippine government is pursuing peace negotiations with both the CPP-NPA and the
MILF.
Today's environment is one in which localized conflicts have become increasinternational

ingly intertwined with the social values of a larger international audience, bringing

about the downfall of institutions and governments. Small grassroots movements

and extremist

cells

throughout the world have capitalized on

social

media

net-

works to gain sympathy from an international audience

all

moral values and judgments on the legitimacy of armed

conflicts. In the case

of the

one could argue that these two NIACs, with long roots

in the

Philippines, however,
past, largely

let

go of the

Yet there

its

remain outside the reach of an increasingly globalized world. These

NIACs appear to be propagated
fuse to

too willing to impose

is

in the hearts

and minds of people who simply

re-

past.

hope

for a future generation in

rhetoric of grievance

no longer

inspire the
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working with various communities has demonstrated that promoting peace is
another way to defeat the enemy. We have learned that people will behave according to the way they are viewed

come

one;

if

—

treated as an

if

enemy, then they

treated as partners they will respond in kind.

complexities, the non-international

viewed simply as a cry for

where the basic

human

armed

security

necessities of survival

With

will beall

their

conflicts in the Philippines could

—the need

become

every individual. If that need can be met, peace

be

way of life

to lead a dignified

fundamental right for each and

a

may follow.
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Twenty-First-Century Challenges:

The Use of Military Forces to Combat
Criminal Threats

Juan Carlos Gomez*
cant change

J

reach

the direction of the wind, hut I can adjust

my destination.

my sails

to

always

1

Introduction

G

legalization confronts

governments with new threats. Moises Nairn, editor

of Foreign Policy, described these threats as follows:

and money is booming.
Like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits governments
against agile, stateless, and resourceful networks empowered by globalization. Governments will continue to lose these wars until they adopt new strategies to deal with a

The

illegal

larger,

trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people,

unprecedented struggle that

between nation-states once

did.

now shapes

the world as

much

as confrontations

2

-

The use of military forces by democratic States in the fight against these criminal
threats

is

viable

military forces

and necessary; however,

important to

maybe used legitimately. To do so,

transformation of the threat
*

it is

it is

know when and how

necessary to understand the

—armed groups, which once challenged governments
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over ideology,

now

to

Combat Criminal Threats

seek financial gain for themselves. While allegedly espousing

ideological politics at both ends of the political

spectrum (extreme

and

these groups have created sinister alliances that ignore geographic

boundaries.

3

and

left

right),

political

This transformation challenges State security and puts the institu-

tional structures of democratic States at risk.

In confronting this
tively neutralize this

and concepts

new

reality, military forces

must adapt

merger of criminal gangs and

if

they are to effec-

terrorist groups.

The

theories

that guided the State-on-State battlefields of the nineteenth

twentieth centuries, where the opposing belligerents could distinguish their

and when

guerrilla warfare

centers, will

Rather,

new

successfully

and guidance must be developed
employed in this new form of conflict.
theories

when combating

human

from population

military forces are to be

must develop an understanding of the law

these criminal/terrorist groups. That law will

that will

come from

law are referred to as "the law of peace" and the "law of war,"

The determination of when each

for military forces that

armed

terrorist. 4

law (HRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), 6 which in

rights

respectively.

if

enemy

5

"classic" international

tional

in isolated areas far

be inadequate to address the new challenge of the criminal

Similarly, military forces

apply

was conducted

and

will

apply presents

new

challenges

have traditionally focused on the law applicable to interna-

conflict.

This article will explore these issues from a Colombian perspective, a country

which has been engaged

and now

for decades in an

also with criminal

through the drug trade.

armed

groups using

struggle with insurgent groups

terrorist tactics for

economic gain

7

The Legal Framework for the Use of Force

Human

rights

law transformed traditional Westphalian sovereignty by providing

that international law can extend into a State

tween an individual

many aspects

citizen

and regulate the relationship be-

and the government. In

its

specifics,

HRL

addresses

of an individual's relationship with the government, such as partici-

pation in the political process. However,

it is

HRL's regulation of an

encounters with law enforcement agents and the courts that

when considering actions that
norms are designed to protect

is

the

individual's

most

relevant

are taken against the criminal terrorist. These

the citizen

from unlawful government

actions,

while at the same time providing law enforcement agencies the ability to protect
citizens

from criminal actions and

commit

crimes.

for the judicial system to
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On

the other hand, international humanitarian law permits the use of force to

restore peace in international

and non-international

conflicts, while at the

same

time minimizing unnecessary suffering to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

IHL has evolved since its inception, particularly in the post-World War II

era,

the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the two 1977 Additional Protocols and

numer-

ous conventions regulating the use of some weapons and outlawing others.
feature of this evolution has been the expansion of IHL
to international
It is this

armed

from

its

with

One

application solely

conflict to non-international or internal

armed

conflict.

law that regulates Colombian military forces in the conduct of military op-

erations against the well-organized, well-equipped narco-trafficking groups oper-

ating within Colombia.

Human Rights or International Humanitarian Law— Which Governs?
Unfortunately, what seems to be the clear delineation between
peace") and

new

IHL

HRL

("law of

("law of war") becomes gray in internal conflicts arising from the

threats that confront governments. Traditionally, counternarcotic efforts

were law enforcement in nature, even in a country such

as the

United States which

on drugs." As such, HRL was the component of international law
that applied to those efforts. The illegal armed groups operating within Colombia,
however, clearly fulfill the definition of an "organized armed group," which, when
declared a "war

combined with the

of violence in which they engage, permits the use of force

level

under the IHL applicable to non-international armed
against them. That the motive for the use of violence
ical

makes no

these groups

is

However, while the

difference.

clear, the ability to

do so

selves within the civilian population.

even more

difficult

than

it

is

is

conflicts to

be applied

now economic versus polit-

right to use military force against

difficult

because they camouflage them-

There the application of force against them

was when they operated in

is

isolated jungle-covered areas

of the country.
In using force in this

new

battlefield,

forces. This has strained the credibility of

mistakes have been

made by

Colombian government

the

armed

institutions re-

sponsible for the conduct of military operations and led to criminal prosecutions

of those involved. While

it

remains clear that the

level

of threat continues to re-

8

quire the involvement of Colombian military forces applying offensive and lethal
force,

it is

equally clear that every reasonable precaution

that the use of that force

is

must be taken

to ensure

directed only against legitimate military objectives in ac-

cordance with IHL.
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We Fight among the People
[Increasingly

we conduct

operations amongst the people.

towns, streets and their houses

—

all

the people, anywhere

The people in the cities,
can be on the battlefield.

—

formed and recognizable groups of eneagainst enemies disguised as civilians, and uninten-

Military engagements can take place against

mies moving amongst
tionally

civilians,

and intentionally against

civilians.

9

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the principal criminal terrorist group, and the other narco-trafficking groups generally do not possess
the capability to engage in conventional armed confrontations with Colombia's
military forces. Today, the armed and criminal groups move and act among the
people, obtaining benefits from a portion of the citizenry both voluntarily and
through extortion.

The brutality of the criminal terrorist groups is unquestioned. They are not supported by most of the population, but this does not necessarily result in support for
the government forces who act to protect the public. To the contrary, each mistake
or illegal or illegitimate act by a public official damages the people's confidence in
the government. 10 The cumulative consequence of these allegations of misconduct
is to turn public opinion against the government and those whose responsibility it
is to protect them. In effect, the protectors of society become the abusers of society.
Public opinion is turned against the government and law enforcement agencies
and military

forces.

Because law enforcement agencies are often incapable of effectively addressing
the threat of the criminal terrorist groups, military forces are often called

on

to op-

new environment among the people. Military forces must redesign
their doctrine to confront the new threats. In today's war there is no victory, no caerate in this

pitulation

become

by a defeated enemy. As Rupert Smith

increasingly timeless; they go

indicates,

on and on."

1 1

cannot eliminate the threat posed by these groups;
or negatively to the ultimate outcome.

The

defeat of illegal

through military
that

force.

it

can only contribute positively

armed groups do not seek a milichaos and provoking overreaction

by military forces with the objective of causing a

The

The use of military force alone

illegal

tary victory; they are interested only in creating

ment, thereby perpetuating never-ending

"[0]ur operations have

loss

of support for the govern-

conflicts.

and criminal armed gangs will not be accomplished
Rather, States must employ methods to dismantle them

comply with the law and bring individual members

to courts for prosecution.

This will require the cooperation of the citizenry of the country.
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cooperation, the population can never be confused with the
nals. If

the population will

it is,

Strategies
efforts to

end

become

must be developed

to obtain the population's support for the State's
strategies

must be designed not just

to

complicity with the gangs. They must also end the belief that the pop-

ulation can be neutral in the conflict.
tive

the enemy.

combat the criminal gangs. These

citizens'

enemy and the crimi-

population that

What is required is a supportive and coopera-

assists national institutional authorities in their efforts.

In

other words, an environment must be created in which each individual citizen feels
secure in denouncing the criminal gangs and assisting in the elimination of the

support structures for criminal

While military and police forces must

activities.

play an important role in establishing this environment, individual
ciety will also

members of so-

have a role to play.

A temporary presence of government forces is insufficient to establish this environment. In areas that organized armed groups have controlled, the
not provide the necessary support

if

they believe police and military forces will

soon withdraw, thus allowing the criminal groups to return. As a
strategy

must envision

that the

government

a

citizens will

permanent presence and an assurance

forces will be there as long as

is

result, the

new

to the population

necessary.

The use of military force is not always the best option to deal with the activities
of the illegal and criminal groups. If mistakes, either intentional or unintentional,
are made in attempts to neutralize the threat and innocent members of the population become victims, this is exactly what criminal gangs desire. This delegitimizes
the State and its democratic institutions. If military force is necessary it must be
used carefully and in full compliance with the law. However, in many instances the
more appropriate response is law enforcement actions designed to arrest and prosecute individual group members.
It

has been observed that "the British

Army was

the Irish Republican Army's

By targeting Catholic civilians and arbitrarily arresting and killing
suspected I.R.A. members, the British angered many young men who turned to the
I.R.A. as their only hope for survival; it was also a way to get revenge." 12 This history
lesson is also important in the Colombian context. Noncompliance with the rule of
law can lead and has led some to join the FARC and other criminal groups; can
cause a delegitimization of the government, the armed forces and police; and can
result in an increase in the number of disciplinary and judicial cases against offi-

best recruiter.

—

cials

—

involved in unlawful

acts.

New Missions for the Armed Forces
Colombia

is

not the only country in the Western Hemisphere that uses

forces within

its

its

military

borders in missions other than national defense of the nation.
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Threats

Mauricio Funes, immediately upon assuming

El Salvador's President

2009, ordered military forces to participate in combating the
gang.

13

and

narco-traffic

tary forces can be observed in Mexico,

bands

in the favelas. 15

the

army and the

navy.

14

In

The same use of mili-

where President Felipe Calderon

clared "war against the narco-traffickers," a "war" engaged in
16

role.

law enforcement efforts of the police

Brazil, military forces contribute to the

against the criminal

mara salvatrucha

continue to be employed in that

El Salvadoran military forces

office in

by the

in

2006 de-

federal police,

To a lesser degree, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru are also

using their military forces to address security- related issues within their borders.

Adaptation to the

New Operational Environment

As was indicated previously, criminal
sively as a

activity

would

ideally

be dealt with exclu-

law enforcement matter that could be addressed by law enforcement

agencies. Unfortunately, the capabilities

and economic capacity of the

illegal

armed groups and the organized crime organizations are such that they are beyond
the ability of law enforcement agencies, acting alone, to address. In these circumstances,

governments

may legitimately call upon military forces to

maintain social

order and address the threat created by these groups and organizations. Military
forces

must adapt, however, to these new missions and operational environment if

they are going to effectively and efficiently neutralize the threats they have been
called

on

to address; failure to

ment and

do so

will result in loss

of support from the govern-

citizens.

Particularly over the last eight years,

Colombian

military forces

and law en-

forcement agencies have been successful in reducing the threat posed by criminal
organizations and
bilities

illegal

armed groups.

Several have been defeated,

and the capa-

of those that remain have been greatly reduced. In addition, the level of vio-

lence within the country has greatly decreased. In

many areas,

the threat has been

reduced to the point that military forces no longer need to be used in a traditional
military capacity. In those areas, criminal activity, including terrorist acts, can

now

be dealt with as a law enforcement matter. The rule of law has been reestablished

and a security environment established where

HRL

—not IHL—

is

applied by mili-

tary forces performing law enforcement functions. In these areas, illegal

groups and criminal organizations do not control portions of the

armed

territory, al-

though they continue to operate within them. In response to pressure brought by
military forces

and law enforcement agencies

groups and criminal organizations simply
controlled areas; this
In those places in
pability,

is

what

is

known

in these areas, the illegal

move

as the

their areas of operations to less

"bubble

Colombia where the FARC

armed

still

effect."

possesses a viable military ca-

Colombian military forces employ the use of force in accordance with IHL
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combat it. Offensive operations, in the classic sense, remain an option in isolated
areas away from population centers. However, when operations are conducted
to

among

the people, care

must be taken

in the application of force. Unnecessarily

harm to civilians or their property can create greater long-term issues than
the immediate military advantage gained. While IHL remains the governing law,
the use of force must be more restrictively applied as a last resort and should only
be used when necessary in legitimate defense of the military force and when there is
no other alternative to accomplish the assigned mission.
The criminal organizations now operating in Colombia, whose motives are economic instead of political, are not interested in a negotiated settlement that would
provide them a place in the political process. While they speak of a desire to negotiate, they do so only to obtain immediate benefits and perpetuate the conflict. They
causing

look to intervention by churches, politicians, social leaders and international organizations weary of the long conflict.

The criminal groups not only

subsist

among

the people; they use the population for their benefit.

The questions

that

role far different

must be answered

from

against external threats,

accomplished while
tional

their principal

how military forces are to be used in a

purpose of maintaining national security

and how combating criminal

at the

and international

are

activity

can be successively

same time retaining that most important attribute of na-

legitimacy.

Knowing the Threat
Knowing and understanding the type of threat

to be confronted

is

of fundamental

importance. Real-time intelligence information on the criminal organization's ob-

and membership

jective, capabilities

is

essential to formulating strategy

and

courses of action.

Participation of Military Lawyers

The complexity of international and domestic law and the expectation in Western
democracies that the government and military forces will conduct themselves in
accordance with the law require that military lawyers be involved in
military operations,
tion

and

analysis.

17

from

their

all

aspects of

planning and execution to post-execution evalua-

These military lawyers must havcthe knowledge and experi-

ence to be credible with the commanders they advise. The value of such
participation

by military lawyers has been demonstrated

in

Colombia.

Rules for the Use of Force

There must be

clear,

understandable rules provided to military forces on the

cumstances under which force

may be

cir-

used and the type and degree of that force.
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This

is

dependent on the mission assigned to the

ently colored cards are used.
in a
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forces. In

Colombia, two

differ-

A blue card is used when the military unit is engaged

law enforcement mission. The rules on the blue card are based on HRL. They

provide for the use of force only
the mission

and

when no

in self-defense of the

other option

available to accomplish

is

person and others. The red card

is

used in op-

on IHL and permit the
if demanded by military necessity.

erations against military objectives. These cards are based
offensive use of force, including lethal force

Coordination with the Judicial Branch of Government

The

military forces

must coordinate

federal police. In the case of

and the National

Police,

their efforts with the judicial

Colombia,

this is the Office

of the Attorney General

and subordinate organizations. Each military operation

undertaken as a law enforcement mission

enforcement agencies so that
normally occur in the

branch and the

new

is

undertaken in conjunction with law

effective criminal prosecutions

operating area

among

can take place. These

the people, where adherence to

HRL is critical.
Members and Public Officials
Allegations of criminal misconduct by law enforcement agents and members of the
military are inevitable when operating in the middle of the population. These must
Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct by Military

be openly and effectively investigated.
prosecutions must be initiated.

When allegations are substantiated criminal

When investigations don't support the allegations,

must be publicly shared, including the factual details of the incident or
event in question. Thorough, complete and transparent investigations are necessary to maintain public support. The worst strategy is government silence, which
the results

permits the media and others to speculate or to

tell

their versions of what they be-

lieved happened.

Truth

Is

Paramount

made and will be made by military members and
law enforcement agents, even when actions are taken in good faith. When these occur, they must be truthfully revealed and explained. Too often, innocent mistakes
Mistakes and errors have been

have been covered up with falsehoods. Actions taken in good

faith

pected results can be accepted; falsehoods and cover-ups cannot.
to effectively investigate allegations of misconduct, falsehoods
to a loss of public support.
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Institutional Loyalty

When

a military

member

or law enforcement agent engages in criminal conduct,

the institution concerned, whether

it is

the

armed

forces or federal police,

must

provide that individual the rights provided by domestic law, but must not be seen
as defending the

conduct

in question. Loyalty

must be given

to the institution as a

whole, not to the individual member. Regrettably, in Colombia there have been in-

when military members or law enforcement agents have used their position
of authority to commit crimes. When they go unpunished, there are political, legal
stances

and economic

costs to the

government and

and public support

suffer.

Tactical Operations

Can Impact National

Throughout

history, conflict has

institution concerned,

and

credibility

Strategy

been analyzed

at three levels: strategic,

opera-

The national strategic level involves development of national
policy and objectives, and the use of resources to accomplish those objectives. At
the operational level, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and
tional

and

tactical.

sustained to accomplish strategic objectives. At the tactical
are planned

level, military

missions

and executed to accomplish military objectives. Today, those levels are

closer together than at

any time

in the past. Technological advances, social net-

works and an almost instantaneous communications capability allow what
curring at the tactical level to be
tactical situations can,

made known

and often do, have

public perceptions and opinion

literally

oc-

around the world. Because

effects at the strategic level in

—both negative and

is

positive

—

it is

terms of

essential that

commanders at the strategic and operational levels be in communication with, and
in control of, military units operating at the tactical level. They must have the capacity to react and adapt to the circumstances as they occur on the ground.
Political

and Judicial Concerns Arising from

the

New Operating Environment

The risk of legal action being taken against them is the greatest concern of military
members and law enforcement agents operating in the new environment. In Colombia, the potential of criminal and disciplinary investigations being initiated has

reduced morale

among members and

agents.

It

has caused

some

to decide in cer-

mi

tain circumstances that

it is

safer

not to

an investigation. Another concern
against public officials
politically

and

is

act, as

that

them

taking action might subject

making

allegations of criminal

to

conduct

and administrative demands of the government

is

both

financially profitable.

Beyond the impact on the individual who is the subject of the allegation, allegations of misconduct damage the credibility of the government. When the
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allegations have a basis in fact, action to investigate
is

required. Responses to false allegations

and hold persons accountable

must publicly

identify the allegations as

and action must be taken against those who make such allegations when
they violate Colombian criminal law. Care must be taken in doing so, however;
false,

nothing can damage the credibility and reputation of the institution concerned

more than

to find

an allegation

is

unsupported on the basis of an inadequate or

incomplete investigation when the allegation

must be vigorously

refuted; a failure to

do so

is,

is

in fact, true. False allegations

nearly the

same

as accepting the

allegation as true.

The

inevitable result of the use of military force,

non-international

armed

conflict,

jured and civilian property will be

government must be prepared
suffered losses.

To

fail

to

is

whether in international or

that innocent persons will be killed

damaged and

destroyed.

to accept responsibility

do so harms morale among

and

in-

When this occurs, the

and compensate those who

civilians

and can turn them

armed groups combating the government.
In Colombia, there are both non-judicial and judicial processes to evaluate
claims for damages caused by military forces and to promptly provide adequate
into supporters of the

compensation to those harmed. This not only has the benefit of promoting goodwill,

but also reduces the likelihood that allegations of criminal misconduct

will

be

brought against the military members causing the harm.
Final Reflections

Nairn, in his "The Five

These

five

Wars of Globalization"

wars stretch and even render obsolete

article,

concludes:

many of the existing institutions, legal

frameworks, military doctrines and law enforcement techniques on which gov-

ernments have relied for years. Analysts need to rethink the concept of war "fronts"
defined by geography and the definition of "combatants" according to the Geneva
Convention. The functions of intelligence agents, soldiers, police officers, or immigration officers need rethinking and adaption to the new realities. 19

Facing the reality that threats to national security today are more likely to arise

from within rather than from outside,

as

Nairn suggested in 2003, governments,

including that of Colombia, have rethought

confront these

new

threats.

how to employ their military forces to

Colombia's experience has demonstrated that while

military forces can be used lawfully in the fight against these internal threats to
security

and democratic

effectively

combat these

they must adopt

new

and doctrine

to

threats that are largely centered in the population.

A

stability,
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failure to

do so has the potential

stitutions

—than does the

to

more

threat against

severely

—and

State in-

which military forces are employed.

conduct, the law that governs will be HRL.
is

the State

used in a law enforcement capacity to deal with criminal

If military forces are

than

damage

It

requires

more

restrained use of force

provided under IHL. While military forces can operate effectively under

both regimes, the Colombian experience demonstrates that
tary forces understand the law

it is

essential that mili-

under which they are operating on missions to

which they are assigned. Misapprehension of the

legal

regime can result in exces-

and mission

sive use of force, increased risk to military personnel

failure.

Democratic societies in the twenty- first century enjoy the benefits and freedoms

demand that their governments provide them the rights and
in the various human rights instruments. Colombia is no

provided by HRL, and
guarantees set forth

The Colombian population appreciates the threat posed by the criminal
gangs, but expects that the government's response and the actions of law enforcement organizations and military forces will be fully consistent with that law. It will
exception.

not tolerate excesses.

The privilege to govern and have the monopoly on the lawful use of force within
a society obligates those

the law, whether
values.

adjust

it

be

who have that privilege to use force in full compliance with

HRL or IHL,

and

to adhere to the highest ethical

and moral

The wind has blown and societies have changed. Now governments must
their sails and respond to internal threats within the framework of the law;

their societies expect nothing less.
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one of the High Contracting Parties."
Other treaties applicable in internal conflict include the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excesvised.

.

.

.

Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in
19 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1523 (1980). Amended Article 1 to the Convention made
all of its protocols applicable in internal conflicts. See also Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,
Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in 36 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1507
(1997); Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
357 (2008). See also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2 volumes: Vol. I,
sively Injurious or to

Rules; Vol.
7.

to the

II,

Practice (2 Parts)) (Jean-Marie Henckaerts

& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).

Casteel, supra note 3 (stating that three terrorist organizations in

Colombia,

all

with links

drug trade, were responsible for about 3,500 murders in 2002).
Under the Colombian constitutional scheme, the "Military Force"

is composed of the
Army, Navy and Air Force and what is referred to as the "Public Force" includes the three military services and the National Police.
9. SMITH, supra note 4, at 281 (Smith describes war among the people as being the dominant form of war since the end of the Cold War).

8.

10. In a January 201 1 interview with former President Alvaro Uribe, he emphasized to the
author the importance of dismantling the criminal groups through lawful actions, using the

courts for prosecutions whenever possible.
1 1

SMITH, supra note

12.

Central Intelligence Assassins,

4, at

29 1

THE TEMPLE NEWS

(Nov.

14, 2002),

http://temple-news

.com/2002/1 1/14/central-intelligence-assassins/.

Maras is the term used to label the El Salvadoran youth gangs. The mara salvatrucha origwhen young El Salvadoran immigrants, armed with machetes,
guns and guerrilla combat training gained during El Salvador's civil war, united and became one
of the city's most violent gangs. Using the expedited removal procedures of the Immigration and
Nationality Act resulted in large numbers of gang members being deported to El Salvador
throughout the 1990s, where they continued their gang activities. El Salvadoran youth, already
1

3.

inated in Los Angeles in the 1980s
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desensitized to violence by the civil war, were easy recruits.
tents

and purposes, deportation from the United

One author commented, "For all inMS- 13 [mara

States merely provided

—an expansion

means for transnational expansion
become more organized, powerful, and violent."

salvatrucha] with an effective

low the gang

to

United States-El Salvador Extradition Treaty:

A Dated Obstacle in

would

that

al-

Kelly Padgett Lineberger, The
the Transnational

War Against

Mara Salvatrucha (MS- 1 3), 44 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 87, 1 94 20 1 1 )
14. Alex Renderos, Salvadoran Leader Names Newly Retired General to Top Police Post; The
Selection Comes after a Similar Security Appointment, and Stirs Fear of Militarization., LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at A3.
15. See, e.g. Open for Business: The Pacification of Brazil's Favelas, KNOWLEDGE WHARTON,
(

,

Jan. 3,
16.

2012, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2910.

Stephen Sackur, "No alternative"

to

Mexico's drug war

—

says Calderon,

BBC, Oct.

27,

20 1 0, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9 1 30 1 55.stm.
17.

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to

the Protection of Victims of International
("[States]

.

.

appropriate

.

shall

level

2001; the other services followed

19.

lies

June

military lawyers into the planning

suit.

8,

1977,

1

125 U.N.T.S. 3

or half-truths."

Nairn, supra note

this

Protocol

.

.

.

at the

.").

The

and execution process

in

Their participation occurs on a daily basis.

During the period of his presidency, Alvaro Uribe

but never the

82,

on the application of the [Geneva] Conventions and

Colombian Air Force incorporated
18.

Armed Conflicts art.

ensure that legal advisers are available to advise military commanders

2, at 36.
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An Australian Perspective on NonInternational Armed Conflict:
Afghanistan and East Timor

Rob McLaughlin*
Introduction

Over

the course of the last three decades, Australia has committed forces to a

wide range of operations that have,
Defence Force (ADF) in
the

its

collectively, involved the Australian

most sustained period of high operational tempo

Vietnam War. The operations include the

first

since

Gulf War, in 1990-91, and the

second Gulf War, in 2003 (both international armed conflicts (IACs)); belligerent

armed conflicts (NIACs) in Iraq post-2003 and
Afghanistan (at least since 2005); and participation in a range of peace operations
of widely varied political, physical and legal risk, including transitional administrations in Cambodia and East Timor, sanctions enforcement in the North Arabian
Gulf, and stabilization and mitigation operations in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor,
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. As each operation has unfolded, Australia
has learned (or in some cases, relearned) both practical and theoretical lessons
in operational law. In many cases, these lessons have been identified and
participation in non-international

contextualized within a relatively defined (albeit fluid) operational legal paradigm
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Law, Australian National University; Captain, Royal Australian Navy.

in this article are
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experience with I AC, and non-law of armed conflict (LOAC)-governed

in that

peace operations, has tended to be relatively linear and coherently incremental.

With NIACs, however, the

been

trajectory has not always

believe that there are three reasons for this differing path.
in

any detail, but

it is

nevertheless useful to set

operations generally, there was

armed

conflict

First, as

—and remains— much

NIAC. Ongoing debates

applies in

shall

I

them out up

contextual backdrop to the focus of this study.

as logical or

smooth.

I

not examine them

front for they provide a

opposed

to

less clarity

as to the application of

I

AC and peace

about what law

human

rights

law in

(which are almost universally conducted by reference to NIAC-

based examples) and the
1

lively

and contentious discussion surrounding the

appli-

some characterize as a NIAC situation between
the Gaza Strip 2 are but two examples that illustrate this

cation of IAC blockade law to what

and Hamas

Israel

in

3

point. Indeed the fundamental task of distinguishing the

"upper" and "lower" neighbor

legal

NIAC threshold from its

paradigms (IAC and less-than-NIAC law en-

forcement in situations of civil disturbance) similarly remains a highly contested

and

politically laden debate.

"opacity" of

NIAC LOAC

is

There

in the current

push to

most

not

IAC

all)

of the

LOAC by reinterpreting

its

rules are equally applicable in

tion

—

human

—of

the actuality

ments of operations

The second

NIAC, and
The

rights law.

(or indeed, colonized by)

enumerated paradigmatic neighbors, which

if not

and

to

humanize

scope of application and the substance of many of its

LOAC is being squeezed between
fully

relative "scarcity"

NIAC LOAC is the primary battleharmonize IAC and NIAC LOAC by asserting that

constituent concepts in the light of

more

doubt that the

one reason why

ground
(if

is little

greater fluidity

result

its

that

is

NIAC

better defined

and

in turn creates the percep-

and indeterminacy than

in other ele-

law.

reason, which emanates

from the

first, is

that the existence of a

NIAC remains a highly political assessment, whereas the existence of an IAC is generally (or at least relatively when

compared to NIAC) easy to establish with a degree
of logic and certainty. This is most evident at the lower NIAC threshold, between
non-NIAC situations of civil disturbance and NIAC itself. The very large space for
political influence in a

equivalent

IAC

NIAC

(much
has meant that

characterization decision

conflict characterization space)

larger than in the
in addition to the

LOAC being dogged by a higher degree of substantive unceropacity than either IAC LOAC or peace operations law, it has also re-

application of NIAC
tainty

and

mained
initial

a

much more

politically

nuanced and contested body of law

at

point of characterization. Perhaps the most striking illustration

British reluctance to characterize "the Troubles" in

Northern Ireland

other than a less-than-NIAC law enforcement situation.
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The

third reason

common

across

mitted forces to

—

certainly evident, in

many partner

my

operating States

IAC situations,

it

view, in Australian practice, but

—

is

when

that

com-

has almost universally been as a belligerent: Iraq/

Kuwait, 1990-91; Afghanistan, 2001; Iraq, 2003. However,

NIAC

Australia has

when

Australia has

it

has almost universally been as a non-

belligerent stabilization or mitigation force.

There was clearly a NIAC under way in

committed

forces into

situations,

Somalia in 1992, but Australia's force was not a party to
stabilization/mitigation mission
that

would have been

conduct

available to

it,

lethal targeting operations

and Rwanda

it

was

whether there was a

dejure,

was part of a

a party to the

NIAC. Ac-

lethal force in self-defense,

but not to

if it

had been

under the auspices of LOAC. 5 In Cambodia

similarly so. In East Timor, although there

NIAC

it

and did not exercise the full suite of LOAC powers

was authorized to use

cordingly, the force

rather,

it;

(or even an

IAC) afoot

is

debate as to

in 1999-2001, Australian forces

were not a party to any armed conflict and thus could not

avail

themselves of the

sharper end of LOAC authorizations dejure. Thus, until Australia substantially re-

engaged

NIAC,

in Afghanistan in

Australia

LOAC. While
parties to the

had

the

to

ADF

2005 as a belligerent party in what was by then

some

extent been able to bypass the complexities of NIAC

often deployed into

NIAC and

clearly a

NIAC

contexts, those forces were not

operated under the "routine" peace operations legal

paradigm.

Aim

My aim in this short study is to ask how, from a legal perspective, Australia has approached the issue of "NIAC."

I

by examining four discrete

will seek to achieve this

issues: conflict characterization, characterization

of the opposing force, rules of en-

gagement (ROE) and treatment of captured/detained personnel. The methodology

I

have adopted

comparative prism

—

is

a

to

issues

through a broadly

comparison between a high-level non-NIAC operation

(East Timor, 1999-2001)

2005).

examine each of these

and

a

NIAC

The purpose behind adopting

this

operation (Afghanistan, ongoing since

methodology

for establishing

an alternative against which

also provides a

means of

NIAC

illustrating the degree to

is

to provide a

framework

practice can be compared.

whrch

this practice

consistent or different across the lower threshold of NIAC, that

is,

is

It

either

between less-than-

NIAC "peace" operations (law enforcement operations or stabilization/mitigation
operations), and NIAC operations themselves. The reasons Australia has taken different characterization paths,
central to understanding

premise, as will quickly

and the consequences of these

choices, are,

any "Australian approach to NIAC."

become

evident,

is
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NIAC and

and of the threshold between
influences to a

much

less

than NI AC

is

beholden to non-legal

greater degree than in clear law enforcement or clear

IAC

contexts.

Characterization of the Conflict: Afghanistan

Characterization of the conflict situation

is

vs.

East Timor

fundamental to Australia's approach to

almost every other element of operational authority. Although this issue
nificant for

some other

is

less sig-

NIAC or as
involvement in a NIAC as bellig-

States, the choice to characterize a conflict as a

"law enforcement," or to characterize Australian

erency or as law enforcement or stabilization/mitigation partnership, results in a

ADF. This caveat is, in essence, that where Australia
is not a belligerent party to an armed conflict, Australian forces cannot (in general)

vital use-of- force

caveat for the

use lethal force in circumstances other than in individual and unit self-defense
(usually including defense of others). Furthermore, use of force
lian force

tralian

is

not a belligerent

where the Austra-

governed entirely by the "routine" elements of Aus-

is

domestic criminal law. 6 There

is,

consequently, no legally available option

LOAC authorizations when Australia is not a belligerent party to the NIAC. When Australia is a belligerent party to
the NIAC, and lethal force is used in alleged accordance with NIAC LOAC (for exfor Australian forces to access

ample, to target a fighter
applicable law shifts,

any of the lethal

member of an

organized armed group (OAG)), then the

and brings into play Division 268 of the Commonwealth

Criminal Code (which domesticates the 1998

Rome

Statute of the International

Criminal Court offenses into Australian law). 7
Afghanistan, at least since Australian forces re-engaged militarily in 2005,

NIAC and Australia is clearly a belligerent party to that NIAC. East Timor in
2001 was, however, consciously characterized as a "law enforcement" or
tion operation, even

considered.

though the

What may have

issue of characterization as a

NIAC

(or

is

a

1999-

stabiliza-

IAC) was

influenced these two legal/policy characterization de-

on the ground" were not
scale. The Afghanistan con-

cisions along very different paths? Certainly, the "facts
radically different
text

is

when

current and well

rationalized against a relative

known and

requires

little

recap; however,

worthwhile briefly reviewing, for comparative purposes, the

Timor context.
rates in

less

it is

perhaps

current East

In relation to intensity, there were/are proportionally high casualty

both conflict contexts. In East Timor, tens (by some counts hundreds) of

thousands had died under Indonesian occupation, and the consequent insurgency,
since 1975. 8 At the point of intervention in 1999, there were wide-scale destruction

of infrastructure and massive displacement of the population.

On

September

20,

1999, as the United Nations Security Council-sanctioned International Force East
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Timor (INTERFET) commenced deployment, few buildings in Dili were undamaged and all but three of East Timor's main population centers had been either
completely destroyed (two towns) or 70 percent burnt

down

or leveled (four

towns). 9 Population displacement was on a massive scale: as recorded subsequently
in

an

ADF

"A preliminary

"lessons learnt" study:

UN

inter-agency assessment of

on 27 September 1999 estimated that of a total pre-ballot population of 890,000, over 500,000 had been displaced by violence, including 150,000
10
to West Timor [Indonesian territory]."
In terms of organization, in East Timor there were legacy militias and insurthe situation issued

gency groupings (which had been fighting Indonesian occupation since 1975), as

newer

well as

militias of

both pro-integrationist and independence sympathies.

The political context was complicated by external actors (such as Portugal (the former colonial power), Australia, Indonesia and the UN) and militia sponsors (including,

it

now seems

well established, elements within the Indonesian military).

The comparison with Afghanistan's

political

by the engagement of Pakistan, United

and transnational

militia,

dent.

The

terrorist

situation in East

States,

group

and

conflict situation (complicated

NATO, UN, and warlord, trans-border

interests)

is

—when

scaled

Timor 1999-2001 could arguably be

—

readily evi-

said to have

met

both the Tadic "intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties to the conflict"

elements 11 as readily as the situation in Afghanistan currently does.

However, despite such contextual
ground" of which

similarities in

terms of the "facts on the

LOAC takes cognizance, the strategic contexts in which the East

Timor and Afghanistan

conflict characterization decisions

cally different. This clearly

played into the fundamentally different characteriza-

tion decisions Australia arrived at in relation to these

Afghanistan, the "other" was the unloved Taliban and

Al Qaeda

were made were radi-

—both routinely described through

two

its

conflict contexts. In

widely detested partner

militarized rhetoric emphasizing or-

ganization, capacity, universal aims, threat level

and

reach.

As

Prime Minister, John Howard, said of the attacks of September

who sponsored and sheltered the
[I]t is

who

the product of evil

Australia's then

11,

2001 and those

perpetrators:

minds and

it is

the product of an attitude of a group of people

words of Winston Churchill when he
said that those responsible for the Nazi occupation of Europe should be regarded in
their brutish hour of triumph as the moral outcasts of mankind. 12
in every sense [e]voke those very evocative

In announcing the deployment of forces to Afghanistan, Prime Minister

Howard was explicit as to the readily condemnable
certainly don't have

nature of the "other": "Well

any concern about being involved
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who were

people

responsible for the terrorist attack." 13 Indeed, Australia had by

ANZUS

invoked the

this stage

Treaty, 14 indicating that the Afghanistan conflict

context had been informed by a significant legal act which was

focused than not.

15

more armed conflict

This militarized (as opposed to law enforcement terminology

based) characterization of the conflict remains the case. As Minister for Defence
M

Stephen Smith observed in March 201

1,

[o]ur fundamental goal

is

to prevent Af-

ghanistan from again being used by terrorists to plan and train for attacks on inno-

own

cent civilians, including Australians in our

Thus in

region and beyond." 16

relation to Afghanistan, defining the context as a

a belligerent within

it

NIAC and engaging as

heralded few prospects of causing a damaging

member

portant neighbor or influential

rift

with an im-

of the international community, or of

subscribing to a highly legally contested or politically risky characterization of the

many ways,

"other." In

the political
tralian

there was

sion was

it

being as a belligerent party.

strategic context in

which the East Timor

made was very different

on the ground" there had been
occupation.

political or strategic risk to balance against

and strategic gain of characterizing the situation as a NIAC and of Aus-

engagement within

But the

little

a

indeed. Certainly,

NIAC

if

one looks only to the

this

was a

difficult issue: Australia

had recognized the Indonesian annexation.
1999-2001 into something

like a

18

NIAC with

the conflict characterization settled

was one of the few

Even when the

upon appears

to have

had greater "national" scope

NIAC
(UNTAET)

later

than in the

support,

group

INTERFET

if not

militias

in a

UN

in

been that there was no

to characterize the conflict

Transitional Administration in East

deployed ashore in

were burning, looting,

These

morphed

Timor

"blue helmet" period, but chose not to do so. This decision was main-

tained even as

tacit

conflict

States that

integrationist militia as the "other,"

force), Australia certainly

militias

17
1(4) conflict.

During INTERFET (an Australian-commanded "green helmet"

afoot.

as a

"facts

(or IAC?) during the period of Indonesian

may even have been an Additional Protocol I Article

It

But for Australia,

NIAC

conflict characterization deci-

NIAC

killing

backing, of some

and

Dili,

where the pro-integrationist

terrorizing,

and were doing so with the

members of the Indonesian

were certainly potentially characterizable
context

if

as

military. 19

an organized armed

we apply our Afghanistan-based conception of "orga-

nized armed group." But in 1999, the recent (and ongoing) "civilians taking a di-

was

rect part in hostilities" debate

against the slim

—and

relatively

in Additional Protocol

I,

21

But there were also other

The

first

was the

unnuanced

—black

Additional Protocol

1949 Geneva Conventions,

tion.

in the future; thus the assessment

and

II

20

their associated

letter

and

law

criteria recognizable

Common

Article 3 to the

commentaries.

vital factors that militated against

fact that

was made

such characteriza-

INTERFET was present in East Timor partly on the
298

Rob McLaughlin
22
basis of an Indonesian invitation.

be a

The second was that security was envisaged to
combined INTERFET/Indonesian responsibility during the transition phase,

thus requiring

INTERFET

drew (although

to cooperate with Indonesian forces until they with-

in reality this did

not turn out to be a long phase, as Indonesian

forces rapidly departed). Finally, regardless of whether there

and Australia

Security Council

(as the lead

was

NIAC afoot, the

a

troop-contributing nation

(TCN)

for

commander) consciously determined that the
UN-sanctioned force was not involved in a NIAC. This was not a universal view.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had indicated to Australia
that "militia members detained for acts of violence against INTERFET members
were entitled to prisoner of war status. The ICRC's reasoning was that if it were accepted that the militia were at least controlled by the Indonesian armed forces then
clashes between militia and INTERFET would constitute armed conflict." 23
The Australian view was that LOAC did not apply dejure, and the situation was
one of law enforcement/stabilization. Thus even if the Fourth Geneva Convention
(GC IV) 24 was used as a template for managing the situation, this was clearly contemplated as resting upon a policy basis, for quite apart from whether the situation
was even an armed conflict at all, GC IV of course applies de jure to IACs, not

INTERFET, and

also furnishing

its

NIACs. However, one revealing element

in this decision-making process

structive as to the sorts of concerns that can

in-

inform conflict characterization deci-

NIAC, or less-than-NIAC law enforcement/
of reciprocity was clearly in mind. For some of those

sions at the lower threshold (that
stabilization) in that the issue

is

is,

GC
IV applied dejure, it may "have the legal consequence either of rendering ADF

analyzing the context there was certainly a concern that

if Australia

found that

personnel 'lawful' targets, making Australia party to any conflict, or bringing into
effect the

other Geneva Conventions of 1949." 25 Ultimately, the settled view taken

was that
the Convention

[GC

IV]

would not make Australian troops

a party to a conflict

could then be targeted "as of right by other parties to the conflict.

.

.

." If

who

the Fourth

Convention applied and armed elements attacked Australian troops this would be
illegal unless it was part of an organised armed force with a responsible command
structure.

26

Clearly, the reciprocity issue

terized as a

NIAC

(or

IAC)

—

it

that

the East

would have

force being subject to legitimate
a factor

is, if

which played into the

Timor context had been charac-

raised the specter of the

UN-sanctioned

LOAC targeting—was an overt concern, and thus
conflict characterization decision with respect to

East Timor.
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Characterization of the Opposing Force

many ways, the "legal" characterization given to the "other" (the adversary) in a
conflict situation (be it NIAC or less than NIAC) necessarily follows from the
In

broader conflict characterization decision. However,
serving that

—arguably,

in Australian experience at least

tion accorded this "other" has

defining the line in

given that

activity,

two major implications

NIAC between
all

that

violent action

by an

OAG

initio.

This

the overall conflict characterization

all

"militia" or

—the

is

The

first is

and merely criminal

NIAC

in a
is

legal characteriza-

for operations.

targetable fighter activity

characterizable as criminal activity ab

when

nevertheless worth ob-

it is

is

fundamentally

an issue that does not

less-than-NIAC

"armed gang" violence be met with

arise

status, thus requiring

a law enforcement, as op-

posed to a LOAC-based, response. The second implication concerns the rhetorical
treatment of the "other." This factor, while not
nation as

it

uation, as

strictly legal, requires brief

exami-

appears to reflect a fundamentally political/legal appreciation of the

opposed

to

one based purely

in "the facts

sit-

on the ground."

Organized Armed Groups in Non-International Armed Conflict
This study

is

not the venue for revisiting the battlelines in the ongoing debate on

direct participation in hostilities

cient for
activity

and the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance. 27

our purposes to simply recall that the argument

in essence,

and which actors are within the targetable envelope

authorization to proactively seek out and
situations of self-defense),

purposes.

It is

kill

and what and who are outside

LOAC sense of

that envelope for

LOAC

therefore sufficient to simply note that a fundamental point of

what activity/which actors associated with

The

(in the

about what

without having to limit lethal force to

divergence centers around what constitutes an

sense.

is,

It is suffi-

that

directly relevant question, however,

OAG,

and,

more

OAG are targetable
is

whether

importantly,
in the

LOAC

any

signifi-

this heralds

cant operational implications.
In Afghanistan, where Australia considers itself to be a belligerent party to a

NIAC, the main "other" is defined in terms of an OAG. This characterization, however,

is

not a simple matter, and as

is

the case for

stan (and previously Iraq), this concept of

operational and

many States engaged in Afghani-

OAG has actually evolved as an applied

ROE concept in tandem with its evolution as a legal concept. As a

consequence, there was a period of working through and settling the parameters of
the concept in terms of

TCN law and policy at the very time

it

was

also being used

to support lethal effects in the field. This evolution of a critical legal

and opera-

NIAC, through the crucible of current operations, has not been
without problems. The foremost of these has been that while Australia has been
tional concept for
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working out what
doing

this

it

means when

and conclusions do

it

OAG,

an

refers to

other States have also been

differ.

Two examples may serve to illustrate this conundrum. The first is the furor that
erupted within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) over "targeting

drug barons," a debate that

is

readily traced through the newspapers of many

TCNs. As the New York Times

ISAF

reported:

United States military commanders have told Congress that they are convinced that
the policy

is

money that
The Senate

under the

legal

also said the

move

is

is

an

military's rules of engagement

essential part of their

new

helping finance the Taliban insurgency.

report's disclosure of a hit

list

for

drug

and international law. They

plan to disrupt the flow of drug
.

.

may lead

traffickers

the United States over the expansion of the military's mission,

already raised questions about the strategy of killing individuals
military targets.

This policy

and

to criticism in

NATO allies have

who are not traditional

28

shift

TCNs. As reported

caused significant concern
in the

among

a

number of ISAF

partner

UK newspaper The Guardian,

Previous missions have been held up by Nato lawyers arguing over whether an operation was primarily a counter-narcotics/policing mission or a counter-terrorism/
military mission.

European allies have strongly resisted the push to using military assets

for counter-narcotics missions.

The new American policy is the outcome of heated debates between the US and many
of its European allies in Afghanistan who have long viewed the country's booming
narcotics industry as a policing problem, not a military one. 29

The Canadian view, expressing the compromise
been reached

in the policy debate,

was reported

that ultimately appears to have

to be as follows:

Some commanders opposed targeting the drug trade because it
law to use military force against

civilian targets

—even

if

is^against international

they are criminals.

NATO secretary general Jaap de [Hoop] Scheffer says the debate is over and there is full
agreement within the alliance to go

Mr MacKay says
there

is

Canadian troops

after Afghanistan's illegal

will attack

drug lords and opium

proof of a direct link to the Taliban insurgency. 30
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This formulation of the

gency"

still

test as

being "proof of a direct link to the Taliban insur-

allowed for different national interpretations as to what "legal ap-

proach" would be utilized by each individual
based targeting).

TCN

(law enforcement or

also explicitly recognized that individual

It

variety of criteria (on occasion inconsistent as

TCNs

employ

will

between those TCNs) for

LOACa

establish-

ing the nexus required to bring drug trafficking (a criminal activity) within the

OAG targetable envelope (a LOAC concern). This is generally achieved, appears,
via the legal paths of personal linkages to fighter OAG roles, or the adequacy and
it

directness of the linkage between financing activities

Canadian formulation of the
utilize a

legal position

degree of constructive ambiguity

is

and

fighting activities.

thus indicative of the routine need to

when

publicizing the resolution to con-

tentious legal/policy debates in the context of multinational operations

the words used to explain the resolution
pretive wriggle

The

—

that

must still permit of individual TCN

is,

inter-

room.

The second example relates to the attachment of military members from one
TCN to units from another TCN, where those two States may adopt slightly differand without the OAG targetable envelope.
ent views on what and who is within
For example, when Australia sent Gunners to join a UK artillery regiment on deployment to Afghanistan, 31 it was vital that Australia and the United Kingdom
looked very closely at each other's concept of OAG. The legal risk inherent in any

—

such attachment, while remote,

—

nevertheless present.

is

If,

for example, the at-

UK command engaged a target
who was within the targetable OAG envelope under the UK approach (and thus a
completely legitimate target for the UK), but outside the targetable OAG envelope
tached (fully briefed) Australian Gunners under

under the Australian approach (and thus perhaps not a legitimate military
under the Australian interpretation), then the Gunners
to claims that they stood in legal danger
easily mitigated

—such

OAGs

in

is

is

to identify

ciation of potential

The

whether those interpretive differences actually herald any

maybe targeted. For the sake of a clear appre-

TCN domestic legal consequences, this step in operational legal

management should never be

glossed over.

In Afghanistan, the characterization of the "other" as an
is

command and control

to identify the very possibility of different interpretations.

substantive differences in what/ who

risk

risks are often

—

case, the first step

next step

under Australian law. Such

when the risk is linked to a fluid and highly contested legal conlegitimate envelope of targetable activities and members within
risk mitigation becomes significantly more difficult. In such a

as the

NIAC

may have opened the door

through briefings, caveats, and operational

arrangements, but
cept

target

intimately reflected in the rhetoric

Al Qaeda adversary

is

OAG in the LOAC sense

employed to describe that "other." The Taliban/

described as a determined, capable, organized military foe,
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and the campaign

as

punctuated by "fighting seasons." In March 201

[tjhere are signs that the international

community's recent troop surge, combined now

with a strong military and political strategy, has reversed the Taliban's

But

I

do urge

is

the Austra-

example, indicated that

lian Minister for Defence, for

This progress

1,

incremental and hard-won, but

it is

apparent.

.

momentum.

.

Agency head, General Ron
and heavily dependent
and will be able to threaten

caution. United States Defense Intelligence

Burgess, has cautioned that "the security situation remains fragile

on ISAF support" and that the Taliban "remains resilient
US and international goals in Afghanistan through 201 1."

We must expect pushback from the Taliban, particularly in areas recently claimed by
ISAF and Afghan troops, when this year's fighting season commences
We do need to steel ourselves for a tough fighting season. 32

The

rhetoric

and concepts associated with a

military, as

in April or

May.

opposed to merely criminal,

adversary are well evident: planning, campaigns, the holding of territory, the high
level

of security threat, coordination, political purpose and so on. In this way,

the political/legal rhetoric used to describe the "other"

is

clearly

and funda-

mentally beholden to the earlier decisions to characterize the conflict as a

NIAC,

to characterize Australia's

involvement in that

NIAC as that of a belliger-

ent party and to consequently describe the "other"

NIAC

—

in

terms of an

—the

adversary in the

OAG.

"Criminal Gangs" in Less-Than-NIAC Situations
In East Timor, the decision to operate in a "law enforcement"
characterizing the conflict as a
Australia as a non-party to
"other."

As there was no

it)

NIAC

(or, if a

mode, and

to avoid

NIAC was afoot, then to characterize

predetermined the characterization decision

NIAC for INTERFET,

there was

no

as to the

targetable "other" in

LOAC sense. Thus the "other" was legally characterizable as a simple criminal,
with none of the complications inherent in the LOAC concept of OAG at play. This
the

simplifies the legal regime applicable to dealing with this "other" in that because

no scope for the application of LOAC
targeting authorizations, each criminal and each act of criminal violence can only
be dealt with in the law enforcement context of detention, arrest, search and seizure,
and use of lethal force only in self-defense. This political/legal decision as to conthey are mere criminals, and there

flict

characterization,

and

quires that this adversary
military terms.

its

is

is

consequent characterization of the "other," thus

described in terms of criminality, that

During the height of the

crisis in
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not in de facto
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member of the Australian Parliament indicated that "we know what has happened,
according to newspaper reports, because of the open communications that took
place between elements of the Indonesian military
in East
'[t]he

and some of their

militia thugs

Timor." 33 Similarly, the then Australian Foreign Minister was adamant that
United Nations, Australia and the international community as a whole

not, of course, be bullied

tions process

by thugs.

We will

will

not be bullied out of this United Na-

and we will not be bullied into abandoning the United Nations super-

vised ballot in East Timor." 34

He went on
I

think

it is

to affirm that

fair to

say that the international community,

on

balance, thought that the

would be pretty bad after the announcement of the result, but I do not think
community quite expected and Kofi Annan has made this point in
the last week or two
the rampant destruction that took place during that period. I do
not think the international community, in the end, concluded that people could ever
situation

the international

—

—

behave that badly. 35

He continued, "[W]e hope in any case, with the insertion of the multinational force
and with the move towards the United Nations taking over control of East Timor,
that we will see the rather rapid dissolution of the militias." 36
The

rhetoric of "pure" criminality

—thuggery, bad behavior,

transience, private

ends, lack of coordination, cowardice in the face of a concerted police

response

—

is

clearly evident, as

is

and military

the complete absence of any militarized rhetoric

in describing this adversary.

Rules of Engagement Issues

The
and

fact that East

Timor was

stabilization context,

cant consequences for
it

characterized as a less-than-NIAC law enforcement

whereas Afghanistan

ROE. Each

a

NIAC, obviously held

signifi-

characterization decision, however, brings with

a series of unique complications that

For Afghanistan,

is

must be

reflected in

ROE.

ROE are clearly LOAC based and authorize the proactive target-

ing of certain individuals with lethal force, not being limited to self-defense. This

complicated, however, by the fact that
pretive differences

between States

LOAC lends itself to a broad range of inter-

—much more

so than the core legal elements of

less-than-NIAC law enforcement and stabilization/mitigation operations.
necessitates that a

work basis (such

is

whole range of LOAC

rules that are applicable only

on

It

also

a patch-

as those relating to anti-personnel land mines, cluster munitions,
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riot control agents, explosive

conflicted

A brief examination

may

with respect to determining

—and

is

some degree

to

mitigated.

ROE

issues that Australia

serve to illustrate this situation. First, as noted

previously, the issue of applying

OAG

In law enforcement-based opera-

of four peculiarly NIAC-related

has faced in this context

outside the

need to be managed and de-

LOAC elements are not applicable dejure; thus the complexity

of managing this patchwork of obligations

tions

etc.)

among multiple operational partners.

most of these

tions,

remnants of war,

— through

ROE— concurrently

(as a national legal position)

targetable envelope

is

evolving law

who is within and who is

problematic. This holds direct implica-

potential criminal consequences

—

TCN's

for each

forces

when con-

ducting combined operations, or while on attachments with units from other

TCNs

—such

Gunners deployed with

as the Australian

UK

artillery

Australian staff officers deployed into U.S. -commanded/controlled

regiments or

combined

air

operations centers. 37

Second, one complication of the fact that Australia has characterized the conflict
in Afghanistan as a

Australian

ROE

NATO

based

NIAC and

had

to

Australia as a belligerent party to that

NIAC

is

be drafted with a close eye on the equivalent belligerency-

ROE. This

creates a

need to explain, "nationalize" and de-conflict

some critical items of terminology. One of the more significant is that NATO

ROE

use the concepts of "hostile act" and "hostile intent" in a radically different

from Australian

ROE

cepts can be used as
ate

ROE

attack

doctrine and practice. In

NATO ROE

components of LOAC-based attack rules,

that require restraint

would be

that

from attack

(in situations

way

doctrine, these con-

38

for example, to cre-

where, under

LOAC,

lawful) unless the adversary force demonstrates hostile intent to-

ward an own-force element (such as positioning to attack it) or carries out a hostile
act against

an own-force element (such

as attacking

it).

An example of this form of

NATO usage is rule of engagement 421. That rule states: "Attack against any forces
or

any

against

targets

demonstrating hostile intent (not constituting an imminent attack)

NATO forces is authorised." 39

In Australian

ROE doctrine and practice, the concepts of hostile act and hostile

intent are generally

ROE

employed

in relation to individual

and unit

self-defense as

shorthand for the domestic criminal law requirements of necessity, immi-

nence and reasonableness of use of force in individual self-defense. This

manner

in

which these two concepts are

conflict characterization

must apply a whole range of more stringent rules and pro-

decision

is

cesses to

many enabling capabilities.

civilian contractor

also the

utilized in the International Institute of

Humanitarian Law's Rules of Engagement Handbook. 40
The third example of an ROE implication of a NIAC
that Australia

is

operator of an

In

NIAC,

it

unmanned
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really matters what, precisely, the
aerial vehicle

is

doing. Certain
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actions will not place that civilian in the position of becoming a direct participant
in hostilities

(and thus subject to the temporary or longer-term loss of the

civilian

protections that attend this change in "status"), whereas certain other acts will do
so. In

who

law enforcement/stabilization operations,

the operator

the operator's status

is;

it

does not matter nearly so

much

incontrovertibly not that of a direct

is

participant in hostilities because there are, in a

LOAC sense, no hostilities in which

to participate.

Finally,

one very interesting

ROE

which has emerged

issue

casualty incident inquiry reports that Australia
release

from time

to time

is

the status characterization of the person killed. This has
justification are often

When

two-pronged.

some

civilian

and many other TCNs publicly

and uncertainty

the very fluidity

in

that often

meant

surround

that assertions of

explaining a use of lethal force in a

NIAC context, it is not unusual for military personnel to report it as a consequence
of self-defense and the result of a reasonably held belief
vailing at the time

—

that the "target"

was a

fighter

—in the circumstances pre-

member of an OAG.

This para-

digm mixing is not merely an Australian legal oddity. As Constantin von der
Groben observed in relation to the German prosecutor's investigation into the

Kunduz

tanker incident in Afghanistan in 2009 (a scenario involving uncertainty

as to the precise legal

paradigm against which

ambiguity in the

[t]he

with the airstrike
international

is

facts follows

that

armed

it

to assess the conduct),

an ambiguity in the applicable laws. The problem

was unclear whether

it

had been performed

as part of a

non-

conflict in Afghanistan or just as part of a stabilization mission

below the threshold of "armed

The consequence was

conflict."

41

that until the prosecutor settled the issue, there

was un-

certainty as to whether the deaths inflicted stood to be assessed against general Ger-

man

LOAC-based German criminal law

criminal law (self-defense) or separate

(targeting). Similarly, the U.S.

fused

government

—

manner in which the Osama bin Laden

to the public

self-defense

42

—has

as a

consequence of the

"kill/capture" mission

initially

con-

was presented

also faced this "killing a legitimate target" versus "killed in

when he moved to

attack

one of those sent

to arrest

him" justificatory

conundrum. This difficulty in paradigmatic justification rarely arises in the context
of

I

AC

(other than in situations of occupation), where the reason cited for killing

batants,

enemy uniform is generally precisely that they were targetable enemy comand thus legitimate targets under LOAC. Self-defense does not generally

arise in

terms of primary

those in

legal justifications,

that military personnel of each party to the

time

when both

are engaged in

what

their

I

even though, of course,

it is

routine

AC will kill those of the adversary at a

own domestic law would recognize as an
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in extremis situation

Nor does

excuse.

where self-defense was naturally

available as a justification or

this dualist justification present as necessary (or

where

possible) in less-than-NIAC law enforcement contexts,

because

all

indeed legally

status

is

irrelevant

are "civilians"; thus, the available justification for use of lethal force

self-defense

and LOAC-based targeting authorizations are not

One example of this paradigm mixing may be found

is

legally available.

in a publicly released

ADF

Inquiry Officer Report, "Possible Civilian Casualties Resulting from Clearance of a

Compound at
officer

2

Apr

09.

43

In this report, the inquiry

determined that the Australian force element entered a compound where

an insurgent leader was identified
shot and killed a

as

being present and in the clearance process

number of men whom they believed

to be in firing positions

and

But the precise explanation for each death

to be directly participating in hostilities.
is

on

[Redacted], Afghanistan,

said to be "self-defense," although this

is

buttressed with assertions of belief as to

the direct-participation-in-hostilities status of those killed. In
tentially substantive legal issue precisely

my view, this is a po-

because Australian criminal law requires

different standards of assessment for killings in self-defense, as distinct

NIAC of civilians taking a
members of an OAG. Under LOAC, it is

from

kill-

ings in the context of

direct part in hostilities and/or

fighter

clear that "defense" against

an

bound by the same LOAC rules as attack. This logically means, for example, that a soldier cannot use CS gas "in self-defense" against an attack by fighter
members of the adversary OAG, as use of such riot control agents against the LOACtargetable enemy would likely breach Article 1(5) of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 45 It would also mean that the death, injury and destruction caused in the
"attack"

44

is

"defensive" action

LOAC
47

law

would be

assessable against the

conception of proportionality.

46

unique and highly contextual

But "self-defense" in Australian criminal

not bound by the same limitations or assessment

is

criteria.

There

is

no

legal

prohibition on use of a chemical spray (Mace, for example) in self-defense and

LOAC

"proportionality"

ments expressed
sity."

In

my own

is

not the same as the criminal law self-defense require-

in elements

such as "reasonableness," "imminence" and "neces-

view, the concept of a "TIC" (troops in contact) action against

civilians taking a direct part in hostilities/OAG fighters in

plicated this issue

NIAC contexts has com-

by perhaps inadvertently dressing what

is

fundamentally a

LOAC situation of attack and response in the legal rhetoric of urgent self-defense.
do believe that this
that

may be

opposed to

a

is

a sleeper

problem with potentially serious

deleterious for operational confidence

consequences

a claim of "self-defense" (as

LOAC justification) is tested in a domestic court that may take little

or worse, incorrect but precedent setting

and the

if

legal

I

—cognizance of

alternative assessment criteria that
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ROE— East Timor

Less-Than-NIAC

In East Timor, the decision to characterize the conflict as a less-than-NIAC law en-

ROE

forcement/stabilization operation created a different set of

and most significant, was the manner by which
as

between self-defense (where

lethal force

accomplishment (where, for Australia

Working through
ple.

this issue via the

INTERFET ROE contained

is

any

at

norm,

as

it

—

first,

permitted) and, separately, mission
rate, lethal force

mechanism of ROE

is

not permitted).

is

important, but not sim-

a rule apparently authorizing use of force, includ-

NIAC

contexts, such a rule

targeting, status

and

is,

of

of lethal force outside

lays the general authorization for use

self-defense, allowing further rules to then detail

may be employed

The

ROE delineate use-of- force options

ing lethal force, for mission accomplishment. In
course, the

issues.

when and how

this lethal force

identification rules, for example. But in

less-than-NIAC law enforcement operations, Australian criminal law does not
generally countenance use of lethal force other than in self-defense, which was the

UNTAET ROE.

subject of a separate series of rules in the

commander

of

INTERFET

actually restricted use of lethal force to situations of

self-defense only, thus, in effect, reading

In

my

view,

INTERFET

it

conflict
is

is

down the mission accomplishment rule. 48

was both operationally sound and

mission accomplishment rule

The second

ROE

issue in this context

NIAC

characterized as a

—

is

down

than-NIAC

"all

legally necessary to read the

manner.

in this

—one which

is

when

a

United Nations Security

necessary means" authorization

context. That

is,

not an issue where the

lingering uncertainty as to what, precisely,

permissible in terms of use of lethal force

Council Chapter VII

In fact, the Australian

is

to be applied in a less-

does this authorization provide a non-LOAC-based

permission to use lethal force for mission accomplishment where there
of self-defense in play? This

is

a highly

—there

tested view
I

would

is

In

issue

and

specific

my view— and I will readily admit it is a con-

no recognition

also submit) of a "third"

no

complicated question that can only be ana-

lyzed through an ecumenical approach taking both international

TCN domestic law into account.

is

in Australian

law (nor in international law,

paradigm permitting use of lethal force

in pur-

suance of a Security Council mandate, outside of self-defense, in the absence of

armed
zation,
is

conflict.
if

That

is,

the conflict has not been characterized as an

no authority to use

it is

regardless of a Chapter VII "all necessary

not possible to

lethal force for

justify

an

armed

any reason outside

means" authori-

conflict,

then there

self-defense. 49 Therefore,

ROE permitting use of lethal force in

based) mission accomplishment situations on the basis of an

"all

(non-self-defense

necessary means"

authorization.

upon transition to UNTAET and UN ROE, this situation became
even more opaque. The April 28, 2000 UN ROE stated that "UNTAET military
In East Timor,
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Law of
laws." 50 The

personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the

Armed

Conflict

.

.

.

and

to apply the

ROE then detailed "Level of Force"
defense, but also in a series of what

ROE

in

accordance with those

rules that permitted use of lethal force in self-

would otherwise be better understood

as mis-

sion accomplishment-based actions. These rules included authorizations to use
lethal force against

any party who limited or intended to

UNTAET freedom
to prevent UNTAET

limit

of movement, and against any armed party that attempted

UN

personnel from discharging their duty. 51 The issue of what, precisely, the

means when

it

says "self-defense" in the context of

whether "self-defense of the mandate"
mestic legal systems at
tional question.

52

all, is, I

is

UN

operations, and, indeed,

self-defense as understood in

believe, a well obfuscated

many

do-

and often avoided opera-

However, given the Australian characterization of the context

less-than-NIAC law enforcement, any mission accomplishment

as

ROE that allowed

use of lethal force outside of self-defense had to be assessed against the standard of
general Australian criminal law (as that

is

the standard against which a soldier

who

used lethal force would be assessed), not the Australian domestication of

LOAC

—although they were UN ROE—could

not, as

into Australian law.

Thus these rules

a matter of Australian law, be applied

by Australian

forces as drafted, although

it is

TCNs could apply these rules to their fullest extent and still
compliance with their own domestic law.

equally clear that other

remain

in

This general issue discloses a third

ROE challenge inherent in deciding to adopt

a less-than-NIAC law enforcement characterization

—

force protection. In the East

Timor context, this conundrum came to the fore when militia elements recommenced cross-border raiding activity, killed a number of UNTAET Peacekeeping
Force (PKF) members and retreated back into West Timor (Indonesian territory)
for sanctuary. To deal with this, the ROE were amended to provide an "expanded"
definition of hostile act/hostile intent which provided that militia identified as
being armed and moving in a tactical manner could in certain situations be engaged with lethal force "in self-defense." The ROE achieved this by determining
that the PKF could legitimately characterize such conduct as constituting an imminent threat. 53

The

ROE issue that arises, however, is that the consciously considered decision

to characterize a conflict situation as less-than-NIAC law

enforcement when a

NIAC characterization possibility exists carries with it some legal risk.
when

the

bounds of self-defense

of lethal force

—have

—

as the

only available lawful justification for use

to be stretched within the law enforcement

low an adequate response

This results

to a developing threat.
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Treatment of Captured/Detained Personnel
In

many

respects, despite the highly political

and

strategically sensitive nature of

detainee issues in military operations, for Australia this field of endeavor actually
discloses very

little

difference between implementation in

than-NIAC law enforcement/stabilization

NIAC and

that in less-

operations. This admittedly contentious

assertion can be illustrated via a brief examination of the fundamental principles
distilled
specific

from public statements and experience, and uncluttered by contextlegal terminology
applied in detainee operations in East Timor and

—

Afghanistan.
In East Timor, where the structures, institutions,

had

entirely dissolved, they

had

to be rebuilt

from

and agents of law and order

scratch, first

on an interim basis

more enduring basis by UNTAET, prior to full East
May 2002. To cover the gap, Australia established a
Detainee Management Unit (DMU), which comprised an independent military

by INTERFET, and then on
Timorese independence in

a

and

judge, counsel for detainees, a prosecutor

a detention visitor

an independent check on detention processes and conditions.

mandated

ongoing detention, not to

to review

try offenses.

who maintained

54

The

DMU

was

The ultimate aim was

simply to ensure that only those against whom there was a reasonable case of future
prosecution for a serious offense (under the transitional justice system then being
reconstructed) remained in detention.
tention arrangements during

1

The fundamental

INTERFET

are arguably distillable as follows:

Ensuring a process that allowed for quick
of people posing security/stability

Ensuring protection of the relevant

3.

Using
both

as a recognition of the

tory,

and

as a

initial

removal from the

streets

risks.

2.

local criminal or security

principles governing de-

human

rights for detainees.

law as the reason/basis for detention,

primary sovereignty

at

play within the terri-

means of developing and promoting capacity within

that

sovereignty.

4.

Using analogous elements of LOAC, on a policy
basis, to

5.

Having

as

opposed

to dejure

inform detention operations.
in place systems of guarantees for

to treatment

and

Timor criminal

legal processes

fundamental

human

rights as

post-handover into the developing East

justice system.
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when

In Afghanistan,

Uruzgan Province

Australia redeployed to

as a partner

with Dutch forces, the detainee management arrangements reflected the fact that
Australia

had negotiated

a

memorandum

(MOU)

of understanding

with the

Dutch government, under which Dutch forces took full responsibility for the
detention and handover of all Australian-apprehended detainees. The Dutch had
separately negotiated an MOU with the government of Afghanistan that addressed handover and ongoing monitoring arrangements for all detainees (including Australian-"sourced" detainees) who were handed over to Afghan
authorities in line with

On August
full

ISAF arrangements with the government of Afghanistan.

2010, as the Dutch force redeployed out of Uruzgan, Australia took

1,

responsibility for

its

detainees, and, as a consequence, negotiated

MOUs with

Afghanistan and the United States on handover and monitoring arrangements. 55
Despite the very different conflict context
erent party
tal

—there

is

—

a

NIAC

in

which Australia

is

a bellig-

arguably little substantial difference between the fundamen-

principles governing the Australian approach to detention operations in East

Timor under INTERFET and UNTAET, and those governing detention operations in Afghanistan. That is, regardless of the context and the legal paraphernalia
that attends

it

—be

it

NIAC or less-than-NIAC conflict

—

the fundamental princi-

ples governing detention operations are almost indistinguishable.

neath each adapted principle
are taken

distilled

from the Australian Minister

from the INTERFET detention operations

detentions between

1.

December

for Defence's

management arrangements statement and
ments Briefing Paper, and serve

March

his

23, 201

to illustrate the virtually

initial

space of people posing security/stability

risks.

first

tlefield,

1

14,

2010 detainee

Detainee Arrange-

unchanged nature of

INTERFET and Afghanistan:

Ensuring a process that allows for quick

"The

The quotes be-

priority

is

the critical need to

removal from the

battle-

remove insurgents from the

where they endanger Australian, International Security

tance Force and Afghan lives."

bat-

Assis-

56
9

2.

Ensuring protection of the relevant

"The second

priority

ees, consistent

3.

Using

the need to ensure

rights for detainees.

humane

with Australian values and our

local criminal or security

as a recognition of the

a

is

human

treatment of detain-

legal obligations." 57

law as the reason/basis for detention, both

primary sovereignty at play within the territory and as

means of developing and promoting capacity within
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"Once

initial

screening

Afghan or United
dence to
4.

complete, detainees are transferred either to

is

States custody, or released if there

ongoing detention."

justify

is

insufficient evi-

58

Using elements of LOAC, on a policy basis

as

opposed to dejure, to inform

detention operations.
In comparing detention operations across
contexts,
sensitive

I

NIAC and

believe that this "principle" provides the

measurement

tention are

now

as to the degree to

less-than-NIAC

most

interesting

which the two regimes

and

for de-

almost indistinguishable. As the Minister for Defence

observed, "[t]he detainee
international standards
consistent with [that

is,

management framework draws on

applicable

and advice from international organizations.

It is

not based on] the Laws of Armed Conflict and the

Geneva Conventions." 59

NIAC LOAC was

As

will

for

NIAC detention

be evident,

digm. Furthermore,

not described as the governing law

operations, but rather as simply an informing paraI

would hazard

Australian development

—UK

to argue that this

cases (in the

UK

is

not merely an

Court of Appeal and

House of Lords/UK Supreme Court, and before the European Court of
Human Rights), such asAlJedda 60 Al-Skeini61 and Maya Evans, 62 also iny

dicate this trend

toward assessing detention operations

a law enforcement

primarily

5.

Having

Afghan criminal

As the Minister
tralian officials

in

as a

issue.

in place systems of guarantees for

and

NIAC through

and human rights-governed prism, as opposed to

LOAC-governed

to treatment

in

legal processes

fundamental

human

rights as

post-handover into the developing

justice system.

for

Defence

stated:

"A detainee monitoring team of Aus-

monitors detainees' welfare and conditions while they are

US or Afghan custody, until they are released or sentenced. The moni-

toring team visit detainees shortly after transfer

weeks

after the initial visits."

and around every four

63

This makes clear the scope of and arrangements for this post-handover

monitoring are not merely presentational, but are designed to be

effective

and remedial: "This monitoring is underpinned by formal arrangements
with Afghanistan and the US, which include assurances on the
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treatment of detainees and free access by Australian

officials

and human

rights organisations." 64

Indeed, this deep concern with post-handover monitoring, even where the

handover has been to proper representatives of the

territorial sovereignty

damentally human rights-based as opposed to LOAC-based concern
in the recognition,

but general dismissal, of the

—

logistical difficulties

is

—

a fun-

reflected

involved in

"the current requirement for an initial detainee monitoring visit to occur within 72

hours

after a detainee

is

transferred

from the Australian

Initial

Screening Area to

US or Afghan custody." A policy decision to retain this requirement, because it is
65

practically important, regardless of the significant logistical

problems it can pose,

is

indicative of this concern.
It

thus seems reasonably safe to assert,

would argue,

I

that the fundamental

—

Timor and Afghanistan one a
less-than-NIAC context and the other clearly a NIAC LOAC-governed context
are hardly distinguishable. From a purist legal perspective, this may be sound or
unsound, laudable or regrettable. But that is not the point. The practical point is
that this is how operational practice is evolving, and that
in line with the humanize and harmonize agenda which is seeing NIAC squeezed between colonizing tendencies from below (human rights) and above (IAC LOAC)
there has been little
objection to this evolution. Indeed, apart from the detailed requirements of prisoner of war status, processes and regulation that apply in IAC, it is fast becoming
arguable that detention operations in armed conflict have now been almost completely colonized by the human rights paradigm and law enforcement sensibilities.
principles governing detention operations in East

—

—

Conclusion

The Australian

experience,

I

believe, clearly illustrates that in potential

contexts, conflict characterization decisions

—from which almost
lead —

dinate operational legal issues will take their

policy approach.

And from

are subject to a

LOAC
facts

purists

who

I

accept that this

soldier

is

is

legal/

this

will take

a potentially contentious conclusion for

rationale for the purist view

most humanitarian explanation of

wounded

mixed

and ROE,

will insist that characterization decisions are

on the ground." The

other subor-

this initial stepping-off point, core subsidiary opera-

tions law decisions, such as characterization of the adversary,
their divergent leads.

all

NIAC

is

only about "the

well expressed in Pictet's

seemingly clear and simple principle: "A

not more deserving, or

less deserving,

of medical treatment

according to whether his Government does, or does not, recognize the existence
of a state of war." 66

313

An Australian
I

Perspective on Non-International Armed Conflict

respectfully disagree that the characterization obligation,

the threshold between

NIAC and

less-than-NIAC conflict contexts,

being read in such a purist, black
rely

on

"facts" has always

been a

fairly self-evident indicators.

old between

when

letter

call to

dealing with

capable of

is

law manner. The purist admonition to

an objective

test

using a narrow range of

But the jurisdictional "facts" that inhabit the thresh-

NIAC and less-than-NIAC

conflict contexts are significantly less ob-

than in prospective IAC situations, quite apart from lingering

jective

uncertainties as to

how NIAC

conflict" occurring in the

on which

side of the law

IAC or "internationalized internal armed
same battlespace. The "facts" relevant to determining
relates to

enforcement/NIAC threshold

a situation falls involve as-

and

sessing highly flexible concepts such as violence, banditry, terrorism

As Geoffrey Best observes of
Conventions, "[t]hey had
they to

know

they to

tell it

this

mob

conundrum

known what an

a non-international

from

legal

violence,

for the negotiators of the

threat.

Geneva

war was, but how were

international

armed conflict when they saw one? How were
riots, and banditry?
These were not silly or
.

necessarily non-humanitarian questions."

.

.

67

Genuflection to the objective finality of the "facts" has never been, and

still is

not, the full picture in characterization at the less-than-NIAC civil disturbance/

NIAC threshold.

I

believe that this assessment

experience of East

Timor and Afghanistan

"Australian approach to

NIAC"

is

readily evidenced in the Australian

—two

conflict contexts in

(to the extent that a distinct

which the

approach could be

been played out down very different paths. In both contexts, the

said to exist) has

decision as to conflict characterization as

NIAC

or less-than-NIAC

civil distur-

bance was not only intensely political, but also subject to a high degree of reverberation in that each decision clearly indicates that subordinate issues

whether to make
not

—can

—such

as

lethal targeting authorizations available to the country's forces or

influence the preliminary conflict characterization decision.

Notes
1.

tional
2.

Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and Interna-

Human

Rights

Law

in Situations

of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310 (2007).
Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry

See, e.g., the differing conclusions in

on the 31 May 2010

Flotilla

Incident

H 69-81

GazaFlotillaPanelReport.pdf; Jacob Turkel et

Maritime Incident of 31

May 2010,

ffll

(2011), available at http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/
al.,

13-1 12 (201

1

1),

The Public Commission

to

Examine the

available at http://turkel-committee.gov.il/

files/wordocs//87072002 11 english.pdf; Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, Report on
the Israeli Attack

on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy

to

Gaza on 31

May 2010,

at

60-99 (201

1),

available at http://gazaflotilla.delegitimize.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/official-turkish
-inquiry.pdf.

314

.

Rob McLaughlin
For example, on Afghanistan 2001-11 see generally Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Bor-

3.

and

derlines

Conflicts:

Non-International

The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide between International and

Armed

Conflicts, 91

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 35

(2009);

James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian
Law: A Critique of Internationalised Armed Conflict, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 313 (2003); Dawn Steinhoff, Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with Engaging Non-State Armed Groups, 45 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 297 (2009); Annyssa
Belial, Gilles

Giaca

ghanistan, 93
4.

& Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Af-

International Review of the Red Cross

l,

5-7 (201

1).

This labeling was maintained even though the proposed solution was cast in terms of

language more traditionally associated with

NIAC

contexts

—"self-determination,"

"political

settlement" and so on. See Mr. Prime Minister John Major, Ireland (Joint Declaration), Dec. 15,
1993, 234 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1993) 1071-82 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications

The

.parliament.uk/pa/cml99394/cmhansrd/1993-12-15/Debate-l.html.

maintained

this discipline in characterizing the situation

United

Kingdom

throughout the entire operation in

Northern Ireland, including through peaks of violence such as in 1970-71, when (for example)
the Joint Security Committee was concerned to ensure "balanced reporting" of what was "a near-

war situation." See generally Conclusions of a Meeting of the Joint Security Committee Held on
Thursday 4 February 1971 in Stormont Castle at 1130 AM, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
proni/1971/proni_HA-32-3-5_1971-02-04.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). See also Prime
Minister's Meeting with Home Secretary - Wednesday 4 February 1970, ffl| 1, 12, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/proni/1970/proni_CAB-9-G-91-2_1970-02-04.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
201 1). Both provide examples of the UK government's stress upon a law enforcement approach
to the situation.
5.

See generally United Nations Operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM)

MEMORIAL, http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_20244.asp

1992,

AUSTRALIAN WAR

Nov. 21, 2011) ("The
Australians were based in Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector, west of Mogadishu. The Australian contingent in Baidoa had four main roles: maintain a secure environment in Baidoa; maintain a presence in the surrounding countryside; protect aid convoys; and assist in the equitable
(last visited

distribution of aid.").
6.

See, e.g.,

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

s

10.4 (Austl.) ("self-defence"), available at http://

www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/ (then follow Key Resources hyperlink; then follow Criminal Code

Act 1995 hyperlink).
7.

Id.,

div268.

See, e.g., JOHN MARTINKUS, A DIRTY LITTLE WAR XV (2001).
australian defence force military law centre, law and military
Operations in East Timor Sept 1999-Feb 2000: Lessons Learnt for Legal Officers 12
(2000) [hereinafter EAST TIMOR LESSONS LEARNT]
,
8.

9.

10.

Id.

1999,HH

See also Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili, 8 to 12 September

7, 11,

14-26, U.N. Doc. S/1999/976 (Sept. 14, 1999), available at http://daccess-dds-ny

.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/262/20/PDF/N9926220.pdf?OpenElement.
11. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 1 562 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://www.icty.Org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/
tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
1

2.

Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

Howard, Prime Minister)
13.

Press Conference

House of Representatives,

1

7 September 200 1 30739 (John
,

(Austl.).

on

U.S. -Led Response, Prime Minister John

Howard

(Oct. 4, 2001),

transcript available at http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/intl/oct/0104/australia.html.

315

An Australian Perspective on Non-International Armed Conflict
Security Treaty between Australia,

14.
1,

New Zealand, and the United States of America, Sept.

1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/

treaties/1952/2.html.

Press Statement, Prime Minister John

15.

Howard, Howard Government Invokes

ANZUS

Treaty (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://australianpolitics.com/news/2001/01-09-14c.shtml.

Prime Minister Howard spoke of the Al Qaeda/Taliban attacks on the United
assault

upon

its

territorial integrity," clearly indicating a

preciation of the conflict context, as

opposed

to viewing

States as "an

open

militarized/armed conflict-based ap-

it

as a

law enforcement challenge. Cth,

Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 September 2001, 31684 (John Howard,

Prime Minister) (Austl.).
1 6.
Stephen Smith, Minister

for Defence,

Paper on Afghanistan (Mar. 23, 20 1

1 ),

available at

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/03/23/minister-for-defence-paper-presented-by-the
-minister-for-defence-stephen-smith-on-afghanistan/ [hereinafter Paper on Afghanistan (Mar.

23,2011)].
17.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the

Protection of Victims of International
ter

Armed Conflicts, June 8,

1977,

1

125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-

API].
18.

See, e.g., East

Timor

(Port, v Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90

ffl[

16-17 (]une 30), available at http://

www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/84/6949.pdf.
19.

See,

e.g.,

Michael Kelly

et al.,

Legal Aspects ofAustralia's Involvement in the International

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
Council mission reported that the violence in East Timor after the

101 (2001) ("The Security

Force for East Timor, 83

ballot could not

have oc-

curred without the involvement of large elements of the Indonesian military and police, concluding that the Indonesian authorities were either unwilling or unable to provide an

environment

May agreements."). The then Australian
Downer, was explicit on this point: "We have made the point that

for the peaceful

Foreign Minister, Alexander

there are clearly links between

not a matter that

is

implementation of the 5

members of the [Indonesian military] and the militias, and that is

debated any longer even by the [Indonesian military]

sian government." Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

9927 (Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
20.

itself or

by the Indone-

House of Representatives, 20 September

1999,

(Austl.).

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to

the Protection of Victims of Non-International

Armed

Conflicts, June 8,

1977, 1125

U.N.T.S. 609.

Wounded and Sick in Armed
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
21.

Convention

Forces in the Field

art. 3,

Aug.

for the Amelioration of the

art. 3,

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,

Prisoners of War

Condition of the

Aug. 12,1 949, 6 U.S.T. 3 1

1

4,

75 U.N.T.S. 3 1 Convention for the
;

75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Aug. 12,1 949, 6 U.S.T. 33 1 6, 75 U.N.T.S. 1 35; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.

287 [hereinafter
22.

art. 3,

GC IV].

See S.C. Res. 1264, pmbl.,

ffll

4, 5,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264

the statement by the President of Indonesia

on

("Welcoming
which he expressed the

(Sept. 15, 1999)

12 September 1999 in

readiness of Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force through the United Nations in

Welcomes the expressed commitment of the Government ofIndonesia to cooperate
with the multinational force in all aspects of the implementation of its mandate and looks forward
to close coordination between the multinational force and the Government of Indonesia; 5. UnEast Timor"; "4.

Government of Indonesia's continuing responsibility under the Agreements of 5 May
1999, taking into account the mandate of the multinational force set out in paragraph 3 above,

derlines the

316

.

Rob McLaughlin
to

maintain peace and security

popular consultation and the

in

East Timor in the interim phase between the conclusion of the

start

of the implementation of its result and to guarantee the secu-

of the personnel and premises of UNAMET.") (emphasis added).

rity

East Timor Lessons Learnt, supra note

23.

24.

GC IV, supra note 2

25.

Id.,

9, at 23.

1

Annex E: Defence

Geneva Convention of 1949

on the Application of the Fourth
Deployment of the ADF to East Timor (Sept. 3,

Legal Office Policy Statement
to Possible

1999).
26.

Id.,

1ffl

13-14.

Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002
Nils Melzer, International

27.

_0990.pdf.

James Risen,

28.

(Aug.

9,

29.

U.S. to

Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords

Tied to Taliban,

NEW YORK TIMES

2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html.

& Jon Boone, US puts Afghan drug lords on hit list to disrupt
THE GUARDIAN (UNITED KINGDOM), Aug. 10, 2009, International, at 17, avail-

Richard Norton-Taylor

Taliban finances,

able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/ 1 0/us-policy-drugs-afghanistan-taliban.

Dan Karpenchuk, NATO

30.

troops to go after Afghan drug lords,

ABC NEWS

(Feb. 7, 2009),

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-02-07/nato-troops-to-go-after-afghan-drug-lords/286182.
Press Statement, Joel Fitzgibbon, Minister for Defence, Australian Artillerymen

31.

to Afghanistan in

Support of UK Operations (Mar.

Deploy

13, 2008), available at http://defence.gov.au/

minister/70tpl.cfm?CurrentId=7498.
Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

32.

House of Representatives, 23 March 2011, 2969 (Stephen

Smith, Minister for Defence) (Austl.).
Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

33.

Danby)
34.

House of Representatives, 30 June

Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

House of Representatives, 20 September

Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

ment
ited

1999, 9926 (Alex-

(Austl.).

House of Representatives, 20 September

ander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
37.

1999, 7929 (Alexander

for Foreign Affairs) (Austl.).

ander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs)
36.

1999, 10279 (Michael

(Austl.).

Cth, Parliamentary Debates,

Downer, Minister
35.

House of Representatives, 22 September

1999, 9928 (Alex-

(Austl.).

See Australian Government, Department of Defence, Fact Sheet: Australia's

Commit-

in Afghanistan, http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/info/factsheet.htm (last vis-

Nov. 21, 2011). See

12, 2011), available at

also

Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, Paper on Afghanistan (May

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/05/12/paper-by-presented-by

-minister-for-defence-stephen-smith-on-afghanistan/ [hereinafter Papef on Afghanistan

(May

12,2011)].
38.

and brief outlines of Rule 421 and Series 41 in the NATO
BUMGARDNER ET AL., NATO LEGAL DESKBOOK 255-56 (2d ed.

See, for example, the definitions

Legal Deskbook.

SHERROD

L.

2010), available at https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Library/Legal/LEGALDESKB/file/_WFS/

LEGAL%20DESKBOOK%20FIN%20AL%20version%20-%2022%20SEPT%202010.pdf.
39. Id. at

256 (emphasis added). The employment of "forces" and "targets" as the descriptors

of the subjects of the rule clearly links

this

and authorizations, not those relevant to

conception of hostile intent to LOAC-based status

hostile intent in the context of individual or unit self-

defense in domestic criminal law.

317

An Australian Perspective on Non-International Armed Conflict
Dennis Mandsager et al., International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San
Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement 3-4, 22-25, 82 (2009), available at http://www
.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/ROE%20handbook%20ENG%20May%202011%20PRINT%20RUN
40.

.pdf.

Constantin von der Groben, Criminal Responsibility of German Soldiers
The Case of Colonel Klein, 1 1 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 469, 475 (2010).
41.

42.

See, e.g.,

James

J.

Zogby,

A

Bungled

PR

in

Afghanistan:

Job Keeps the Bin Laden Controversy Alive,

AL

ARABIYA NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/05/08/148269.html
?PHPSESSID=7dhvn5ksaknrltl3vphk32l9k0.
43. Available at http://www.defence.gov.au/coi/reports/IOReport20090402Slipper.pdf. See

combined reading of paragraphs 9, 12-13, 18, 22-23, 25-27 and 31-32.
supra note 17, art. 49(1) ("Attacks means acts of violence against the adversary,

the bivalence inherent in a

AP

44.

whether

I,

in offence or defence.").

45. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1(5), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 ("Each
State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a

AP

supra note 17,

51-52, 57.

46.

See

47.

Criminal Code Act 1995, supra note

defence

if

I,

and only

or another person

.

if
.

.

arts.

method of warfare.").

6, s 10.4(2)

he or she believes the conduct

and the conduct

is

is

("A person carries out conduct in

self-

necessary: (a) to defend himself or herself

a reasonable response in the circumstances as

he or she

perceives them.").
48.
49.

East Timor Lessons Learnt, supra note 9, at 38.
My view on this issue is more fully described in Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Ap-

plicable to Use of Lethal Force

When

Operating under a United Nations Security Council Chapter

VII Mandate Authorising "All Necessary Means, "

1

2

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW

389 (2007).
50. UN ROE for the Military Component of the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNTAET) (MPS/3633) U 7(b) (Apr. 28, 2000), reprinted in Australian Defence Force, Military
Law Centre, Law and Military Operations in East Timor (UNTAET) Feb 2000-May 2002, An-

nexure
51.

X (2002).
M, 17(b),

Rules 1.9 and 1.10.

TREVOR FlNDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS (2002).
Law Centre, Law and Military Operations in East
Timor (UNTAET) Feb 2000-May 2002, 23 (2002); Dale Stephens, Military Involvement in Law
Enforcement, 92 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 453, 462-63 (2010).
52.

See generally

53.

Australian Defence Force, Military

54.

See Kelly

55.

Press Statement, Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence, Detainee

et al.,

supra note

19.

Management in Afghani-

stan (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/Smithtpl.cfm?CurrentId=l 1212 [hereinafter Detainee

Management

in Afghanistan].

56.

Paper on Afghanistan (Mar. 23, 201

57.

Id.

58.

Detainee

59.

Paper on Afghanistan (Mar. 23, 2011), supra note 16 (my

Management

1),

supra note

16.

in Afghanistan, supra note 55.

comment and emphasis

added).
60.

R (on the application of Al-Jedda)v. Secretary of State for Defence,

v. United Kingdom, 27021/08 Eur.
cases/ECHR/201 l/1092.html.

Jedda

[2007]

UKHL58;A1-

Ct. H.R. (201 1), available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/

318

Rob McLaughlin
61.

Al-Skeini and Others

v.

Secretary of State for Defence, [2007]

Others v. United Kingdom, 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (201

UKHL 26; Al-Skeini and

1),

available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/

v.

Secretary of State for Defence, [2010]

cases/ECHR/201 l/1093.html.
62.

EWHC

The Queen (on

the application of Maya Evans)

1445 (Admin).

63.

Paper on Afghanistan (Mar. 23, 201

64.

Id.

65.

Paper on Afghanistan (May

1),

12, 2011),

supra note

16.

supra note 37 ("In the period

1

August 2010 to 8

May 201 1, Australia apprehended 590 detainees. Of these, 81 have been transferred to Afghan
authorities and 40 to US authorities. The remainder have been released following initial
screening.").
66. Commentary to Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded and Sick in armed Forces in the Field 29 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952).
67. Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945, at 174 (1994).

319

PART VII
DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL

ARMED CONFLICTS

XV
Detention of Terrorists in the
Twenty-first Century

William K. Lietzau*
I.

Of

all

the instruments of power that

terests,

dict

Introduction

none

yields collateral

may be employed to further national in-

consequences that are more

difficult to pre-

And with respect to the past decade's use

than the unleashing of military force.

of that instrument, no consequence has engendered more debate, confusion or
passion than U.S. detention policy. This article attempts to clarify the reasons for

—explaining

the controversy surrounding the policy

it

primarily as a function of

the nature of twenty-first-century warfare, as opposed to competing political or
ideological perspectives, as

many

claim.

It

then proffers a vision for moving past

the controversy.

At

first,

few recognized the juridical stressors associated with a twenty-first-

century armed conflict steeped in terrorism; most simply looked to old laws to address this

new

type of conflict. In this context a

wider with the years of conflict. Today, even
1

the United States the burdens of

comfort with U.S.

legal

armed

rift

many

conflict

began to form and grew ever
nations willing to share with

have expressed significant

dis-

endeavors related to detention. 2 This dissonance and the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Rule of Law and Detainee Policy. This article is adapted
from a speech given at Harvard University Law School in February 201 1 at a conference titled
"Understanding Detention and Predicting Prosecutions: Legal Challenges and Legislative Options Ten Years After 9/ 1 1 ." The views in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the United States government.
*
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disquiet

among our

plans, diminished

its

have impeded the United

allies

effectiveness in fighting terrorism

work that must be done to
ahead.
States

It is

and

not

much

its allies

States'

establish

an

effective legal

implementation of its

and stymied the important

regime for the longer conflict

of a stretch to assert that the manner in which the United

take

up these challenges may very well

reflect the

most endur-

ing impact of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, history teaches that changes in the law often

among

rank
first

the most noteworthy consequences of war.

to diagnose correctly the

The

goal, then,

problem confronting the United

identify the prescription that will yield a principled, credible

States

should be

and then

to

and sustainable de-

tention policy.

The

thesis

is

simple. Authority to detain

and regulation of the conditions of de-

tention in the context of armed conflict derive most appropriately from the law of

war. As such, the general rules should be uncontroversial

—armies have captured

and detained enemy fighters for years. But today's war is different: the enemy is not
a State,
ily

its

fighters are not lawful

combatants and the end of this

conflict

discerned. Extant law of war was not written for today's conflict,

is

not eas-

and an analysis

of it therefore exposes gaps that offend our twenty- first- century sensibilities. Fore-

most among the lacunae

who

is

the absence of appropriate processes for determining

can and should be detained and for

how long. The

solution, then,

today's efforts to identify the process that best ensures that
lawfully can detain and, even then, only those

whose

is

found

in

we detain only those we

threat

is

so substantial that

it

can be mitigated only by detention.

II.

Identifying the

Paradigm

The most fundamental component of controversy associated with the post-9/11
armed conflict is the confluence of legal regimes available to guide detentions.
Soon after 9/11, President George W. Bush made clear that he viewed al Qaeda's attack as an act of war, 3 the response to which would include military force. 4 What
became known as the "global war on terror" had begun. When President Barack H.
Obama took office, he distanced himself from some of the more controversial policies of his predecessor, and he discarded from the conflict's lexicon the terms
"global" and "terror." But he did not abandon the legal framework of armed conflict. President Obama, with deliberate clarity, still used the vocabulary of war
when describing the conflict with al Qaeda, 5 including in his Nobel Peace Prize
acceptance speech, where he explained

duty to engage in armed

conflict.

policy over the past decade

is

6

why peace-loving nations sometimes have a

Fundamental

to understanding U.S. detention

the comprehension that authority for detention flows

from the nature of warfare and the law of war that regulates
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As such, one would anticipate

would be

that

anyone captured during an armed

dealt with as a prisoner of war, without substantial debate. For centuries,

armies have captured and detained

enemy fighters;

sension that would

practice today. Indeed,

by

this

conflict

accompany the

author (Detainee Policy) did not

few,

if any,

on

anticipated the dis9/1

1,

the office held

humanitarian norms associ-

exist; basic

ated with wartime detention were well understood by the United States' highly
trained

armed

tention policy

and

forces

a

deputy assistant secretary-level position to oversee de-

would have seemed

like substantial overkill.

There are several explanations for the adverse global reaction to such a fundamental and heretofore uncontroversial component of warfighting, but the primary

one

been an issue of debate. The

that the very status of this conflict as a "war" has

is

clarion call to

war discussed above has not always been

ony of other instruments

at

work

—most

tion to his call to arms, President Bush's
that terrorists

discernible

amid the cacoph-

notably, that of law enforcement. In addi-

first

post-9/1

1

speech included the promise

7

would be brought to justice. President Obama's 2009 Archives speech

similarly suggested a preference for criminal judicial processes. 8 Indeed, prior to
9/11, law

enforcement had traditionally been the tool of choice for addressing terror-

ism, both domestically

and

in the international realm. 9

the view that law enforcement

is

Many continue to

the "right" paradigm for the conflict today. 10

This article takes the view that, both in 2001 and today, war was and

paradigm to apply in characterizing the

rect

sue of detention.

On

adhere to

September

is

the cor-

conflict itself and in addressing the

12, 2001, the

is-

United Nations Security Council

passed a resolution expressly recognizing the United States' right to self-defense. 11

Days

later,

the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took the unprece-

dented step of passing a collective defense resolution, citing Article 5 of the
Charter. 12

NATO

ANZUS and Rio Pact nations passed similar resolutions, 13 and the U.S.

Congress, on September 13, enacted a joint resolution authorizing the President to
use

"all

necessary and appropriate force against those involved in the terrorist at-

tacks of 9/1 1." 14 In the early days after 9/11, there
sal

recognition that the felling of New York's

nation's military headquarters

seemed

tallest

buildings and a section of the

had ignited an armed

But acceptance of that paradigm waned

as the

to be ar\ almost univer-

conflict in the truest sense.

population

at

Guantanamo

grew.

Indeed, criticism of the "war" paradigm emerged in 2002 as a collateral ramification of criticism of wartime detention policies. First
tion's decision that

war.

15

came

the

Bush administra-

captured combatants would not be considered prisoners of

The apparent

geographic reach of the United States' war-making

limitless

authorities ("global"), as well as the absence of a clear delineation of the
("terror"), caused substantial

rule of law itself

was

at risk.

enemy

concern in the international community that the

And

yet,

although there are substantial flaws in the
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syllogism that leads from discomfort with current policies to denial of the existence

of a war, the suggestion that

this

can be treated as a law enforcement problem

is

not

without sound precedent.
First,

there

is

the simple fact that the citizenry of the United States have not been

witness to long-term law of war detention of enemy prisoners since

World War

Both the Korean and Vietnam wars involved prisoners detained by our
Prisoners of war were held for only brief periods of time in the

more

detention periods were even shorter in the

first

II.

local allies.

Gulf War, and

limited conflicts that punctuated

the interludes.

More important,
tacks

—

at least

prior to 9/1

1

the principal

means

those without a clear State sponsor

for dealing with terrorist at-

—was

that of law enforcement.

on the ground were killed in the
bombing of Pan American Flight 103. 16 The first Bush administration treated the
problem of apprehending suspects as one of diplomacy and extradition; 17 it was
clearly a law enforcement matter. In the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, six
and

In 1988, 259 people aboard the plane

11

people were killed and more than one thousand injured. 18

Law enforcement officials

conducted an extensive investigation, resulting ultimately in the apprehension, extradition, trial

and conviction

bombing, including Sheik

in U.S. District

Court of most of the suspects

Omar Abdel Rahman.

19

Again,

in the

we observe an unques-

tionably law enforcement response.

The 1998 embassy bombings
claimed the

lives

Tanzanians.

20

States

es

Salaam, Tanzania

more than two hundred Kenyans and

of twelve Americans and

The United

Kenya and Dar

in Nairobi,

conducted a one-strike military response, 21 and

issued indictments against fifteen individuals, four of whom were apprehended by

foreign governments, extradited to the United States,
U.S. District Court.

law enforcement
military

22

and

tried

and convicted

Despite the mixed military and law enforcement response,

efforts

appear to have been both primary and sustained, while the

component was

less significant

and

transitory. 23

In recent years, international efforts to address the law as

it

relates to terrorism

have yielded a number of international agreements relevant to countering the
rorist threat.

As with domestic

a predisposition

tack

in

legislation,

however, these conventions also

ter-

reflect

toward law enforcement. The United States responded to the

on the Khobar Towers complex housing

at-

U.S. military personnel in Saudi

Arabia both by launching a law enforcement investigation and by commencing an
international initiative that ultimately resulted in the negotiation

Bombing Convention.

and entry into

24

United States has attempted to

Through the United Nations, the
shore up weaknesses in the law enforcement model

through

treaties establishing a

regime of aut dedere autpunire (extradite or prose-

25

Other examples of the campaign to reinforce the

force of the Terrorist

cute) for terrorism offenses.
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law enforcement archetype in countering transnational armed groups include

and

U.S. support for the Terrorist Financing Convention

Terrorism Convention.

efforts

toward a Nuclear

26

on law enforcement to comincluding Canada, France, Germany,

Internationally, other countries traditionally rely

bat terrorism as well.
Israel,

Numerous

countries,

Colombia, Russia and the United Kingdom, have established programs to

combat terrorism that, while markedly different in organization and process, share
striking similarities: each vests

primary responsibility for response to

dents in a designated central authority, typically

terrorist inci-

national or local police; each

its

embraces a national counterterrorism policy involving a variety of strategies,

in-

cluding intelligence collection, police presence and various physical security measures;

and each primarily

relies

on

its

general criminal laws to prosecute terrorists,

although most also have specific terrorism-related laws that allow for special investigation or prosecution modalities and increased penalties. Taken together, these

components evidence an across-the-board, unambiguous

reliance

on the law en-

27

The respective British and Spanish
responses to terrorist-sponsored suicide bombings in the London subway and Madrid's rail system confirmed Europe's staunch reliance on the law enforcement
model to fight terrorism. 28 And India's response to the Mumbai attack is indicative
of the paradigm's favored status even in conflict-torn South Asia. In the same vein,
the United States' choice of fora in which to prosecute persons accused in the first
forcement paradigm in countering terrorism.

few years

after 9/11

was limited

solely to the federal criminal court system. 29

The fact that law enforcement was used in the past is not a compelling argument
for its post-9/1 1 prevalence, however. The predominant global perspective immediately after 9/11 appears to have manifested itself as an acknowledgment that law
enforcement had failed. Generally, civilizations prefer to live in peace, addressing
minor, disruptive violence with law enforcement tools designed for a peaceful
of existence. But no one was interested in status quo after 9/1
at

war with the United

conflict

One

was viewed by

its

but

its

Al Qaeda had been

attack of 2001 changed the

way that

others.

could explain the United

function of
history

States for years,

1.

state

relatively

States' relatively

unique victimization

would miss the mark. The United

unique post-9/11

at the time.

States

still

shift as a

But such a reading of

approaches terrorism as a law

Qaeda that is viewed differently. In the fall of 2001, the United States went to war with al Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization with global reach, and its territorial sponsors, the
Taliban. In hindsight, having substantially degraded the organization and collected massive amounts of intelligence revealing al Qaeda's objectives and
enforcement matter;

it is

the distinct conflict with
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capabilities,

it

conflict could

can be seen that only the massive effort that amounted to an armed

have brought

down Osama

III.

Identifying the Problem

Acknowledging the confluence of

armed conflict,

bin Laden.

legal regimes,

we

turn to the law governing

the lex specialise which recognizes that in time of war there has been

a disruption of the peacetime legal regime. 30 Because warfare

experience,

and the capture of enemy forces

one would expect

al

—

of the relevant bodies of law

and domestic orders throughout the
the United States put boots

last

new to human

might naturally prevail

Qaeda's war with the United States and

to challenge both the initial choice-of-law question
tive tenets

not

certainly not unfamiliar to warfare,

is

that traditional detention modalities

without fanfare. But

is

and the

its allies

continues

limits of the constitu-

tenets that largely defined international

half of the twentieth century.

on the ground

in Afghanistan,

it

Soon

after

became apparent

that

many of the most familiar jus in hello precepts were simply inapplicable to, or inadequate

for,

armed

State organization

conflict of this type

—armed

employing terrorism

as

its

conflict with a transnational

modus

non-

operandi.

A graphic may assist in understanding and explaining the legal regimes in play
does not exist in

with respect to terrorist detention. This chart,

artificial in that it

any positive statement of international law,

nonetheless useful in reflecting the

is

disparate nature of applicable legal regimes that attend the detention of terrorists.

International

Law

Public International

e

Law

Law

Law

of Peace

lex generalis

Z
Human

Rights

of

\

War

lex specialis

^

jus ad
d bellum

Humanitari;
Humanitarian

Law

jus

Unprivileged Belligerents

Law

in bello
belk

^^m

Privileged Belligerents

Geneva Conventions

Criminal Procedure

Purpose: Punishment

Purpose: Protection against future threat

for past act

Standard: Proof beyond reasonable doubt

Standard:

Domestic Law
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The

left

side of the chart depicts the lexgeneralis of a peacetime society, labeled

"law of peace."
ues

On the right side is the lex specialis of the law of war. As one contin-

down the left side, human

issues.

law

rights

identified as

is

And, more important, crossing the

international norms, criminal procedure

line into

is

most relevant

to detention

domestic implementation of

depicted as the body of law that pro-

vided authority for terrorist criminal detention throughout most of the twentieth

body of law applicable to any criminal trial (whether by
federal court or military commission). It is the body of law to which habeas judges
naturally first looked in their initial Guantanamo cases, and it is the only body of
law on this chart that is constituent in the curriculum of every American law student. Even a law student who elects to study international law is more likely to focentury.

cus

on

It

represents the

lexgeneralis than

least in

its less

frequently utile wartime counterpart. Moreover, at

previous generations, jus in hello was likely to get short shrift relative to

its

more engaging counterparties ad helium. That is changing, but the point is that
throughout most of the past decade, lawyers both in the United States and abroad
intuitively devolved to the criminal law model when seeking lawful justification
for the detention of terrorists.

Guantanamo detention facility, very few even seemed to be aware that a wartime model for terrorist
detention existed. Historically, the United States has not used the law of war model
Conversely, in the days following the establishment of the

for the detention of terrorists; the

law enforcement model was the focus of

counterterrorism policies for the better part of the
to the law of armed conflict.

half century. 31

Few looked

empty boxes more significantly designate,
body of law, one would find a paucity of domestic

And,

even were one to consult that

last

as the

implementing legislation associated with the authority to detain. Indeed, even a direct application of

and

Geneva law

yields

detain. Authority to capture

is

no applicable

inferred,

positive authority to capture

and while the Third Convention

ognizes the propriety of internment for prisoners of war in international
conflict,

32

Finally,

such positive authority

is

absent for non-international

and most relevant to the international Tawyer,

armed

rec-

armed

conflict.

a review of the law of war

standards applicable to this particular conflict reveals significant omissions.

Geneva

law, especially as

prisoners of war

—

it

pertains to detention,

is

focused on the treatment of

a category principally constituted

forces of a State that

is

by members of the armed

party to the Conventions, in conflict with another State

party to the Conventions. 33 Rules applicable to a conflict "not of an international
character," 34
in

if

that even accurately describes a conflict halfway

which the United

States

is

joined by the

countries, are scant to say the least. 35
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At
ent

essence, the United States'

its

that against al

is

first

and most

essential

armed

conflict at pres-

Qaeda, a transnational armed group in which none of the

members qualify for prisoner of war status. 36 Thus, it is no surprise that few turned
to the law of war as the appropriate
ists.

And, even

bello,

paradigm

the polity were completely

if

for the post-9/1

immersed

1

detention of terror-

in the finer points ofjws in

we would find little positive authority or guidance for the detention of an

emy that

en-

does not qualify for prisoner of war protections under even the most ex-

pansive reading of the Third Geneva Convention, yet
adversary in the conflict.

37

indisputably the primary

is

There are no "privileged belligerents" among those

whom the United States opposes.
Because of these unique circumstances, criticism of U.S. detention policies

memorialized
initially

in iconic

embodied
38

Conventions.

in a claim that the

United States was "violating" the Geneva

These claims morphed into the

that this "global

extend to

—was

photographs from the early days of Guantanamo Bay

war on

this type

terror"

was not even

a

slightly

more

defensible assertion

war because the law of war did not

of undefined conflict. Indeed, President Bush's moniker fueled

recrimination as the geographically

unbounded nature of the term

"global

war on

terror" disquieted those already uncomfortable with U.S. assertions of jus

bellum authority to use the military instrument.

of force was a

more

common noun
armed

traditional

Nevertheless,
differences

armed

—

—

terror

—only

39

ad

That the target of the application

further distanced the endeavor

from

conflict. 40

we have had two

U.S. presidents

—separated by wide

ideological

similarly conclude that U.S. national security interests necessitate an

conflict with a transnational

armed

to the conclusion that a radically different

detention paradigm will

To jump then

—and inherently unsuitable—peacetime

work to bridge jus

tractive to a litigious society happily

terrorist organization. 41

in bello's gaps,

although conceptually at-

governed by the rule of law,

is

simply not

sustainable.

Proof of

this

is

found

in

the

Obama

administration's attempt to close

Guantanamo Bay and its focused effort to scrutinize thoroughly the case of each
Guantanamo detainee. The U.S. government made every effort to diminish the
population of detainees at Guantanamo by identifying criminals for prosecution,
as well as candidates for release or transfer to

another country. 42

these truly unprecedented efforts, the senior-most

And

members of

yet, despite

the President's

national security team determined unanimously that at least forty-eight detainees

could be neither prosecuted nor transferred. 43 As President
in his Archives speech, "[t]hese are people

United

States."

44
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Some who cling to the polemic of past years may claim that the lot of these fortyeight detainees

simply a function of evidence so tainted by misdirected interro-

is

gation techniques that a successful prosecution option was rendered impossible.

But such an argument

complex problem, and

to further the effort to solve this

to recognize the radically different purposes

it fails

the

fails

and circumstances

that attend

two disparate detention paradigms.

Looking to the
point

legal

liberty. In the

is

arrested based

on

regime associated with criminal procedure, the starting

United

States, citizens

walk

freely in the streets unless

a police officer's probable cause belief that a crime has

committed and the individual

to be detained

committed

it.

45

been

Within forty-eight

must convince an independent magistrate of that
probable cause; to avoid release on bail pending disposition of charges, a convincing case of dangerousness or flight risk must be made, 47 a lawyer must be prohours, the arresting officer
46

vided, 48

Miranda

rights

must be read 49 and

a speedy trial clock begins to tick. 50 In

order to convict a pretrial detainee of the underlying offense that led to his or her
detention, a prosecutor

ment of an

must prove

to a jury beyond a reasonable

offense for which the individual

is

charged.

51

Once

sentencing authority can decide whether to set the individual
further detention (incarceration) of the individual

human
far

rights

more

law provides in the United

refined

States.

free

by the adversary. To

Under
able

or whether
is

what
is

rights law.

A member of the enemy force

only to the extent that he or she can avoid death or capture

enemy's starting point

a U.S. soldier, the

the law of war, combatants

member

free,

warranted. This

and nuanced than the antecedent human

armed conflict is

this occurs, the

Our domestic implementation

But in war, the starting point is radically different.
in

is

doubt every ele-

may be

as a target.

lawfully shot dead simply for being a

—

enemy force there is no requirement
doubt that some past offense was committed. 52
of the

may be

for

proof beyond a reason-

In certain circumstances, that target might, as a discretionary matter, be cap-

tured rather than killed. 53

Were that to

occur,

it

would make no sense suddenly to

"turn off' the wartime paradigm and switch to thafof law enforcement, providing
all

the process associated with criminal procedure.

To do

so

would be the equiva-

"You have legal authority to kill another human being, but if you capture him instead, you had better collect enough
evidence to prove him guilty of a crime in a courtroom." Making it more complex
to capture a person in combat by adding additional obligations could incentivize
killing
ironically and perversely
in the name of human rights. 54

lent of telling the nineteen-year-old recruit,

—

—

One might conclude that the answer
in turn provides very

little

regulation

is

simply applying the law of war, but that

and permits

indefinite detention with

readily foreseeable end. Unlike the State-on-State conflict for
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Geneva Conventions were written, in the current conflict, combatants are more
difficult to recognize and the "end" of hostilities is anything but easily identified or
end of World War

predicted. At the
soldiers

II,

more than four hundred thousand enemy

were incarcerated within the continental United States

in a state of indefi-

knew that the war and their concomitant detention would
end upon surrender. Enemy soldiers at that time, mostly conscripted, could be released to return to their former lives. The end of today's conflict, however, will be
far more difficult to identify, both in timing and in circumstance. And instead of
conscripts, al Qaeda is manned by a highly committed volunteer force. When does
nite detention, yet

all

When

Qaeda leaders are killed or surrender?
The Geneva Conventions, written more than a half century ago, simply were not
designed for the present conflict. And even if they had been, the past sixty years
have witnessed countless enhancements to criminal procedure on the human
rights side of the chart, but almost no refinements to the law of war side. 55 Were we
to reconfigure the law of war to address today's conflict, we would condition the
date and time of release of the detainees on some criteria other than the "end of
hostilities." We would be forced to come to grips with some sort of individualized
assessment as to when hostilities have ended for each individual detainee.
This body of law associated with the conduct of warfare is naturally far less developed than that attending law enforcement. Its constituting documents were
this conflict

end?

all

senior

al

drafted in the 1940s, before the nature of the present conflict was even envisaged.
is

natural that jurists

would

initially

look to the

criminal procedure to address issues of detention.

It

more refined and nuanced
Indeed, some who have grasped
far

the paradigmatic disparity have claimed that the fact that the law of war does not

more

fully address relevant detention issues

means

that

human rights norms must

apply as a matter of law.

But the dearth of applicable guidance does not necessarily militate in favor of
shifting to lex generalis; the
itself.

No

conflict,

ture

and

normative gaps are not related to the authority to detain

one questions kinetic targeting authority

in non-international

armed

and a corollary must be that such authority subsumes the authority to capdetain.

Human

rights

law applicable to detention

is

clearly oriented to-

ward the steady-state peacetime regime internal to a State's borders. To apply these
rules to overseas wartime circumstances is the equivalent of applying a highway
speed limit to an

aircraft.

That there

not a cogent argument to

demand

is

no agreed speed limit for aircraft

is

certainly

application of automobile limits; the circum-

stances are plainly different.

The

fact

is,

however, that

detention than

is

human

rights

norms

the speed limit analogy above

are far

more

—but not

relevant to wartime

as a legal requirement.

Regardless of whether there exists an applicable regulatory scheme,
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learned that our

more

would accord

refined twenty- first-century sensibilities

a de-

more process than would have been deemed sufficient in another era.
Even if appropriate norms had not evolved in favor of process and they have
tainee far

—

unique aspects of this

conflict, likely lack

of certainty with respect to the status of

persons captured and ambiguity attending the end of the
are taking part,

those

who

all

point to the need for a process to provide the missing

clarity.

The complexity

at the

itself is in

need of attention.

joinder of detention policy and law

this

It is

worth noting that the controversy

is

self-evident as a

is

function of political history. But before leaving the subject a few
are apropos.

For

one would

believe such a process should be dictated as a matter of law,

have to conclude that the law of war

mised on

which they

hostilities in

more observations

most fundamentally pre-

dissonance in the available legal regimes and not in the political pol-

icy differences that have, unfortunately, captured headlines for the better part of a

decade. In today's counterterrorism conflict, the United States

who

is

dealing with per-

members of the enemy force in war and criminals involved
in heinous acts of terrorism. The underlying basis for detention is substantially
but subtly different for each regime. The law enforcement model is oriented tosons

are, at once,

—

ward punishment for a prior crime; the law of war model serves to protect against a
future threat. Under the law of war, the newly minted recruit is legally just as deserving of capture and detention as is the experienced war criminal. But only the
latter

may be worthy of prosecution. One paradigm results in punishment and then

only after the adjudication of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of culpability for past

The other detains as a protective measure after a showing of future threat, most
likely imputed from affiliation.
This confluence of applicable bases for detention and attendant legal paradigms
acts.

is

the primary complicating factor in twenty- first- century detention policy.

sounds in the application of old laws to new wars
that pits the United States against an

eradicating the

American way of life,

traditional State-on-State conflict,

—

the counterterrorism conflict

enemy dedicated to killing its citizens and
an enemy whose members, if captured in a

would be characterized

as prisoners of war.

detention authority derives from their status as belligerents

would have

justified targeting

them

enough to have been captured in the
poses

if

released, not as

amounts

punishment

It re-

for kinetic strike
alternative.

Each

for anything he

—

the

same

The

status that

had they not been fortunate

is

held because of the threat he

may have

done. Although this

to the principal point of confusion in recent years, U.S. detention policy

further complicated

The war

against

by the

al

multiplicity of conflicts in

Qaeda

is

which

it is

is

presently engaged.

not the only one by which the detention landscape

of the past decade has been colored. Further complicating the scene are the

counterinsurgency that

we would

like to believe is at its
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denouement

in Iraq

and
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the non-international
ently

armed

conflict in Afghanistan that

by the more than forty allies who

Additional Protocol

II,

56

were

it

conceived of

United

battle at the side of the

applicable,

regulating detention in non-international

More

is

would

armed

differ-

States.

Even

offer a paucity of guidance for

conflict.

important, the existence of a non-international armed conflict

may itself

be a matter of controversy. Very few countries have or will concede that their internal
security issues

amount

to internal

armed

conflicts.

To do

so

the very ability of an executive to govern his or her nation.

of any counterinsurgency

is

is

to call into question

And

the end-state goal

transition to the lex generalise or law of peace,

which

provides for detention of terrorist insurgents only as a matter of law enforcement.
In States like Iraq the executive

is

unlikely ever to concede there to be a conflict that

Qaeda were based in New Mexico, the Federal Bureau of Investigation most likely would be handling detention policy as a
law enforcement matter. Foreign armed forces normally are deemed to be engaged

would justify law of war detention.

in

armed

If al

conflict or occupation only if acting outside of the parameters of the

domestic laws and consent of the host

State.

Further, the nature of counterinsurgency

is

such that success means ultimately

winning the hearts and minds of insurgent sympathizers because, unlike the expulsion of foreign attackers, the end state of any successful suppression of insurgency
involves peaceful coexistence with the previous adversary.

any number of reasons,
forcement regime that

it is

most

As a consequence,

for

useful to shift as quickly as possible to a law en-

treats insurgent

combatants

as criminals to

be dealt with by

a peacetime criminal justice system.

This was reflected by U.S. policy toward, and eventually the legal authorities associated with, the conflict in Iraq.

took place during the

latter

As

a general rule, capture

and detention

that

portion of the U.S. presence in Iraq was conducted un-

der a warrant-based program that accorded fully with Iraqi domestic law. Similarly,

current

initiatives

in

Afghanistan

inextricably, in the direction of a

commanders must

sion, the point

is

resolve

that the

taking

it

perhaps

conflict,

may or may not

on how

—

on the ground. But

it is

implemented

a chal-

for purposes of this discus-

movement toward law enforcement

function of the peculiarities of the military mission;

law even though

the

law enforcement paradigm that

serve counterinsurgency interests depending

lenge

are

it is

operations

is

a

not required by the rule of

has the unfortunate collateral effect of furthering the confusion

associated with the disparate legal regimes.
If Iraq sits

digms
tion

on the law enforcement

side of the chart depicting the various para-

for the detention of terrorists, with

Guantanamo

firmly occupying the posi-

on the law of war side (except for the individual cases of criminals who maybe

brought to

justice

through criminal proceedings), then Afghanistan
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the two.

Law of war authorities are presently employed to capture terrorists, but ulon the law

timately the peacetime society for which Afghans yearn will need to rely

enforcement model.

And,

as a final complicating factor

supplementing those mentioned above

historic preference for addressing terrorism

—

the

through the law enforcement para-

digm, gaps in the law of war and the unique mandates of counterinsurgency

—

it

cannot be forgotten that the world's perceptions of these evolving policies have

been immeasurably impacted by Abu Ghraib and the inevitable association of the
reprehensible crimes that took place there with the detention of terrorists at

Guantanamo and with

every other aspect of U.S. detention policy. This

The

instance of bad facts putting the United States at risk for bad law.

is

an

truly

President's

actions in clearly prohibiting certain inappropriate interrogation practices 57

and

58

commitment to transparency in detention operations are steps in the
right direction. International lawyers must be careful not to confuse these matters,
which need attention in every armed conflict, with the more recondite developments that characterize twenty- first-century armed conflict with transnational teraffirming a

rorist organizations.

IV. Identifying the Solution

If the taint associated

with U.S. detention policy were merely an issue of previous

missteps or failed policies,

it

could have been corrected long ago. But too

many

have sought a quick answer, either by misapplying the law of war or inappropriately looking to a

peacetime

legal

regime to justify

regulatory gaps with an entirely different
different circumstances. If war

not

the current conflict,

fit

it

is

detention practices

all

body of law that was drafted

—

filling

for radically

the correct paradigm, but extant law of war does

follows that the law of war should be adjusted to

fit

present circumstances.

An

adjustment to the law

solution.

may follow logically,

Some would argue

but* it

is

that international "law"

not necessarily the only

is

not always needed

if

sufficient principles exist to guide nations into morally responsible behavior that

no

appropriately balances military and humanitarian interests. This article takes
position

on the

advisability of changing the law of war. Instead,

gardless of the future legal requirements, the
policies that

fit

first

step

is

2009

re-

and implement

the current circumstances and, assuming a law-making exercise or

starting point for this discussion

regarding

Guantanamo

assumes that

to identify

development of custom could follow, can usefully inform that

The

it

Bay.

detention

policies

is

a speech

in

the

The fundamental theme of
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future.

by President

most

Obama

controversial

in

May of

location

the President's remarks was his
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affirmation that U.S. detention policies are, and will be, guided by the rule of law

and American values. He asserted the importance of American leadership
ternational

community and

in the

development of principled

in the in-

legal authorities to

guide the evolution of international law.

Applying American values to the new circumstances of twenty-first-century

armed conflict, law of war detention

is

a valid

and morally necessary component of

the warfighting effort. That authority cannot be

encumbered by

detain only when a criminal case for past acts can be proven.

a requirement to

On the other hand, in-

cannot proceed with the simplicity that accompanies the deten-

definite detention

tion of conventional prisoners of war. This conflict suffers

from lack of

clarity

regarding both the "who" and "when" for long-term detention. That weakness,
then,

is

best rectified

by the establishment of a

government and the detainee can
This understanding

is

clear process

from which both the

benefit.

not completely new. In prior years Combatant Status Re-

view Tribunals have been used to assess the basis of Guantanamo detentions case

by case and Administrative Review Boards have been used to
necessity of detention
a consequence,

assess the continuing

on the basis of threat. Both processes had weaknesses, and as

both have been discarded, the gap having been

partially filled with

habeas litigation and Periodic Review Boards. Similarly, experience has led to
nificant

Iraq

sig-

developments that have radically improved the review processes for both

and Afghanistan.

Today, newly captured individuals are submitted to a Detainee Review Board.

The Board, comprised of three
ual's detention for

field-grade military officers, reviews each individ-

both legality and necessity of continued detention. The detainee

receives expert assistance

from

a U.S. officer

who is authorized access to all reason-

ably available information pertaining to that detainee. This review is repeated periodically after the initial hearing,
at the

The

internment

facility.

which must take place within

sixty days of arrival

Similar improvements are forthcoming in

President's 2009 executive order

59

lays

out an even more robust process

oriented toward assessing the continued threat of those detained at

who

Guantanamo.

Guantanamo

already have received access to habeas review in federal courts.

Although some

may

prefer the certainty associated with a legally

view requirement, today the United States benefits from the
issue as a policy matter

—learning from experience

curately predicted. Experience

is

imposed

re-

ability to address the

that never could have been ac-

necessary because

it is

so important to preserve

the requisite yet delicate equipoise between military necessity and humanitarian
interests.

Skewing that equipoise undermines the entire purpose of the law of war.

International humanitarian law serves humanitarian interests only

and only

if

adherence serves humanitarian
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goals. Failing to detain

if

adhered

to,

and detaining
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for too short or too long a period miss
sity

both the humanitarian and military neces-

marks. The correct process can guide us to those objectives, however.

The

of U.S. detention policy has provided fodder for so

fact that the subject

much discussion among lawyers, policymakers and the public,
volvement by the White House, the courts and Congress,

as well as active in-

testament to

is

its

contin-

ued timeliness and paramount importance. The legal/policy regime that emerges

from

this era will likely forever alter the

combating external or transnational

framework could

effectively

way

nation-States apply the rule of law in

nuanced,

this

combating

ter-

terrorist threats. If properly

maximize the likelihood of success

rorism, while preserving and protecting the

human

rights

in

and

civil liberties

that

define civilized society.
Sadly, to some, the

birth

fits

and

have thus

far characterized this regime's

and infancy portend neither counterterrorism success nor preservation of

civil liberties.

U.S. policy with respect to the detention of terrorists has been con-

fused for nearly a decade.
alike. It

It

has resulted in criticism from adversaries and

first

matters on which President

But for these very reasons, there

The

And

has been the focus of heated debate within the national polity.

one of the
tion.

starts that

last

Obama took action

may be

after his

allies
it

was

inaugura-

hope.

ten years have not only provided the clarity of hindsight to identify the

need for change; they have provided the benefit of time and impetus for the pendu-

lum to swing in both directions. The United States has been accused of holding innocents in legal black holes 60 and of prematurely releasing terrorists so they can
return again to attack us. 61

It

has been accused both of abusing detainees and of

coddling them.

Optimism should not

derive

from

a

new discovery,

or a political cure easily ad-

ministered after an election shifts the polity in one direction or the other. But, at
its

heart, this

is

not a political

issue;

it is

one benefitted by years of experience

ing to find the right answer. Oliver Wendell

law has not been

logic; [but] experience."

62

Holmes once

said,

"[T]he

energy and persistence that have so well served this nation as

problems

in the past

all

of the

International lawyers need not only the

creativity,

—and

life

in try-

of those are needed; also needed

is

it

tackled

the kind of wis-

dom that in some cases derives from experience alone. After nearly a decade of trial
and

error, as the beneficiary of that experience that reaches

human

logic, the

United States

is

now better situated
V.

beyond the

than ever to get

limits of

this right.

Conclusion

Anyone who claims the detainee policy problem

to be easy does not understand

Past policies have not always served U.S. interests, but the
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problem

is

it.

not a binary
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one, where one failed solution isolates
are principles,

honed

its

antithesis as "the" right answer.

in the crucible of the last decade, to

But there

which one can look

for

guidance. Twenty-first-century sensibilities will not stomach indefinite detention

without process. But
flict,

if the

military instrument

kinetic targeting authorities cannot

is

used as a function of armed con-

and should not be disconnected from de-

tention authorities. Countries that defer to a requirement for criminal proof in

making

targeting decisions in

war are unlikely

to be

on the winning

side.

The war against al Qaeda and its affiliates is not yet at an end, and it cannot be allowed to proceed without a principled, sustainable and credible detention

one that

will serve as

an example for the international community

policy,

as well. In Sep-

tember 2010, President Jakob Kellenberger of the International Committee of the

Red Cross delivered a speech

Geneva

in

date the Geneva Conventions. 63

in

which he announced an

The law of war

is

indeed in transition

even to a degree evoking the era of post-Westphalian peace

from the chaos of World War
sciously

A

II.

65

and conscientiously seek

It

to

that are being developed

impact

—norms

—would constitute

the next century

As former

British

—perhaps

or the order emerging

goes without saying that lawyers should con-

failure to participate thoughtfully

norms

64

up-

initiative to

a

this

and

change.

deliberately in fashioning the legal

community for
missed opportunity of substantial moment.
that will guide the global

Defence Minister John Reid asserted in April of 2006,

we owe it to ourselves, to our people, to our forces, and to the cause of international order to constantly reappraise and update the relationship between our underlying values, the legal instruments

which apply them to the world of conflict, and the

historical

circumstances in which they are to be applied or "we risk continuing to fight a 2 1st century conflict with 20th century rules." 66

The terrorist

attacks of 9/1

1

thrust the United States into a crisis of historic pro-

portion. In such crises, leaders seize

on

international lawyers to analyze courses of

action with a view to determining their legality. Lawyers are charged to identify,

apply and distinguish norms relevant to the situation. Such norms are frequently
of long-standing pedigree, their principles having been established in code and
treaty

and evolved over decades through

critical

assessment and practical

application.

On

rare occasions, however, the international lawyer's skill

must be exercised

not only in the interpretation and application of extant law, but also in the concep-

and establishment of new law. And, on yet rarer occasions

tion

—national and

tory

global interests rise or

normative construct, rendering the

fall

—watersheds of

on the establishment of

legal exercise in itself the object

338

that

his-

new

of national
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strategy

and perhaps even an imperative component of international order. At

must be poised not only to advise on what may be leenvision what is legally necessary and desirable, both

these seminal divides, lawyers
gally permissible,
in the

day

at

but also to

hand and

in the

new epoch. Now

is

such a watershed moment.
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25. Id., art. 4 ("Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is
present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties which have
established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph
8 (Providing that States in

whose territory a person

1

present

is

or 2 of the present article.");

id., art.

who has committed or is alleged to

have committed an offense under the Convention agree to investigate his involvement in the offense, and, if appropriate, take

such person into custody for the purpose of prosecution or extra-

dition. If a State does not extradite the person,

it is

obliged, without exception whatsoever, to

prosecute him.).
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

26.

Dec.

art. 10(1),

1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229.

9,

See generally U.S.

27.

TERRORISM:

See also Russian Federal

Adopted by the

March

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-8, COMBATING

HOW FIVE FOREIGN COUNTRIES ARE ORGANIZED TO COMBAT TERRORISM (2000).
State

Law No. 35-FZ of Mar.

Duma

on February

6,

26, 2006,

2006, On Counteraction of Terrorism,
Endorsed by the Federation Council on

2006 (Establishing the "fundamental principles of counteraction against terrorism, the
1
and organizational basics of preventing terrorism and struggling against it, of reducing to
minimum and (or) liquidating the consequences of manifestations thereof, as well as the legal
and organisational basics of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in struggling
,

legal

against terrorism.").
28.

British Police

Hunt for Subway Bombing Ringleaders, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Aug.

1,

2005, http://www.voanews.com/burmese/archive/2005-08/2005-08-01-voal.cfm (reporting that
British

law enforcement was searching for the suspected ringleaders

to the July

subway bombings

bombers were
dition);

Spared Travelers
Jan. 16, 2007, at

deadly March
29.

London, which

killed fifty-six

in British custody at the time; a fourth

Kevin Sullivan

TIMES, Mar.

in

who had provided

persons on July

was arrested in

Italy

7.

support

Three alleged

and was fighting extra-

& Karla Adam, Trial Opens in London Transit Bombing Plot; Good Fortune

Two Weeks

After Attacks That Killed 52, Jury

Is

Told,

WASHINGTON

POST,

A 12; Elaine Sciolino, 10 Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, NEW YORK

12,
1,

2004, at

Al (reporting on

2004 attack that

left

Spain's massive

192 dead and

Criminal Terrorism Enforcement

in the

more than

manhunt

for perpetrators of the

1,400 injured).

United States during the Five Years Since the 9/1 II

01 Attacks, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/ (From* September 11, 2001 through

May 2006,
Justice

federal investigative agencies referred for prosecution 1,391 individuals

Department

classified as international terrorists. Prosecutions

these individuals, 213 were convicted (by
also Phil

trial

were

whom the

filed against

335 of

or plea) and 123 were sentenced to prison.). See

Hirschkorn, Jury Spares 9/11 Plotter Moussaoui,

CNN JUSTICE (May 3, 2006), http://

articles.cnn.com/2006-05-03/justice/moussaoui.verdict_l_zacarias-moussaoui-frenchman-of

-moroccan-heritage-penalty-phase?_s=PM:LAW (reporting that a federal jury had sentenced al
Qaeda terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui to life in prison for his role in the September 11, 2001, attacks

on the United

30.

States.).

A brief comment on terminology is appropriate. This article uses the terms "law of war,"

"international law of armed conflict," "laws

and customs of war," and "international humanitarsynonymous. While international lawyers most frequently claim them to be so, the
terms often embody subtle distinctions worthy of note. Most publications refer to the law of war
ian law" as
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and international law of armed conflict as having the same meaning. One could say that the latter
term is broader in that it captures the concept of internal armed conflict as well. In the case of
both terms, they are sometimes used to refer to bothjus ad bellum andjus in bello, and sometimes
to refer only to jus in bello. The term "international humanitarian law" is not normally used by
the United States, because to do so is said to encourage a failure to distinguish adequately between the law of war and human rights law. Indeed, the terminology is frequently misused. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however, which together with European
countries prefers the term "international humanitarian law," has asserted it to be synonymous
with the international law of armed conflict, which both the ICRC and European countries concede is distinct from human rights law. Treating it as a synonym, however, can be misleading.
For example, the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction is said to encompass international
humanitarian law. However, that treaty, in addition to addressing war crimes {jus in bello) and
aggression {jus ad bellum) also subsumes crimes against humanity and genocide within its subject matter jurisdiction, both of which can be committed in periods of peace and war. Both of
these arenas of criminality can be said to have evolved out of the law of war, but while the term
"international humanitarian law"

is

deemed unproblematic when

them collectively,
humanity and crimes of

referring to

the term "law of war" might be seen as inapplicable to crimes against

genocide committed during peacetime.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-23. In addition to the embassy bombings, there
numerous examples of past U.S. law enforcement responses to terrorist acts. The first Bush
administration treated the problem of apprehending suspects after the 1998 bombing of Pan
American Flight 103 as one of diplomacy and extradition, clearly a law enforcement matter. See
Sammakia, supra note 17. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, law enforcement tools
were employed to investigate, apprehend, extradite, try and convict the perpetrators of the
31.

are

bombing. See Neumeister, supra note 19.
32. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.

Aug.

12, 1949,

6U.S.T.

GC III].

3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter
33.

21,

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging
to

one of the following

(1)

categories,

Members of the armed

militias or volunteer corps
(2)

Members of other

who

have

fallen into the

power of the enemy:

forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as

forming part of such armed

militias

members of

forces.

and members of other volunteer corps, including

those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and

operating in or outside their

own

territory,

even

if this

territory

is

occupied, pro-

vided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance

movements,
(a) that

fulfil

the following conditions:

of being

commanded by a person

responsible for his subordinates;

(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that

of carrying arms openly;

(d) that of

conducting their operations

in

accordance with the laws and cus-

toms of war.
(3)

Members of regular armed

who profess allegiance to a government or an

forces

authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4)

Persons

who accompany

thereof, such as civilian

the

armed

members of

forces without actually being

military aircraft

members

crews, war correspondents,

supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the

armed

forces,

provided that they have received authorization, from the
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armed

forces

which they accompany, who

shall

provide them for that purpose with

an identity card similar to the annexed model.
(5)

Members of crews,

including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant

marine and the crews of civil

aircraft

(6) Inhabitants

of a non-occupied territory,

spontaneously take up arms to
to

of the Parties to the conflict,

who do not bene-

by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international

fit

resist

who on

the approach of the

law.

enemy

the invading forces, without having had time

form themselves into regular armed
and customs of war.

units,

provided they carry arms openly and

respect the laws
B.

The following

shall likewise

be treated as prisoners of war under the present

Convention:
(1)

Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied

country,

if the

occupying Power considers

them, even though

to intern

it

going on outside the territory

it

necessary by reason of such allegiance

has originally liberated them while hostilities were
it

occupies, in particular where such persons have

made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and
which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to
them with a view to internment.
(2)

The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in

cle,

who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on

and

whom

the present Artitheir territory

these Powers are required to intern under international law, without

prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers

may choose to give

and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and,
where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral
or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting
Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a
Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the
functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic
and consular usage and treaties.
Id., art. 4.

34.

Id., art. 3.

35.

"Conflicts not of an international character" (or "non-international

armed

conflicts")

by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, custom, and, to those that
are party, the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II). The United
States signed Protocol II and submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent in 1987, where it
remains before Senate subcommittees. Many have asserted that certain provisions in Protocol II
have achieved the status of custom. In particular, Articles 4-6, outlining fundamental guarantees
are governed only

for detainees, protections

the international

and process requirements

community

as reflecting

for prosecutions, are typically regarded in

custom. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-

ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International

Armed

Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in 16

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

MATERIALS 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
36. A combatant must meet the criteria outlined in GC III, supra note 32, Article 4 in order
to be designated as a prisoner of war. See supra note 33. Al Qaeda is not a State party to the Convention and its members do not meet the criteria for militias and volunteer corps as described in
Article 4(A)(2).
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37.

GC III, supra note 32, art. 4(A).

38.

See, e.g.,

NEWSWEEK,
39.

Roy Gutman, Christopher Dickey

AUMF did

the President's use of force. Instead
cific targets

Sami Yousafzai, Guantanamo

Justice?,

July 8, 2002, at 34.

worth noting that

It is

&

—those

it

not impose geographic or temporal limitations on

provides the President authority to use force against spe-

"nations, groups, or persons" that the President determines "planned,

authorized, committed, or aided" the terrorist attacks

AUMF,

such organizations or persons."

on

9/1

1,

as well as those

supra note 14. See also

who "harbored

MOHAMMED-MAHMOUD

OULD MOHAMEDOU, NON-LINEARITY OF ENGAGEMENT, TRANSNATIONAL ARMED GROUPS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN Al QAEDA AND THE UNITED STATES (2005),
available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Non-Linearity_of

_Engagement.pdf (discussing the evolutionary nature of warfare
groups

like al

as

it

relates to transnational

Qaeda).

However, while the government described the conflict as a "war on terror," it clearly did
not intend to engage in conflict with all terrorists anywhere in the world. Instead, the government conducted a war against the armed groups responsible for the attacks of 9/11
(al Qaeda, the Taliban and their associates), as prescribed by the AUMF, and mostly within the
40.

territory of Afghanistan.
41.

See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.

42.

U.S.

Department of

TASK FORCE

Justice et al., Final Report of the

Guantanamo Review

(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report

.pdf.

43.

Id.

44.

Obama, supra note

45.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

46.

50.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428
U.S. CONST, amend. VI (1791); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

51.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).

47.
48.
49.

5.

(1968).

1

(2000).

Yoram Dinstein, The System of Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR OF
52.

See

von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007) ("As far as ordinary combatants are concerned, it must be perceived that they are running a risque du metier.
They can be attacked (and killed) wherever they are, in and out of uniform: even when they are
not on active duty. There is no prohibition either of opening fire on retreating troops (who have
not surrendered) or of targeting individual combatants."). See also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND

KNUT IPSEN

145, 148 (Wolff Heintschel

UNJUST WARS 143
53.

(4th ed. 2006).

Unless the target

is

hors de combat, the law of war never requires taking less than lethal

force against a lawful target.

However,

if

a target

might

just as easily

be captured and detained,

commanders may elect in certain circumstances a non-lethal course of action to preserve intelligence collection.
54.

See Editorial,

What to do

with terror suspects?,

WASHINGTON

POST, July

4,

201

1,

at

A 10,

available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-to-do-with-terror-suspects/201 1/

07/0 1 /gHQ AduqEyH_story.html.
55. There are some exceptions to this dearth of new rules in the law of war, including the
adoption of international agreements related to specific weapons and the development of the
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1977 Protocols

(I

and

II)

Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The United States

is

not

party to either of the Additional Protocols. Although the government has consistently supported
joining Protocol

II, it

has been very

critical

of some provisions of Additional Protocol

I

since

its

creation.
56.

Additional Protocol

II,

supra note 35.

57.

Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).

58.

Obama, supra note

59.

Supra note 57.

60.

See,

e.g.,

Richard

Commission on

Human

J.

5.

Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American

Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole," 10

HUMAN

RIGHTS BRIEF

2

(2003).
61.

See, e.g.,

The

Editors, Stop Releasing Terrorists,

NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec.

29,

2009, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228875/stop-releasing-terrorists/editors.
62.

Lecture

1

—Early Forms of

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE

Liability, in

COMMON LAW

(1881).
63.
at

Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Address

Ceremony

to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the

Geneva Conventions: learning from the past

Geneva Conventions:

Sixty years of the

to better face the future (Dec. 8, 2009), available at

http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-president

-120809.htm.
64.

Peace Treaty between the Holy

Roman Emperor and

the King of France

and Their Re-

spective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.

Ending the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch, and the German phase of the Thirty
War, the Peace of Westphalia recognized the full territorial sovereignty of the member
states of the Holy Roman Empire, rendering the princes of the empire absolute sovereigns in

Years'

their

own dominions.

65.

In 1945,

See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2002.

World War

II

drawing to an end, representatives of fifty countries met in San

on International Organization to draw up the
United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the
representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at
Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. The Charter was signed on June 26,
1945 by the representatives of the fifty countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, later signed the Charter and became one of the original fifty-one member States. The
United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, when the Charter had been
ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and by a
majority of other signatories. See The United Nation^, About the United Nations/History, http://
www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). The creation of the United
Nations is widely recognized as one of the most important events of the post-World War II period. That the delegates were influenced substantially by the war is reflected in the preamble to
the United Nations Charter, which provides, "We the people of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
" U.N. Charter pmbl. The fundamental purpose of the Charter is
untold sorrow to mankind
the maintenance of international peace and security. Id., art. 1 para. 1 See RUTH B. RUSSELL,
A History of the United Nations, the Role of the United States 1940-1945, at 964 (proFrancisco at the United Nations Conference

,

.

viding an in-depth description of the formation of the Charter).
66.

John Reid, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Address at the Royal United
and Security Studies: 20th-century Rules, 21st-century Conflict

Services Institute for Defence

(Apr.

3,

2006).
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XVI
Detention in Non-International Armed
Conflicts

Knut Dormann*
Introduction

Themade

question of detention in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) has

This

is

it

to the forefront of the international legal

particularly due to the fact that

and operational debate.

most of current armed conflicts are of a non-

numbers of persons being
deprived of their liberty. When assessing the legal and operational challenges
posed in such situations, it is important to bear in mind that NIACs may take different forms, ranging from classical civil war situations with armed violence essentially occurring within the confines of one single territory between government
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed opposition
groups, to NIACs spilling over to neighboring countries, and to armed conflict situations in which multinational forces intervene on the side of a host government
against organized armed opposition groups. The debate, therefore, needs to focus
on common features to all types of NIACs, as well as on where distinctions need
possibly to be made. For example, with regard to a NIAC, when multinational
forces intervene on the side of a host government, questions arise as to how to deal
international character

and

that they lead to important

*

Head, Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Special thanks are
due to Jelena Pejic, Legal Advisor, Legal Division, ICRC, for her substantive contribution to this
article.

Thanks

assistance.

are also

due to Helena Sunnegardh, Legal Attache, Legal Division, ICRC,

for her
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with the relationship between the third States and the host government, bearing
in

mind

that they

may be

and international

subject to different domestic

legal

obligations.

This contribution cannot attempt to look at

all

the challenges that arise;

only give a snapshot of them. As will be shown, a more in-depth discussion

quired in the years to come. The article will focus on two main issues.

It

it

can

is

re-

will first

NIAC and, in particular, the
interplay between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human

address the applicable legal framework to detention in

rights law;

and second, present the International Committee of the Red Cross's

(ICRC's) analysis of the need to strengthen the law in light of humanitarian prob-

lems observed in

its field

operations and the related normative weaknesses. The

concluding remarks will then summarize how the international community has re-

sponded

to the

ICRC's

analysis.

Before addressing these two issues,
plicable in

NIAC

some observations on

the sources of law ap-

made to set the frame.
of treaty IHL governing NIAC

should be

The main sources
are Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (generally considered to reflect customary
law 2 ), which specifically refers among others to persons in detention, 3 and the 1977
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, 4 when applicable namely, Articles 41

—

6,

which

specifically relate to persons deprived of liberty.

tomary international law has complemented
treaty rules,
tional

5

The development of cus-

treaty law. 6

customary IHL plays a more significant role in

armed

conflicts (IACs).

Still,

Due

to the paucity of

NIAC than in interna-

the question remains whether

further strengthened, taking into account the challenges posed

IHL needs to be

by current forms of

NIAC. In particular it needs to be assessed whether existing protections are strong
enough in such situations.
IHL is not the only legal framework relevant in NIACs. It is generally accepted,
despite the views of a few important dissenters, including the United States, 7 that

human

rights

law applies alongside IHL in armed

extraterritorially.

8

and

that

it

also applies

What is not settled is the precise interplay of the two branches of

international law in situations of armed conflict
rial

conflicts,

and the extent of the

extraterrito-

application of human rights law.

It is

widely accepted that

IHL

is

the lex specialis in

IAC

(in the field of detention

of persons in particular through the detailed regulation on prisoners of war,

namely, in the Third Geneva Convention, 9 and internment of persons protected by
the Fourth

NIAC

Geneva Convention 10 ). However, the interplay

for at least

two reasons.
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is

more complex

in
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First,

while

it is

clear that States'

determining the interplay of a

mains a

IACs

endeavor.

difficult

— IHL

in

NIACs

tween norms that

human

State's

One

rights obligations

IHL and human

reason

is

that

continue in NIAC,

rights treaty obligations re-

—contrary

to

IHL

applicable in

more rudimentary, and thus gives less rise to conflicts bewould generally be addressed through application of the lex

specialis rule. It is also

is

not sufficient to state in general terms that

human

rights law

continues to apply in armed conflict without elaborating on what this means in

armed conflict are different from times of peace. This explains why some IHL and human rights rules differ in content, and thus produce
conflicting results when applied to the same situation. The norms of these two
bodies of law reflect the different reality for which each body was primarily developed. One example relates to the rules applicable to the use of force: the IHL rules
on the conduct of hostilities differ from those that would apply in law enforcement
situations. 12 Differences exist as well in the field of detention. The most evident difference between IHL and human rights standards concerns the rules governing
practice. 11 Situations of

procedural safeguards for security detention. 13

Second, the obligations of the State party under

human

rights

not legally shared by the non-State party to an armed conflict.

many cases

treaties are

In addition, in

cannot perform government-like functions on which the imple-

it

mentation of human rights norms
at the protection

example,

is

very clear on that, as

IHL

is

also the only legal

fighting against each other.

these situations.

based.

IHL is the only branch of international

Common Article 3

armed

conflict.

is

of persons that clearly binds both State and non-State

parties in

that,

law

these obligations could not be practically carried out by the non-State

party because

law aimed

14

It

it

refers to

of the four Geneva Conventions, for

"each Party to the conflict." Based on

regime binding non-State organized armed groups
thus remains an indispensable legal framework for

13

mind these factors, the relationship between IHL and human rights
norms in a NIAC, and the respective legal obligations for parties to a NIAC must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
„
Bearing in

IHL Rules Applicable
Deprivation of liberty

is

to

Detention in

NIAC

an inevitable and lawful occurrence in armed

conflict,

NIAC. The fundamental obligation underpinning any form of detention in armed conflict is to treat persons deprived of liberty humanely. 16 Other,
more specific IHL rules give effect to this obligation and complement it. The different rules on detention (most of which overlap with human rights law) may be
broadly divided into four groups: rules on the treatment of detainees in the narrow
including in
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sense, rules

on material conditions of detention,

and procedural

fair trial rights

safeguards in internment.
In the following discussion these rules will be briefly presented
similar or equivalent

human

rights

and compared to

norms, and the question of whether they remain

appropriate and sufficient in contemporary

armed

Rules on the Treatment of Detainees in the

conflicts will

be addressed.

Narrow Sense

Rules on the treatment of detainees in the narrow sense aim to protect the physical

and well-being of persons deprived of liberty for whatever
reason. They comprise, most importantly, the prohibition of murder, torture and

and mental

integrity

other forms of cruel,
scientific

inhuman or degrading

experiments, as well as other forms of violence to

and rape.

17

rights law.

18

cludes prohibitions of sexual violence
hibited under both
It

IHL and human

may be concluded that in

strong enough.
flicts it is

treatment, mutilation, and medical or

When

this area the

life

and

All of the acts

health,

which

in-

mentioned are pro-

normative framework posed by IHL

humanitarian problems

is

contemporary armed con-

arise in

due not to lack of norms, but to lack of compliance with and enforcement

of these rules.

To
life

the extent that the transfer of detainees

may lead

to violations of the right to

may

or of the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, this aspect

also

be categorized as belonging to the treatment of detainees in the narrow sense.

The transfer of detainees raises significant legal and practical problems in current armed conflicts. The transfer of persons between States has been one of the
recurring practices in armed conflicts over the past several years, particularly in
situations

where multinational forces transfer persons

country of origin or to a third

State. Generally, there

humanitarian standpoint whenever there
subject to serious violations of

ICRC's view

is

is

is

to a "host" State, to their

cause for concern from a

a risk that a transferred person

IHL upon

The

transfer to the receiving State.

that the principle of non-refoulement must be observed

person might be transferred from one authority to another and
risk that a transferred detainee

may be

whenever

when

there

is

a

a

might be subject to torture and other forms of ill(which includes the imposition of the

treatment, arbitrary deprivation of

life

death penalty after an unfair

enforced disappearance, and persecution. 19

trial),

The ICRC works constantly with detaining authorities
texts to ensure that the principle

There are no

explicit

transfers of detainees.
plicit

to a

IHL

is

it

con-

adhered to in practice.

rules in treaty

However,

in various operational

law applicable to

may be argued that

it

NIAC

dealing with

would contravene the

prohibitions of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions

if a

ex-

party

NIAC transferred an individual under its control or authority to another party
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while there are substantial grounds to believe that the person would be tortured or

otherwise ill-treated or arbitrarily deprived of life. 20 Such a rule exists

more explic-

IHL applicable in IAC. The rules relating to the transfer responsibilities of a detaining authority in an IAC go even further for specific categories of persons. They
itly in

establish specific post-transfer responsibilities for the transferring State in case the

receiving State does not
tion

21

comply with the provisions of the Third Geneva Conven-

or the Fourth Geneva Convention. 22
the ICRC's view that in light of the lack of specificity in

It is

NIAC treaty law and

the problems observed in a variety of conflict situations throughout the world,

should be considered whether the existing

legal

it

framework could be strengthened

by identifying specific rules dealing with responsibilities in cases of transfer in
NIACs. It would be crucial to provide more legal guidance to detaining authorities.

The

lack of legal provisions in

IHL governing NIACs

suggests that

it

would be

highly advisable to provide a set of workable substantive and procedural rules that

would both guide the

actions of States

and non-State organized armed groups and

protect the rights of affected persons. Current practice, in which

NIACs

more non-State organized

involve coalitions of States fighting one or

armed groups

more and more

how

in a "host" country, indicates that uncertainty about

to orga-

nize a lawful transfer regime, including with regard to post-transfer responsibilities, is likely

to increase, rather than decrease; thus a

possibility of strengthening the legal

rules applicable in

IAC should

need to further

reflect

on the

framework. The underlying principles of IHL

serve as a starting point. 23

Rules on Material Conditions of Detention

The purpose of the

rules

on material conditions of detention

is

taining authorities adequately provide for detainees' physical

to ensure that de-

and psychological

needs, which include food, accommodation, health, hygiene, contacts with the

outside world, religious observance and others. 24 Treaty and customary

IHL pro-

and foremost

to condi-

vide a substantial catalogue of standards that pertain
tions of detention in IAC.

25

They also provide

first

less detailed

26

NIAC, as do "soft law" human rights instruments.
norms could be derived from both bodies of law. 28
In the absence of specific treaty law for

Additional Protocol

II

to the

provide important guidance.

NIAC

standards that apply in

A common

other than what

Geneva Conventions,

A

27

this

is

common

normative strengthening

in the

catalogue of

contained in

catalogue can

ICRC's view

is

nevertheless desirable to better address the humanitarian problems observed by

ICRC delegates in places of detention worldwide. They relate particularly to lack of
adequate food, water, accommodation and access to medical care; no contact with
families

and the outside world;

failure to separate appropriately (adults
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from security

children, those charged with criminal offenses

detainees, etc.);

fail-

ure to register detainees; and overcrowding.

When looking at the rules on

material conditions of detention

seems impor-

it

tant to also analyze the needs of particularly vulnerable groups (namely,

children, the disabled

and the

elderly).

requires special attention.

When women

cultural reasons. Likewise,

women often

The

situation of

women,

women,

for instance,

same prison as men,
their access to fresh air may be compromised if the courtyard is communal, since
mixing with men would put them at risk of abuse and may not be permitted for
are detained in the

remain locked

in their cells if prison corri-

dors are open to both sexes. Female detainees have specific health and hygiene needs.

Pregnant women and nursing mothers require dietary supplements and appropriate
pre-

and postnatal care so

that they

and

their babies

remain

in

good

health. 29

Children in detention also require specific protection and care. Prison conditions

and

cially

in

facilities

and vulnerabilities, espe-

are not always adapted to their needs

terms of protection against inhumane or degrading disciplinary

measures. In addition, in numerous situations, these children are deprived of

They may also suffer from a
lack of sufficient recreational and physical activity. They rarely enjoy adequate
communication with the outside world, including with their parents, which may
access to appropriate schooling or vocational training.

seriously affect their emotional development. 30

Most of these concerns, which include the needs of other categories of persons,
such as the elderly and the disabled, are not sufficiently addressed under current
IHL governing NIAC. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions does not
provide special protection to particularly vulnerable persons in detention, and
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions only obliges the parties to
NIACs to separate detained women and men "within the limits of their capabili31
ties."
Similarly, under customary law, detained children must be held in quarters
separate from those of adults, except when they are accommodated with their
family. 32 Besides these rules, the law applicable to
specific protection

and

thus,

it is

NIACs does not provide further

submitted, requires supplementing.

Fair Trial Rights

Persons detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense are entitled to
a

number of fair trial

and human

rights.

rights law.

The

While

list

of fair

Common Article

not provide a list of judicial guarantees,
of Additional Protocol

I

trial rights is

to the

it is

almost identical under IHL

3 to the

Geneva Conventions does

now generally accepted that Article 75(4)

Geneva Conventions 33

—which was

drafted based

on the corresponding provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 34
reflects customary law applicable in all types of armed

—
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conflict.

col

Article 75(4), in fact, encapsulates

Common

which supplements

II,

rights

35

law in that

conflict.

it

allows

all

of Article 6(5) of Additional Proto-

Article 3 in

NIAC. IHL

no derogation from fair trial

reinforces

human

rights in situations of armed

36

In light of the preceding,

it

would appear that the existing legal framework is

bust enough to address the protection needs of persons suspected of having

mitted a criminal offense.

If

humanitarian problems

arise nevertheless,

ro-

comit

is

generally due not to a lack of rules, but rather to a lack of implementation or lack of
respect for existing rules.

Procedural Safeguards in Internment

The question of procedural safeguards in internment is probably the key issue in
terms of legal and practical challenges with regard to detention in NIAC, in particular in "multinational" NIACs. 37
Internment may be defined as the non-criminal detention of a person based on
the serious threat that his or her activity poses to the security of the detaining

The area of procedural safeguards in internment is
probably the principal area in which differences emerge in IHL applicable to
international and non-international armed conflicts, as well as between IHL and
human rights law, and where gaps in IHL governing NIAC may be observed. 38
Outside armed conflict, non-criminal (i.e., administrative) detention should be
authority in an

armed

conflict.

very exceptional. 39 In the vast majority of cases, deprivation of liberty happens

when

a person

under

human

is

suspected of having committed a criminal offense. The rationale

ing, that its judicial

may be

law

rights

is

the assumption that the courts of a State are function-

system

is

capable of absorbing whatever

any given time, that

arrested at

legal

counsel

is

number of persons

available, that

law enforce-

ment officials have the capacity to perform their tasks, etc. The reality in situations
of armed conflict is, however, different. As a consequence, IHL provides for different rules. 40 While these latter rules are quite detailed in addressing internment in

IAC, IHL

on procedural safeguards for persons interned in NIAC. They imply, however, that persons would be interned in NIACs.
Additional Protocol II explicitly mentions internment in Articles 5 and 6(5). It
thus confirms that it is a form of deprivation of liberty inherent to NIAC. At the
same time, the Protocol does not list internment grounds or process rights.
treaties

In a traditional

ment armed
law,
gal

do not contain

rules

NIAC occurring in the territory of a single State between govern-

forces

and one or more non-State organized armed groups, domestic

informed by the

State's

human

rights obligations

and IHL, constitutes the

le-

framework regulating the deprivation of liberty of members of such non-State
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armed groups by
That question

the State. 41

What does

this

mean

in

terms of State obligations?

subject to diverging opinions.

is

According to some views domestic law does not permit non-criminal detention
in

armed

without derogation from obligations under applicable

conflict

ICCPR this would apply even if the State provided ju-

rights

law treaties. Under the

dicial

review as required under Article 9(4). 42

Others suggest that derogation would be necessary
right to habeas

NIAC

According to
gation.

seems
flict,

44

still

other views, the right to habeas corpus

Such an approach, which

difficult to reconcile,

it is

is

perfectly valid

host State's

which

a

its

NIAC

involves only

territory.

national

armed

is

and these

government

in

own territories alongside of the

forces engaging organized

its

territory against
it

forces acting

is

a "multi-

NIAC). The second

is

a

one or more organized armed

NIAC

Jirga in 2002,

in

which turned the

ini-

which United Nations forces or

under the aegis of a regional organization are sent to help

"host" government involved in hostilities against one or

stabilize a

more organized armed

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the African Union Mission in Somalia

groups in
the

example

in

prevailed in Afghanistan after the confir-

mation of the Karzai government by the Loya
into a

first

armed groups

which multinational armed forces are fighting alongside the

forces of a "host" State in

IAC

forces undertake internment. 45

There are two examples of such NIACs. The

NIAC,"

in peacetime,

even more complex than in those instances where

groups (for example, the situation as

tial

and necessary

forces in the latter's territory, identification of the legal frame-

work governing internment
the

not subject to dero-

NIAC involves multinational forces fight-

involving States fighting outside their

armed

is

submitted, with the law or the reality of armed con-

ing abroad alongside a host government

NIACs

the State suspended the

sufficient in LAC). 43

in particular in situations in

In

if

corpus and provided only administrative review of internment in a

would be

(as

human

its

territory.

are examples.

Uncertainty surrounding States'

human

rights obligations in these

two

NIAC

scenarios arise. These exist for internment in general, but are also particularly acute
in the field of procedural safeguards. Five

been identified by Jelena
First, as

human

Pejic;

46

such general issues of uncertainty have

these illustrate the complexity:

has been pointed out, a few States

rights

still

reject the

notion of application of

law in armed conflict as such.

Second, State members of a multinational force, whether acting under

may not be bound by the same human rights treaties, including
ICCPR, and may therefore have different legal obligations.

pices or otherwise,

the

UN aus-
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Third, the exact extent of the extraterritorial reach of human rights law remains

The

unclear.
tee

47

International Court of Justice

UN Human

and the

have opined that States continue to be bound by their

when

tions

practical issues that arise. 48

on

human

Commit-

rights obliga-

they act abroad. However, their pronouncements, especially those by

the International Court of Justice, have not yet settled

sessed

Rights

the legal, political

all

and

The concrete implications of the statements must be as-

a case-by-case basis; this

is

certainly necessary for internment carried out

by multinational forces abroad.
Fourth, and somewhat linked to the preceding points and assuming the applicability

of human rights law, a legal issue that has not been addressed by any judicial

or other

body is whether

States

must derogate from

human

their

rights obligation

to protect personal liberty in order to detain persons abroad without providing ha-

beas corpus review.

seems obvious that

It

—

to be adapted to battlefield reality

that

is,

if

the application of human rights law

situations in

which

to provide judicial review of the lawfulness of internment in

may not be feasible

thousands or tens of

would appear that a derogation would be necessary.
the next issue that needs to be resolved is which State involved in

thousands of cases
the case,

—

it

it

should derogate, the one actually holding the detainees or the host
tice,

no

State of a multinational force has ever

Fifth,

State

what

is

and a host

made

State, or

of a Chapter VII 49

a

NIAC

State. In prac-

a derogation.

by a multinational

UN Security Council resolution autho-

force, in particular

mining the extent of procedural safeguards

to

when

it

rights obligations?

treaty cannot set aside otherwise applicable

As regards Security Council

to deter-

be granted? For example, can a

a legal basis for internment without judicial review, particularly

been no derogation from their human

comes

human rights obligations and provide

bilateral treaty override the respective States'

human

It

when

would seem

there has

that such a

rights obligations.

authority, the issue arose in the international debate

whether a Chapter VII resolution authorizing* multinational force to "use

necessary means" to

(if

mandate may be read as permitting internment.
the one hand, there is good reason to believe that it

On

the mission can use force against persons

of the formulation "use
also intern persons).

all

On

necessary means"

any

means" does not help

case,

in

—the

—then

it

traditional understanding

must

logically

be allowed to

the other hand, there are also compelling arguments

against such a position (the clause
ple of legality). In

all

fulfill its

Views remain divided. 50

may

If this is

the legal effect of a bilateral treaty adopted between a detaining

rizing internment

as to

is

is

not specific enough to comply with the princi-

such a general clause referring only to

"all

necessary

determining the applicable procedural safeguards

absence of further details in the resolution. 51
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In light of this reality, the

ICRC

thinking and, based on that, in

its

has been particularly active in

its

legal/policy

operational dialogue with States.

on procedural safeguards in NIAC (and, to
a certain extent, the still rudimentary nature of the process due to civilians interned
In light of the lack of IHL treaty rules

in IAC), the

Principles

Conflict

ICRC developed

and Safeguards

for Internment/Administrative Detention in

and Other Situations of Violence."

work, bearing in mind relevant
considerations.

They

are

2005 entitled "Procedural

institutional guidelines in

The

rules derive

Armed

from an IHL frame-

human rights law, and are complemented by policy

meant

account the specific situation

52

at

to be

implemented

hand. The

ICRC

in a

manner

that takes into

on these guidelines

relies

in

its

operational dialogue with States, multinational forces and other actors.

Two

aspects addressed in the institutional guidelines deserve to be specifically

mentioned since they are

at the heart

of any internment system and are the issues

most extensively debated internationally and domestically: the grounds justifying
internment and the internment review process. Both are related to the principle of
legality that

a State resorts to internment. 53

must be respected when

Grounds for Internment

NIAC

International humanitarian law applicable in

internment. In
lied

its

institutional guidelines

on "imperative reasons of security"

inform internment decisions in
standard

is

NIAC. This

derived from what

all

is

and operational dialogue, the ICRC

as the

accepted in

of internment. In addition, the standard

is

IAC and

NIAC. This

deemed appropriate

is

in

and highlights the exceptional nature

already in wide use. 54

also well adapted to the situation

is

re-

minimum legal standard that should

situations of violence, including

policy choice takes into account

that this standard

does not specify grounds for

which foreign forces are detaining non-nationals

The ICRC believes
of multinational NIAC, in

in the territory of a host State.

Due to the similarities with internment in occupation situations, in that both occur
abroad, the wording chosen

occupied

territories

is

based on the internment standard applicable in

under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The ICRC believes that

the proposed standard strikes a workable balance between the need to protect

personal liberty and the detaining authority's need to protect against activity that
is

seriously prejudicial to

its

security.

The "imperative reasons of security standard"

is

high.

ated in relation to each person detained as to whether

it

It

must be carefully evalu-

has been met.

uncontroversial that direct participation in hostilities 55

is

an

It

should be

activity that

would

meet the "imperative reasons of security standard." While direct participation in
hostilities is a notion that is particularly relevant when it comes to the use of force
in

armed

conflict, as

it

defines the circumstances under which civilians lose their
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protection from direct attacks,

such activity
course,

may

on what

seems obvious that the same persons engaging

a priori also be subject to internment. This

direct participation in hostilities

vidual's conduct.

The ICRC has

issue, certain aspects
is

it

issued

its

encompasses

interpretive

in

in

dependent, of

is

terms of an indi-

recommendations on

of which are the subject of controversial debate.

56

This

that

article

not the place to elaborate on the substance of the recommendations or the reac-

tion they received.

It

some of the wide

suffices to say that

by others would seem quite problematic from
reconciling

them with

interpretations defended

a targeting perspective, as

would

the "imperative reasons of security standard" applicable to

internment.

As posted
internment

in the

ICRC

may not be

guidelines

on procedural principles and safeguards, 57

resorted to for the sole purpose of interrogation or

gence gathering unless the person in question
curity threat based

on

his or her

own

activity.

used in order to punish a person for past

deemed

is

58

intelli-

to represent a serious se-

Similarly,

internment

may not be

activity.

Internment Review Process
In terms of process, the ICRC's institutional guidelines state, inter

alia,

that a per-

son must be informed promptly in a language he or she understands of the reasons
for internment. This

must be done in order to enable the internee to

exercise his or

her right to challenge the lawfulness of the internment with the least possible delay
before an independent and impartial body.

The

right to be

informed

is

specifically

IAC in Article 75(3) of Additional Protocol I, and while not explicitly provided for in NIAC, it can be seen as an element of the obligation of humane
treatment applicable to internment in all situations of armed conflict. 59
recognized for

An

internee has the right to challenge the lawfulness of his or her internment

with the
tice,

least possible delay before

an independent and impartial body. In prac-

exercising this right in an effective

way will

require the fulfillment of several

procedural and practical steps, including providing internees with sufficient evi-

dence supporting the allegations against them, ensuring that procedures are in
place to enable internees to seek

and obtain additional evidence and making sure

that internees understand the various stages of the internment review process

the process as a whole.

60

nature and not judicial,

of the review body.

The ICRC's

In the case that the internment review
it is

essential to ensure the

is

and

administrative in

independence and impartiality

61

institutional guidelines provide that

an internee has the right to au-

tomatic, periodic review of the lawfulness of continued internment. Such review

requires the detaining authority to ascertain whether the "imperative reasons of
security standard" continues to be met,

and to order release of the internee if that is
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not the case. The safeguards that apply to

each periodic review.

review are also to be applied to

initial

62

The fact that the ICRC felt obligated to produce guidelines based on law and policy indicates the need for a discussion of whether IHL applicable in NIAC also must
be strengthened. IHL treaty law simply does not spell out procedural safeguards for
persons interned in a NIAC.
Conclusion

As has been

detailed, there

NIAC. This body of law
and human

an important body of law governing detention in

sometimes based on a complex interplay between IHL

Still, it is

submitted, there are a

which IHL needs to be further strengthened

areas in
tarian

rights law.

is

is

number of normative gaps or

in order to

respond to humani-

problems posed by detention in NIAC. This is one of the conclusions of a two-

year internal study conducted by the

ICRC on

protection for victims of armed conflicts.

63

Strengthening the law

firmation of existing law in situations where
clarification or

development when

it

the need to strengthen the legal

it is

may mean

reaf-

not properly implemented and

its

does not sufficiently meet the needs of the victims

of armed conflict.

The

objectives of the

ICRC

study were to better identify and understand the

humanitarian problems arising out of current armed
existing treaty
legal

and customary

IHL with

framework offers adequate answers

ther development of the law

examined, the
legal
all

rules of

what

a view to determining

to these

to analyze

whether

humanitarian problems or

may be needed. With

is

for regulating the

respect to

this

if fur-

most of the questions

conduct of parties to armed

required to improve the victims' situation

with that framework, rather than adoption of
fully respected

and

ICRC study showed that IHL, in its current state, provides a suitable

framework

cases

conflicts,

new

is

conflicts. In
stricter

compliance

rules. If all parties

IHL, most current humanitarian issues would not

almost

concerned

exist. If attempts

were undertaken to strengthen IHL, these should, therefore, build on the existing
legal

framework. However, the

state,

was not adequate

ICRC

study also showed that IHL, in

in every respect

identified three other areas

tional

mechanisms

for

current

some
NIAC, the

and should be further developed

areas. In addition to the issue of persons deprived of their liberty in

ICRC

its

in

where the law should be strengthened: interna-

monitoring compliance with IHL and reparation for

vic-

tims of violations, the protection of the natural environment in armed conflict and
the protection of internally displaced persons in

of the internal study the

ICRC

armed

conflict. After finalization

consulted States with a view to discovering to what
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extent the study's conclusions were broadly shared and to assess the possibility of

strengthening legal protection for victims of armed conflicts in these areas. 64

summary, States who participated in a first round of bilateral consultations
confirmed the main conclusion of the ICRC's study, that IHL remains as relevant
In

today as ever before to ensuring protection to
States agreed that in

work

is

the best

most

way

quacy of existing

all

victims of armed conflict. These

cases greater compliance with the existing legal frame-

to address the needs of victims.

rules of

IHL was

As a consequence, the ade-

strongly reaffirmed.

The

States consulted also

broadly agreed on the analysis of the humanitarian concerns

set

out in the study;

on how to address these concerns in legal terms varied, however, and
therefore the best way to proceed remains open for discussion. States were not
necessarily convinced that a treaty-making process was required. All options must
their views

be studied, including the preparation of soft-law instruments, the identification of
best practices
rules.

and the

facilitation

The consultation

also

showed

the law needed reinforcement in

dicated that

Most

it

of expert processes aimed

would not be

all

at clarifying existing

that States were not entirely convinced that

the areas identified by the ICRC.

realistic to

work simultaneously on

all

States stressed that future discussions should focus in the near

areas: protection for

They also

in-

four areas.

term on two

persons deprived of liberty and mechanisms for monitoring

compliance with IHL.

The ICRC submitted

a report with the substantive findings

and the

the consultation with States to the 31st International Conference of the

of

Red Cross

65

November 201 1. It also proposed a draft resolution with a
obtaining agreement of the members of the Conference (i.e., all States

and Red Crescent
view to

results

in

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and
the ICRC) for the way forward. The International Conference adopted resolution l 66 by consensus, confirming the two priority areas for future work: protection for persons deprived of liberty and mechanisms for monitoring compliance
with IHL. The main elements of the resolution relevant for this contribution on
Geneva Conventions,

parties to the

detention in

The

all

national

NIAC state:

31st International Conference of the

Red Cross and Red

Crescent,

.

.

mindful of the need to strengthen international humanitarian law, in particular
through its reaffirmation in situations when it is not properly implemented and its
clarification or

development when

of armed conflict,

it

does not sufficiently meet the needs of the victims

67
.

.
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2.

acknowledges that the report [submitted by the

ference] identifies serious humanitarian concerns

ICRC

Con-

to the International

and challenges

that

need to be ad-

dressed, in particular those related to the protection of persons deprived of their

armed conflict
and that, on the basis of the consultations, the
concrete and coordinated action to address these concerns;

liberty in relation to

report calls for

3.

recognizes the

.

.

.

importance of analyzing the humanitarian concerns and military

considerations related to the deprivation of liberty in relation to
the aim, inter alia, of ensuring

armed

conflict with

humane treatment, adequate conditions of detention,

taking into account age, gender, disabilities and other factors that can increase vulnerability,

and the requisite procedural and

terned or transferred in relation to

armed

legal safeguards for

persons detained, in-

conflict;

that further research, consultation and discussion are needed to asmost appropriate way to ensure that international humanitarian law remains
practical and relevant in providing legal protection to all persons deprived of their
liberty in relation to armed conflict;
4.

recognizes

.

.

sess the

.

6.

invites the

.

ICRC to pursue further research, consultation and discussion in coop-

eration with States and,

appropriate, other relevant actors, including international

if

and regional organisations, to identify and propose a range of options and its recommendations to: i) ensure that international humanitarian law remains practical and
relevant in providing legal protection to
tion to

armed

conflict;

.

.

.

ence, including National Societies, to

primary

8.

role of States in the

invites the

tervals to all

all

persons deprived of their liberty in rela-

members of the International Conferparticipate in this work while recognizing the

and encourages

all

development of international humanitarian law;

.

.

ICRC to provide information on the progress of its work at regular in-

members of the

International Conference

and to submit a report on

this

work, with a range of options, to the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross

and Red Crescent,

Through
It

its

consideration and appropriate action.

this resolution the International

further assess

NIAC.

for

how

Conference recognized the need to

best to address the situation of persons deprived of liberty in

gave a particular focus to ensuring

humane

treatment; adequate condi-

tions of detention, taking into account age, gender, disabilities
that can increase vulnerability;

and the

requisite procedural

and other

and

factors

legal safeguards

armed conflict. The ICRC will
respond to the invitation expressed by the International Conference and continue
further research, consultation and discussion in cooperation with States in that
particular domain in order to identify and propose a range of options and its recommendations. In light of the many questions addressed in this article, work in
for persons detained, interned or transferred during

this area will

be important

—but

also challenging.
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Synergy among Legal Regimes in the

Case of Libya
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mid-February 201
the wake of popular uprisings
Tunisia and Egypt,
Inmembers
of the Libyan public began protesting against the decades-old regime
1,

of Libyan leader

ment sought to

in

Muammar Gaddafi. The situation rapidly escalated as the govern-

forcibly suppress the demonstrations.

had deteriorated into an armed

A number

in

By earfy March

the situation

conflict.

of international organizations responded to the

crisis in

Libya as

it

They utilized a variety of different tools, ranging from official statements
and press communiques to the adoption of sanctions and other legal measures. On
March 19, 2011, a coalition of States initiated a bombing campaign in Libya. The
evolved.

United Nations Security Council authorized

this

to reports of serious violations of international
tional

enforcement action in response

human

rights

law and the interna-

law of armed conflict committed in Libya by persons acting on behalf of the

Gaddafi regime.

* Professor

of Law and Director, Center for International

Law & Policy, New England Law

|

Boston.

International Enforcement in

NIAC: The Case of Libya

This article provides an overview of applicable rules of international law

through different phases of the situation in Libya and sketches out various modes of

enforcement action employed by international organizations to respond to the crisis,
analyzing several of the controversial legal issues that arise in that context.

concludes with an analysis of the unresolved
situation in Libya

legal issues implicated

and by the international community's responses
Applicable

The article

by the evolving

to

it.

Law

Non-intervention

One of the

foundational principles of the international legal order, and a corollary

to the equally

fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of States, the principle

of non-intervention requires
fairs

all

States to refrain

of other States, or, in the words of the

from

UN Charter, in "matters which are es-

domestic jurisdiction" of other

sentially within the

interfering in the internal af-

States.

1

While the scope of this

principle was traditionally understood to preclude international regulation of the

way in which a State treated its own people, that understanding has evolved consid-

UN Charter system.
In light of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter and the practice of

erably since, at the

Charter bodies,
if

latest,

it is

the advent of the

now generally accepted that serious human rights abuses, even

committed purely within a

State

(i.e.,

not involving

aliens, foreign territory or

any other material interests of other States), are no longer regarded as internal matters shielded

by the principle of non-intervention. Most

States are also parties to

human rights treaties, further internationalizing the issue of how they treat
their own people and correspondingly diminishing the scope of the principle of nonspecific

intervention. Nonetheless,

mere

political wrangling,

even

if it

involves the failure to

meet international expectations of good governance, remains a purely internal matter so

long as

it

does not entail violations of international legal obligations.

The Use of Force//«s ad Bellum
Another fundamental
force. Article 2(4)

of the

rule of international law

UN Charter provides that "

their international relations
tegrity or political

is

the prohibition
[

a ] 11

Members

on the use of

shall refrain in

from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-

independence of any

State,

or in any other

manner

inconsistent

with the Purposes of the United Nations." The two established exceptions to this
prohibition are valid exercises of the right of self-defense and enforcement action
taken in accordance with
rules

UN Security Council authorization.

2

These international

on the use of force apply only between States. Thus, the prohibition on the use

of force does not apply internally to a State. 3
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The Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens
This body of international law regulates the way States treat foreigners. It provides
for a baseline of humane treatment, essentially protecting foreigners against serious

human

rights abuses, denials of justice

Embedded

liberty or property.

and other unjustified deprivations of

in the traditional State-centric international legal

system, the responsibility of the wrongdoing State, in general,

by the

State of nationality of the victim.

may be invoked only

4

The Law of Armed Conflict//MS in Be//o/International Humanitarian Law
The international law of armed conflict regulates the conduct of hostilities and
provides legal protections for individuals not

—or no longer—taking

part in the

As such, the vast majority of its provisions apply only in times of armed

hostilities.

conflict or occupation. Prior to

inter-State

armed

World War

conflicts. Starting

II,

the jus in hello generally applied to

with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 5

began to regulate non-international armed

it

also

conflicts, including purely internal

With the advent of international regulation of non-international
conflict came the direct applicability of international humanitarian law to
non-State, organized armed groups. 6 While international law still provides more
extensive regulation of inter-State armed conflicts than of non-inter-State armed
armed
armed

conflicts.

of difference has diminished.

conflicts, the extent

International Criminal

Law in the Strict Sense

International criminal law in the strict sense refers to those rules of international

law the breach of which gives
tional law.

7

rise to individual

criminal responsibility in interna-

These rules of international law directly bind individuals,

operating through the vehicle of domestic law

(e.g.,

suppression

as

opposed to

treaties).

The core

crimes in international criminal law are war crimes, genocide, crimes against hu-

manity and aggression. As Libya

is

not a party to the Statute of the International

Criminal Court (ICC), Libyan nationals committing acts entirely within Libya are

bound only by

those international criminal prohibitions that have acquired the

status of customary international law.

the

ICC

Statute were prohibited

Most, but not

all,

of the crimes prohibited by

by customary international law during the

rele-

vant period.

International

Human Rights Law

International

human

individuals under

fundamental

its

rights law, in general, regulates the

way

a State treats

control by requiring States to respect and ensure certain

rights of the

human

person. 8 As noted above, the evolution of this
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modern body of international law has

greatly reduced the scope of the

non-intervention principle in relation to a State's conduct toward

its

own people.

human rights law is prinLibya has been a party to several universal and regional human

Unlike the areas of international law identified above,
cipally treaty-based.

rights treaties since well before the

ternational

Protocol,

10

Covenant on

Civil

and

20 1

is

a party to, inter alia, the In-

(ICCPR) 9 and

Political Rights

the International Covenant

the Convention

unrest. Libya

1

on Economic,

Social

its first

and Cultural

Optional
Rights, 11

on the Rights of the Child, 12 the Convention on the Elimination of

Forms of Racial Discrimination, 13 the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 14 and the African Charter on Human

All

and Peoples'

Rights. 15

The ICCPR is subject to derogation. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, States parties
may take measures derogating from certain obligations under the Covenant to the
extent strictly necessary to respond to a "public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation."
to

Among the derogable rights are the rights to freedom of expression,

freedom of movement, to freedom from arbitrary detention and to a

States parties

must

States parties

through the intermediary of the

to available

officially

proclaim a

fair trial.

16

of emergency and must notify other

state

UN Secretary- General.

UN records, at no time during the 201

1

17

According

unrest did Libya lodge a notice

of derogation with the Secretary-General.

Phases of the Conflict and Modes of International Enforcement
Prior to the February Unrest
Prior to the unrest, the applicable law included
tional law, except for the

law of armed

all

conflict,

of the above bodies of interna-

and those

rules of international

criminal law derived from the law of armed conflict since there was no

armed con-

human
rights treaties to which it was a party and also by norms of customary human rights
flict

in existence. Libya

law. 18 Similarly, Libya

was

fully

bound by

territory).

refrain

obligations under

all

of the

was bound by the requirements of the law of State responsi-

bility for injury to aliens in its relations
its

its

with foreigners (particularly those within

Libya and individuals within Libya were also under an obligation to

from committing the international crimes of genocide and crimes against

humanity. Other

States, in their relations

with Libya, were bound by the prohibi-

on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. States were obliged
refrain from interfering in the internal functioning of the Libyan political sys-

tion
to

tem,

at least to the extent that its

tional obligations

owed

functioning did not contravene Libya's interna-

to those States. 19
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February Unrest

By mid- February

a series of protests broke out across Libya.

Once

the unrest in

Libya reached the point of a "public emergency which threaten [ed] the
nation," Libya could have claimed an authority to derogate from

gations under the
uation."

20

life

of the

some of its

obli-

ICCPR to the extent "strictly required by the exigencies of the sit-

This would have permitted the Libyan government a freer hand in arrest

and detention matters,

as well as in restricting the

dom of movement and the

freedom of expression, the

free-

freedom of association. As noted above, Libya did not

provide notice of derogation to the treaty depositary. Nonetheless, there

some

is

authority to suggest that the failure to notify does not of itself preclude the lawfulness of derogation. 21 While in principle

derogable, the burden
striction

imposed.

would be on Libya to demonstrate the

and

beyond the

and international organizations

torture.

The

rights,

such

gravity of the reported viola-

internal sphere,

and gave standing

to other

to invoke the international responsibility of

Libya. Notwithstanding these violations, at this stage recognition of

any entity

other than the Gaddafi regime as the government of Libya would likely
constituted a prohibited intervention in Libyan internal affairs.
against Libya

are

necessity for each re-

emerged of violations of non-derogable

freedom from

to

tions brought the matter
States

ICCPR

rights in the

22

In any event, reports soon
as the right to life

most of the

still

have

The use of force

remained prohibited. Notwithstanding the emerging notion of the

responsibility to protect,

which may provide enhanced standing to take diplomatic

measures or economic sanctions, the use of force remained precluded absent Security

Council authorization. 23 The use of force could not be justified on the basis of

collective self-defense since the protesters, as non-State actors,

tional legal right of self-defense

February 25:

One

of the

under the jus ad bellum.

UN Human Rights Council Special Session

first

Rights Council.
"situation of

had no interna-

organizations to adopt operative measures was the

UN Human

On February 25, 201 1, the Council convened a special session on the

human

special session of the

rights in the

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." This was the fifteenth

Council since

Council over its predecessor, the

its

creation in 2006.

One of the advances of the

UN Commission on Human Rights,

ease of convening special sessions.

is

the relative

While the Commission required the support of

a majority of members, the Council can

convene a special session with the support

of only one-third of its members.
Several others factors contributed to the convening of this special session. Libya

was

at the

time a

above, Libya

is

member

a party to a

of the

Human

Rights Council. In addition, as noted

number of international human
373
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was thus a

clear legal basis for invoking Libya's international responsibility. Lastly,

the Libyan ambassador to the

Human

Rights Council had by this time ceased to

support the Gaddafi government and supported the convening of the special
session.

In

its

Resolution S-15/1 of February 25, 2011, the

Human

Rights Council de-

cided to establish an international commission of inquiry and to

recommend

that

Libya be suspended from the Council.
After recalling official statements

on the

situation

made by

other

UN

bodies,

the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the African

Union
and the European Union, the Human Rights Council strongly condemned the
"gross and systematic" human rights violations being committed in Libya, and
suggested that some of the abuses might rise to the level of crimes against
humanity. 24 It also "strongly call[ed] upon" the government of Libya to fulfill its
"responsibility to protect" its population; to comply with its human rights obligations, placing particular emphasis on the freedoms of expression, assembly and information; 25 and to "stop any attacks against civilians." 26
The Human Rights Council urged the Libyan government to "respect the popular will, aspirations and demands of its people and to make [its] utmost efforts to
prevent further deterioration of the crisis." 27 The Council also stressed the need to
hold accountable "those responsible for attacks in [Libya], including by forces under Government control, on civilians." 28 In addition, it reminded Libya of its commitment,

as a

member

of the Council, "to uphold the highest standards in the

promotion and protection of human

and

its

special procedures."

rights

and to cooperate fully with the Council

29

The Council then decided to "urgently dispatch an independent, international
commission of inquiry ... to investigate all alleged violations of international
human rights law in [Libya], to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations

and of the crimes perpetrated and, where

ble." Its express

accountable."

purpose was to ensure "that those individuals responsible are held

30

Finally, the

Council recommended to

bly, that Libya's "rights

the gross

its

parent body, the

UN General Assem-

of membership" in the Council be suspended, "in view of

and systematic violations of human

February 26:

possible, to identify those responsi-

rights

by the Libyan

authorities." 31

UN Security Council Emergency Meeting

On February 26, the day after the special session of the Human Rights Council, the

UN

Security Council convened an emergency meeting.

The

Security Council

unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 32 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
took binding measures under Article 4 1 of the Charter, including the imposition of
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an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset
Libya to the ICC.

33

freeze.

As with the Libyan ambassador

It

also referred the situation in

to the

Human

Rights Council,

the ambassador of Libya to the United Nations had ceased to support the Gaddafi

government and spoke

in

support of the Security Council resolution.

The preambular paragraphs of the Security Council resolution refer to the
"gross and systematic violations of human rights" taking place, 34 as well as serious
violations of "international humanitarian law." 35 The reference to "international
humanitarian law" may indicate a perception that the situation in Libya had by this
time evolved into an armed conflict. 36 Mirroring language employed by the Human
Rights Council, the Security Council also recalled "the Libyan authorities' responsibility to

protect

its

population," 37 evoking the "responsibility to protect" concept

and perhaps implying further consequences

for continued failure to

fulfill

that

responsibility.

The Security Council welcomed the work of the
iterated

its call

for accountability,

Human Rights Council and re-

emphasizing the responsibility of superiors. 38

then recalled the Security Council's

It

own power to defer ICC prosecutions, perhaps

telegraphing an incentive to cooperate. 39 In this respect, Article 16 of the
ute provides that the Security Council

may

defer an

ICC prosecution

ICC
for

Stat-

up

to

for

an

twelve months, with the possibility of renewal.

The

resolution's operative language begins with the Council's

immediate end to the violence and

mands of the population."
tional

human

rights

40

It

its call

for steps to

fulfill

[i]

mmediately lift

the "legitimate de-

urges the Libyan authorities to comply with interna-

and humanitarian

law, 41 to ensure the safety of foreign

nationals, to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian supplies
"

demand

restrictions

on

all

and workers, and

to

forms of media." 42

The Security Council's referral of the situation to the ICC marks the first time
that the referral power has been used with the unanimous support of Council
members. The only other Security Council referral to date, that of the situation in
Darfur, was not unanimously supported. Both China and the United States abstained in that vote. China had also been a holdout for the Libya resolution, but was
ultimately persuaded to vote in favor of the resolution.
indicated that

it

The Chinese delegation

supported the resolution "taking into account the special circum-

stances in Libya." 43

The ICC

referral

cluded in the Darfur

is

followed by a jurisdictional exclusion similar to that in-

referral. It

provides that

nationals, current or

former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya which

not a party to the

Court

shall

is

Rome

Statute of the International Criminal

be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for
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omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya estab-

by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been ex-

lished or authorized

pressly waived

by the

State.

44

By its terms this provision would seem to exclude not only ICC jurisdiction, but
any jurisdiction other than that of the non-State party. Some delegations have

dis-

agreed with this interpretation, opining instead that

ICC

it

only excludes

jurisdiction.

The resolution also provided that the ICC's expenses in this matter shall be
borne by the ICC States parties and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily.
The resolution created a new Sanctions Committee to, inter alia, monitor implementation of the sanctions, designate individuals subject to the measures, consider
requests for exemptions

March

1:

and report back

to the Council.

UN General Assembly Suspends Libya's Rights of Membership in the

Human Rights Council
Human Rights Council, the UN General As-

Acting on the recommendation of the

sembly on March
bership" in the

1,

201 1, in Resolution 65/265, suspended Libya's "rights of mem-

Human

Assembly had used

its

Rights Council. 45 This was the

time the General

first

authority to suspend a State.

March 3: ICC Prosecutor Opens Investigation
On March 3, 201 1, the ICC Prosecutor announced his decision

to

open an

investi-

gation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Libya since February
15.

46

In his statement, he also identified certain individuals with "formal or de facto

authority,

who commanded and had control over the forces that allegedly commit-

ted the crimes,"

responsible
singled out

Security

if

and thus "put them on notice"

forces

under

their

that they could be held criminally

command committed

crimes. In particular, he

Muammar Gaddafi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of Regime

and Military

Intelligence, the

head of Gaddafi's Personal Security and the

head of the Libyan External Security Organization.
bers of opposition groups

would

also

He further indicated that mem-

be subject to investigation

if they

committed

crimes.

He concludes by stating, "It is important
One could read this statement to mean that

to avoid an

the

ICC

armed

conflict in Libya."

Prosecutor's position at that

time was that the situation in Libya had not yet reached the necessary
lence, organization

and duration

tion of war crimes in the

March

to constitute an
3 statement.
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Early March: Emergence of Armed Conflict

By

early

March,

some of the forces opposing the Gaddafi
themselves as organized armed groups. In addition, the

at the latest, at least

regime had constituted

violence between the government and these groups

and intense

to constitute

non-international

armed

armed

became

sufficiently protracted

of the law of

conflict, leading to the application

conflict. 47

about the application of the

The application of the;ws in hello also brings
relevant war crimes provisions of international crimi-

nal law.

March

Arab League Calls for the Use of Force
At its meeting in Cairo on March 12, 201 1, the Council of the Arab League issued a
statement on the implications of the events in Libya and the Arab position. 48 Most
significantly, the Arab League called upon the UN Security Council to impose a nofly zone and to create "safe areas." The members of the Security Council had already been discussing the possibility of the use of armed force. In this context, the
political support of the Arab League was seen as a key factor.
In the preamble the League called for compliance with international law and
an end to the fighting. It also called on the Libyan authorities to withdraw from
the areas they "entered forcibly" and to ensure "the right of the Libyan people to
fulfill their demands and build their own future and institutions in a democratic
12:

framework." 49

The League Council then

recalled

its

commitment "to reject all forms of foreign

intervention in Libya," but emphasized "that the failure to take necessary actions to

end

this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in internal

decided to

call

upon

Libyan

affairs." 50 It

then

the Security Council "to take the necessary measures to im-

pose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe
areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary
tection of the Libyan people

measure that allows the pro-

and foreign nationals residing

March 17: Security Council Authorizes the Use of Force
On March 17, 201 1, the UN Security Council, again using
under Chapter VII of the

its

." 51
.

.

.

enforcement power

UN Charter, responded to the call by imposing a no-fly

zone and authorizing the use of armed force to protect
populated areas under threat of attack."
isting sanctions

in Libya

and established

52

civilians

and

"civilian

Resolution 1973 also expanded the ex-

a Panel of Experts to assist the Sanctions

Committee.

The

The
abstentions came from the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and
Germany. The two permanent members that abstained Russia and China have
resolution was adopted with a vote often in favor and five abstentions.

—
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traditionally espoused robust interpretations of the non-intervention principle. 53

The abstaining delegations

cited a lack of information, the failure to exhaust

diplomatic means, ambiguity as to

how force would be

used and by

whom, and

doubts as to whether the use of force would effectively achieve the Council's
purposes. 54

The operative

text of the resolution begins with the Council's

immediate establishment of a

and abuses

tacks against,

and a "complete end

ceasefire

of, civilians." 55

The Council

also

demand

for the

to violence

and

demanded

that Libya

all at-

comply with its obligations under international human rights law, humanitarian
law and refugee law, and "take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic
needs," as well as to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. 56
In operative paragraph 4, the Council authorized the use of armed force to protect civilians

Specifically,

Member

and

it

civilian

populated areas, while excluding military occupation.

authorized

States that

have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through

and acting in cooperation with the SecretaryGeneral, to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.
regional organizations or arrangements,

This broad grant of authority was narrowed by the requirements of "acting in
cooperation with the Secretary- General," the limitation to protection of "civilians" 57

and areas "under threat of attack," 58 and the exclusion of occupation. 59

The resolution also established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace "in order to protect civilians," providing exemptions for humanitarian flights and authorizing
member States to use armed force to enforce it. 60
In addition to strengthening enforcement of the arms embargo, the resolution
also expanded the asset freeze. Mindful that a new Libyan government would need
these assets, the Council "[a]ffirm[ed]

frozen

.

.

.

shall, at a later stage, as

soon

benefit of the people of the Libyan
Finally, the Security

determination to ensure that assets

as possible

be made available to and for the

Arab Jamahiriya." 61

Council used

government, and those acting on

its

its

its

power

to

bind States to deprive the Libyan

behalf, of legal remedies that

might otherwise

be available for breach of contract under domestic law. Operative paragraph 27
quires "all States"
at the instance

62

to take "the necessary

measures to ensure that no claim

re-

shall lie

of the Libyan authorities ... in connection with any contract or

other transaction where

its

performance was affected by reason of the measures

taken by the Security Council
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March 19: Coalition Airstrikes Begin
On March 19, armed forces of France, the United

States, the

United Kingdom and

others initiated military strikes in Libya pursuant to Security Council Resolution

The intervention of other States' armed forces brought into application the
law of international armed conflict. 63
On March 27, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO would undertake
1973.

enforcement action in Libya. 64 Control of the enforcement action
subsequently transferred to

in Libya

was

NATO under unified command.

March 25: African Court of Human and

Peoples' Rights Orders Provisional

Measures

On March 25, 20

1 1

the African Court of Human

,

ordered provisional measures against Libya.

Commission on

the African

tion with the

Court

the African Charter

and Peoples' Rights unanimously

The proceedings were

by

instituted

Human and Peoples' Rights, which lodged an applica-

after receiving a

on

65

number of complaints

Human and Peoples'

The Commission did not request

alleging violations of

Rights by Libya, a State party.

the Court to order provisional measures.

"empowered to order provisional measures proprio motu 'in cases of extreme gravity and urgency and when necessary to
avoid irreparable harm to persons' and 'which it deems necessary to adopt in the
Nonetheless, the Court recalled that

it is

interest of the parties or of justice.'" 66

After satisfying

itself,

prima

facie, that

it

had

jurisdiction, the

Court reviewed

statements and resolutions of relevant international organizations. In light of the

condemnations of abuses contained therein, the Court concluded that "there
therefore a situation of extreme gravity

harm

to persons

the rights to

Charter."

life

who
and

and urgency,

is

as well as a risk of irreparable

are the subject of the application, in particular, in relation to

to physical integrity of persons as guaranteed in the [African]

67

The Court then found that the circumstances required it to order, "as a matter
of great urgency and without any proceedings," 68 the following provisional measures: ( 1 ) that Libya refrain from "any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons,

the Charter or of other international
party";
to

and

(2) that

which could be

human

a breach of the provisions of

rights instruments to

which

it is

a

Libya report to the Court within fifteen days on measures taken

implement the order. 69

The

first

provisional measure ordered

is

somewhat

"could" introduces a degree of ambiguity. Further,

pendent clause beginning with "which" describes or
It is likely

that

it

it is

unclear.

Use of the term

unclear whether the de-

qualifies the preceding clause.

qualifies the preceding clause, so that only those actions that
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constitute a breach (or "could" constitute a breach) of

human

rights

law are en-

compassed by the order.

Mid- April: Concern about NATO Interpretation of Mandate
By mid-April, some States, including Security Council permanent members Russia
and China, began
mandate.

its

70

to claim that the multinational force

was exceeding the scope of

In particular, they recalled that regime change

was not authorized

by Security Council Resolution 1973. According to some observers, NATO's
airstrikes

went beyond protection of civilians and potentially constituted

tion of the prohibition

a viola-

on the use of force.

May 4: ICC Prosecutor Presents Report to the Security Council
Pursuant to operative paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1970, the ICC
Prosecutor on

May 4 reported to the Security Council on actions taken pursuant to

the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC. 71 In his report, the Prosecutor pro-

vided an overview of the preliminary examination of jurisdictional issues con-

ducted by his

office,

the ongoing investigation and anticipated judicial activities.

The Prosecutor found that available information provided "reasonable grounds
to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed and continue being
committed in Libya," 72 and he noted that there is also "relevant information concerning" war crimes "once the situation developed into an armed conflict." 73
As to admissibility of the complaint, the Prosecutor indicated that his office had
"not found any genuine national investigation or prosecution of the persons or

conduct that would form the subject matter of the cases
also

found that the situation

ICC

Statute, taking into

"clearly

account

all

it

will investigate." 74

He

meets the threshold of gravity required by the
relevant criteria." 75

He noted

that there

were

no countervailing "reasons to believe that the investigation would not serve the interests of justice," 76 and thus opened an investigation on March 3.
In describing the ongoing investigation, the Prosecutor stated that his office was

pursuing those
tion activities

who bore

the greatest responsibility.

He

also referred to coopera-

and reported receiving "outstanding support from

States Parties

and

non-States Parties alike."
After enumerating the type
that this evidence revealed

and quantity of evidence

collected,

two main types of "incidents":

he indicated

(1) "[s]ecurity forces

unarmed civilians constituting crimes against humanity," and
existence of an armed conflict with alleged war crimes as well as other

allegedly attacking
(2) "[t]he

crimes against humanity that appear to have been committed by different Parties." 77

He

then surveyed specific factual allegations supporting the existence of these

types of crimes, including excessive use of force by security forces; "[systematic
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enforced disappearances and destruction

arrests, torture, killings, deportations,

of mosques"; 78 rape; and "unlawful

arrest,

Africans perceived to be mercenaries."

As
fice

mistreatment and

of sub-Saharan

to the anticipated judicial proceedings, the Prosecutor indicated that his of-

would soon be submitting

16, the

application for an arrest warrant.

its first

ICC Prosecutor requested

three individuals, including

a pretrial

chamber

On May

to issue arrest warrants for

Muammar Gaddafi.

Commission of Inquiry Issues Report
On June 1, 2011, the Commission of Inquiry,

June

killings

79

1:

Rights Council Resolution S-15/1, issued
"a significant
as well as

its

established pursuant to

The Commission opined that

rights

law violations have occurred,

report.

number of international human

Human

80

war crimes and crimes against humanity." According to the Commission,

the large majority of violations were

committed by those acting on behalf of the

Gaddafi regime "in the pursuit of a systematic and widespread policy of repression
against opponents to his regime

and

his leadership." In addition, the report

noted

been violations by opponents to the regime."

that "[t]here have also

As to methodology, the Commission "opted for a cautious approach in the present report by consistently referring to the information obtained as being distin-

guishable from evidence that could be used in criminal proceedings, whether
national or international." Despite
rights,

its

findings of

numerous

violations of

humanitarian and international criminal law, the "commission

this stage,

Human

it is

human

feels that, at

not in a position to identify those responsible, as requested by the

Rights Council in the resolution establishing

its

mandate."

June 27: ICC Pretrial Chamber Issues Arrest Warrants

On June 27, ICC
yan

officials,

Pre-Trial

including

Chamber

I

issued arrest warrants for three senior Lib-

Muammar Gaddafi. This was the second time that the ICC

has issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of State.

The

first

was

for

Al Bashir, the President of Sudan. As with the situation in Sudan, Libya
State party to the

ICC

is

Omar
not a

Statute.

Unresolved Legal Issues

The

international

situation in Libya:

community employed

a broad range of tools in responding to the

arms embargoes, economic sanctions, recognition/de-recognition,

suspension of rights of membership, regional

mission of inquiry, an

ICC

referral

human

rights

mechanisms, a com-

and, ultimately, the use of force. The

unprecedented combination of these tools and the intersections of the various
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bodies of international law identified above have given

rise to a

number of unre-

solved legal issues.

ICCPR

Derogation under the

The Human Rights Council and
violations of provisions of
rights

dom

human

condemned Libya

for

Among

the

law and humanitarian law.

rights

invoked by both bodies were the rights to freedom of expression and

free-

of assembly, both of which are subject to limitation and derogation.

As noted above,

some of their
life

the Security Council both

States parties to the

ICCPR may take measures derogating from

obligations in the event of a "public

emergency which threatens the

of the nation." While no clear threshold has been established for determining

when

this

standard has been met, the jurisprudence of the

Human

Rights Council

indicates that the possibility of derogation arises only in situations of the
gravity. In

any event,

this

utmost

standard was clearly met by the time the situation in

Libya erupted into armed conflict.

two derogation-related

In this context,

issues arise.

Libya's failure to notify the other States parties to the

General of any derogation. The second
gate

is

is

The

first is

ICCPR via

whether Libya's

impeded by the Libyan government's

the significance of
the

UN Secretary-

legal ability to dero-

emergency

role in creating the

situation.

As noted above, the

failure to notify the Secretary-General

preclude the lawfulness of derogation.
portant purposes.
States parties

It is

its

The

does not necessarily

notification nonetheless serves im-

an important procedural safeguard in that

it

puts other

on notice of the derogation and presents them with an opportunity to

assess the situation.

from

81

More

significantly,

it

also requires the State party derogating

obligations to specify "the provisions

the reasons by which

Apart from

its

it

was actuated."

from which

it

has derogated and

.

.

82

failure to notify the Secretary-General, Libya also failed to pro-

vide any public statement concerning derogation. There was thus no indication
that Libya intended to avail itself of the capacity to derogate.

dication of what measures

would be taken

Nor was there any in-

in derogation of its obligations, the de-

gree of derogation or the extent to which such measures were necessary.

recent jurisprudence of the

Human Rights Council supports the view that the comany form may be

plete failure to provide this information in

of such measures.

More

fatal to

the lawfulness

83

The second derogation-related

issue

is

whether and to what extent a

ticipation in creating a situation of public

emergency might undercut

State's par-

its

ability to

derogate. There are at least two conceptual models for thinking about this issue.
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The

first is

by analogy to the relationship between the jus ad helium and the jus

in hello.
It is

jus

a basic principle of the jus in hello that

ad helium. The

situation of
hello.

conflict

is

international

applies equally to

application

issue of which State violated the jus

armed

Once an

its

ad helium

in bringing

conflict has begun, the

about a

law of armed conflict

regulating the conduct of hostilities

protections for individuals not

—or

no longer

—taking

Nonetheless, a State that violates the jws ad helium would
sponsibility for that violation,

independent of the

generally irrelevant to the application of the jus in

armed

all parties,

is

and providing

part in the hostilities.

still

bear international re-

and would be obliged to make reparation

for

all

of its

harmful consequences.

Applying this model to the issue of derogation, one could argue that the cause of

an emergency situation should not

affect the ability to

derogate once that situation

has arisen. Thus, once the threshold of "public emergency which threatens the

life

of the nation" has been met and the State has announced measures derogating

from

its

obligations in conformity with Article 4, the applicable legal

framework

Under this approach, international law would not look "behind"
the then-prevailing facts on the ground. The issue of who caused the state of emergency would be irrelevant to the issue of derogation. At the same time, the State
party would still bear responsibility for any human rights violations, including
those in violation of derogable obligations, committed in the lead-up to the emerhas been altered.

gency situation.

Another approach would be to proceed from the principle of "unclean hands."
This equitable principle, whereby actors are precluded from benefiting from their

own wrongdoing, is arguably a general principle of law within the meaning of Article

38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 84 and variations of it are

reflected in several fields of international law, including the
bility

and the law of treaties. Under

this

law of State responsi-

approach, a State party should not be able

to avail itself of the possibility of derogation

if

the government of that State party

created the emergency situation by committing serious violations of human rights

law

(e.g.,

in the context of a brutal

There are strong arguments
ploying the former approach
in bringing

about the new

is

crackdown against

protesters).

in favor of both approaches.

that

state

it

The advantage of em-

avoids having to determine

who was at

fault

of affairs. The importance of this principle in the

context of the jus ad helium/jus in hello dichotomy

is

particularly clear. States gen-

no standing judicial body
with jurisdiction to determine otherwise. One could argue that the wisdom of remaining agnostic as to which party wrongfully caused a conflict would apply a forerally claim that their uses

tiori in

of force are lawful, and there

an internal context.
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Moreover, States have agreed that irrespective of who started the armed conflict,
certain rules

This

raises,

must be followed by all

parties in order to mitigate

however, an important distinction with respect to the issue of deroga-

tion. In international law, the principle

and jus

armed

in hello

conflict.

derogation

some of its effects.

is

of the independence of the jus ad bellum

ensures that the restrictions of the jus in hello will apply to any

Derogation

is

in a sense the inverse.

the removal of restrictions that

The consequence of a

valid

would otherwise apply to the conduct

of the State party. Another basis of distinction

may

be found in the nature and

human rights law. This body of law principally regulates
the way a State treats its own people, formerly regarded as a purely internal matter.
International human rights treaties also establish compliance bodies to monitor
function of international

implementation of the obligations under those
lic

treaties,

including in times of pub-

emergency.

Application of International

The

issue of whether

Human Rights Law during Armed Conflict

and to what extent international human

situations of international

armed

conflict

rights

law applies in

and occupation remains

controversial.

While international judicial bodies have found that international human
continues to apply in times of armed conflict,
position

85

some

and instead argue that international human

rights

law

States consistently reject this

rights

law ceases to apply or

is

otherwise entirely abrogated by the application of the lex specialis of the jus in
hello* 6

Despite this continuing controversy over the application of human rights law to

armed conflict, there now appears to be consensus that human rights
law does apply in internal armed conflicts. Even the United States, which has been
international

vocal in

its

rejection of the application of human rights treaty law to international

armed conflicts and to

armed conflicts, has never
objected to the application of human rights law to internal armed conflicts. 87 Indeed, the United States consistently exerts pressure bilaterally on States dealing
with situations of internal armed conflict to comply with their obligations under
international

human

transnational, non-international

rights law.

Thus, to the extent the conflict in Libya remained internal, the application of international

human

ever, that there

is

rights

law to

was uncontroversial. This does not mean, how-

not continuing controversy over the interoperability of particular

rules of human rights law

divergent views

it

on

and humanitarian law

There are

still

this subject.

As noted above, once other

States

began

to use

armed

force in Libya, the law of

armed conflict began to apply to the conflict between those States
The applicability of international human rights law to international

international

and Libya.

in this context.
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armed

conflicts

remains unsettled, though a consensus appears to be emerging

favor of application at least where the relevant party to the conflict

degree of control over territory or individuals.
intervening States

any

In any event,

bombing campaigns

limited to aerial

is

88

direct control of individuals or territory), then

human

international

rights law,

erence to the rules of thejws

even

if

applicable,

(i.e.,

if

likely

exercising a

the role of the

in the absence of

most questions

would

is

in

arising

under

be resolved by

ref-

in hello as lex specialist

Use of Force Issues

A number of controversial legal issues are implicated by the Security Council's authorization to use force in this context.

Some have

suggested that the Security Council's authorization to use force to

To

protect civilians was a manifestation of the responsibility- to-protect doctrine.

the extent this assessment

is

accurate,

underscores the political nature of the doc-

it

The use of force was authorized by a vote of the Security Council,

trine.

was enabled through
lack of allies in the

ternational

a vote that

a careful alignment of political factors, including Gaddafi's

Arab world. There

is little

indication that the response

by the

in-

community gave legal content to the responsibility-to-protect concept,

except perhaps as a conceptual umbrella for independently existing obligations

under

human

rights

and humanitarian

law. 90

More controversial has been the way in which force was used by the intervening
States

and regional organizations. In

particular, the international

community's

support for the mandate began to erode in the wake of concerns that

NATO was

exceeding the authorization granted by the Security Council in Resolution 1973.

The Security Council's grant of authority to use force to "protect civilians and
civilian populated areas" seemed to sweep more broadly than the more limited establishment of "safe areas" called for by the Arab League. Presumably, the United
Kingdom, France and the United States preferred not to have to go back to the Security Council again
less,

if

an

the Security Council

initial

grant of authority proved inadequate. Nonethe-

imposed

limits

on the authorization

to use force, clearly

envisioning a protective use of force. Thus, despite the breadth of the mandate,

would not seem

to

encompass regime change. 91

Key to assessing the scope of the mandate is the
ian."

To

would

it

interpret this

term

interpretation of the term "civil-

92
in light of existing rules of international law,

naturally turn to the law of armed conflict.

one

As the mandate was formulated

armed conflict in Libya, the relevant body of
law would be the law of non-international armed conflict.
There are divergent opinions as to the meaning of the term "civilian" in noninternational armed conflict. Some authorities take the position that as civilians
against the backdrop of the internal
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who are not combatants, and as there are,

strictly

no combatants in non-international armed conflict, then all individuals
non-international armed conflict are civilians. This would arguably even in-

speaking,
in a

clude Gaddafi himself, as well as the

members of his

pretation, only purely defensive uses of force

offensive use of force

Others
those

reject

would

security forces.

would be

necessarily target those

who

such a broad application of the term

On this inter-

permissible, as any

are to be protected.

"civilian,"

contending that

who take part in the hostilities are effectively combatants, styling them as un-

lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents. This
curity forces, rebel soldiers and,

se-

depending upon the breadth of interpretation, any

other individual taking part in the
these individuals

would include Qaddafi's

hostilities.

On this interpretation, protection of

would fall outside the mandate. Noteworthy in this context is that

the United States government over the past decade has advanced a relatively nar-

row conception of civilian

status,

excluding those taking part in the

hostilities

or

even providing material support to the belligerents. In the present context, such interpretations

narrow

its

authority to use force.

A further wrinkle is introduced by use of the term "civilian populated areas under
threat of attack."

Use of this phrase could expand the mandate

tion of

where

all

places

civilians reside. In particular,

within the mandate the use of force to protect
also then apply to

Once

towns where Gaddafi

the tide turned against Gaddafi

all

it

to include protec-

could be read to include

parts of Libya.

Of course, it would

loyalists resided.

and the

rebels

against loyalist strongholds, the legality of continued

began to launch offensives

NATO bombing in support

of the rebels became questionable. Particularly difficult to justify under the
date

would be the

man-

NATO attacks against retreating convoys. While some have rea-

soned that protection of

civilians in

Libya necessitated regime change, and that

dislodging Gaddafi from power was a justified

such reasoning renders the limitations expressly

means of

set forth in

fulfilling the

mandate,

Resolution 1973 almost

meaningless.
If

NATO's use of force exceeded the scope of the

1973 authorization, would that

then constitute the crime of aggression within the definition for that crime adopted
at the

sion

2010 Review Conference of the International Criminal Court? The aggres-

amendment adopted

at the

Review Conference defines aggression

as

the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of

aggression which, by

its

character, gravity

the Charter of the United Nations.

and

93
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The phrase

"act of aggression"

bly Resolution 3314.

94

is

then defined by reference to General Assem-

That resolution does not expressly

excess of Security Council authorization. Nonetheless,

gous category of conduct.
forces of

one

ment of the

State

It

it

refer to uses of force in

does provide an analo-

includes as an act of aggression "[t]he use of

which are within the

armed

territory of another State with the agree-

receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the

agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement." 95 Thus, to the extent the definition of aggression includes ultra vires uses of force,
the

it

could be argued that certain offensive aspects of

NATO bombing campaign qualify as acts of aggression.

The definition of the crime of aggression under the ICC Statute, however, is
somewhat narrower. In particular, the act of aggression would have to "by its character, gravity and scale, constitute!] a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations." Given the divergent interpretations of the mandate, it would be
difficult to

conclude that any violation was "manifest," or objectively evident. 96

In any event,

NATO's broad

interpretation of the

back the responsibility-to-protect doctrine

mandate seems

to have set

as a political matter. Russia

and

China, States that have traditionally advocated robust interpretations of the
non-intervention principle but were persuaded to acquiesce in the 1973 mandate,

have since voted against even the mildest measures in relation to the situation in
Syria. 97

ICC Referral Issues
The ICC referral also raises a number of significant legal issues, including the applicability of head of State

immunity and the principle of non-retroactive application

of criminal law (or nullum crimen sine

The Security Council
ICC jurisdiction in this
Libya's non-party status

referral

was

lege).

a necessary precondition to the exercise of

case because Libya

is

is

also relevant to the issues of head of State

the application of nullum crimen sine

nity

1.

arrest

As an incumbent head of State, Gaddafi was

from foreign

legal process

Statute. 98

immunity and

lege.

As noted above, an ICC pretrial chamber issued an
June 201

ICC

not a party to the

warrant for Gaddafi in

entitled to absolute

immu-

under customary international law. Although

Gaddafi's death rendered the issue moot, the question remains whether the issu-

ance of the arrest warrant was a violation of international law, and
tity, if

if so,

which en-

any, bore responsibility for the violation.

The ICC has established for itself the lawfulness of issuing arrest warrants for sitting heads of State by reference to its own Statute. The Statute provides that
'

[i]

mmunities or

special procedural rules

which may attach
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of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court

from exercising

jurisdiction over such a person." 99 Thus, those States that are

its

parties to the treaty have effectively

waived immunity claims. This

States that are not parties to the treaty.

100

Nonetheless, in

the issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President
pretrial

chamber found

its

is

not true for

decision authorizing

Omar Al

Bashir, an

that the abrogation of immunity provided in the

ICC

ICC Stat-

ute applied equally vis-a-vis the territorial States of situations referred to the Court

by the Security Council irrespective of whether or not that State

ICC

Statute.

101

It

remains unresolved whether

tomary international
It

may be argued

Libyan authorities

it is

shall

cooperate fully" with the Court, effectively abrogated any

it is

also arguable that

would have
if

unclear

the issuance of the arrest warrant conflicted with interna-

who would

a legal person,

if it is

any derogation of existing customary

to be expressly stipulated.

bear responsibility for the violation.

and even

the In-

Is

bound by customary international

ternational Criminal Court a legal person

Even

consistent with cus-

that Security Council Resolution 1970, in deciding that "the

In any event, even
tional law,

is

a party to the

law.

immunities. However,
international law

this decision

is

law?

violated customary international law,

if it

it

remains unclear what remedy would be available to injured States or individuals.

Another

issue related to Libya's status as a non-State party to the

revolves around the principle of nullum crimen sine
ple,

an individual

may

According to

this princi-

not be prosecuted for conduct that was not proscribed by

applicable law at the time the conduct took place. 102

Rome

lege.

Rome Statute

As Libya

is

not a party to the

Statute, the criminal prohibitions set forth therein did not

form part of the

law applicable to Libyan nationals acting on the territory of Libya. Nonetheless,
the time the

Rome

Statute

was adopted, there was broad agreement

that

at

most of

the crimes included in the Court's subject matter jurisdiction had already ac-

quired the status of customary law.

It

was

was an element of progressive development
to the

war crimes provisions applicable

also understood,

however, that there

in the Statute, particularly in relation

in situations of non-international

armed

conflict.

Hardly a decade

earlier,

it

was

far

from

olations of the law of non-international

clear

armed

whether even the most serious
conflict

would

vi-

give rise to the in-

By the
mid-1990s, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had
determined that serious violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were war crimes giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. 103 The
Tribunal's pronouncements were not met with any significant opposition from
dividual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator in international law.

States.

By the time of the Rome

Statute's

adoption in the

388
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it

was
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already well accepted
constituted

among

war crimes. The Rome

Statute,

however, provides a

tensive elaboration of war crimes in non-international

beyond the provisions of

Common

States that serious violations of

Common

Article

3.

armed

Article 3

much more

conflict,

ex-

going well

Thus, in considering war crimes

charges against the suspects, the Court will have to carefully examine whether the

crimes were well established in customary international law in early 201

1.

104

Conclusion

In responding to the situation in Libya, the international
virtually every tool at

its

disposal, creating

embargoes, sanctions, and other

legal

community employed

an unprecedented combination of force,

and

political

mechanisms. The

Human

Rights Council convened a special session, issued a condemnation, established a

commission of inquiry and ultimately sought the suspension of Libya's membership,

which was

effected

by the General Assembly

in a seminal exercise of

its

au-

The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze. It also referred
the situation to the ICC, which issued an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi and
two others for alleged crimes against humanity. Following the emergence of armed
conflict in Libya, the Security Council authorized the use of force, which was initially carried out by a coalition of States, then taken over by NATO.
The combination of these tools in the Libyan context reveals the extent to which
a number of important legal issues of human rights law, jus in be#o> jus ad bellum
thority to

do

so.

and international criminal law are unresolved.
cability

of derogation from

Specifically, the availability

ICCPR obligations,

and appli-

absent notification to the Secretary-

General, and in the context of a State-generated emergency situation need to be
addressed, as does the application of international

human

rights

law during times

of international armed conflict, particularly in the context of aerial
paigns. Also unresolved

is

the extent to which,

if at all,

NATO exceeded the scope of

the Security Council's authorization of the use of force, and

crime of aggression

is

thereby implicated. Additionally,

violated customary international law
State of a non-State party to the

by issuing an

bombing cam-

it is

arrest

if so,

whether the

uncertain

if

the

ICC

warrant for the head of

Rome Statute, who would be accountable if so, and

whether the application of certain war crimes charges

in this context

would

trans-

gress the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.

Despite the significance of these questions, the political, ad hoc nature of the international

community's response to the situation

in Libya portends that

these issues will likely remain unresolved for the foreseeable future.
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Concluding Remarks on Non-International

Armed Conflicts

Yoram Dinstein*

This Newport conference has covered a large number of issues pertaining to
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), as compared to international

armed

conflicts (IACs). In these

themes:
(iii)

(i)

NIAC; (ii)
hello in a NIAC;

the proper definition of a

the application of the jws in

tion relevant to a

NIAC;

the interaction between

(v) intervention

NIACs and
/.

A

useful definition of a

Additional Protocol

II

NIAC

(AP

II)

do not configure
out below.)

by

shall focus

six

main

conflicts;

the various types of recogni-

a foreign country in a

NIAC; and

(vi)

Definition

in international

law appears in Article 1(1) of

NIAC must

of 1977: a

its

armed

armed groups." (The
1

"take place in the territory

forces

text goes

and dissident armed

on

to

add features that

in the nucleus of the general definition; these will be spelled

2

There are two constitutive elements in

* Professor

(iv)

I

IACs.

of a High Contracting Party between
forces or other organized

on
the thresholds of armed

concluding remarks,

Emeritus, Tel Aviv University,

Israel.

this definition:
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A NIAC must

(a)

that

is

take place within the borders of a high contracting party,

to say, a single State;

and

A NIAC has to be waged between

armed forces of the State (loyal to
the central government) on the one hand, and organized armed groups
(including dissident armed forces) on the other.

(b)

the

NIAC as an Internal Armed Conflict
The first vital ingredient of NIAC relates to

A.

within a State. This characteristic
19(1) of the 1954

armed

is

its

internal nature,

that

it is

waged

repeated in other texts, as illustrated in Article

Hague Convention on Cultural

conflict not of

i.e.,

Property, which speaks of "an

an international character, occurring within the territory of

one of the High Contracting

Parties." 3 Virtually

all

commonly used definitions of a

NIAC are restrictive in that the armed conflict is circumscribed
(the common locution in the past was "civil war").

to a single State 4

Admittedly, a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the

Hamdan

case of 2006, seems to have arrived at the conclusion that the post-9/1

transnational "war
that a

NIAC

NIAC. 5 However, the idea
oxymoronic: an armed conflict can be a

on terrorism" should be deemed

can be global in nature

is

a

NIAC and it can be global, but it cannot be both. Cross-border action against terrorists, like the SEAL Team Six raid that took out Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, may be
carried out as an "extraterritorial law enforcement" operation. 6 Ordinary military

operations in Afghanistan, directed at Al-Qaeda terrorists, blend into an
in that

—

country

against the Taliban

peated references have been

American alignment
mind, the armed

made

—

that, in

my

opinion,

is still

IAC waged

ongoing. 7 Re-

in the course of the present conference to the

in Afghanistan against

conflict in Afghanistan

"Al-Qaeda and

its

associates."

To my

should rather be seen as conducted against

"the Taliban and their associates." And, since the central issue in the legal (and public)

debate on the subject

add that

I

fail

that of detention of captured

to grasp the rationale

side of Afghanistan.

B.

is

enemy personnel,

I

must

behind the decision to incarcerate detainees out-

Why is Guantanamo Bay preferable to Bagram?

Organized Armed Groups

The second component of the definition of NIAC postulates the existence of a clash
of arms between the armed forces of a State (loyal to the central government) and
organized armed groups (including dissident armed forces) rebelling against the
powers that be. Several comments are called for in this context.
The phrase "organized armed group" is of pivotal significance. The rudiments
of organization are immanent in any insurgency amounting to a NIAC. Without
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organization, there

is

no NIAC

from mere

(as distinct

internal disturbances.) 8

The

may consist of (i) dissident (viz.,
mutinous) units of the State's armed forces; or it maybe formed by (ii) improvised
groups of civilians who have coalesced in rebelling against the central government.
organized armed group

may fall into two types.

It

The degree of organization of insurgent groups does not have

a fixed pattern. Dis-

sident military forces will naturally possess built-in structure

Other

— improvised—organized armed groups

are likely to be

and hierarchy.

more

loosely knit

on the existence of some minimal organization, so that disconnected acts of violence committed by individuals will be excluded from the definition.
together (at least at the onset of the insurgency). But the emphasis

The

on insurgent organized groups being "armed" is principally dedistinguish them from political opposition factions that challenge the

insistence

signed to
central

is

government without resorting

to force. For sure, being

"armed" does not

imply that the armament employed by the insurgents has to be sophisticated.

The

central

government of the

come paralyzed
rect

— even

of the

result

to disintegrate

NIAC

which a

State in

NIAC

is

raging

and disappear altogether

is

—

liable to be-

either as a di-

or for other reasons. In extreme cases, such a

phenomenon produces what is commonly called a "failed State." However, the removal from the scene of the

NIAC. Frequently, an

central

existing

government does not have

NIAC may continue

— or

a

to put an

end

to the

new NIAC may be trig-

—between two or more organized armed groups vying with each other
between sundry, organized armed
speaking,
ascendance.
breakdown of governmental control— can no longer
groups — subsequent
gered

for

Strictly

hostilities

to the

be viewed

as

an insurgency:

tion of NIAC

after

all,

must embrace such

who is rebelling against whom? But the defini-

a state of affairs.

The add-on potential of a clash between two or more organized armed groups
coming within the scope of a NIAC has been acknowledged by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the

Tadic case in 1995, which talked about "protracted armed violence between gov-

ernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State" (emphasis added). 9 Article 8(2)(f) of the 1998
tional Criminal

Court follows in the same

the territory of a State

when

there

is

vein:

Rome

"armed

protracted

armed

Statute of the Interna-

conflicts that take place in

conflict

between govern-

mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups." 10
doubt, this comprehensive version

C. Motives

is

the correct definition of a

NIAC today.

and Modalities

The motives propelling an organized armed group
tral

No

government

to an insurgency against the cen-

(or to a violent confrontation with other organized

401

armed groups)
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may

ethnic, etc.

may be

These motives

differ.

Whatever the motive,

The modalities of NIACs

political, social,

economic, ideological,

religious,

does not impact on the definition of NIAC.

it

are multiple;

some

and some

are national

regional:

An organized armed group may have countrywide goals, the ultimate be-

(a)

ing to overthrow the central government, with the insurgents taking into

hands the helm of State throughout the

their

illustration

territorial

domain

(the best

being that of the Franco rebellion in the Spanish Civil War,

1936-39). Alternatively, an organized armed group

may have more lim-

such as effecting radical constitutional innovations,

ited national aims,

ensuring greater participation of underrepresented groups in the
cal process,

politi-

securing fundamental freedoms or gaining certain specific

concessions from the central government.

(b)

may be

The

insurgents' aims

e.g.,

demanding autonomy within

confined to a particular region or
a portion of the State.

locality,

The insurgents

may even push for outright secession of a part of the country, with a view
to creating a

new

sovereign State (the best example being that of the

Southern Confederacy in the American Civil War, 1861-65) or unit-

—on

ing

irredentist

grounds

—with an

existing foreign State.

There

may

be a more complex impetus for the insurgents' drive to wrest control
over a particular district from the central government. Even criminal incentives (as in the case of narco-traffickers) cannot be ruled out. 11

—

—

The long and short of it is that irrespective of concrete objectives when an
organized armed group is rebelling against the central government of a State, there
is

a

NIAC in

progress.

Thresholds

II.

The

spectrum of violence

overall

nal disturbances to

wide

is

NIACs and IACs

—ranging from ordinary crime and

—and

it is

necessary to bear in

ferent tiers of violence are subject to discrete legal regimes.
refer to three thresholds of

IACs

—plus

armed

a level of violence that

conflicts
is

—two

below the

12

It is

relating to

first

mind

inter-

that dif-

therefore useful to

NIACs and one

to

threshold.

A. Below-the-Threshold Situations

Below-the-threshold violence
1(2) of AP

II

fits

a domestic law

enforcement paradigm. Article

provides that the Protocol will not apply to "situations of internal
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disturbances and tensions, such as

riots, isolated

and sporadic

other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."
reiterated in Article 8(2)(f) of the 1998

Court,

14

in Article 22(2) of the

1

and

acts of violence

The same formula

is

Rome Statute of the International Criminal

1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Conven-

tion for the Protection of Cultural Property 15
cle

13

and

in a 2001

Amendment

Weapons (CCW).

of the 1980 Convention on Conventional

16

to Arti-

By now,

this

uniform treaty definition of below- the-threshold violence seems to be universally
accepted.
atic

noun

The two
is

signal adjectives are "isolated

and sporadic," and the emblem-

"riots."

and sporadic" disturbances,

Riots, as well as other "isolated

— namely,

dled by law enforcement agencies

mestic designation)

—

riot-like disturbances

rather than

are ordinarily han-

police forces (regardless of their do-

by military contingents.

Still,

the intensity of

may be such that military units are summoned to lend indis-

pensable assistance to the police in stamping out the violence. This by

not

alter the

operation of the law enforcement paradigm.

Below- the-threshold violence does not

call for

itself

does

17

the application of thejws in hello

The conduct of all concerned in below-the-threshold
governed by the domestic constitutional and criminal legal sys-

(the law of armed conflict).

confrontations

is

tem of the State afflicted with the violence,

human

subject to the strictures of international

rights law.

As a rule, law enforcement agents enjoy less latitude when it comes to opening fire

on rioters during "isolated and sporadic" disturbances compared to the degree of latitude conferred

on the armed

forces

when engaged

Nevertheless, exceptionally, law enforcement agents

narios

—may have more

latitude in the use of certain

in

an IAOor even in a NIAC.

—

in below-the-threshold sce-

weapons, when quelling an or-

dinary disturbance, compared to their counterparts in an armed conflict (either an

IAC or a NIAC). Preeminently, in Article 1(5) of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention contracting parties undertake not to use "riot control agents"
language, tear gas) as a
the

method of warfare, whereas Article 11(9) (d)

employment of non-lethal chemical agents

cluding domestic riot control.
(interdicted in

armed

18

for law

(or, in plain

explicitly allows

enforcement purposes,

in-

Moreover, the use of expanding soft-nosed bullets

conflicts) 19

teams engage in counterterrorism

is

common when

special

activities, particularly

weapons and

when

tactics

faced with hostage

takers or suicide bombers.

Over the First Threshold
The first threshold of NIACs is established in Common Article 3

to the four

Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims, which

refers tout court to

B.

"armed

Geneva

conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions

of the High Contracting Parties." 20

paved the way for Article 19(1) of the 1 954 Hague Convention
Cultural Property, which employs the

Common Article
case

—

in other
in

3 has acquired a special status, since

—

in the

1986 Nicaragua

the majority of the International Court of Justice held that

"minimum
and

same formula.

for the Protection of

21

rules applicable to international

words, that

it

reflects

first

expresses

to non-international conflicts"; 22

customary international law (applicable both

NIACs). Yet, unfortunately,

point at which the

and

it

threshold

is

Common Article

3

does not shed

crossed. Article 19(1) of the

in

light

IACs

on the

Hague Convention

does not do that either.

The most

authoritative attempt to

—

Chamber of the ICTY, which held
"protracted armed violence." 23 The
8(2)(f) of the

Rome

"Protracted"
it

enough

is

in the

vacuum was made by

1995 Tadic case

—

adjective "protracted"

obviously the antonym of AP

that the internal violence

is

II's

is

"isolated

prolonged for

it

the Appeals

that there

must be

repeated in Article

and sporadic," but

to qualify as a

Tadic judgment of 1997, added

the notion of "protracted" hostilities

—the element of the

—

as

is

NIAC? The

an extrapolation of

"intensity" of the

armed

thereby "distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized

and short-lived
the

the

Statute of the International Criminal Court. 24

ICTY Trial Chamber, in its
conflict,

fill

insurrections, or terrorist activities." 25 Subsequent

ICTY have come up with

intensity of an

armed

judgments of

"[vjarious indicative factors" in trying to assess the

conflict.

26

Over the Second Threshold
The second threshold is laid down in Article 1(1) of AP II, which, after stating that a
NIAC must "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups," goes
on to refer to organized armed groups that "under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." 27
The salient element here, in comparison to the first threshold, is the control exercised by the insurgent organized armed group (under responsible command)
over a part of the territory. The size of the area under insurgent control is not defined, but it must be sufficient (i) to allow "sustained and concerted military operations" to be carried out; and (ii) to enable the implementation of the Protocol (for
example, caring for the wounded and sick). 28 The degree of control exercised by the
insurgents in the area in question need not exceed these two conditions. In particuC.

lar,

there

is

no requirement

sense" will take place.

that "any actual administration in a governmental

29
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As for the

condition, any (military or quasi-military) operations carried out

first

by insurgents

in a

NIAC

over the second threshold must be "sustained and con-

means

certed." "Sustained"

that the operations are kept

some

certed" signals that they are carried out according to

With

armed

respect to the second condition,

conflict control over certain areas

(possibly

more than

once). In the ebb

it

up continuously; "con-

must be kept

may

mind

in

that in

any

pass from one side to the other

and flow of a NIAC, an insurgent organized

armed group may lose control over an

area earlier seized by

consequential. For the second condition to be met, what
the insurgent organized

plan. 30

armed group

it.

itself is in-

indispensable

is

retains control over

That by

some

is

that

territory at

any

given time.

The

great advantage of the territorial control prerequisite

acid test facilitating the ability to
threshold. Thus,
it is

apart a

when one juxtaposes

noteworthy that the

Libya. If Libya

tell

is

different

is

it

provides an

NIAC from intense violence below the

the settings in Libya

rising in Syria

that

is

no

and

Syria in June 201

protracted or intense than that in

less

from Syria (apart from the element of foreign interven-

tion with the fiat of the Security Council), 31

in the fact that the Libyan insur-

it is

gents have gained control of large tracts of land, whereas in Syria there has been
similar development.

The

trouble, of course,

control over territory excludes
the struggles by

Basque

separatists in Spain.

Irish

Republican

bello,

which

on

Army in Northern

crossed, the treaty law of AP

Several provisions of AP

atory of customary international law.

NIACs above

that the insistence

no

insurgents'

—

e.g.,

Ireland or the

32

Once the second threshold is
contracting parties.

is

some cases of protracted and intense violence

and against the

33

1,

34

II

Iltomes into play for

can currently be viewed as declar-

Regardless,

must be perceived

it

that

all

the second threshold remain subject also to the customary jus in

is

applicable whenever the

first

threshold

is

crossed.

D. Over the Third Threshold

Whereas the gap between the

first

and the second thresholds

is

quantitative (the

NIAC is actually occurring),
the leap over the third threshold is qualitative: it is a move from a NIAC to an IAC.
Many people are under the impression that a NIAC is ipso facto less intensive than
second threshold providing weightier evidence that a

an IAC, although
In any event,

it

tense than in a

NIAC)

this idea

is

not empirically corroborated by the historical record.

does not matter whether the fighting in an IAC

NIAC. The

sole question

or inter-State (an IAC).

two or more

The

is

whether the fighting

third threshold

States are taking part in the

armed
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is

more or
is

less in-

intra-State (a

crossed automatically once

conflict, fighting

each other.
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Crossing the third threshold means that the jus

in hello in its

plenitude will be

armed conflict. The jus in hello applicable in a NIAC is sketchier, 35
gamut of the jus in hello is in play only when an IAC is going on.

applicable to the

and the

entire

More
law

significantly, perhaps,

IACs are subject

to a jus

ad helium: international

entrenched both in the United Nations Charter and in customary interna-

(as

tional law) forbids the use of force in international relations, with only
tions,

viz.,

(i)

and

self-defense,

(ii)

enforcement action either mandated or

No

authorized by a binding decision of the Security Council. 36
helium exists as regards NIACs. "There
wars."

37

two excep-

no

is

While the domestic law of every

parallel jus

ad

rule in international law against civil

State forbids an insurgency against the

established order, international law turns a blind eye to the issue. International

law neither prohibits an uprising against the central government nor denies the
right of the central

government

to put

III.

The jus

in hello regulating

IACs

down

the insurrection by force.

Jus in Bello

started to develop in the nineteenth century,

and

now become strongly anchored in both custom and extensive treaty law. Conversely, the jus in bello applicable in NIACs did not begin to develop until the adophas

tion of

Common

Article 3 of the

Geneva Conventions. Indeed,

decades for the urge to further develop

NIAC jus

in hello to

it

took several

become

firmly im-

planted in the international legal mind-set.

NIAC jus in bello governs armed conflicts above either the first or the second
threshold. When it does, it is applicable throughout the territory of the State affected, as long as the NIAC is going on. In the words of the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY, in the 2002 case ofKunarac, a violation of the NIACjws in bello may "occur
at a

A.

time when and in a place where no fighting

is

actually taking place." 38

The Trend of Convergence

Contemporary developments
convergence between the jus
manifested in the following

(a)

in bello

law display a palpable trend of growing

governing IACs and in NIACs. This trend

treaties:

Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, which elaborates a list of NIAC war crimes (admittedly not as long

Article 8(c)-(e) of the 1998

as the

(b)

in treaty

comparable

list

of IAC war crimes) 39

Article 1(3) of the 1996

Amended

Protocol

the instrument (dealing with mines
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to the

and booby

CCW, which applies

traps) to

NIACs 40

is
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(c)

Article 22(1) of the 1999

the Protection of Cultural Property,

(d)

The 2001 amendment
all

Hague Convention
which does the same 41

Second Protocol

to Article

1

of the

to the

CCW,

the Protocols annexed to the Convention.

which applies

to

for

NIACs

42

No doubt, we are also witnessing the emergence of a new customary law in this
regard:

some of it

is

already fully formed, 43 and

some

is

probably in the process of

formation.

B.

The Impossibility of a Full Merger

Notwithstanding the increasing resemblance between the norms of the jus
applicable in

IACs and

NIACs,

in

it is

in hello

unlikely that there will ever be a total merger

of the law in the two discrete categories of armed conflicts. There have been some

academic

calls for

Yet, at least three

conflating the law regulating the

two types of armed

conflicts. 44

insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of such an amalgam-

ation being effected in the practice of States:

(a)

What might be termed a congenital trait of NIACs is that captured insur(POWs). 45 The

gents cannot claim the privileges of prisoners of war
tionale

is

ra-

that domestic law always considers insurgents to be criminals,

perhaps even

traitors. 46

When

gents are subject to prosecution

detained by government forces, insur-

and punishment

duct by the domestic courts (military or
reasons, insurgents in

for their criminal con-

civilian).

NIACs cannot be regarded

For that and other

as

"combatants"

contradistinction to civilians). 47 Accordingly, the 2006 San

(in

Remo Man-

Non- International Armed Conflict uses the term "fighters" instead.
The intrinsic asymmetry between well-organized (trained, disciplined, uniformed, etc.) members of the armed forces loyal to the central
government and loosely organized insurgents (especially when they do
ual on

48

not belong to dissident forces) creates
application of thejws in hello in a

(b)

lots

of practical problems in the

NIAC.

The law of neutrality does not apply to NIACs. 49 This is due to the fact
that in a NIAC solely one single State is embroiled in the armed conflict. 50
The construct of a neutral as a "third State" does not make sense when
the nature of the
State being

armed

conflict precludes the possibility of a

second

engaged (subject to the extraordinary setting of "recognition

of belligerency"). 51
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The whole body of law relating to belligerent occupation is out of tune
with NIACs, 52 since neither areas seized by insurgents nor those retained
or liberated by the central government can be regarded as occupied terri-

(c)

tories in the sense of thejws in bello. 53

I

not dwell upon additional

shall

gality

—

less

compelling

—problems

relating to the le-

of certain means and methods of warfare, which have been raised during this

conference.

C. Exceptional Situations

There are two exceptional situations when the jus
they were IACs.
ligerency." 54

One

—under customary

The other

tional Protocol

is

international law

—

NIACs

apply in

as if

"recognition of bel-

is

confined to treaty law. Pursuant to Article 1(4) of Addi-

of 1977, which

I

in bello will

is

devoted to IACs, armed conflicts in the exercise

of the right of self-determination are subject to the application of the Protocol and
the

States. 55 It

Geneva Conventions, although they do not involve two opposing

must be noted, however,

that this

is

an exceedingly controversial provision which

does not bind non-contracting parties to the Protocol.

IV. Recognition

A. "Recognition of Belligerency"

Sometimes, the central government of a State ravaged by a
circumstances to face a dire

reality.

government
leges,

it

compelled by

manage

to capture large

numbers of

forces loyal to the central government. If the central

desires to ensure that

its

captive soldiers will benefit

from

POW privi-

has no viable option except to confer on the insurgents "recognition of bel-

ligerency,"

which means that

governing IACs
It is

armed

is

This happens primarily when, by dint of their

military successes in the field, the insurgents
soldiers serving in the

NIAC

will

become

—on condition of
applicable to the

reciprocity

NIAC.

—the whole

interesting to note that, in a regular IAC, a belligerent party

to grant

POW status to

forces of State B)

owing

its

POW status.

ing against the central

nationals: an

enemy soldier

allegiance to the captor State (State

of the link of nationality
entitled to

own

—

57

is

In a

not regarded by ihe jus

jus in bello

56
is

not required

(serving in the

A)

—mostly

in bello as a lawful

armed

as a result

combatant

NIAC, members of the organized armed group

government of State

fight-

A are ordinarily nationals of that State.

Once the central government proclaims a "recognition of belligerency," however,
it is bound to treat insurgent captives as POWs despite their local nationality. What
ensues

is

that the protection afforded to such insurgents in a

408
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virtue of
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the;ws in bello

an IAC.

—

is

actually wider in scope than the parallel protection available in

58

When

"recognition of belligerency"

is

granted by the central government of

means that the IACjws in bello is applied to the NIAC not only in the relations between that government and the insurgents but also vis-a-vis all other
States. The upshot is that the laws of neutrality will be in effect as far as States B, C,
State A,

etc.,

the

it

are concerned. These States will then not be allowed to forcibly intervene in

armed

conflict: neither in

support of the insurgents nor even in support of the

under customary interna-

central government, notwithstanding the general rule
tional law that intervention to assist the central

may be

"Recognition of belligerency"

A but by State

ernment of State
hostilities will

Such recognition cannot

A

continue to be governed by the NIACjws

nition of belligerency"

by State B

nition of belligerency"

by

legal effect

that State

B

permitted. 59

affect the position
will alter its

affect the

conduct of

and the insurgents
in bello).

Nor does

of States C, D,

etc.

(these

"recog-

But "recog-

standing with respect to the NIAC.

of "recognition of belligerency" by State B does not denote that

thereby entitled to forcibly intervene in the conflict in favor of the

is

insurgents.

State

is

proclaimed not only by the central gov-

between the central government of State

hostilities

The

B.

government

To

the contrary, State

B

is

bound by

ency" to observe total neutrality in the NIAC. That

is

its

"recognition of belliger-

to say, following "recognition

of belligerency," State B will have to display impartiality toward both the central

government of State A and the insurgents. Whereas

—

—prior

to ^recognition of bel-

B was allowed to forcibly intervene in the NIAC in favor of the
central government of State A 60 and disallowed to do that in aiding and abetting the
insurgents, 61 as from the turning point of "recognition of belligerency" State B is
forbidden to assist any of the opposing sides. State B thus loses its pre-existing right

ligerency"

State

government of State A, without acquiring a new right

to militarily assist the central

to militarily support the insurgents.

As

a matter of fact, explicit "recognition of belligerency"

today.

62

But the basic concept of "recognition of belligerency"

There

is

no need

asmuch

as

it

for

may be

distilled

from the

ing from "recognition of belligerency,"

"Recognition of belligerency"

if

government of State A

the

as relevant as ever.

actual conduct or official

mulgation of neutrality issued by State B

tus of

is

largely in "disuse"

an express proclamation of "recognition of belligerency," in-

of State B. Thus, "recognition of belligerency"

tral

is

—

63

may be

pronouncements

tacitly inferred

from

a pro-

(so that instead of such neutrality flow-

it is

the other

way around).

may also be implied from the conduct of the cen-

for example, if it confers

on insurgent captives the sta-

POWs (a clear-cut indication that the IAC jus in bello applies). Additionally,
central government of State A wishes to close a maritime port seized and
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controlled by the insurgents, the only effective

blockade.

64

The

way

do

to

this

may be

upside, from the central government's viewpoint,

to

impose a

that

is

it

can

then interfere with freedom of navigation of international shipping on the high
seas.

The downside

is

on

that the imposition of a blockade

by the

a port controlled

insurgents implies "recognition of belligerency," inasmuch as a blockade

means of warfare vouchsafed by IAC
(preeminently, that the blockade

but not by NIACjws

is

jus in hello

effective

—

and does not

exist

on paper only) 65

them.

B.

—

A does not wish to

bestow upon the insurgents (by implication) "recognition of belligerency,"

no choice but

a

subject to certain conditions

government of State

in hello. If the central

is

it

has

to avoid a proclamation of blockade as against a port controlled

by

66

Other Types of Recognition

"Recognition of belligerency" must not be confused with three other types of recognition:

and

(iii)

(i)

"recognition of insurgency,"

"Recognition of insurgency" in State

A

is

B and has conse-

issued by State

far-reaching than those attendant

less

new government

new State.

recognition of a

quences that are

recognition of a

(ii)

on "recognition of belliger-

come about when an organized

ency." "Recognition of insurgency" will usually

armed group fighting the central government of State A gains effective control of
some territory. By granting (explicitly or implicitly) "recognition of insurgency,"
State B merely indicates that it will maintain some de facto relations with the insurgents, in order to safeguard

its

own interests (and those of its nationals)

tory actually under the sway of the insurgents.

67

in the terri-

In other words, State

B

will

outflank the central government and deal directly with the insurgents in matters
pertaining to the area subject to their control.

new central government

Recognition of the insurgents as the
granted by State B "prior

to, in

the absence

of,

of State

A may be

concurrently with, or subsequent to

recognition of belligerency" by the central government of State

A (or by State C). 68

The outcome of a recognition of the insurgents by State B as the new central government of State A is a dramatic volte-face in the political constellation. It means
that, following the recognition, State B may extend military assistance to the new
government (by consent/request) against the

now looked upon
shall

forces

still

as the insurgents against the reconstructed central authorities.

have more to say on

this eventuality in the context

be noted, however, that premature recognition of the
of international law.

Another

loyal to the ancien regime,

new government

is

a

It

I

must

breach

70

possibility

the insurgents as a

of intervention.

69

is

new

recognition
State, X.

—

issued

What such
410

by

State

B

—of

the entity created by

recognition denotes

is

that State

B

—
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armed conflict not as an intra-State NIAC (between the central government and organized armed groups) but as an inter-State IAC (between States A
and X). This is an even more radical reshuffle of the political cards. Still, in practice,
regards the

the result of recognition of State

B must then maintain

State

X is similar to "recognition of belligerency" in that

neutrality regarding both belligerent parties.

V. Intervention

A. Forcible Intervention against the Central
State

B

is

Government

liable to forcibly intervene in the affairs

gency against the central government of State A.
the insurgents, they

of State A by fomenting an insur-

B has effective control over
organs. 71 There is no need to go

If State

may be regarded as its de facto

here into the controversial issue of the degree of control required in order for
effective for this purpose. Suffice

be

insurgents

is

effective, the

appears on the face of

it

it

to say that, if State B's control over the

IAC between

States

A and B.

Generally speaking, the issue of forcible intervention by State
to a less flagrant scenario.

central

to

armed conflict is internationalized. 72 In other words, what
to be a NIAC in State A would actually cross the third

threshold and qualify as an

place in State A, but State

it

The presupposition

is

B

that a genuine

in State

NIAC

A relates
is

taking

B extends military assistance to the insurgents against the

government of State A. Such military assistance may cross the third thresh-

IAC between State A and B (side by side with
B has some elbow room before its action is considered

old and bring about an

the NIAC).

However,

to be cross-

State

ing the third threshold. Thus, the majority of the International Court of Justice
in the

the

Nicaragua case of 1986

—did "not

believe" that

form of the provision of weapons or

mere

logistical or

"assistance to rebels in

other support" rates as an

armed attack. 73 Still, the degree of logistical support that can lawfully be extended
by State B to insurgents in State A is not free of doubt. 74 At any rate, it is indisputable that

—

at a certain

—

point

a forcible intervention

surgents against the central government of State

B. Forcible Intervention in

Under customary

by State B on behalf of the

A will produce an IAC.

Support of the Central Government

international law, State

B

is

allowed to forcibly intervene in a

—

at its

It is

true

NIAC in State A, as long as this is done on behalf of the central government
request or, as a
that,

in-

minimum, with

its

consent

—and

under Article 2 of a 1975 resolution of the

"The Principle of Non-intervention

in Civil

eign assistance to any party in a "civil war."

with traditional international law;

76

it

75

against the insurgents.
Institut

Wars,"

But

it is

de Droit International,

forbidden to extend for-

this prohibition

is

irreconcilable

runs counter to the statement of the
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International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case that intervention
77
at the request of the government of a State";
and

more modern

it is

is

"allowable

equally inconsistent with the

78

Contemporary international practice is replete
with instances of detachments of armed forces sent by one State to another, at the
practice of States.

latter's request, in

order to help in restoring law and order in the face of intractable

domestic turmoil.

79

If State

B

on behalf of the central government of State A
the armed conflict still qualifies as a NIAC
even when

forcibly intervenes

—

against the insurgents,
State

B deploys

in State

against the insurgents
State,

The

A

an expeditionary force engaged in intense

—inasmuch

as the troops of State

B

hostilities

are not battling another

but operating jointly with that other State (State A) to quell the insurgency.

remains the same notwithstanding effective control by the in-

legal position

surgents of large areas and despite large-scale casualties that the hostilities entail.
Surely, State

B cannot dispatch troops

into State

—against the

gents within the latter's territory
forcible intervention

with the
the

full

by

State

B

in a

A— in order to fight the insur-

will

of the host government.

Any

NIAC going on within State A must take place

consent of the central government of State A. 80 Such consent maybe in

form of either

has started; or

(i)

an ad hoc request for (or acceptance

of) help after the

NIAC

a previous treaty (usually a military alliance or a regional ar-

(ii)

rangement) in which contracting parties confer on each other the right of interven-

NIACs. (For an example,

tion in prospective

African Union.)

see the

2002 Durban Protocol of the

81

When consent is granted by State A to entry into its territory of armed forces of
State B, in order to carry out military operations against the insurgents,

appreciated that

—

judgment

Armed Activities (Congo v. Uganda)

in the

in the language of the International

Court of Justice,

case

—

State

B

is

it

must be

in

its

2005

restricted

by

"the parameters of that consent, in terms of geographic location and objectives/' 82

Moreover,

as stressed

by the Court,

State A's consent can always be revoked (no

formalities being required for revocation, in the absence of a treaty). 83 This
cial point.

By revoking

its

consent, State

is

a cru-

A pulls the rug from under the legality of

the presence of the foreign troops and State

B must

extract

them without undue

delay.

Any extension
State A,

of the presence of the armed forces of State B in the territory of

beyond the termination of State A's consent

to their presence (plus a rea-

sonable space of time enabling their orderly departure), amounts to aggression, 84

and converts the armed conflict from
Naturally, there
(State

NIAC

A

is

a

problem

if

a

NIAC into an IAC between States A and B.

the central

government of

State

A

disappears

thus becoming a "failed State"). In such circumstances, no party to the

can express

its

consent to foreign intervention in the NIAC, and no
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revocation of consent can be issued. This scenario might invite application of the

1975 resolution concerning non-intervention in

Institut's

son

is

that,

State" (A)

should States B and

—

in support of two

"civil

opposing organized armed groups 86

IAC between

C. Recognition of the Insurgents as the

B and C

States

the one

is

empowered

the Benghazi authorities

rea-

are likely

outcome.

New Government
new

central gov-

A transforms everything: 87 the newly recognized central
to seek forcible assistance

one competent to revoke the request
Libyan

—they

as the

Recognition by State B of the leadership of an insurgency as the

ment

The

C both intervene militarily in a NIAC in the "failed

to clash with each other, with an

ernment of State

wars." 85

for help.

from

State B;

governalso the

it is

Such recognition was extended to

by a number of European countries intervening

NIAC against the Tripoli government

in the

Moammar Qaddafi.

run by

B recognizes the leadership of an organized armed group of
insurgents as the new central government of State A, and State C continues to recognize the original central government or recognizes the leadership of another orEvidently,

if

State

ganized armed group as the successor of that government, and

C militarily intervene

in the

between States B and C.

NIAC

in State A, this

is

likely to

if both

B and
an IAC

States

develop into

88

The Security Council can always adopt a binding decision (under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter), which will mandate or authorize forcible intervention by other States in a NIAC in progress in State A. 89 Such inte/vention will certainly be lawful, but (if directed against the central government of State A) it will
either turn the NIAC into an IAC or bring about a separate IAC.
VI. Interaction

A.

Armed Conflict and Criminal Activities

The outbreak of an armed

conflict (whether

an IAC or a NIAC) does not

entail the

cessation of ordinary criminal activities (within the ordinary bounds of the law en-

forcement paradigm). Indeed, the outbreak of an armed conflict
ordinary crime

is

on the

rise: this is

linked to times of great tension;
conflict;

and even

(iii)

(ii)

commonly due

to

(i)

may mean

psychological reasons

the omnipresence of weapons during an

the emergence of

numerous new crimes (such

—

are governed not

armed

as black

marketeering or trading with the enemy). In any event, ordinary crimes

when committed in the course of an armed conflict

that

—even

by the jws

in

bello

but by the domestic criminal law, subject to the precepts of international hu-

man

rights.
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As noted earlier,

a

NIAC may have criminal motivations. 90 In such cases, it is pa-

draw the line between military operations executed against the
insurgents in a NIAC and those directed at ordinary criminals. Colombia is a prime
tently difficult to

We

example.

heard

at this

conference that the Colombian armed forces are pro-

vided with multicolored cards telling them whether their operations
the rubric of a

The

idea

is

NIAC

attractive,

tions are governed

come within

or the law enforcement paradigm (below the threshold). 91

but

I

doubt

by different

by no means the same. The

flip

efficacy. After

its

legal systems,

of a card

all,

the two categories of situa-

and the training of forces required

is

may not be sufficient for the government

units to adapt themselves instantly to an entirely disparate legal regime.

B.

Simultaneous NIACs

More than one NIAC may be going on in a single country at any given time. This
transpires when the central government has to contend
usually in distinct parts

—

of a large territory

—with assorted organized armed groups having

perhaps even clashing, aims. (As we heard
presents a vivid illustration.)

at this

diverse,

and

conference, the Philippines

92

A NIAC in one country (State A) may spill over its borders and generate another
NIAC within a neighboring country (State B). The situation in the Great Lakes region in Africa (in different time frames)
nario, insurgents against the central

within State B and ignite another

is

the

most graphic example. In

government of State

NIAC,

this

A find temporary shelter

time against the central government

of State B. As long as the two central governments of States
rately or in collaboration with

gents, the

two simultaneous

each other) wage

conflicts

—

this sce-

hostilities

A and B

(acting sepa-

only against the insur-

despite their cross-border effects

—remain

become embroiled in combat against
each other, the armed conflict crosses the third threshold and becomes an IAC.
There is actually a parallel state of affairs in IACs. Two or more IACs between diverse belligerent parties may be going on simultaneously (perhaps in different
NIACs. But

if

the two central governments

parts of the world). These separate

the

but

C.

IACs may spread and even

roll into

one. Thus,

USSR was part of the Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany from June
it

1941 on,

joined the war against Japan only in August 1945.

Combinations of NIACs and IACs

There

may be multiple combinations of NIACs and IACs, both vertically (along an

axis of time)

and horizontally (along an

axis of space).

Horizontally, the territory of a single State

may be ravaged by hostilities that can

be categorized as both an IAC (between two or more States opposing one another)

and

a

NIAC

(between the central government and an organized armed group or
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even between two or more

rival

organized armed groups vying for power within

The dual armed conflicts,

the State).

may commence siIAC may be preceded by the NIAC or vice

international

multaneously or consecutively (the
But the point

versa).
tilities

is

that

and

internal,

—whether synchronized or unsynchronized—the hos-

have separate inter-State and intra-State strands. 93 That

for instance, in Afghanistan in

long-standing

NIAC with

is

what happened,

October 2001: the Taliban regime, having fought

a

the Northern Alliance, got itself embroiled in a parallel

IAC with the United States and its allies as a result of providing shelter and support
to the

Al-Qaeda

terrorists

United States on 9/1 1.
Vertically,

armed

who had launched

the notorious attack against the

94

conflicts

may be mixed

in

two ways.

First,

—

an armed conflict

—

may commence as a NIAC but later segue into or bring about an IAC. We have
already seen how a forcible intervention by State B on the side of insurgents against

A will trigger an IAC. 95 It should be added that
if the central government of State A disappears
and if the insurgents assume con-

the central government of State

—

trol

over State A, forming a

hostilities
flict

from

new central government therein

—continuation of the

by State B against the erstwhile insurgents would convert the armed cona

against the

NIAC into an IAC, since the armed forces of State B will now be pitted
new central government

of State A.

An alternative vertical scenario arises when an IAC is the outcome of the implosion of a State torn apart by a NIAC and the continuation of the hostilities between
new sovereign States into which it has fragmented. Such implosion and
fragmentation occurred in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In 1997, the Trial Chamber of
the ICTY held in the Tadic case that, from the beginning of 1992 until May of the
same year, an IAC existed in Bosnia between the forces of the Republic of Bosnia-

the several

Herzegovina on the one hand, and those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia

and Montenegro), on the other. 96 Yet, the majority of the Chamber (Judges

Stephen and Vohrah) arrived

at the

Yugoslav troops announced in

conclusion that, as a result of the withdrawal of

May

1992, the conflict reverted to being a

97

NIAC in

The Presiding Judge (McDonald) dissented on the ground that the withdrawal was a fiction and that Yugoslavia remained in effective control of the Serb
forces in Bosnia. 98 The majority opinion was reversed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 1999. 99 The original Trial Chamber's majority opinion had elicited much
criticism from scholars; 100 and even before the delivery of the final judgment on
appeal, another Trial Chamber of the ICTY took a divergent view in the Delalic case
of 1998. 101 Still, the essence of the disagreement must be viewed as factual in nature. Legally speaking, the fundamental character of an armed conflict as an IAC or
a NIAC can indeed metamorphose
more than once from one stretch of time to
nature.

—

—

another.
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Obviously, as far as fighters in the

what exact time frame

to detect at

judges

—with the advantages of

a

concerned,

field are

NIAC

has

legal expertise

may not always be easy

it

morphed

into an IAC:

and hindsight

if

the

—could not

ICTY

readily

on an analysis of the situation in Bosnia in 1992, one can only imagine how
much more confusing the position looked from the battlefield perspective. It is

agree

when

therefore easier to wrestle with the situation
tected between the

clared

its

NIAC and

The template

the IAC.

formal independence from Ethiopia

referendum

—

in 1993.

Then,

after a period

tween Eritrea and Ethiopia triggered a
further hostilities in 2003.

is

Eritrea.

This country de-

a protracted

NIAC and a

of several years, border disputes be-

IAC

in

1998-2000 and reignited

between the

line here

(unlike in the former Yugoslav provinces)

is

—following

full-scale

The dividing

NIAC may turn

a clear-cut interval can be de-

NIAC and

the

IAC

easy to delineate.

IAC may turn into a NIAC. Iraq is a
good illustration. After the fall of Baghdad in an IAC between the American-led coJust as a

into an IAC, an

and the Baathist regime,

alition

NIAC evolved between

a

newly elected government was

installed, at

which

The NIAC in
Iraq was waged concurrently with the coalition's IAC pursued against the same
102
foe.
The IAC came to an end after fierce fighting upon the official termination of
American combat operations in Iraq in 2010, but the NIAC does not appear to be
point a

over

it

and the remnants of the

Baathists.

yet.

VII.

Conclusions

no need to belabor the point that NIACs are taking place all over the world
with startling frequency and with alarming intensity. NIACs are certainly more
There

is

common

today than IACs, and the

sometimes

may take

colossal.

trail

of devastation that they leave behind

Winning domestic peace subsequent

to a sanguinary

down

NIAC

decades.

These self-evident truths are not always registered in the
reason

is

is

that

governments are often "in denial," doing

the applicable threshold of violence. That

is

official gazettes.

their

to say,

The

utmost to ratchet

when governments

are

engaged in an IAC, they tend to go one step below, claiming that the armed conflict
is

under the third threshold.

When they are caught in a NIAC, they are reluctant to

concede that they are facing an insurgency and are inclined to cling to the
that the violence

(however protracted and intense)

merely a disturbance below the
lawyers to

make

the right

call

first

threshold. 103

when IACs

or

is

fiction

sporadic and constitutes

Still, it is

the duty of international

NIACs are taking place, without mak-

ing concessions to "political correctness" in the eyes of this or that government.
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must constantly bear in mind that correct taxonomy lays the foundation

for the ap-

plication of the right legal regime.
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